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CHAPTER I

THE POLITICAL AND DYNASTIC HISTORY OF THE IRANIAN WORLD
(A.D. 1000-1217)

I. THE EASTERN IRANIAN WORLD ON THE EVE OF THE TURKISH INVASIONS

For nearly a thousand years—indeed, until our own century—Iran has generally been ruled by non-Persian dynasties, usually Turkish but sometimes Mongol or Kurdish. This domination at the highest level has had less effect on Iranian national psychology and literary consciousness than might be expected, for all of the alien ruling dynasties have come from races of low cultural development, and thus they have lacked the administrative expertise necessary for ruling a land of ancient settlement and civilization. Whether consciously or unconsciously, they have adopted Iranian culture at their courts, and they have been compelled to employ Iranian officials to administer the country and collect the taxes.

The first such alien rulers were the Saljuq Turks, who appeared in the Iranian world in the first half of the 5th/11th century. For them as well as for their successors, the process of assimilation to the indigenous culture and practices of Persia was not uncongenial, because they were able to draw on the country’s ancient traditions of exalted monarchic power and submissiveness by the people. Moreover, in these traditions kingly authority was identified with divine authority, which helped the dynasties to rise above their tribal origins. The Saljuqs had originated as chieftains of nomadic bands in the Central Asian steppes. Their powers and ambitions often hedged about by a complex of traditional tribal rights and customs, the steppe leaders were little more than primi inter pares amongst the heads of all the prominent tribal families. With their entry into the Iranian world, the Saljuqs and their successors found the instruments at hand with which to make themselves, if they so desired, despots of the traditional Persian stamp: these instruments were a settled administration, a steady revenue from taxation, and usually a personal guard and standing army.
Yet the process of self-magnification had a reverse side. What was to be done with the ladder by which these leaders had risen? For their supporters had included fellow tribesmen, e.g. the Saljuqs’ Türkmen; military retainers, such as the Turkish and Mongol soldiers of the Mongol Qa’ans, and fellow sectaries and religious devotees, such as the Safavids’ Qızıl-Bâsh. In the Saljuq period the Oghuz and other Türkmen were a pressing problem for the sultans. How could the Türkmen be reconciled to the new concept of royal power—especially when they saw the old tribal custom, which defined and guaranteed each man’s personal position and duties, quietly set aside and replaced by the Islamic šari‘a and by the Iranian governmental ethos, in both of which political quietism and virtually unconditional obedience to the monarch were enjoined? This question, in varying terms, runs through much of Iran’s history in the last nine centuries, underlying
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many of its revolutions and crises of power. It is particularly important in the age of the Saljuqs, when the sultans were never able satisfactorily to resolve this tension in their empire.

Whilst it is true that the coming of the Saljuqs inaugurated the age of alien, especially Turkish, rule, the change was not absolutely abrupt. We shall first of all be concerned with the eastern Iranian world, comprising Khurasan, the adjoining regions of modern Afghanistan, and the lands of the Oxus and Syr Darya basins. At the opening of the 5th/11th century, the Iranian world still extended far beyond the Oxus, embracing the regions of Khwārazm, Transoxiana (called by the Arabs Mā warā' al-nahr, "the lands beyond the river"), and Farghāna. In pre-Christian and early Christian times the Massagetae, the Sakae, the Scyths, the Sarmatians, and the Alans—all Indo-European peoples—had roamed the Eurasian steppes from the Ukraine to the Altai. The pressure of Altaic and Ugrian peoples from the heartland of Central Asia and Siberia gradually pushed the limits of Indo-European occupation southwards, but until the end of the 4th/10th century the lands along the Oxus and south of the Aral Sea, together with the middle and upper reaches of the Syr Darya as far as its sources in the slopes of the T’ien Shan, were still generally ruled by royal dynasties or local princes who were apparently Iranian. The picture presented by the holders of power is thus relatively straightforward, except that the Iranian names and titles of petty rulers and local landowners (dihqāns) in such frontier regions as Isfijāb, Īlāq, and Farghāna do not make it absolutely certain that they were racially Iranians. However, a demographic analysis of the whole population in this Iranian-ruled area involves certain difficulties. From the earliest times Transoxiana has been a corridor through which peoples from the steppes have passed into the settled lands to the south and west; thus history and geography have worked against an ethnic homogeneity for the region. Whether the invading waves have receded or been swallowed up in the existing population, a human debris has inevitably been left behind. This was undoubtedly the origin of the Turkish elements in eastern Afghanistan, for these Oghuz and Khalaj were nomads on the plateau between Kabul and Bust when Muslim arms first penetrated there in the early centuries of Islam, and they survived as an ethnic unity throughout the periods of the Ghaznavids, Ghūrids, and Khwārazm-Shāhs. It has been plausibly argued by J. Marquart that these Turks were remnants of peoples brought from north of the Oxus by the confederation of the Ephthalites
or White Huns, whose leaders seem to have been of the same race as the Iranians.¹  
In Transoxiana and Khwārazm, the infiltration of Turkish elements must also have begun early. Topography—i.e. the mountain chains running east and west, the land-locked river basins and oases—made Transoxiana and especially Soghdia (the basin of the Zarafshān river) a politically fragmented region. In the 1st/7th and 2nd/8th centuries the region was a battleground where Iranian rulers fought the invading Arabs from the south as well as the Western Türk or T’u-chūeh from the north, with the Chinese keeping an eye on what was nominally a distant province of their empire. Turkish warriors were frequently invited from outside by the local rulers in an effort to repel the Arabs, but it is also possible that some of these troops were recruited from the Turks already settled within the borders of Transoxiana.² For not all Turks were pastoral nomads or forest hunters. In such comparatively favoured spots of Central Asia as the Orkhon and Selenga valleys in Mongolia, and the Chu valley and shores of the Īsīq-Köl in Semireche (“land of the seven rivers”, or the northern part of the modern Soviet Kirghiz republic and the parts of the Kazakh republic adjoining its northern borders)—in all these areas Turkish agriculturalists had been able to make a living in peaceful periods.³ Similarly, the rural peasantry and even the town populations of Transoxiana and Khwārazm may well have contained Turkish elements from an early date. Firdausi’s Shāh-Nāma speaks of Iran and Turān, i.e. the Iranians and the Turks, as two naturally antipathetic groups: “two elements, fire and water, which rage against each other in the depths of the heart”,⁴ but the economic facts, well brought out by the Arabic geographers, belie this. They say that the economy of the pastoralist Turks from the steppe was complementary to and interdependent with the economy of the agricultural

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oases and towns of the Iranian Tājiks. The settled regions supplied the nomads with cereals, manufactured goods, and arms, and the nomads reared stock animals and brought dairy products, hides, and furs to the farmers. In Transoxiana and Khwārazm, wrote al-Iṣṭakhri (c. 340/951), the Oghuz and Qarluq from beyond the Syr Darya and from the Qara Qum steppes supplied horses, sheep, camels, mules, and asses. It is likely, too, that some of the pastoralists remained in the market centres of the settled region and gradually settled down within its borders.

The rule of native Iranian dynasties in Khwārazm, Transoxiana, and Khurāsān foundered by the opening decades of the 5th/11th century. The Sāmānids of Bukhārā had ruled in the latter two provinces, first as local administrators for the ‘Abbāsid governors of Khurāsān, and then as virtually independent sovereigns. In the last decade of the 10th century their rule sustained almost simultaneous attacks from two Turkish powers, the Qarakhānids and the Ghaznavids. The Qarakhānids originated from a confederation of Turkish tribes who had long occupied the steppes that stretched from the middle Syr Darya to the T'ien Shan. Their nucleus seems to have been the Qarluq tribe and its component peoples of the Yaghma, Tukhsi, and Chigil. The Qarluq were an old people in the steppes, known from the 1st/7th century as a constituent group within the Türkū empire. Already the characteristic title for their chiefs, Iilik, appears in the Turfan texts of that period; and in later times Muslim sources often refer to the Qarakhānīd dynasty as that of the Ilik-Khāns. Within the various confederations that took shape in the steppes after the collapse of the Türkū empire in 125/741, the head of the Qarluq assumed the title first of Yabghu and then of Qaghan (Arabic form, Khāqān), or “supreme monarch”. The adoption of this latter title was to become characteristic of the Qarakhānids, whereas the Saljuqs never felt entitled to adopt it. In the course of the 4th/10th century the Qarluq became Muslim; the first ruler to become converted is traditionally held to be Satuq Bughra Khān (d. ? 344/955), who assumed the Islamic name of ‘Abd al-Karīm and reigned from Kāshghār and Talas over the western wing of his people.

2 There exists no special monograph devoted to the Sāmānids; the best account of this very important but still obscure dynasty remains that by W. Barthold in his Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion, G[ilib] M[emorial] S[eries], vol. v, pp. 209 ff. See also Irye’s brief survey, “The Samanids: a Little-Known Dynasty”, Muslim World, pp. 40–5; and idem, The History of Bukhara (a translation of Narshakhi’s Ta’ribkh-i Bukhārā), the notes to which contain much valuable information on the Sāmānids.
Those who worked in the pagan outer darkness of the steppes were mainly the dervishes or Şuũfis, i.e. religious enthusiasts whose orthodoxy was suspect, and who were often persona non grata to the orthodox Sâmânid government and religious institution. Nevertheless the Qarâkhânids became firm Sunnîs once they entered the Islamic world.  

The Qarâkhânid Bughra Khân Hârûn or Hasan, a grandson of Satuq Bughra Khân, temporarily occupied the Sâmânid capital of Bukhâra in 382/992. As he passed through Transoxiana he met with little opposition: indeed, he was encouraged in his action by the rebellious Sâmânid general Abû ‘Ali Simjûrî and also by discontented dihqâns. Faced with the Qarâkhânid invasion from the north and the revolt of the generals Abû ‘Ali Simjûrî and Fâ’iq Khâsâ in Khurâsân, the Sâmânid amîr Nûh b. Manşûr (366–87/976–7 to 997) was compelled to call in from Ghazna another of his Turkish slave commanders, Sebûk-Tegîn.

Abû Manşûr Sebûk-Tegîn (d. 387/997) was the founder of the Ghaznavid dynasty and father of the famous Mahmûd of Ghazna (388–421/998–1030). Sebûk-Tegîn came originally from Barskhan, a settlement on the shores of the Isîq-Köl, whose ruler, according to the anonymous author of the Persian geographical treatise Hudûd al-Âlâm (“Limits of the World”), was one of the Qarluq. It seems therefore probable that the Ghaznavids were of Qarluq origin. In a tribal war Sebûk-Tegîn was captured by the neighbouring Tûkhsî and sold in a Sâmânid slave market at Châch. Because of his hardiness and his skill with weapons, he rose rapidly from the ranks of the Sâmânid’s slave guards, coming under the patronage of Chief Hajîb or Commander-in-Chief Alp-Tegîn. In 311/962 he accompanied his master to Ghazna, where Alp-Tegîn henceforth established himself as ruler, and in 366/977 Sebûk-Tegîn succeeded to power there, continuing, like his predecessors, to regard himself as governor there on behalf of the Sâmânids.

In 384/994 the amîr Nûh b. Manşûr summoned Sebûk-Tegîn to Khurâsân to fight the rebellious generals but this led to the establishment of the Ghaznavids in Khurâsân and all the Sâmânîd

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1 The Qarâkhânids and the Qarluq, from whom the dynasty very probably sprang, have been studied by O. Pritsak. Amongst his many articles on them, see especially “Kara-
hanîlar” in İslam Ansiklopedisi; and on the origins of the dynasty, “Von den Karluk zu den Karachaniden”; Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, pp. 270–300.


4 On Sebûk-Tegîn’s early life and his rule as governor in Ghazna, see Nâzîm, op. cit. pp. 28–33, and Bosworth, The Ghaznavids, pp. 35–44.
provinces south of the Oxus. These territories were definitely annexed in 388/998 by Abu'l-Qāsim Māhmūd b. Sēbūk-Tegin. Meanwhile it had proved impossible to dislodge the Qarakhānids from the Syr Darya basin, and in 389/999 the Sāmānid dynasty was definitely overthrown in Transoxiana by the Iliq Naṣr b. ‘Alī (d. 403/1012-13), nephew of Bughra Khān Hārūn. The heroism of the last of the Sāmānids, Ismā‘īl al-Muntasir, could achieve nothing in the face of the division of the Sāmānid empire between the Iliq and Māhmūd. In 391/1001 these two came to a formal agreement whereby the Oxus was to be the boundary between the two kingdoms, and in 395/1005 Ismā‘īl was killed through the treachery of an Arab nomad chief in the Qara Qum desert.¹

In the adjacent province of Khwārazm, the classical Chorasmia, the days of rule by native Iranian monarchs were also numbered. For several thousand years the region of the lower Oxus had held a complex of rich agricultural oases linked by irrigation canals, the full extent of which has only recently come to light through the researches of Soviet archaeologists. (The Iranian scholar al-Bīrūnī says that the Khwārazmian era began when the region was first settled and cultivated, this date being placed in the early 13th-century B.C.) That the ancient dynasty of Afrīghid Khwārazm-Shāhs survived for nearly three centuries after the coming of Islam to their land is unique in the Islamic world: al-Bīrūnī lists twenty-two rulers of this line running from A.D. 305 to 385/995.² However, the vandalism of Qutaibab. Muslim’s invading Arabs in 93/712 had an enfeebling effect on the culture of ancient Khwārazm, and this seems to have been aggravated by economic decline, whose symptoms, according to S. P. Tolstov, included the neglect of irrigation works and the decline of urban life. The system of large fortified estates, which is characteristic of Khwārazmian agrarian society at this time, was a response to increasing external pressure from Turkish steppe peoples, who were attracted not only by prospects of plunder but also by the winter pasture available along the shores of the Oxus. The Turkicizing of the population of Khwārazm probably began during this period.³ In the 4th/10th century there were

villages with Turkish names on the right bank of the Oxus. The Ghaznavid historian Abu’l-Fadl Baihaqi speaks of Qipchaq, Küjet, and Chaghräq Turks harrying the fringes of Khwárazm in 422/1030, and a few years after this the Saljuqs and their followers spent some time on Khwárazmian pastures before moving southwards into Khurásan. The higher culture of Iranian Khwárazm offered resistance to the process of Turkicization, but the trend nevertheless continued over the next centuries (see pp. 141-2 below).

In spite of this, the downfall of the native Afrighid dynasty of Khwárazm-Sháhs in 385/995 came about through internal disturbances. Gurganj, a town on the left bank of the Oxus, had grown in importance as the terminus of caravan trade across the Qghuz steppes to the Volga and southern Russia, thereby eclipsing the ancient capital on the right bank of Káth. A local Gurganj family, the Ma’münids, succeeded in deposing the last Afrighid, Abū ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad, and assumed the traditional title of Khwárazm-Sháh. But their tenure of power was brief. The Sámanids had been nominal suzerains of Khwárazm, though in practice they had rarely interfered there; now the shadow of their supplanter, Mahmüd of Ghazna, grew menacing for the Ma’münids. In 406/1015-16 Abu'l-'Abbás Ma’mūn b. Ma’mūn married one of the Ghaznavid sultan’s sisters, Hurra-yi Kalji; nevertheless, Ghaznavid pressure was relentless. The ‘Abbásid caliph in Baghdad sent directly to the Khwárazm-Sháh a patent of investiture for Khwárazm, a standard, and the honorific titles ‘Ain al-Daula wa Zain al-Milla (“Eye of the State and Ornament of the Religious Community”); but the shah did not dare to receive these publicly in his capital Gurganj for fear of provoking Mahmüd’s wrath. In the sultan’s imperial strategy, possession of Khwárazm was necessary to turn the flank of the Qarakhánids, amongst whom the ruler of Samarqand and Buhkārā—Ali b. Hasan Bughra Khān, known as ‘Ali-Tegin (d. 425/1034)—was showing himself an implacable enemy of the Ghaznavids. After an ultimatum to the Khwárazmians, which contained humiliating demands and required the renunciation of national sovereignty, Mahmüd’s troops invaded and annexed Khwárazm in 408/1017. The sultan then installed as Khwárazm-Sháh Altun-Tash, one of his most trusted slave generals and a former ghulām or military retainer of his father Sebük-Tegin; for the next seventeen years Khwá-


razm remained a salient of Ghaznavid power that reached into the steppes.¹

Some Western orientalists have viewed the downfall of these northeastern Iranian dynasties through a certain romantic haze. They have idealized the Sāmānids, at whose court the renaissance of New Persian culture and literature began—a court adorned by such figures as Bal'ami, Rūdaki, and Daqiqī; or, mourning the passing of the Khwārazm-Shāhs, whose kingdom nurtured the polymath al-Bīrūnī, they have called it the end of an epoch, after which Iran lost political control of its destiny for many centuries.² On the other hand, as V. Minorsky has justly pointed out, there have been few laments for the passing of those Iranian dynasties farther west, that also went down in the course of the 5th/11th century under Turkish pressure; yet the Būyids’ court at Ray and Shirāz, the Kākūyids’ at Ifsahān, and the Ziyārīds’ court at Gurgān and Ṭabaristān gave shelter to such diverse geniuses as al-Mutanabbi, Avicenna, and al-Bīrūnī. To some extent these Western attitudes reflect those of the contemporary Sunni Muslim sources which are distinctly favourable to dynasties like the Tāhirīds and Sāmānīds, sprung from the landed classes, while they are hostile to those of plebeian origin, e.g. the Ṣaffārīds or to those tinged with Shi‘ism or unorthodoxy, such as the Būyids and Kākūyids.³

The collapse of the native Iranian dynasties of the north-east was followed within a few decades by a major migration of Turkish peoples, the Oghuz, from the outer steppes. Similar population movements have been recurrent features of the history of this region from early times, for the Oxus and Syr Darya basins are a transitional zone between Central Asia and the lands of ancient civilization in the Near East. The mountain chains of the Alburz [Elburz], Pamirs, and Hindu Kush are high and, being geologically young, are sharp and jagged, yet they have never seriously hindered the passage of armies and other peoples; nor have invaders from the steppes ever found that the transition to the Iranian plateau necessitated much change in their way of life. In order for a pastoralist economy to survive, each summer the flocks and

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herds should be driven out of their winter grounds to pastures, or jailaqs, in the hills. Thus the terrain of Iran was quite well suited to the traditional way of life of Central Asian invaders. For instance, the oases of Khurāsān could provide rich pasture for herds, and certain chamanās (pasture grounds), e.g. the Ülang-i Rādkān between Mashhād [Meshed] and Khābūshān, and the Marg-i Šā'ikh near Nāsā, have played significant parts in Iranian history as the camping and grazing grounds of armies. As the Türkmen moved westwards, they found the valleys of Āzarbāijān and Armenia and the plains of Anatolia highly suitable for their flocks. In this way the Saljuq and Mongol invasions inevitably had an effect on landholding and land utilization in the Iranian world.

Yet these considerations do not explain why the Türkmen succeeded in bringing about permanent changes in the ethnography and economy of the Iranian world, whereas most of the earlier invaders had eventually been absorbed into the existing way of life. It was certainly not through sheer weight of human numbers, for there were not many Türkmen bands in Khurāsān during the reign of Maš'ūd b. Maḥmūd of Ghazna (421-32/1030-41), although the damaging effects of their sheep and goats as they nibbled across the country's agricultural oases were indeed serious. It seems that in the first half of the 5th/11th century, the Iranian bastion of the north-east, whose age-old function had been to hold closed this corridor for peoples, lost its resilience and no longer possessed the absorptive power it had once had. In the previous century the Afrīghid Khwārazm-Shāhs had every autumn led an expedition into the steppes against the Türkmen; and the Sāmānid amirs launched punitive expeditions and slave raids across the Syr Darya, such as the famous campaign of Ismā'īl b. Aḥmad (279-95/892-907) against the Qarluq at Talas in 280/893. It is true that the groundwork for this collapse had been in some measure prepared, with Turks taking part in the internal wars of Transoxiana and also settling peacefully within its borders. Furthermore, from the early 3rd/9th century onwards Muslim rulers in all parts of the eastern caliphate had been growing more dependent on Turkish slave troops, which increased the flow of Turks through Transoxiana and Khurāsān. This traffic in human beings became an important source of revenue for the Sāmānids, who issued licences and collected transit dues; at the same time the amirs became...

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dependent on Turkish ghulāms for their own bodyguard, seeking to use them as a counterbalance to the indigenous military class of the dihqāns.¹

To sum up: the disappearance of the native Khwārazm-Shāhs and Sāmānids meant the end of two firmly constituted states in the eastern Iranian world, and the result was a power vacuum. The authority of the Qarakhānids in Transoxiana and that of the Ghaznavids in Khurāsān and Khwārazm had no organic roots; in the first region it was diffused and less effective than Sāmānīd rule had been, and in the other two regions it was despotic, capricious, and operating from a very distant capital, Ghazna. These points will be examined at greater length in the next section.

II. KHURĀSĀN: THE DECLINE OF GHAZNAVID POWER AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SALJUQS

All through their period of domination the Qarakhānids in Transoxiana remained a tribal confederation and never formed a unitary state. Their territories straddled the T’ien Shan, where their yailaqs lay, and on the facts of geography alone it is hard to see how such an empire could have been governed by one power. Originally the dynasty did have a certain unity, although there was from the start the old Turkish double system of a Great Khan and a Co-Khan. But as early as the first decades of the 5th/11th century the sources mention internecine strife in the family; and two distinct branches—which may be called after their characteristic Islamic names, the ‘Alids and Ḥasanids—begin to emerge. After 433/1041–2 there were lines of eastern and western Qarakhānids, established at first in Balāsāghūn and Uzkand respectively, and then in Kāshghar and Samarqand. Within the family there existed the complicated system of a double khanate and subordinate under-khans, so that several princes might hold power simultaneously in various regions; and the family’s titulature and onomasticon, combining both Turkish tribal and totemistic titles with Islamic names and honorifics, was confused and constantly changing. The task of sorting out the genealogy of the dynasty has thus been very difficult; only the researches of the numismatist R. Vasmer and the Turcologist O. Pritsak have thrown light on it.²

¹ Bosworth, pp. 208–9.
In the early part of the 5th/11th century the administration of Transoxiana reverted to a pattern resembling that which had prevailed on the eve of the Muslim conquests: small city-states were scattered along the Zarafshān, and the middle Syr Darya was under the general supervision of Qarakhānid princes. With this trend towards regionalism, the landed aristocracy enjoyed a resurgence of power. The dihqān of Ilaq, on the north bank of the Syr Darya, began for the first time to mint his own coins. The general weight and expense of administration decreased. A continuator of Narshākhi, the historian of Bukhara, records that the land tax of Bukhārā and its environs was everywhere lightened after the fall of the Sāmānids, in part because irrigation works were neglected and land became water-logged and unproductive. Hence after the disappearance of the Sāmānīd amirs, with their centralizing administrative policy and their standing army, Transoxiana was ill-prepared to meet fresh waves of invaders from the steppes.

We have seen that Khurāsān passed into the Ghaznavids’ hands. Towards the end of his life the restless dynamism of Sultān Maḥmūd made him press westwards across Iran against his rivals the Dailamī Būyids, various branches of whom ruled in western and central Iran and in Iraq (see below, section 111, pp. 25 ff.). The Shi‘ism of the Būyids and their tutelage of the ‘Abbāsid caliphs in Baghdad gave the early Ghaznavids plausible pretexts for intervention in the west. They had grandiloquent plans for liberating the caliphs, opening up the pilgrimage route to Mecca and Medina, and then pushing on to attack the Shi‘i Fāṭimids in Syria and Egypt; but the Türkmen’s pressure in the east ensured that these designs remained only dreams. It was not until 420/1029, the last year of his life, that Maḥmūd came to Ray in northern Iran and deposed its Būyid ruler Majd al-Daula Rustam b. ‘Alī (387–420/997–1029). At the same time that the province of Ray and Jībal was annexed, another Dailamī ruler, the Kākūyīd ‘Alī al-Daula Muḥammad b. Dushmanziyār of Iṣfahān (398–433/1008 to 1041–2), was made a tributary, and various petty Kurdish and Dailamī rulers of north-western Persia, such as the Musāfi riders of Tārum, were also forced to recognize the sultan. The Ziyārid Manūchter b. Qābūs (403–20 or 421/1012–13 to 1029 or 1030) was already

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THE RISE OF THE SALJUQS

paying tribute to Maḥmūd; now he had to allow Ghaznavid armies transit through his territories and was forced on at least one occasion to contribute troops to them. (For a detailed survey of these minor Dailamī dynasties, see below, section III.) In the province of Kirmān in south-eastern Iran, which was under the control of the Būyids of Fārs and Khūzistān, Maḥmūd had in 407/1016-17 attempted to set his own nominee on the throne, but without lasting success; thereafter he left Kirmān alone. One of Masʿūd b. Maḥmūd’s armies did temporarily occupy the province in 424/1033, but was shortly afterwards driven out by the returning Būyids.¹

When Maḥmūd died in 421/1030, the territory of the Ghaznavid empire was at its largest. It had become a successor state to the Sāmānids in their former lands south of the Oxus, but its original centre was Ghazna and the region of Zābulistān on the eastern rim of the Afghan plateau. As soon as he came to power in Ghazna in 366/977, Sebük-Tegin began a series of raids against the Hindūshāhī rajahs of Vaihand, and Maḥmūd gained his lasting reputation in the Islamic world as the great ghādī (warrior for the faith), leading campaigns each winter against the infidels of the plains of northern India. Maḥmūd’s thirst for plunder and territory, and also his need to employ a standing army of some 50,000 men, combined to give Ghaznavid policy a markedly imperialist and aggressive bent;² whilst from the religious aspect, the Ghaznavids’ strict Sunni orthodoxy enabled the sultan to pose as the faithful agent of the caliph and to purge his own dominions of religious dissidents such as the extremist Shiʿī Ismāʿīlis and the Muʿtazālis.

The spoils of India were insufficient to finance this vast empire; the steady taxation revenue from the heartland of the empire, Afghanistan and Khurāsān, had to supplement them. Khurāsān suffered most severely from the exactions of Ghaznavid tax collectors, who were driven on by the sultan’s threats of torture and death for those who failed him. For some ten years, until his dismissal and death in 404/1013-14, the Vizier Abu’l-ʿAbbās al-Faḍl Isfarā’īnī mulcted the merchants, artisans, and peasants of Khurāsān, causing misery and depopulation. In the words of the Ghaznavid historian ʿUtbi, “Affairs were characterized there by nothing but tax levies, sucking which sucked dry, and attempts to extract fresh sources of revenue, without any construc-

¹ Cf. Nazirin, The Life and Times of Sultan Maḥmūd of Ghazna, pp. 77-9, 80-5, 192-3; Bosworth, Islamic Studies, pp. 69-72.
tive measures”. Hence after a few years there was nothing more to be
got in Khurāsān, “since after water had been thrown on her udder, not
a trickle of milk could be got nor any trace of fat”.  

Mas'ūd continued to act irresponsibly in Iran. When Ray had first
been conquered there had been some sympathy for the Ghaznavids,
for they delivered the people from the Shi‘ī Būyids and their turbulent
soldiery. But the exactions of the Ghaznavid officials soon alienated
all support: “Tash Farrāšt [the Ghaznavid military governor] had filled
the land with injustice and tyranny, until the people prayed for de­
liverance from them [the Ghaznavids] and their rule. The land became
ruined and the population dispersed.” This policy of Rauhwirtschaft
prevented the growth of any bond of sympathy or feelings of inter­
dependence between the sultan and his Iranian subjects. Loyalty and
patriotism as we know them had no meaning in the Islamic world at
this time, as can be seen in Ḥāmilūd’s words to the people of Balkh
after the Qarakhānid invasion of 397–8/1006–8: he reproached them
for putting up a spirited defence against the besiegers, because some of
the sultan’s personal property had been destroyed in the fighting. On
their side, the attitude of the merchants and landowners of Khurāsān
was purely pragmatic; they tolerated Ghaznavid rule as long as it could
secure the external defence of the province. In Mas'ūd’s reign it became
clear that the Ghaznavids could not provide this protection, so there
was no reason for the Khurāsānīan cities to retain any further loyalty
to them. Even as early as 397/1006, a considerable number of the
dīhqāns and notables had inclined towards the Qarakhānid invaders. 

The Ghaznavids failed, therefore, to identify themselves with the
historic interests of Khurāsān, that is, with the securing of internal
prosperity, an atmosphere in which commerce and agriculture could
flourish, and with the preservation of the north-eastern frontier against
external invaders from Central Asia. In both spheres their achievements
fell short of those of earlier, Iranian rulers of the province, such as the
Sāmānīds. The racially Turkish Ghaznavids adopted the government’s
traditional institutions and practices, encouraged Iranian culture, and
held court with the magnificence of Iranian monarchs; but their

86–9.
3 Baihaqi, Ta‘rikh-i Mas‘ūdī, p. 551; ‘Utbi, ii, p. 77; cf. Barthold, Turkestan, p. 291, and
identification was not deep enough, or perhaps it did not have time to develop: the sultans ruled in Khorasân for only forty years, and in Ray and Jībāl for only seven or eight years. In basic outlook the sultans remained in large measure Turkish condottieri, thus the lure of India and their dreams of expansion towards Iraq and beyond distracted them from proper attention to the defence of the Oxus line. Until it was too late, the Ghaznavid sultans regarded the Türkmen as minor irritants, just one more wave of raiders from the steppes who would either sweep through Iran to regions beyond or else become absorbed into the existing economy and social structure of Persia.

When the Saljuqs first appeared in Transoxiana and Khorasân in the 5th/11th century, they came as marauders and plunderers. It has been suggested that the Turkish peoples' conversion to Islam and their consequent zeal for jihād (holy war) helped them to overrun so much of the Middle East. It is true that in the course of the 5th/11th century the Türkmen carried on warfare against the Byzantines and the Christian kingdoms of Armenia and the Caucasus, and that the Saljuqs achieved some prestige in the eyes of the orthodox by overthrowing Shīʿī Būyid rule in western Iran. Sunnī writers even came to give an ideological justification for the Turks' political and military domination of the Middle East. The Iranian historian Rāvandi dedicated his history of the Saljuqs, the Rāḥat al-sudur wa ʿayat al-surūr (“Solace of Hearts and Signal for Gladness”, begun in 599/1202), to one of the Saljuq sultans of Rūm or Asia Minor, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kāi-Khusrau b. Qīlj-Arslān. Rāvandi tells of a hidden, supernatural voice from the Kaʿba at Mecca, which spoke to the Imām Abū Ḥanīfa and promised him that as long as the sword remained in the hands of the Turks, his faith (that of the Ḥanafī law school, which was followed par excellence by the Turks) would not perish. Rāvandi himself adds a pious doxology: “Praise be to God, He is exalted, that the defenders of Islam are mighty and that the followers of the Ḥanafī rite are happy and joyful! In the lands of the Arabs, Persians, Byzantines, and Russians, the sword is in the hands of the Turks, and fear of their sword is firmly implanted in all hearts!”

Yet these considerations, valid though they may be for the second half of the 5th/11th century and after, have no relevance for the

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1 This view is put especially clearly by August Müller in his Der Islam im Morgen- und Abendland (Berlin, 1884–7), vol. II, pp. 53–4.

preceding decades of the Saljuq invasions of Khurasan. Barthold has pointed out that the Sufi shaikhs who worked in the steppes were usually evangelical hell-fire preachers, who dangled their audiences over the pit rather than painting for them the delights of a warriors' paradise. Moreover, it is hard to see that the orthodox Muslim faqih and theologians, who came mainly from the property-owning classes, could positively have welcomed the Qarakhanids or Saljuqs. It is safest to treat this passing of Transoxiana and Khurasan into Turkish hands as acts of resignation by the landowning and religious interests, which feared the centralizing policy of the Samanid amirs more than they did the incoming Qarakhanids; moreover the merchants and landowners had despaired of getting further help against the Turkmen from the distant government in Ghazna.

The Saljuqs belonged to the Oghuz Turks, who appear in history as a grouping of nine tribes, the Toquz Oghuz. These tribes formed part of the eastern Türkü and are mentioned in the royal annals of the confederation, the Orkhon inscriptions of Outer Mongolia, written in the first half of the 2nd/8th century. When that empire collapsed in 125/741 and a fresh confederation was formed, the Oghuz chief eventually came to hold the military office of Yabghu of the "right wing of the horde", although he never acquired the supreme title of Qaghan. Towards the end of the 2nd/8th century the Oghuz moved westwards through the Siberian steppes to the Aral Sea and to the Volga and southern Russia. With their attacks on Ushrusana in the reign of the Caliph al-Ma'mun (198-218/813-33), they come within the purview of Islamic writers.

Some Oghuz also moved into the Dihistan steppes north of the Atrak river, and others took over the existing settlements at the mouth of the Syr Darya, where the Islamic sources of the 4th/10th century mention three Turkish towns: Jand, Khuvir, and the "new town" of Yengi-Kent. Most of the Turks were Oghuz, and they included both nomads and sedentaries. They acquired a certain amount of culture, for this region had economic connexions with Khwarazm and Transoxiana, but the cultural and material level of those Oghuz who were nomads between the Dihistan steppes and the Urals remained perceptibly lower. The Arab traveller Ibn Faḍlan was passing through their territories in 309-10/921-2 on an embassy from the caliphate to the Bulghars of the middle Volga, and he met a band of Oghuz who were

1 Histoire des Turcs d'Asie Centrale, pp. 57-9.
living in extreme wretchedness and wandering “like straying wild asses”. Ibn Faḍlān met amongst them certain leaders whose titles recur in later Saljuq history; their chief had the title of Yabghu, whilst the military leader was called Šāhib al-jaish (Sü-Bashī or Sü-Begi in Turkish), or “army leader”; and there was a subordinate commander called the Lesser Yīnāl. It is in the 4th/10th century too that the term “Türkmen” first appears in Islamic sources; about 370/980 the geographer Maqdisi, speaking of two strongholds in the province of Isfījāb, calls them “frontier posts against the Türkmen”. It is not clear whether the term has a political or an ethnic denotation, but in the 5th/11th century and after it was undoubtedly applied to the south-western Turks, the Oğuz and Qipchaq, whereas the term “Turk” is used for the more easterly Turks of the Qarluq group. Ghaznavid sources frequently call the incoming Oğuz “Türkmen”, and in his “Mirror for Princes” (the Siyāsat-Nāma) the Saljuq vizier Niẓām al-Mulk uses the term for the tribal followers of the Great Saljuqs who had remained nomads within Iran and the lands to the west.¹

According to Maḥmūd Kaşkıharī, author of the pioneer Turkish–Arabic dictionary, the Diwan lughāt al-Turk (completed 466/1074), the leading tribe of the Oğuz, from whom their princes sprang, was the Qiniq. The Saljuq family (it does not seem originally to have been any bigger social unit than this) belonged to the Qiniq.² At the end of the 4th/10th century the ruler of the Oğuz was the Yabghu, who had a winter capital at Yengi-Kent in the Syr Darya delta, and whose authority ranged over the steppes from there to the Volga. The lower Syr Darya was at this time in the zone where Islam and paganism met, and where Muslim ghāzīs (fighters for the faith) were active; at one stage in their rise to power the Saljuqs themselves operated here as typical ghāzīs. According to the Malik-Nāma, an account of Saljuq origins which Cahen believes to have been written for Sultan Alp-Arslan, the progenitor of the Saljuq family was one Duqaq, called Temür-Yalīgh (“iron-bow”). He and his son Saljuq served the “king of the Turks”, i.e. the Yabghu, with Saljuq holding the important military office of Sü-Bashi. Certain sources state that Duqaq and Saljuq served the king


of the Khazars, whose kingdom embraced the lower Volga and southern Russia, but this seems to be merely a memory of earlier Oghuz-Khazar connexions. Eventually the Yabghu became jealous of Saljuq's power, and the latter was forced to flee with his retainers and their flocks to Jand; it was in the region of Jand, apparently in the last decade of the 10th century, that the Saljuq family became Muslim and then turned to ghazw, or raiding, against those Turks who remained pagan, including the Yabghu of Yengi-Kent. The fierce hostility between these two branches of the Qiniq was not resolved until 433/1042, when the Saljuqs took over Khwārazm and drove out the Yabghu's son and successor, Shāh Malik b. 'Ali (see below, section iv, p. 52).1

Over the next decades the Saljuqs (now led by the three sons of Saljuq who had reached manhood, Mūsā, Mikā'il, and Arslan Iṣrā'il, as well as by Mikā'il's two sons Toghril Beg Muhammad and Chaghri Beg Dā'ūd) hired out their services to the warring factions of Transoxiana and Khwārazm, fighting for anyone who would assure them pasture for their herds. Indeed, some sources specifically say that it was pressure of population and the need for pasture which compelled them to move southwards. They can have had no thoughts of a more ambitious role in the Iranian world, even though the Malik-Nāma (preserved in al-Ḥusaini's historical account of the dynasty, Akhbār al-daula al-Saljuqiyya) describes a dream in which Saljuq saw himself urinating fire, whose sparks spread all over the world: a shaman (priest-doctor) interpreted this to mean that a son of his would rule over all the world. The Yabghu of Yengi-Kent became a Muslim in 393/1003 and aided the last of the Sāmānids, Iṣmā'il al-Muntasir (see p. 7 above). His Saljuq rivals, who on the fall of the Sāmānids had moved to pastures near Bukhārā, therefore gave their services to the Sāmānids' enemies, the Qarakhānids. Toghril and Chaghri fought for a Qarakhānid called Bughra Khān (possibly the ruler of Talas and Isfījāb, Yīghan-Tegin b. Qadrī Khān Yūsuf) and then joined forces with their uncle Arslan Iṣrā'il in the service of a rival Qarakhānid, 'Ali-Tegin of Bukhārā and Samarqand. Their followers were now living on winter pastures at Nūr Bukhārā or Nakhshab, near 'Ali-Tegin's capital, moving eastwards into Soghdia for the summer.2

When in 417/1026 'Ali-Tegin was temporarily defeated by the united

2 Cahen, Oriens, pp. 44-52; Bosworth, op. cit. pp. 223-4.
forces of Mahmūd of Ghazna and Qādīr Khān Yūsuf of Kāshghar and Khotan, the Saljuq bands split up once more. Arslān Isrāʾīl's followers, comprising 4,000 tents, complained of the oppression of their own chiefs and requested permission from Mahmūd to settle on the northern fringes of Khorāsān near Sarakhs, Abīvard, and Farāvāh; they promised to act as auxiliaries for the Ghaznavids and to refrain from encroaching on the settled land. Either at this point or shortly afterwards, Arslān Isrāʾīl himself fell into Mahmūd's hands and later died in prison. Toghūrī and Chaghri remained in the neighbourhood of Bukhāra with 'Ali-Tegin; after 420/1029 they quarrelled with the Qarākhanīd, yet in 423/1032 the Saljuqs were to be found fighting on 'Ali-Tegin's side against the Ghaznavid general Altun-Tāsh at the battle of Dabūsiyya. When in 425/1034 'Ali-Tegin died, they moved into Khwārazm at the invitation of Altun-Tāsh's son Hārūn, who was then in virtual rebellion against Mahmūd. At this point the old enmity between the Saljuqs and the line of the Oghuz Yabhūs of Yengi-Kent flared up: the Saljuqs were overwhelmingly defeated by Shāh Malik of Jand, who aimed at annexing Khwārazm for himself.¹

The Saljuqs' only recourse now was to follow the example of Arslān Isrāʾīl's band and head southwards for Khorāsān. A group of 7,000 or 10,000 Türkmen were led by Toghūrī, Chaghri, Mūsā Yabhū (the Saljuqs had themselves assumed this title in rivalry to the Yabhūs of Yengi-Kent and Jand), and by Ibrāhīm Ināl, who is described as a son of Toghūrī's mother and the leader of the Ināliyān, a section of the Türkmen mentioned separately in the sources. Their defeat in Khwārazm had left the Ināliyān in a state of utter wretchedness, and in 426/1035, in a very humble letter to Masʿūd of Ghazna's vizier, the leaders described themselves as "the slaves Yabhū, Toghūrī, and Chaghri, Clients of the Commander of the Faithful" and asked that the towns of Nasā and Farāvāh be granted to them. The existing depredations caused by the wave of Türkmen who had entered Khorāsān in 416/1025, the so-called "‘Irāqi" Türkmen, were now aggravated by the Saljuqs' spoliations. They sent cavalry columns into Afghanistan as far as Gūzgān, Tukhāristān, and Sistān, where they carried off livestock, pastured their sheep on agricultural land, and interrupted the caravan trade, generally terrorizing the towns of Khorāsān and causing starvation in both countryside and town. For the seven years 422–9/1031–8, until the town capitulated to Toghūrī, no sowing was possible outside

¹ Cahen, pp. 52–5; Bosworth, pp. 224–5.
the walls of Baihaq (modern Sabzavār), and during all this time mutton was unobtainable there.\(^1\)

The Ghaznavid sultans alternated between attempts at conciliation and punitive expeditions. They tried to enrol the Saljuq leaders as frontier guards against further Türkmen inroads, giving them each in 426/1035 the title *Dihqān* and the insignia and dress of a governor, and they even offered marriage alliances to Toghril, Chaghri, and Mūsā Yabghu. But it was soon obvious that the Saljuqs, being nomads, were unfamiliar with the concepts of defined frontiers and the sanctity of landed property. During the period 426–31/1035–40 large Ghaznavid armies were almost continually in the field against the Türkmen. The sultan blamed his Turkish ghulām commanders for pusillanimity and incompetence, even accusing them of collusion with the Saljuqs. The Ghaznavid armies were better led, better armed, and probably numerically superior to the poorly armed, half-starved nomad bands, and at first glance the advantages were all on one side. Yet though the sultan’s forces scored some successes in pitched battles, they were never able to follow them up. The nomads had a clear advantage in mobility. They were unhampered by the elephants, siege machinery, and camp-following without which no Ghaznavid army could move; they were more hardened to the extremes of climate, the lack of water, and the famine conditions then prevailing in Khūrāsān; and they did not have to operate, as did the Ghaznavid armies, from fixed bases.\(^2\)

Meanwhile, the position of the Khūrāsānian towns became perilous. There was little danger that the Saljuqs would storm them directly, for the nomads were unequipped for siege warfare and fought shy of it. The great cities surrendered voluntarily to them: Marv in 428/1037 and Herāt and Nishāpūr in 429/1038 (this last was recovered by the sultan’s forces and not lost again till 431/1039). In each case the notables and landowners took the initiative in making peace, having despaired of receiving adequate protection from the sultan in Ghazna, who only latterly came to Khūrāsān to lead his armies. Economic and commercial life was at a standstill. The 8th/15th-century historian Mīrkhwānd describes the distressed state of the Nishāpūr area thus: “That region became ruinous, like the dishevelled tresses of the fair ones or the eyes of the loved ones, and it became devastated by the pasturing of [the Türkmen’s] flocks.”\(^3\) Of the Saljuq chiefs, only Toghril seems at this

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point to have had an eye to the future and to have adopted a statesmanlike attitude. He had difficulty in restraining his own brother from looting Nishāpūr, and the task was *a fortiori* more difficult where the ignorant and rapacious masses of the Türkmen were concerned. On occupying Marv, however, Chaghri did give orders that tillage should be restored and refugees summoned back.¹

Ghaznavid authority was declining even in the more easterly regions of Bādghīs and Tukhāristān, where the mountainous terrain was less suitable for the nomads to operate in. Law and order broke down, ‘ayyārs or brigands flourished, and the officials and leading citizens in cities such as Herāt began to negotiate with the Saljuqs for the surrender of their cities.² The final, decisive blow to Ghaznavid authority in the west came in 431/1040. A large army, led personally by Sultan Mas‘ūd

and accompanied by elephants and the full impedimenta of war, allowed itself to be drawn into battle at the ribât (stronghold) of Dandânqân in the waterless desert between Saraḵhs and Marv. The Türkmen fielded 16,000 cavalrymen and had left 2,000 of their less experienced and less well-mounted members to guard their baggage. Facing them was a dispirited and exhausted Ghaznavid army. In what must rank as one of the decisive battles of Khurâsân's history, Mas'ûd's forces were utterly routed. The Türkmen then dispersed to receive the final surrender of the cities, with Toghrîl going to Nîshâpûr, Müsâ Yâbghu and the Inâliyân to Marv, and Chaghri to Balkh and Tukh-âristân. Mas'ûd's nerves failed completely. Resigning himself to the Saljuqs' inevitable occupation of Ghazna itself, he left for India; but his army had lost confidence in him, and the commanders deposed him when he reached the upper Indus valley, setting up his brother Muḥammad b. Maḥmûd for a brief sultanate.¹

On taking over Khurâsân, the Saljuq leaders became territorial sovereigns and not merely chiefs of nomadic bands. They learned to negotiate with the rulers of other states, and they gained knowledge of the administrative techniques practised in settled states. But even for the Saljuq leaders this process of acquiring political responsibility was disturbing, for it involved a changed mode of life and a changed outlook. Sultans such as Toghrîl, Alp-Arslan, and Malik-Shâh adapted themselves in some measure to the Iranian-Islamic monarchical tradition, leaning more and more heavily on their Iranian officials. Yet in his Siyâsat-Nâma the great vizier Nizâm al-Mulk lamented that the sultans were neglecting the wise administrative practices followed by the Ghaznavids and other former rulers; thus the Iranian officials were never able to mould their masters into the exact shape they would have liked. As soon as Khurâsân and western Iran had been overrun, various members of the Saljuq family were allotted regions to govern (see p. 49 below). Nevertheless their frequent rebellions—those of Ibrâhîm Ḣalâl of Qutlumush b. Arslan Isrâʿîl, and even of the senior member of the family, Müsâ Yâbghu—show that these provincial rulers never understood their subordinate position in the hierarchy of power that was roughly taking shape under the sultan. As for the masses of the Türkmen, now nominally Muslim, they remained at a cultural level little higher than that which they had enjoyed in the

III. WESTERN AND CENTRAL IRAN IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 5TH/11TH CENTURY

With the east secured by the success at Dandāqān, the lands farther west now lay open to Saljuq attack. In 431/1040 western and central Iran were in the last phase of what V. Minorsky has called the “Dailami Investigation into complaints of tyranny (maẓalim) was one of the traditional duties of Islamic rulers; cf. H. F. Amedroz, “The Mazalim Jurisdiction in the Akham Sultaniyya of Mawardi”, [Journal of the] R[oyal] A[siatic] S[society] (1911), pp. 655-74.


2 Baihaqi, pp. 570, 628; Bundari, p. 8; Nishapuri, p. 18; Rāvandi, p. 104; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. ix, p. 312; Bosworth, Ghażnavids, pp. 243-4, 268.
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interlude” of Iranian history. Headed by the various branches of the Büyids, dynasties of Dailami origin flourished not merely in their Urheimat, the mountains of northern and north-western Iran, but also as far south as lower Iraq and the shores of the Persian Gulf. Intermingled with these dynasties were some Kurdish rulers, notably the ‘Annázids of the Shāhanjān tribe (c. 381–511/991–1117), successors in Ḥulwān and Kirmānshāh to the Hasanāyids. Other semi-nomadic Kurds were the effective holders of power in the mountainous regions of Kurdistān and Luristān; in the eastern part of Fārs, around Dārābjud, the Shabānkārā’ī Kurds were especially influential. The Marwānids of Diyārbakr, Akhlāt, and Malāzgird (372–489/983–1096) were also of Kurdish origin, but they rose to power as vassals of the Fāṭimids. During the long reign of Naṣr al-Daula Ahmad b. Marwān (401–53/1011–61), his cities of Āmid, Mayyāfārqiḡ, and Ḥiṣn Kaifā in Diyārbakr enjoyed considerable material prosperity and a vigorous cultural life; an invasion of the Oghuz in 443/1041–2 was beaten off, and the annalist Ibn al-Athir records that the sense of security and the prevailing justice in Ibn Marwān’s dominions were such that people actually dared openly to display their wealth. A local historian of Mayyāfārqiḡ, Ibn al-Azraq (d. after 572/1176–7), describes enthusiastically how Naṣr al-Daula lightened taxes and, as part of his charitable works, supplied the town with piped water. However, the Marwānīd territories came under Saljuq suzerainty soon after Naṣr al-Daula’s death. They were divided between his two sons, and in 478/1085–6 Saljuq armies under Fakhr al-Daula Ibn Jahir and his son ‘Amid al-Daula Ibn Jahir conquered Diyārbakr (see p. 98 below).

On the western edges of the Iranian plateau, where it merges into the plains of Iraq, al-Jazīreh, and northern Syria, there were various Arab amirates including the Mazyadids of Ḥilla, the ‘Uqailids of Mosul, and the Mirdāsids of Aleppo. Militarily they depended on the Bedouins of the region; strategically they were important, first because they commanded the approaches into eastern Anatolia, Armenia, and western Iran, and second, because they were in the buffer zone between the rival dynasties of the Büyids and Fāṭimids and later between the

1 On the region of Dailam and its role in Iranian history at this time, see below, pp. 30 ff.; see also the references in n. 2, p. 30 below.
Saljuqs and Fāṭimids. Their religion, like that of almost all the Arabs of the Syrian desert and its fringes, was Shī‘ī. In the fourth and fifth decades of the eleventh century these amirates were threatened by the Ḍghūz marauders who preceded the arrival of Toghīrīl and the Saljuqs, and their grazing grounds were encroached upon by the Türkmen’s flocks. In general they adopted a hostile attitude towards Toghīrīl when he appeared in Iraq; the Mazyadīd Dubais gave much support to Arslan Bāsāsīrī, who was his own brother-in-law (see pp. 46–7).

The Dailamī dynasty of the Ziyārīds (c. 316–483/928–1090) reigned in the Caspian provinces of Gurgān and Ṭabaristān, and also at times in the province of Qūmīs to the south of the Alburz mountains. They arose from one of the fiercest and most ambitious Dailamī condottieri of the early 4th/10th century, Mardāvīd b. Ziyār (d. 323/935). Later in the century the Ziyārīds’ strategic position, commanding the routes which connected western Iran and Iraq with Khurāsān and Central Asia, allowed them to play a prominent role in the struggles between the Sāmānīds and Būyīds in northern Iran. The most famous of the dynasty, Shams al-Ma‘āli Qābūs b. Vushmagīr (366–403/977 to 1012–13), united something of his grandfather’s ferocity with an enlightened love of letters and culture; some of his Arabic and Persian verses are known, and al-Bīrūnī and Avicenna both spent some time at his court. Though Mardāvīd himself had been violently anti-Muslim, his successors were Sunnīs (this was unusual amongst the generally Shī‘ī Dailamīs), and almost at the end of the dynasty Kai-Kā‘ūs still called himself Maulā Amir al-Muʾminīn, the “Client of the Commander of the Faithful.”

Qābūs felt the pressure of the Ghaznavīds and was compelled to recognize the suzerainty of Māḥūmd, although ‘Utbi’s grandiose claim, that “Jurjān and Ṭabaristān as far as the shores of the Caspian and the region of Dailam, by dint of the combining of circumstances, became just like one of the Sultan’s own dominions”, is certainly exaggerated. Falak al-Ma‘āli Manūchīhr b. Qābūs, the original patron of the Ghaznavīd poet Manūchīhrī Dāmghānī, became Māḥūmd of Ghazna’s son-in-law; he ruled somewhat uneasily in the sultan’s shadow, but did succeed in retaining some freedom of action.³

With Manuchihr's death in 420/1029 or 421/1030 (the date of 424/1033, given by the local but non-contemporary historians Ibn Isfandiyar and Zahir al-Din Mar'ashi, is too late), the Ziyarid dynasty ceased to count for anything outside the specific boundaries of Gurgan and Tabaristan. At this point the family's chronology and order of succession become confused and uncertain. Of all the existing accounts—in Ibn Isfandiyar, Zahir al-Din Mar'ashi (whose material here derives from the former source), Ibn al-Athir, and Baihaqi—only the last is contemporary. It seems that Manuchihr's son Anushirvan succeeded, but since he was a minor, effective power was held by his maternal uncle and chief minister, Abū Kālijār b. Vaihān al-Qāhi. This man was Mas'ūd of Ghazna's father-in-law, but in 425/1034, while the sultan was away in India, he seized the opportunity to ally with the Kakuyid 'Alā' al-Daula of Isfahān, and together they cut off tribute and rebelled. The violent behaviour of a Ghaznavid punitive expedition, which was sent in the next year and which penetrated as far westwards in Tabaristan as Nātil, alienated all sympathy for Mas'ūd in the Caspian provinces. Despite this disharmony, Abū Kālijār and the sultan had a common interest in warding off the Türkmen, for the line of the Atrak river and the Dihistan region had been from early Islamic times a thaghr (frontier region) against the Türkmen of the Qara-Qum and beyond.

Abū Kālijār maintained contact with Mas'ūd till 431/1040; thereafter he had to make his own terms with the Saljuqs, but in fact all mention of him now disappears from the sources. In 433/1041-2 Togrul arrived in Gurgan accompanied by one Mardāvīj b. Bīshū; this man and Anushirvān b. Manuchihr divided power between themselves, placing Togrul's name in the khutba and paying an annual tribute to him. Shortly afterwards a collateral branch of the Ziyārids took over, continuing as Saljuq vassals. From 441/1049-50 until a date after 475/1082-3 the ruler was Unṣūr al-Ma'all Kai-Kā'ūs b. Iskandar, author of another famous “Mirror for Princes”, the Qābūs-Nāma. Before coming to the throne, he had spent some years in Ghazna as a boon-companion of Sultan Maudūd b. Mas'ūd, but he also had connexions with the north-western corner of the Iranian world: he

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1 An attempted elucidation is made by C. E. Bosworth in his article, “On the Chronology of the Ziyārids in Gurgan and Tabaristan”, Der Islam, pp. 25-34.
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had fought in Armenia and Georgia with the Shaddādid amir Ābu’l-
Asvār Shāvur b. Faḍl (d. 459/1067), lord of Dvin and Ganja (see
below, pp. 34–5), and he spent some time amongst the Shaddādīds.1
It is probable that Kā’ūs ruled only in the mountainous interior of
Gurgān and Ṭabaristān while nominees of the Saljuqs held the
coast. His son Gīlān Shāh was the last of the line; the chief of the
Assassins of Alamūt, Ḥasan-i Sabbāh, conquered the mountain regions
of Ṭabaristān, and after c. 483/1090 the Ziyārīds disappear from
history.2

Ibn Isfandiyār records that Ṭabaristān suffered much during the
reign of the Saljuq sultan Alp-Arslān, because his troops moved
frequently through the region. (This was in the seventh decade of the
century: see pp. 64 ff., below.) However, the Ziyārīds’ western neigh­
bour, the Bāvandid Ispahbadh Qārīn b. Surkhāb, was able to con­
solidate his power in the mountains. Thus it was the coastal plain
which suffered, whilst the mountains either remained in the hands of
local chieftains or else fell under Assassin control. In the 5th/11th and
6th/12th centuries the Caspian provinces often served as a corridor for
the passage of nomads from Central Asia, but the coastal lands were
unsuitable for their permanent settlement: the damp and malarial
climate of the region and its dense vegetation and forest are singled
out for mention by many of the Islamic geographers, and one writer
calls Gurgān “the graveyard of the people of Khurāsān”.3 Down to
the nineteenth century the raids and transits of the Türkmen must have
 retarded agriculture, though the fertility of the area gave it considerable
natural resiliency.

The Bāvandid Ispahbadhs (45–750/665–1349) had their roots in the
pre-Islamic Iranian past, for they sprang from the Sassanian Kā’ūs b.
Qubād, brother of Anushirvān the Just. Their Kā’ūsiyya branch
reigned till 397/1006–7, followed by the Ispahbadhiyya from 465/1073
till 606/1210; and then, under Mongol suzerainty, the Kinkhwāriyya
held sway from 635/1237 onwards. They ruled in Ṭabaristān (or Māzandarān, as it became known in the course of the 6th/12th century),4
often relinquishing control of the plains to rulers such as the ‘Alid

1 Qābūs-Nāma, pp. 24–5, 133–6 (Levy tr., pp. 35–7, 230, 234).
2 Ibn Isfandiyār, Ṭabaristān, p. 236; Zahir al-Din Mar’ashi, Ta’rikh-i Ṭabaristān u Rūyān
u Māzandarān, pp. 143–4. However, Rabino di Borgomale (J.A. p. 233) mentions a later
possible scion of the Ziyārīds.
3 Thālibī, Latīf-ī Ma’ārif, p. 113.
4 See Noldeke, Das Iranische Nationalepos, p. 61, for a discussion of this change in
nomenclature.
THE IRANIAN WORLD (A.D. 1000–1217)

Dâ‘is, the Bûyids, and the Ziyârids; but they retained authority in the mountains. The Kâ‘ûsiyya reigned from Firim or Shahriyâr-Kûh in the mountains to the south-west of Sâri, and they were Shi‘is, as the formula on their coins—“Ali is the Friend of God”—shows.1 The last Ispahbâdhs of this line were connected by marriage to the Bûyids and Ziyârids; one of them was Rustam b. Marzbân (d. 540/1106–17), author of a well-known collection of fables, the Marzâbân-Nâma, and a vassal of the Bûyid Majd al-Daula of Ray. The line ended in 397/1006–7, with the death of Shahriyâr b. Dârâ at the hands of Qâbûs b. Vushmagîr.

Other members of the Bâvandid dynasty survived, and as the Ziyârids gradually lost control of the Caspian littoral to the Tûrkmên invaders, the Ispahbâdhiyya entrenched themselves in the mountains. In the early Saljuq period they extended down to the coast; in the third quarter of the 11th century Rustam b. Shahriyâr founded a madrasa, or college, at Sâri, which became the capital of their principality. These Ispahbâdhs were generally vassals of the Saljuqs; in the reign of Sulûtân Mu‘ammad b. Malik-Shâh, for example, there was a son of the Ispahbâd Hûsâm al-Daula Shahriyâr b. Qârin at the court of Iṣfahân, and another son married one of the sultan’s sisters. On the other hand, they were not invariably servile towards their suzerains. When the same Saljuq sultan sent an expedition against the Ismâ‘îlîs of Alamût, Shahriyâr was offended by the sultan’s peremptoriness, refused all help, and routed a Saljuq punitive force sent against him. This expedition was probably in 501/1107–8 or 503/1109–10 under the sultan’s vizier and Amir Chavli; see section VIII, pp. 118–19, below.2

During the 6th/12th century the Caspian provinces frequently fulfilled one of their historic roles, that of a refuge area, with the Bâvandid giving shelter to various Saljuq contenders for the sultanate, as well as to a Ghaznavid prince, to the sons of the Khwârazm-Shâh Qutb al-Dîn Mu‘ammad b. Anûsh-Tegin, and even to the son of the Mazyâdîd Şadaqa b. Mansûr. With the decline of Saljuq power, the Ispahbâd Shâh Ghâzî Rustam b. ‘Ali (534–58/1140–1 to 1163) became a major figure in the politics of northern Iran, pursuing an independent policy aimed at the expansion of his principality. He campaigned each

2 Ibn Isândiyâr, Tabaristan, pp. 240–2; cf. M. G. Hodgson, The Order of Assassins, the Struggle of the Early Nizârî Ismâ‘îlîs against the Islamic World, pp. 97, 100.
year against the Isma'īlis of Alamūt and led one unsuccessful expedition against the Oghuz of the Dihistan steppe. Zahir al-Dīn Mar'āshī calls him the richest and greatest of the rulers of Tabaristān: he conquered Gurgān and Qūmīs, and his power in the west extended as far as Mūghān. He helped the Saljuq Sulaimān-Šāh to gain the sultanate (see below, pp. 169 and 176), and in reward he was given Ray and Sāveh. Shāh Ghāzī's grandson Ḥus ām al-Daula Ardašīr b. Ḥasan (576–602/1171–2 to 1205–6) aided Sultan Toghrīl b. Arslan and the atabeg Pahlavān Muḥammad b. Eldīğūz (see p. 179 below), and he also had friendly relations with the Khwārazm-Šāh Tekīsh b. ʿIl Arslan, the Ayyūbīd Salādīn, and the Caliph al-Nāṣīr. But pressure from the aggressive Khwārazm-Šāhs became hard to resist, despite the Ispahbadhs' attempts to conciliate them by marriage alliances. In the reign of Nāṣīr al-Daula Rustam b. Ardašīr, the Isma'īlis overran most of the Bāvandid territories in Tabaristān, and when in 606/1210 he was assassinated, the Khwārazm-Šāh 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad seized the Caspian provinces and the Ispahbadhiyya line of the dynasty came to an end. ¹

The Bādūspānids were western neighbours of the Bāvandids in Tabaristān, ruling for nearly a thousand years (c. 45–1006/665 to 1597–8) in the mountains of Rustamdār, Rūyān, Nūr, and Kujūr, and bearing the princely titles of Ispahbadhs and Ustūnbārs. The dynasty, which traced its origins to a Sassanian governor of the Caspian provinces, vanished only when the Šafāvid Shāh 'Abbās exterminated its last members. At times the Bādūspānids recognized Šaffārid and Būyīd suzerainty, and later they were generally subordinate to the Bāvandids. Shahrnūsh b. Hazārasp (510–23/1116–17 to 1129) married a sister of Shāh Gūzī Rustam, and his brother Kai-Kā'ūs b. Hazārasp (523–60/1129–65) was also an ally of the Bāvandids and a resolute foe of his neighbours the Isma'īlis; but unlike the Ziyārīds and Bāvandīs, the Bādūspānids obtruded little on Iranian affairs outside their own corner of the Caspian region. Ibn Isfandīyār says that it was Kai-Kā'ūs b. Hazārasp and his descendants who became followers of the Sayyid Abu'l-Husain al-Mu'ayyad Billāh, yet according to Zahir al-Dīn Mar'āshī it was not until a Bādūspānid of the 9th/15th century imposed

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Shi'ism on Rūyān and Rustamdār that most of the population there adopted that faith.¹

Between Ṭabaristān in the east and Āzarbāijān and Mūghān in the west lay Gilān and Dailam. Strictly speaking, Gilān was the coastal plain and Dailam the mountainous interior through which ran the Safīd Rūd and Shāh Rūd, but up to the 5th/11th century the Muslims applied the term Dailam to the whole region. Islam was late in coming here; the Dailami mountaineers were notorious for their depredations in the settled lands to the south of the Alburz, and Qazvīn was long regarded as a thaghīr against these infidels. In the early part of the 3rd/9th century Dailam was a centre for 'Alid propaganda, and the local people were gradually won over to Shi'ism. Here then is why the majority of Dailami dynasties in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries were Shi'i.²

The 4th/10th century was the period of the Dailamis' greatest expansion; in the next century they tended to give way in Iran to Turkish dynasties such as the Ghaznavids and Saljuqs. The oldest of the Dailami dynasties was that of the Justānids, who ruled at Rūdbār. Some seven or eight members of the family are known, the first of whom was mentioned in 189/805 when the Caliph Harun al-Rashīd received at Ray the submission of “the lord of Dailam”. But the dynasty declined as their rivals of the Kangarid or Musāfirid family grew more powerful in Dailam. The last Justānīd ruler definitely known was defeated by the Dailami general ‘Asfār b. Shīrūya (d. 191/931). However, the dynasty may have survived much longer than this, for in 394/1042–3 Toḵrīl Beg received at Qazvīn the submission of the “King of Dailam”, and Kasrāvi has surmised that this was a surviving member of the Justānids. Less certain is a mention by the Persian traveller Naṣīr-i Ḵhusrau, who passed through the region in 437/1046; he spoke of “the Amir of Amīrs, who is from the Kings of Dailam”, but this may refer to one of the Musāfirids.³

The Musāfirids or Sallārids were originally and more correctly called Kangarids.⁴ They arose in Dailam in the early years of the 4th/10th century.¹

² On Dailam and the Dailamis, see Ahmad Kasrāvi, Shahriyārān-i gum-nām, vol. 1, pp. 2–20; Minorsky, La Domination des Dailamites, pp. 1–5; idem, “Daylam”, Encyc. of Islam (2nd ed.).
⁴ Cf. Kasrāvi, op. cit. pp. 36–7, on the name of this dynasty.
century through the efforts of Muhammad b. Musafir, who was allied by marriage to the older dynasty of the Justanids, and whose power grew at the latter's expense. A contemporary Buyid source says that it was this marriage connexion plus the acquisition of the fortress of Samiran in the region of Tarum which established the Musafirids' fortunes. Samiran was then one of the key fortresses of Dailam, just as Alamut was to be in Saljuq times, and several Islamic travellers and geographers described its wonders. After the deposition of Muhammad b. Musafir in 330/941, there were two lines of Musafirids. One remained in the ancestral centre of Tarum; the other expanded northwards and westwards into Azarbajjan, Arran, and eastern Transcaussia. This branch pushed as far as Darband on the Caspian coast, but its power was eventually destroyed by the Rawwadids. The Tarum branch lost Samiran to the Buyid FakhR al-Daula in 379/989, but they recovered it on that ruler's death, and in the period of his son Majd al-Daula's minority, the Musafirids pressed southwards to Zanjan, Abhar, Suhravard, and Sarzahan. The ensuing decades of Musafirid history are very dark, but the dynasty was directly threatened when in 420/1029 Maḥmūd of Ghazna seized Ray (see p. 12 above). Against the Musafirid Ibrāhīm b. Marzbān the sultan sent a "descendant of the Kings of Dailam", probably a Justanid, and then Masʿūd b. Maḥmūd came in person and captured Ibrāhīm. Although a Ghaznavid garrison was left in Tarum, by 427/1036 it was again in Musafirid hands. The early Saljuqs did not try to establish direct rule in Dailam, but were content to exact tribute; then in 434/1042-3 Toghril came westwards, retrieved Ray from the hands of his half-brother Ibrāhīm Inal, and gained submission from "the Salar of Tarum" on the basis of 200,000 dinārs' tribute. Nāṣir-i Khusrau speaks with admiration of Samiran and of the security and justice prevailing in the lands of the "Marzbān al-Dailam, Jīl-i Jīlān, Abū Šāliḥ [Justān b. Ibrāhīm], Maulā Amīr al-Mu'minin". In 454/1062, shortly before his death, Toghril went to Samiran and again took tribute from the local ruler Musafir. After this the sources are quite silent about the dynasty, and it is likely that the line was extinguished when, as the geographer

Yaqūt relates, the Ismāʿīlīs of Alamāt destroyed the fortress of Samirān.¹

The Rawwādīds (latterly the form “Rawād” is commoner in the sources) were another product of the upsurge of the mountain peoples of northern Iran; their domain was Āzarbāījān, and particularly Tabrīz. Strictly speaking, the Rawwādīd family was of Azdī Arab origin, but by the 4th/10th century they were accounted Kurdish. At the opening of the ‘Abbāsid period Rawwād b. Muṭḥannā had held a fief which included Tabrīz. Over the course of the next two centuries his descendants became thoroughly Kurdicized, and the “Rawwādī Kurds” emerged with Iranian names, although the local poet Qatrān (d. c. 465/1072) still praised them for their Arab ancestry. Early in the 4th/10th century the Sājid line of Arab governors in Āzarbāījān collapsed, and the region became politically and socially disturbed. A branch of the Musāfīrids of Tārum first emerged there, but despite Bī yid help the Musāfīrid Ibrāhīm b. Marzbān was deposed in c. 370/980–1, probably by the Rawwādīd Abu’l-Haijā’ Ḥusain b. Muḥammad (344–78/955–88); certainly it was the Rawwādīds who succeeded to all of the Musāfīrid heritage in Āzarbāījān.²

The most prominent member of the dynasty in the 5th/11th century was Vahshūdān b. Mamlān b. Abī’l-Haijā’ (c. 410–465/c. 1019–54). It was in his reign that the Oghuz invaded Āzarbāījān. These were some of the first Türkmen to come westwards, being the so-called “‘Irāqīs”, or followers of Arslān Isrāʾīl, expelled from Khurāsān by Maḥmūd of Ghazna (see pp. 38 and 40–1). Vahshūdān received them favourably in 419/1028, hoping to use them as auxiliaries against his many enemies, such as the Christian Armenians and Georgians and the rival Muslim dynasty of Shaddādīds. He even married the daughter of an Oghuz chief, but it still proved impossible to use the anarchic nomads as a reliable military force. In 429/1037 they plundered Marāghheh and


massacred large numbers of Ḥadhbanī Kurds.\(^1\) Vahšūdān allied with his nephew, the chief of the Ḥadhbanīs, Abu'l-Haija\(^2\) b. Rahib al-Daula, against the Türkmen; many of them now migrated southwards towards Iraq, and in 432/1040–1 Vahšūdān devised a stratagem by which several of the remaining leaders were killed. The rest of the Oghuz in Āzarbāijān then fled to the territory of the Hakkārī Kurds south-west of Lake Vān. Vahšūdān’s capital, Tabriz, was destroyed by an earthquake in 434/1042, and fearing that the Saljuqs would take advantage of his resulting weakness, he moved to one of his fortresses; but the city was soon rebuilt, and Nāṣir-i Khusrāu found it populous and flourishing.\(^2\)

Despite Vahšūdān’s apprehension, a considerable time elapsed before the Saljuqs themselves moved against Āzarbāijān. Meanwhile the main threats came from independent Türkmen bands who passed continuously through the province towards Armenia and the Caucasus; it was in 437/1045 that Qubādh b. Yazid, ruler of Shīrvān in the eastern Caucasus, was forced to build a defensive wall round his capital Yazidiyya.\(^3\) In 446/1054 Toghrīl at last resolved to bring Āzarbāijān and Arrān under his sway. Vahšūdān, making no attempts at opposition, handed over his son as a hostage. The sultan then passed to the Shaddādid capital of Ganja and also received the homage of other minor rulers of eastern Transcaucasia before pressing westwards into Anatolia as far as Malāzgird and Erzerum.\(^4\)

In 450/1058 the eldest of Vahšūdān’s sons, Mamlān, was confirmed by Toghrīl in his father’s territories, but the last days of the dynasty are obscure, as indeed is most of the history of Āzarbāijān at this time. The Ottoman historian Mūnejjim Bashī (d. 1113/1702), whose vast historical compilation incorporates some ancient and otherwise lost sources for the history of north-western Iran and the Caucasus region, says that the Rawwādīds came to an end in 463/1070–1 when Alp-Arslan returned from his Anatolian campaign (see pp. 63–4 below) and deposed Mamlān. However, one later member of the family is known: Āḥmadīl b. Ibrāhīm b. Vahšūdān held Marāqheh and took part in the Crusading warfare in Syria, and the name Āḥmadīl was perpetuated by the line of his own Turkish ghulāms, who began to

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\(^1\) According to the 7th/13th-century biographer Ibn Khallikān, the Ayyūbid Sulṭān Saladin came from this tribe of Kurds; cf. Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, pp. 124–5, 128–9.


\(^3\) On the dynasty of the Shīrvān-Shāhs, see p. 35 below.

rule at Marāğheh after his death in 310/1116. (For these Ḥmadilīs see below, pp. 170–1.)

The Shaddādīds of Arrān and Dvin (c. 340–468/951–1075) were almost certainly Kurds, as Mūnejjīm Bāshī suggests. They arose from a Kurdish adventurer called Muḥammad b. Shaddād, who established himself in Dvin in the middle of the 4th/10th century, the town being held at that time by the Musāfīrids. The ethnic origins of the family are complicated because its members frequently adopted Dailāmī names, such as Lāshkārī and Marzbān, and even the Armenian one of Ashot; but their basic Kurdishness seems very likely, and the variety of their onomasticon is doubtless a reflexion of the confused ethnic and political condition of the region. Muḥammad b. Shaddād could not hold on to Dvin, but in 360/971 his sons Lāshkārī and Fāḍl displaced the Musāfīrids by agreement with the notables of Ganja. Fāḍl eventually secured power in Arrān and reigned there for close to half a century (375–422/986–1031). Armenian sources stress his violence and military vigour: he recovered Dvin, fought the Georgian Bagratīds and the Armenian rulers of Anī, Alvank (Albania), and Tashir, and he subdued the Hungarian Sevordīk in the upper Kur valley. His construction of a fine bridge over the Araxes in 421/1030 points towards ambitions against the Rawwādīds in Āzarbājījān. Fāḍl’s son and grandson had to cope with attacks from the Georgians, from other Caucasian mountaineers such as the Alans or Ossetes, from the Russians, and the Rawwādīd Vahsūdān b. Mamlān. In about the year 440/1048–9 there was a Byzantine invasion under the eunuch Nicephorus, aimed principally at the Shaddādīd branch in Dvin. Ominous, too, was the appearance of the Oghuz, from whom the Rawwādīds south of the Araxes suffered severely. The historians al-‘Āẓīmī and Ibn Duqmāq record an attack by Qutlumūsh b. Arslān Isrā’īl on Ganja in 438/1046–7, and there may have been other incursions which have not been noted in the chronicles.

The Shaddādīds reached their zenith under Abu’l-Asvār Shāvūr b. Fāḍl, who ruled in Dvin from 413/1022 to 441/1049 and then in Ganja till 459/1067. The Byzantines’ devastation of the Dvin area probably

influenced his decision to leave Dvin, where he had faced Armenian princes on his west and south. In 434/1042–3 or 435/1043–4, at the instigation of the Byzantine emperor, Abu’l-Asvār invaded the principality of Ani and thereby acquired a great contemporary reputation as a “warrior for the faith”, praised for his courage and sagacity by the Ziyārīd Kai-Kālūs b. Iskandar, who fought with him as a ghāzī against the Christians. Abu’l-Asvār submitted to Toghrīl in 446/1054–5, and towards the end of his life he was associated with Türkmen expansion into Armenia and Anatolia; in 457/1065 he became governor of Ani, which had been captured from the Christians in the previous year. Before that he had been involved with his neighbours the Shīrvān-Shāhs. In the latter half of the 2nd/8th century the Arab family of the Yazīdīds had governed Arrān for the ‘Abbāsids. During the ensuing decades they were pushed northwards by Dailamī pressure, becoming completely Iranian in their way of life, and though they acquired close marriage connexions with the Shaddādīds, these did not prevent Abu’l-Asvār from invading the territories of his nephew the Shīrvān-Shāh Fāribūrz b. Sallār (455–after 487/1063–after 1094) on four separate occasions during these years.

In the end, the extension of Saljuq power into this north-western region, under the leadership of Alp-Arslan and his ghulām commander ʿImād al-Dīn Sav-Tegin (? Shād-Tegin), proved fatal to the Shaddādīds. Abu’l-Asvār’s son Fāḍl II was captured by the Georgians, and the Shīrvān-Shāh invaded Arrān. An army under Sav-Tegin passed through Arrān in 460/1068, and seeing internal dissensions within the Shaddādīd family, the sultan allotted fiefs in Darband and Arrān to his general. Sav-Tegin once more appeared with an army, this time in 468/1075, and Fāḍl III b. Fāḍl II was obliged to yield his ancestral territories. This ended the main line of the Shaddādīds, though the members of a junior branch, descended from Abu’l-Asvār’s son Manūchīhr, became governors on behalf of the Saljuqs in Ani, and the family can be traced there till the Georgians recaptured the town in 556/1161.

2 The Yazīdīds originated with one Yazīd b. Mazyad, but the designation “Mazyādīd” for this dynasty is best avoided, since it is likely to cause confusion with the Mazyādīds of Hilla.
3 Ibid. pp. 20–1, 74–5; idem, A History of Sharvān and Darband (= an anonymous Taʾrīkh Bāb al-Awhāb preserved in Mūnejjim Bashi), pp. 34–5, 56–65.
We have noted that on the eve of the Saljuq invasions, the western and central parts of the country were in the last phase of the Dailami ascendancy in Iran: indeed the principal Dailami dynasty, that of the Buyids, was already in a state of confusion and decay when Togrul moved westwards from Khurasan. The Buyids had brought with them from their Caspian homeland a patrimonial conception of power in which each member of the dynasty acquired a share of territory and power; from the very start there had been three Buyid principalities in Iran. Moreover, since the Buyids came to rule over such scattered provinces as the Iranian ones of Jibal, Fars, Khuzistan, and Kirmân, and the Arab ones of Iraq and even Oman, the lack of geographical cohesion in their empire undoubtedly favoured the dispersal of political power among several members of the family. In the middle decades of the 4th/10th century the Buyids were held together by family solidarity, which was furthered by the energy and capability of such amirs as the original three sons of 'Ali b. Bûya and those of the next generation, including 'Adudd al-Daula Fanâ-Khusrau (d. 372/983) and Fakhr al-Daula 'Ali (d. 387/997). But 'Adudd al-Daula made plans to perpetuate after his own death the unified rule which he had achieved in his lifetime, and the family henceforth became fragmented and divided against itself. Militarily the Buyids at first depended for infantrymen on their fellow Dailamis, supplemented by Turkish cavalrymen; but in the 5th/11th century the recruitment of Dailami soldiers seems to have dwindled (the reasons for this are unclear) and the amirs became almost wholly dependent on Turkish mercenaries, over whom they frequently lost control.\(^1\)

On the religious plane the Buyids' tenure of power was definitely favourable to the consolidation of 'Alid and Twelve Shi'i organization and doctrine, but with the rise of the Turkish dynasties in eastern Iran, intellectual as well as political trends were no longer so clearly helpful for the Buyids. Political Shi'ism was clearly failing to gain power in the eastern Islamic world, and even the successes of the Nizari Isma'illis were to be fairly limited geographically. In addition, the caliphate of al-Qa'im (422-67/1031-75) witnessed a certain revival of 'Abbasid power, at least in Iraq; here in 437/1045-6, after a century in which the caliphs had been politically impotent under Buyid control,

\(^1\) Cf. Bosworth, "Military organisation under the Buyids of Persia and Iraq", *Orient*, vol. xviii (1968). There exists no special monograph on the Buyids, but a valuable provisional survey is given by C. Cahen in his "Buwayhids", *Encyc. of Islam* (2nd ed.).
al-Qā'im appointed a forceful, strongly Sunni vizier, the Ra'īs al-Ru'āsā' Abu'l-Qāsim Ibn al-Muslima.\(^1\) Intellectually the Sunni revival had already been visible in several phenomena, such as the madrasa-building movement, the gradual rise to respectability of the Aš'āri kalām or theological system (although it was a long time before this process was completed), and the vitality of the conservative and traditionalist law school of Ḥanbalism. The incoming Saljuq rulers enthusiastically aided the progress of this revival.\(^2\)

The territories held by the Buyids in 421/1030 were still extensive. The most serious inroads on their possessions had been made in northern and central Iran. Ray and Jībāl had not been under strong rule since Fākhr al-Daula’s death, when power there had been divided between his two young sons, Majd al-Daula at Ray and Shams al-Daula at Hamadān and Kirmānshāh. Majd al-Daula was an ineffectual ruler, and in practice his territories were governed by his mother Sayyida. After her death in 419/1028, he was unable to keep order or control his troops, and he foolishly appealed to Maḥmūd of Ghazna for help. This request was the pretext for Maḥmūd’s Jībāl campaign. In 420/1029 he sacked Ray, deposed Majd al-Daula, and carried him and his son off as prisoners to Khūrāsān, installing a Ghaznavid governor in Ray. From here, operations were carried out against the Musafirids of Tarum. The area to the south and west of Ray, including Iṣfahān, Hamadān, and Kirmānshāh, had passed out of Buyid control before this time, but into the comparatively friendly hands of the Kākūyids, another dynasty of Dailami origin which was closely connected to the Buyids.

The Kākūyids exercised considerable, if transient, authority in central Iran. The founder of the line, Rustam b. Marzbān Dushmanzīyār, attracted the favour of the Buyids of Ray by helping them against the Ziyārids. His son ‘Alā’ al-Daula Muḥammad\(^3\) was first appointed by the Buyids to govern Iṣfahān, and he later adopted this as the capital of his principality.\(^4\) After 398/1007-8 he was virtually independent of Buyid control, extending his power over the towns of Hamadān, Dināvār, and Shābūr-Khwāst. From Ṭabaristān to Khūzistān, Ibn Kākūya was continually involved in warfare, and, with the resources

\(^2\) For more on the Sunni revival, see section vi, pp. 70 ff.
\(^3\) In the sources he is generally called Ibn Kākūya, for kākū in the Dailami dialect is said to mean “maternal aunt”, and ‘Alā’ al-Daula was the son of Majd al-Daula’s maternal aunt.
\(^4\) An alternative etymology, from a place-name, is suggested by Rabino di Borgomale in *J.A.* (1949), pp. 313-14.
of the rich cities of central Iran at his disposal, he hired mercenaries. Thus in 428/1037, in preparation for an attack on the Ghaznavid-held city of Ray, he was using his wealth to recruit not only local Kurdish and Dailami troops but also the "'Irāqi" Türkmen, these last comprising some who had come directly from the Balkhān-Kūh area to the east of the Caspian together with others who had just fled westwards from Nishāpūr. Indeed, Ibn Kākūya's dynamism was a major factor in the brevity of Ghaznavid rule in western Iran. Although he was twice driven from Isfahān, by Mas'ūd of Ghazna in 421/1030 and by another Ghaznavid army in 425-7/1034-6, his resilience was such that on each occasion he re-established himself, and the sultan had to recognize him as his vassal.

It was the growing power of the "'Irāqi" Türkmen in northern and central Iran which curbed Ibn Kākūya's ambitions. Deflected from Āzarbāijān by the Rawwādid Vahsūdān b. Mamlān and the Kurdish chieftain Abu'l-Halīja' b. Rahīb al-Daulā, two groups of these Oghuz turned to attack Ray (428/1037 or 429/1038) and Hamadān (430/1038-9). Shortly afterwards, the Kākūyids became Saljuq vassals. On the battlefield of Dandanqān in 431/1040, Toghril awarded Ray and Isfahān to Ibn Kākūya's son Abū Mansūr Farāmūz; on Ibn Kākūya's death in 433/1041-2 Farāmūz succeeded him in Isfahān, and Farāmūz's brother Abū Kālijār Garshāsp was given Hamadān. Farāmūz attempted to keep on equal terms with both the Saljuqs and the Būyid al-Malik ar-Rahīm, yet he only managed to exasperate Toghril. In 442/1050-1 the sultan besieged and captured Isfahān and moved his capital thither from Ray; in exchange, Farāmūz received Yazd and Abarqūh, while Garshāsp lost Hamadān and Kangāvar to Ibrāhīm Īnāl and died in exile amongst the Būyids in Khūzistān. Later descendants of Farāmūz adapted themselves more smoothly to Saljuq masters. His son Mu'ayyid al-Daulā 'Ali, ruler of Yazd, married one of Chaghri Beg's daughters, and in 488/1095 he died fighting for Tutush b. Alp-Arslan against Berk-Yaruq (see below, p. 107). 'Ali's son 'Aḍud al-Dīn Abū Kālijār Garshāsp also held Yazd, and, being high in Muhammad's favour, he married a sister of Sultans Muhammad b. Malik-Shāh and Sanjar; but Sultān Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad dispossessed him of Yazd, and henceforth he became a fierce partisan of Sanjar, urging him in 513/1119 to join battle with Maḥmūd at Sāveh (see below, pp. 135-6).2

The Buyid territories in Iraq and southern Iran were broadly divided between Jalāl al-Daula Abū Ṭāhir Shirzil and his nephew ‘Imād al-Dīn Abū Kālijār Marzbān in 421/1030. The former was Amir al-Umara or “Supreme Commander”—as the Buyid rulers in Iraq called themselves—in Baghdad and the rest of Iraq excepting Basra, but though he ruled from 416/1025 to his death in 435/1044, his authority was never very firm. It is true that in Baghdad the caliph did not yet feel strong enough to exert much political pressure. In 429/1037–8 al-Qā’im was powerless to prevent Jalāl al-Daula from assuming the ancient Sassanian title of Shāhanshāh (“King of Kings”), although five years later his opposition to the amir’s appropriation of poll-tax revenues collected in Baghdad from the People of the Book (i.e. Christians and Jews) did deter the Buyid from trying to take them again the next year. The real holders of power in the city were the violent and undisciplined Turkish and Dailami soldiery, the opposing Ḥanbalī and Shi’ī mobs, and the ubiquitous ‘ayyārs. Furthermore, a good proportion of the Turkish troops supported the claims of Abū Kālijār, who ruled in Basra, Khūzistān, Fārs, Kirmān, and Oman. In the years after 423/1032, Jalāl al-Daula was thrice expelled from his own capital by pro-Abū Kālijār forces; on one Friday in the year 428/1037, the khutba in Baghdad was made for four different persons, the caliph, Jalāl al-Daula, Abū Kālijār, and the ‘Uqailid Qirwāsh b. al-Muqallad. After this, however, the two Buyid rulers made peace, and ‘Irāq was comparatively peaceful until Jalāl al-Daula’s death in 435/1044.

The vigorous Abū Kālijār was master in his Iranian territories to an extent that Jalāl al-Daula never enjoyed in Iraq. As well as his father’s heritage of Khūzistān and Fārs, he fell heir to the adjoining province of Kirmān when in 419/1028 his uncle Qiwām al-Daula Abū’l-Fawāris died, and this province he successfully defended against an incoming Ghaznavid army. Jalāl al-Daula had intended that his son Abū Maṣūr


2 On the ‘ayyārs and other groups who flourished in times of stress and weak government, see Cahen, Mouvements Populaires et Autonomisme Urbain dans l’Asie Musulmane du Moyen Âge, passim.

Khusrau Firuz, called al-Malik al-‘Aziz (d. 441/1049), should succeed him, but al-‘Aziz’s ineffectual character was no match for his cousin Abū Kālijār’s military and financial resources. It was Abū Kālijār alone who was able to pay the haqq al-bai‘a, or the subsidies demanded by the Būyid troops on the accession of a new ruler, and for the last four years of his life, until his death in 440/1048, he was ruler of the whole of the Būyid possessions in Iraq and southern Iran.¹

Towards the end of his reign, Abū Kālijār realized that the Türkmen were becoming a major threat to his dynasty, and indeed, within fifteen years of his death, the Turks were to extinguish the independent rule of the Dailamis. We have already touched upon the raids of the Oghuz into western Iran and beyond. Several Christian sources—such as Matthew of Edessa, Samuel of Ani, Vardan, and the continuator of Thomas of Ardzrun, as well as a Muslim source that depends on the Malik-Nāma—all of these place the first penetration of Armenia at a date between 407/1016-17 and 412/1021, when Türkmen under the leadership of Chaghri Beg ravaged the district of Vāspūrakān between Lakes Vān and Rezā’iyeh. But this is almost certainly too early.² The stimulus for these movements by the Oghuz was Maḥmūd of Ghazna’s seizure of Arslan Isrā’îl (c. 418/1027), after which his Türkmen followers spread out in various directions plundering aimlessly. Since many of these came to western Iran, which is often called in early Muslim sources ‘Īraq-i ‘Ajam “Persian Iraq”, they became known as the ‘Īraqī Türkmen. Although the names of several of their leaders are known, it does not seem that they had any one outstanding leader; thus they were a more anarchic group than those Türkmen headed by the Saljuq leaders.

Over the next few years the various Oghuz bands were a turbulent factor in the politics of central and western Iran, where Ghaznavids, Būyids, Kākūyids, and local Kurdish chiefs endeavoured to use them against their rivals. The insecurity of this period prompted the construction of town walls in various places: in 429/1038 ‘Alā’ al-Daula Ibn Kākūya fortified Isfahān, and between 436/1044-5 and 440/1048-9 the Būyid ‘Īmād al-Din Abū Kālijār put a wall round Shīrāz for the

² The historicity of this expedition is maintained by Kafesoglu in “Doğu Anadoluya ilk Selçuklu aki’n’i (1015-21) ve tarihi ehemmiyeti”, Köprülü Armağanı, pp. 239-74; but that an expedition was possible at such an early date is denied by Cahen, “A Propos de Quelques Articles dans le Köprülü Armağanı”, J.A. vol. ccxlii (1954), pp. 271-81.
first time in its history; rich cities such as Ray and Hamadan were other natural targets for the predatory Oghuz. By themselves the Türkmen were militarily and psychologically unfitted for siege warfare (p. 20 above), yet they could benefit from temporary alliances with one or another side in local disputes. It was because of a triple alliance against him, consisting of the Oghuz, the Buyid Fanā-Khusraw, who was a son of the dispossessed Majd al-Daula, and finally the Dailam ruler of Sāveh, Kām-Ravā, that Ibn Kākūya was forced to evacuate Ray after taking it over from the Ghaznavids in 428/1037. A fearful slaughter followed, and this was repeated in 420/1038–9 when the Oghuz and Fanā-Khusraw’s Dailamis captured Hamadan, expelling Ibn Kākūya’s son Garshāsp. Prudently, the inhabitants of Qazvin bought off the Oghuz for 7,000 dinārs.2

Armenia, Diyarbakr, al-Jazīreh, and Iraq likewise suffered from the Oghuz, who spread out from Āzarbājān after Vahsūdān treacherously massacred several of their leaders in 432/1040–1. The establishment of Ibrāhim Īnal at Ray in 433/1041–2, and then at Hamadan the next year, drove more numbers of the ‘Iraqi Türkmen out of Jībāl into Iraq and al-Jazīreh. It seems that Toghril and the Saljuq leaders were already endeavouring to exercise some control over the whole body of Türkmen in the Iranian world, and this was being resisted by the anarchistic ‘Iraqīs. When Toghril came westwards he notified Gök-Tash, Bughra, and other leaders, then he encamped at Zanjān, hoping to win them over. But they were too suspicious, and told him: “We realize full well that your intention is to seize us if only you can get hold of us. It is fear of you which has made us stay apart and encamp here, and if you persist in trying to get your hands on us, we will make for Khurāsān or Rūm, and will never under any circumstances join up with you.” Toghril nevertheless regarded himself as overlord of all the Oghuz, and in 435/1044, after Gök-Tash’s followers had savagely sacked Mosul, he wrote to Jalāl al-Daula, the ruler of ‘Iraq, excusing the Türkmen’s conduct; they were, said Toghril, mere dependents of the Saljuqs, rebellious slaves who deserved severe punishment.3

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1 Ibn al-Balkhi, Fārs-Nāma, p. 133; Yāqūt, Mu’jam al-buldān, vol. iii, p. 351, s.v. “Shirāz”; but according to Hamd Allāh Mustauffi (Nūḥat al-qulūb, p. 113) it was Šamsān al-Daula b. ‘Adud al-Daula who first put a wall round Shirāz.
3 Ibid. pp. 272, 275, 348.
IV. TOGHRİL’S STRUGGLE WITH THE BÜYİDS AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE EASTERN CONQUESTS

After settling affairs in Khwārazm and the Caspian provinces, Toghril came westwards to Jibal in 434/1042/3 and took over from Ibrāhīm İnal the city of Ray, which was to serve briefly as his capital.1 Ibrāhīm İnal now moved into Kurdistan to conduct operations against the Kâküyids and the Kurdish ‘Annázids, but he was already showing signs of the rebelliousness that was to lead to his downfall. In 441/1049–50 he was arrested by Toghril, then later released and restored to favour; on this occasion Toghril gave him the choice of staying with him or of being allocated a territory which he could carve out as his own principality.2

The Oghuz successes in Iran and the consequent crumbling of Ghaznavid and Büyid defences inevitably attracted more Türkmen from Central Asia; indeed, the westward deflexion of unruly elements was now becoming one of Toghril’s instruments of policy. We are badly informed about the tribal affiliations of the Türkmen in Iran at this time. After their appearance in the accounts of Saljuq origins, the Qiniq disappear wholly from mention. The 7th/13th-century Armenian historian Vardan calls Toghril “leader of the Döger”, another Oghuz tribe, who, unlike the Qiniq, did play a significant role in northern Iran; and Cahen has suggested that in his capacity as chief of a coalition of tribes, Toghril might be considered the head of the Döger. Only in the 6th/12th century do we have some information about the activities of individual Oghuz tribes,3 though we do know that in the middle decades of the 5th/11th century there had been a considerable influx of Central Asian elements into northern Iran and thence to the borders of Armenia and Byzantium.

From this same period dates the especial importance of Āzarbāijān as a base for Türkmen expansion. This area lay at one end of the route through Ray and northern Iran along which Türkmen passed from Khurāsān and beyond, and its fertile valleys—Āzarbāijān is one of the few regions of Iran where dry farming can be practised to any considerable extent—provided pasture for the nomads’ herds. Political authority in the region was fragmented, which gave numerous oppor-

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1 See also p. 33 above.
tunities for employment in the service of local rulers. Moreover, as a frontier province sharing a border with Christian powers, Ázarbâijân had long-established traditions of ghâzi warfare, in which families like the Shaddâdids were prominent, as we have seen. All these factors combined to make Ázarbâijân a concentration-point for the Türkmen, and at this period it began to acquire the Turkish ethnic and linguistic colouring which it still has today. Over the next century or so, ghâzi elements from this area put pressure on the Christian kingdoms of Armenia and Georgia, while at the same time they infiltrated into Anatolia, founded ghâzi states such as those of the Dânishmanids and Mangüjekids, and laid the foundation for a Saljuq sultanate at Rûm which would endure for many decades after the Great Saljuqs had disappeared from Iran and Iraq.

It is unlikely that the Saljuq Sultans Toğhril and Alp-Arslan conceived of their mission in the west as an all-out offensive against Christian Armenia, Georgia, and Byzantium. Their main interests were, first, to occupy and bring under direct control the rich lands of ancient Iranian civilization: Khurâsân, Jibâl, and Fârs; and second, they wanted to hold Iraq as a bastion against the Fâtimids and their satellites in Syria and al-Jazîreh. Warfare in Armenia and Anatolia was therefore left primarily to the Türkmen and ghâzís, troublesome and undisciplined marauders whose presence in the settled lands of Írân and Iraq would have been an embarrassment to the sultans. İbrahim İnal does not represent the more mature outlook of the sultans, but on one occasion he expressed what must have been their desires. In 440/1048 he sent a large body of Oghuz ghâzís from Transoxiana to raid Byzantium. He told them previously, “My territory [the region of Hamadân and Hulwân] is not extensive enough to support you or provide for your needs. The most sensible policy for you is to go and attack Rûm, fight in the way of God, and gain booty. I will follow after you and assist you in this.” He and Qutlumush b. Arslân Isrâ’il then led them personally as far as Malâzgird, Erzerum, and Trebizond, eventually capturing the Georgian prince Liparit (called in the Islamic sources “[Lî]fârît”).

3 Ibn al-Athîr, al-Kâmil, vol. ix, pp. 372-3; Barhebraeus, Chronography, p. 206; E. Honigmann, Die Ostgrenze des Byzantinischen Reiches von 363 bis 1071 nach griechischen, arabischen, syrischen und armenischen Quellen (= L. A. Vasiliev, Byzance et les Arabes vol. iii], pp. 179-81;
YET this policy was not of infinite applicability. Many tribal leaders viewed with suspicion the moves by Toghril and Chaghri to appropriate the rich land of Iran for themselves, as well as their claims to a general control over all the Oghuz. Ībrahim Īnal's own jealousies and ambitions could not be stilled, and it is clear that he represented a substantial body of conservative Türkmen feeling. Toghril's magnanimity was now stretched to breaking point. In 451/1059 Ībrahim Īnal and the two sons of his brother Er-Tash rebelled, at a time when affairs in Baghdad and Iraq were critical for Toghril, and the latter had to appeal for help from Chaghri's son Alp-Arslan in Sistān, who came with his brothers Qavurt and Yāqūṭī. When the revolt was suppressed, Ībrahim Īnal was found strangled with a bowstring; Ibn al-Jauzi adds that Toghril had now destroyed all trust and loyalty on the part of the Türkmen.1

Sporadic Türkmen revolts, such as those of Ībrahim Īnal, of Qutlu­mush and his brother Rasūl-Tegin, together with events in 'Iraq and Iran, prevented Toghril himself from taking much part in the raids against Rûm. In 446/1054 he went to Azarbāijān to receive the homage of the Rawwādīds and Shaddādīds, at Tabriz and Ganja respectively. He then led his forces into the region of Vān and against Trebizond and Kars, but without decisive result, and with the onset of winter the siege of Malāzgīrd had to be lifted.2 In the following years Qutlumush and Yāqūṭī were raiding Armenia and eastern Anatolia, and in 450/1058 Kars and Malatya fell. Just before his death Toghril appeared briefly in Azarbāijān (454/1062), but in general he was content to leave the conduct of warfare in the hands of Yāqūṭī.3

Toghril's other great concern was his position vis-à-vis the Būyids and the caliph. Toghril and 'Imād al-Dīn Abū Kālijār, leader of Khūzistān and Fārs, had come to an understanding: the Saljuq had restrained Ībrahim Īnal from raiding Būyid territory in Luristān and Fārs and had married one of Abū Kālijār's daughters, whilst the Būyid's son Fūlād-Sutūn had married one of Chaghri's daughters

M. H. Yinang, Anadolu'nun fethi, pp. 46-8; Cahen, Byzantion (1948), pp. 15-16; Minorsky, Studies in Caucasian History, p. 57; Cahen, "Qutlumush et ses Fils avant l'Asie Mineure", Der Islam, p. 20.


2 Ibn al-Athīr, ix, 410-11; Barhebraeus, p. 207; for much more detailed information in the Christian sources, cf. Honigmann, Die Ostgrenze des Byzantinischen Reiches, pp. 181-2; Yinang, Anadolu'nun fethi, pp. 49-50; and Cahen, Byzantion (1948), pp. 16-17.

3 Yinang, op. cit. pp. 50-7.
Abū Kalijār died the next year, before he could recover his province of Kirmān from the Saljuq Qavurt b. Chaghri Beg, and he was succeeded by his eldest son Khusraw Firūz, who took the title al-Malik al-Rāhim ("the merciful king"). It was fortunate for Toghri's ambitions that al-Malik al-Rāhim's succession was disputed by his brother Fūlād-Sutūn, for a period of internal strife within the Būyid family now ensued, in which several of Abū Kalijār's sons (at least nine of them are known) took part. Al-Malik al-Rāhim was never able to rule outside Iraq, and Fārs and Khūzistān were generally in the hands of Fūlād-Sutūn and several other brothers. It was inevitable that one of the contending parties should call in the Saljuqs. In 444/1052-3, Oghuz raiders had penetrated as far as Shīrāz. In the next year Fūlād-Sutūn inserted Toghri's name in the khutba in his capital of Shīrāz for the first time, and in 446/1054-5 Toghri sent a group of Türkmen to take over Khūzistān.

We have seen that when in 426/1035 the three Saljuq leaders crossed the Oxus, they styled themselves "Clients of the Commander of the Faithful", and that when he captured Nishāpūr and assumed the title of "Exalted Sultan", Toghri opened up diplomatic relations with the caliphate (pp. 19 and 23 above). The Saljuqs soon saw the weakness of Būyid rule in Iraq. In 441/1049-50 Saljuq pressure compelled Nasr al-Daula Ibn Marwān to put Toghri's name in the khutba in Diyarbakr, and northern Iraq, already much ravaged by Oghuz raids, was open to attack by the Saljuqs. Toghri's march to Baghdad has often been viewed as a Sunni crusade to rescue the caliph from his Shi'i oppressors, and it is true that it was the Shi'i proclivities of a Turkish commander in Baghdad, Arslan Basasiri, which prompted al-Qā'im's appeal to Toghri. We can only guess at Toghri's inner motives, but it is surely relevant to note that his Iranian advisers included many officials from Khurāsān, the most strongly Sunni part of Iran. The sources give varying lists of the viziers who are said to have served Toghri, but the backgrounds of these men are predominantly Khurāsānian, and most of them started their careers with the Ghaznavids. Thus the Ṣāḥib Husain Mikālī, whom Ibn al-Athīr includes in his list, entered the Saljuqs' service some time after being captured from the Ghaznavids; he came from a prominent Nishāpūr family which had

produced a long line of Ḥanafī scholars and traditionists as well as administrators. The most famous of Toghūrī’s viziers was the ‘ʿAmid al-Mulk Abū Naṣr Kundurī, who had been recommended to Toghūrī shortly after the latter’s occupation of Nishāpūr. Kundurī was a fierce Ḥanafī, and when Toghūrī gave permission for the khūṭba in Khurāsān to include the cursing of the Shiʿa, Kundurī added the cursing of the Aṣḥārīs, who tended to be of the Ṣafīʿī law school; this caused prominent scholars such as al-Qushairī and Abu’l-Maʿālī al-Juvainī to flee to the Hijāz. Hence there is much justification for regarding the early years of the Great Saljuq sultanate as strongly Sunni and Ḥanafī in ethos and outlook.

Al-Malik al-Raḥīm’s seven-year reign in Baghdad (440-7/1048-55) was racked by continual violence and rioting, with hostility polarized around the figures of the caliph’s Vizier Ibn al-Muslima on one side, and the Turkish general Abū’l-Ḥārīth Arslān Basāṣīrī on the other. The vizier accused Basāṣīrī of being in touch with the Fāṭimid caliph of Egypt, al-Muṣṭansīr (427-87/1036-94), the ‘Abbasids’ great rival, and it is true that a Fāṭimid daʿī (agent), al-Muʿayyad fi’l-Dīn Shīrāzī, became very active in Iraq shortly after this time. In 447/1055 Toghūrī was assembling forces at Hamadān, Dināvār, Kirmānshāh, and Ḥul-wān, and he now announced his intention of making the pilgrimage to Mecca and then of mounting a crusade against the Fāṭimids. Al-Malik al-Raḥīm and the caliph accepted Toghūrī’s appearance at Baghdad in Ramaḍān 447/December 1055, but the Buṭyid prince was unable to preserve his power: he was arrested and deposed by Toghūrī that same month, and spent the remaining four years of his life in Saljuq captivity. In this fashion, the rule of the Dailamīs in ʿĪraq was extinguished after over a century’s tenure of power, although Buṭyid rule continued for a few years more in Fārs.

At this time Fūlād-Sutūn was ruling in Fārs with the support of the Vizier Abū Maṣūr al-Fasawī, called Muhadhḍhib al-Daulā, but chaos increased there with the rise of a chieftain of the Shabānkārāʾī Kurds,


2 Ibn al-Aṭḥīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, p. 21; but according to Bundārī, p. 30, Kundurī later moderated his Ḥanafī views and sought to reconcile the Ḥanafīs and Ṣafīʿīs.

Abu'l-'Abbas Faḍlūya, who in 454/1062 overthrew and killed Fūlah-Sutūn, setting up one of the latter's brothers as a Buyid puppet ruler. However, Faḍlūya was defeated in this same year by a Saljuq army from Kirmān under Qavurt; the khūṭba in Shīrāz was then made in Toghril's name and the rule of the Buyids finally ended there. Another of Abū Kālijār's sons, Abū 'Ali Fana-Khusrau, prospered under later sultans, residing on his sīf at Naubandajān in Fārs, enjoying the privileges of a standard and a salute of drums, and dying full of days and honour in 487/1094. The sources also mention one of Jalāl al-Daula's sons, Abū Manṣūr 'Alī, who held the sīfs of al-Mādā'in and Dair al-'Āqūl in Iraq until 490/1097.2

In ʿIrāq, Basāsīrī had allied with his brother-in-law the Mazyadid Dubais in an open campaign under the Fāṭimid white colours, having received an investiture patent from al-Mustaṣīr in Cairo. Toghril remained in Baghdad for thirteen months without personally meeting al-Qaʿīm, all communication being handled by their respective viziers. After campaigning in al-Jazīreh, Toghril entered Baghdad once more, and at the end of 449/beginning of 1058 he was at last received by the caliph. ʿImād al-Dīn describes at length the splendour of the occasion, during which al-Qaʿīm bestowed on Toghril the honorifics Rukn al-Daula ("Pillar of the State") and Malik al-Mashriq wa-H-Maghrib ("King of the East and West"), together with seven robes of honour in the ʿAbbāsid colour of black and two crowns signifying rule over the Arabs and ʿAjamīs.3 Later the distraction caused by Ibrāhīm ʿInāl's rebellion allowed Basāsīrī and the ʿUqailid Quraish b. Badrān to re-enter Baghdad in 450/end of 1058, when they attracted strong popular support, both Sunnī and Shiʿī; now the Fāṭimid khūṭba was made, the caliph expelled, and the old enemy Ibn al-Muslima savagely executed.4 A year passed before Toghril was able to return. Basāsīrī had been abandoned by the Fāṭimidīs and, in the final battle, by Dubais too, and in 451/1060 he was killed. Thus Fāṭimid ambitions in ʿIrāq were finally thwarted and a decisive check placed first on the Shiʿī element in Baghdad (where the Saljuqs now carried out an intensive purge) and second on the Shiʿī-tinged Arab amīrs of ʿIrāq.5

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1 Ibn al-Balkhī, Fārs-Nāma, p. 166.  
3 Bundārī, pp. 13-14; Ḥusainī, Akhbār al-daula, pp. 18-19; Barhebraeus, pp. 209-12; Mirkhwānd, vol. iv, p. 106.  
The Iranian World (A.D. 1000-1217)

Toghri’s campaigns in Iraq not only relieved the caliph of his enemies, but also crystallized the new division of power and influence in the central lands of the Dār al-Islām. This duality—between the caliph-imāms as spiritual heads and the Saljuq sultans as secular rulers—had eventually to be recognized in Islamic constitutional theory, although it had not occurred in time to be considered in the famous treatise of al-Māwardi (d. 450/1058), al-Aḥkām al-sultāniyya (“The Principles of Government”). Toghri seems to have exulted in his role as deliverer of the caliph: a document of 454/1062, issued by Toghri’s chancery and quoted by the Baghdad historian and theologian Ibn al-Jauzī, is headed, “From the exalted Emperor of Emperors, King of the East and West, Reviver of Islam, Lieutenant of the Imām, and Right Hand of the Caliph of God, the Commander of the Faithful”. ¹

He now sought to draw the two houses more closely together. In 448/1056 al-Qā’im had married one of Chaghri’s daughters, Arslan Khādijā; Toghri himself aspired to marry one of the caliph’s daughters. That an ‘Abbāsid bride should be given to a rough Turkmen was, however, a different matter, and al-Qā’im replied that such alliances were not customary amongst the caliphs. To the importunings of Kunduri, which were supported by the caliph’s own daughter Arslan Khādijā, Toghri himself proudly replied, “We are the children of al-‘Abbās, the best of mankind; both the Imamate and temporal leadership shall remain in us until the Day of Resurrection. He who supports us will be guided aright, but he who opposes us will fall into error.”

Yet to the caliph’s moral authority Toghri could oppose a judicious measure of force majeure. The caliphate at this time was relying financially on gifts from outside powers and their envoys, on the sale of honours, and on revenues granted to them by the secular rulers of Iraq. On Toghri’s orders, Kunduri threatened to sequestrate the caliph’s iqṭā’s (estates), leaving him only with those which his father al-Qādir had possessed.² al-Qā’im had no alternative but to comply, and in 454/1062 the marriage contract was made at Tabriz by Toghri’s representative, the Ra’īs al-‘Iraqain Abu Ahmad al-Nihawandi, and by that of the caliph, Abu’l-Ghanā’im b. al-Muhallabān. The sultan himself was absent in Armenia, and did not meet his wife in

Baghdad until the following year, 455/1063, shortly before his death at Ray.\(^1\)

The conventional eulogies on his death stress Toghriil's piety and clemency on the one hand, and his vigour, even harshness, on the other. We need only note that it was surely a remarkable man who, in a life span of seventy years, could rise from a hand-to-mouth existence as a nomadic chief to a position of sovereignty over lands extending from Kirmān to Diyarbakr. At the time of his death the regions of Anatolia, northern Syria, and the Caucasus still provided ample scope for the energies of ghāzis and tribesmen, although the Türkmen revolts which Toghriil had to quell were a reminder that the Saljuq leaders' progress from steppe chieftains to monarchs in the Iranian style would not be untroubled.

Whilst Toghriil was occupied with the west, Khurāsān and the east remained under the control of Chaghri Beg, according to the division of authority made by the Saljuqs after the Dandānqān victory. Chaghri was allotted Khurāsān and all the lands north of the Oxus that he might conquer, while Marv became his capital; down to the end of Sanjar's reign, Marv was to remain the centre of Saljuq administration for the east. If he could wrest them from the sultans, Mūsā Yabghu was to have the frontier territories which accompanied the Ghaznavid empire: i.e. Herāt, Pūshang, Isfīzār (Aspuzār), Ghūr, Sīstān, and Bust; but his main efforts were in fact to be directed in the direction of Sīstān (see below, pp. 50–1). Qavurt, Chaghri's eldest son, was to expand southwards and occupy Kirmān, Kūhīstān, and Tabas, the latter being an important fortress and trading-post on the route that skirted the great salt desert and connected Khurāsān with Kirmān. İbrahim İnal, Qutlumush b. Arslan, and Chaghri's other two sons, Yāqūtī and Alp-Arslan, accompanied Toghriil westwards.\(^2\)

Chaghri thus remained ruler in the east until his death in 452/1060, though in the final years his son and successor Alp-Arslan took an increasing share in the business of ruling. Noting the paucity of information in the sources on Chaghri's personality and his system of government, Cahen has concluded that he was a somewhat colourless person.\(^3\) He does seem to have been content with the very extensive

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\(^2\) Zahir al-Dīn Nishapūrī, Šaljuq-Nāma, p. 18; Rāvandi, Rāhbat al-Šudūr, p. 104. A slightly different account of their spheres of influence occurs in Bundārī, Zubdat al-misrā, pp. 8–9, and Husainī, Aklbār al-daula, p. 17.

\(^3\) "Chaghri", Encyc. of Islam (2nd ed.).
power which he wielded in the east, and was never tempted into the
acts of rebelliousness which characterized the careers of so many
lesser Saljuq amirs. Toghril, suzerain of the whole of the Saljuq
dominions, was without male heir, and thus it was almost certain that
one of Chaghri’s own sons would succeed to the unified sovereignty of
east and west, which in fact happened under Alp-Arslan. The two
brothers always remained on friendly terms. Chaghri accepted Toghril’s
intervention in Sistan on behalf of Musa Yabghu and his son, and when
Ibrahim Inal rebelled, Toghril received valuable help from Chaghri’s
sons.

Chaghri had wide responsibilities in the east. Beyond the Atrak and
the Oxus, Dihistan and Khwarazm had to be defended against Qipchaq
pressure and a possible revival of Qarakhanid activity. But relations
with the Ghaznavids were his foremost concern. Only gradually over
the next few decades did the Ghaznavid sultans become reconciled
to the permanent loss of their Khurasanian provinces. Ibrahim b.
Mas’ud is said to have mourned his inability to recover the lost
territories: “He used to say, ‘If only I had been in my father Mas’ud’s
place after the death of my grandfather Mahmud, the bastions of our
kingdom would not have collapsed. But now, I am too weak to regain
what they have taken, and neighbouring kings with extensive terri­
itories and powerful armies have conquered it.’”

Sistan had been ruled in the 4th/10th century by amirs descended
from collaterals of the Safarid brothers Ya’qub and ‘Amr b. Laith. But in
393/1002 Mahmud of Ghazna deposed the Amir Khalaf b. Ahmad
d. 399/1008–9) and annexed Sistan to his empire. The unknown but very
patriotic author of the Ta’rikh-i Sistan, a local history of the province,
regards the coming of the Turks, i.e. the Ghaznavids, as a major
disaster for his country. Because of feelings like this, Sistan under
Ghaznavid rule was usually racked by the activities of patriotic ‘ayyârs.
Mas’ud ruled Sistan through a scion of the Safarid dynasty, Amir
Abu’l-Fadl Nasr. Turkmen raids on Sistan are recorded from c. 427/
1036 onwards, and soon afterwards the Saljuqs were definitely called
in by some Sagzi rebels against the Ghaznavids. Er-Tash (d. 440/
1048–9), who is described as a brother of Ibrahim Inal, came and
compelled Abu’l-Fadl to make the khutba in the name of Musa Yabghu,
who was then in Herat; after Dandanqan, Musa came in person to
Sistan. Abu’l-Fadl remained faithful to his new Saljuq masters: his

2 Ta’rikh-i Sistan, p. 354.
brother Abū Naṣr Maṣḥūr married a Turkish princess, and when in 432/1041 Sultan Maudūd b. Mas'ūd of Ghazna (432-41/1041-50) sent an army into Sīstān, Abū’l-Fadl and Er-Tash eventually repulsed it decisively. Abū’l-Fadl also purged the land of Ghaznavid sympathizers, who seem to have been especially well represented amongst the religious classes.\(^1\)

The frontier between this south-easternmost outpost of Saljuq influence and the Ghaznavid empire was finally stabilized in the lower Helmand valley between Sīstān and Bust. In 434/1042 Maudūd repulsed an attack on Bust by Abū’l-Fadl and Er-Tash, but it was Sultan ‘Abd al-Rashid b. Mahmūd who took the offensive in this region. In 443/1051-2 his slave general Toghril invaded Sīstān and drove out Abū’l-Fadl and Mūsā Yābghū, who were forced temporarily to flee to Herāt.\(^2\) Saljuq suzerainty was re-established in Sīstān, but it seems that Chaghri Beg now asserted his own superior rights over Sīstān, first sending his son Yāqūtī and then in 448/1056-7 coming personally to Zarang, the capital of Sīstān, where he minted his own coins. Relying on his position as ruler of Khurāsān and the east, Chaghri clearly hoped to reduce Mūsā Yābghū to a subordinate status in which Sīstān should be held as an apanage of Khurāsān. But later in that year, Mūsā appealed to Toghril as supreme head of the Saljuq family. Toghril, who was in ‘Īraq, thereupon sent Mūsā a patent of investiture for Sīstān and ordered that the khūṭba and the sikka (right of coinage) should both be in Mūsā’s name, as before. Mūsā’s son Qara-Arslān Bōrī resumed these rights on his father’s behalf, and the local administration of the province remained in the hands of the Šaffārid Abū’l-Fadl until his death in 465/1073, when his son Bāhā’ al-Daula wa’l-Dīn Tāhīr took over.\(^3\)

Towards the middle of Mas’ūd of Ghazna’s reign, Khwārazm had fallen under the control of rebellious governors, who had taken advantage of the province’s geographical isolation and its remoteness from Ghazna. It came briefly into the hands of Hārūn b. Altun-Tash Khwārazm-Shāh, and then, after his murder in 426/1035, into those of his brother Ismā’īl Khandān. Both of them lent their support to the Saljuqs—e.g. Hārūn supplied them with arms and beasts of burden—for they were enemies of the Ghaznavids.\(^4\) Shāh Malik, the Oghuz ruler of Jand, therefore allied with Mas’ūd, and in 429/1038

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\(^3\) Tarīkh-i Sīstān, pp. 375-82.

the sultan sent him a patent of investiture for Khwarazm, with the implicit invitation to overthrow Isma'il. In the winter of 432/1040-1 Shãh Malik marched across the desert into Khwarazm to assert his claim, and after a long and singularly bloody battle, he went to the capital and proclaimed the khutba for Sultan Mas'üd, although by this time Mas'üd was in fact dead.¹

The Saljuqs had meanwhile taken over Khurasan, and were now able to turn their attention to Khwarazm and settle scores with their ancient enemy. Toghril and Chaghri combined for this campaign, and in 433/1042 they drove Shãh Malik from Khwarazm. He fled with his forces across the Dihistan steppe to Kirmân and Makrân, and Pritsak has surmised that he was unable to return to his former territories in the Syr Darya delta because these had now passed into the hands of the Qipchaq. Eventually Shãh Malik was captured in Makrân by Er-Tash, who had been securing Sistan; he was then handed over to Chaghri, who killed him. Khwarazm was placed under a Saljuq governor, and the only other information recorded about this region during the rest of Chaghri's lifetime is a revolt by the governor of Khwarazm, which was suppressed personally by Chaghri at the end of the fifth decade of the eleventh century. In the course of this campaign, Chaghri also received the submission of the "Amir of Qipchaq", who became a Muslim and married into Chaghri's family.²

As well as securing the defence of his south-western frontier in the Sistan and Bust area, Maudûd of Ghazna managed to halt the Saljuqs in north-western Afghanistan and even to push them back temporarily. He drove them from Balkh, Herât returned to Ghaznavid allegiance, and Tirmidh, the important bridgehead on the Oxus, remained in his hands for some years more. An army which he had fitted out for the reconquest of Khurâsân was in 435/1043-4 defeated by Alp-Arslan, but Maudûd's prestige was so great that the "King of the Turks in Transoxiana" (probably the Qarakhanid Bôrî-Tegin, the later Tâmgâch-Khân Ibrahîm b. Naṣr of Samarqand) submitted to him, and eventually Maudûd married one of Chaghri's daughters.³ Towards the

end of his reign he planned another *revanche* against the Saljuqs in Khurāsān, by means of subsidies and promises of territory which stirred up several of their enemies. The Kākūyīd former ruler of Hamadān, Abū Kālijār Garshāsp, sent a contingent of troops, while the “Khāqān, King of the Turks” (doubtless Bōri-Tegin again), with his commander Qaşgha, attacked Tirmidh and Khwārazm respectively. Unfortunately for Maudūd, these strategies came to naught with his own death. At some time before his death, Tirmidh had been finally lost to the Ghaznavids; the Saljuqs were now in possession of the upper Oxus valley as far as Qubādhiyān and Vakhsh, and these regions were now entrusted to one of Alp-Arslan’s officials, Abū ‘Ali b. Shādhān.1

The decade 1050–60 was a troubled one for the Ghaznavids. Of the four short reigns in it, the most important were those of ‘Abd al-Rashīd b. Māhmūd (441-4/1050–3) and Farrukh-Zād b. Mas‘ūd (444–51/1053–9), and these two were separated by the short but violent usurpation of the throne by the Turkish slave commander Toghrīl.2

The fact that the Saljuqs derived no great advantage from these disturbances shows that they had reached the natural geographical limits of their expansion in the east. Indeed, at one point ‘Abd al-Rashīd successfully launched a counter-attack, defeating Chaghri and forcing the Oghuz to withdraw for a while from Sistān and Kirmān (see above, p. 51). Farrukh-Zād repelled Chaghri’s forces from Ghazna and captured several important Saljuq commanders before he in turn was defeated by Alp-Arslan. Thus the warfare was in general indecisive, and the two sides were fairly evenly balanced. Farrukh-Zād’s brother and successor, Ibrāhīm b. Mas‘ūd, accordingly made a formal peace treaty with Chaghri.3 Ibrāhīm’s long reign marked a period of prosperity and consolidation for the Ghaznavid empire, and the frontier with the Saljuqs remained essentially stable during his lifetime.4 The Ghaznavid empire was henceforth based upon the two centres of Ghazna in Afghanistan and Lahore in northern India; from the time of the reign of Maudūd these are the only two mints recorded for the Ghaznavids, in contrast to the multiplicity of mints used in the previous reigns.5

1 Husainī, pp. 27–8; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. ix, pp. 381–2; Barthold, *loc. cit.*
2 For an attempt to sort out the confused chronology of this decade, see Bosworth, “The Titulature of the Early Ghaznavids”, *Orien*, pp. 230–2.
4 For the relations between Ibrāhīm and Malik-Shāh, see section vii, pp. 93–4 below.
Before he died, Toghril seems to have designated as his successor Chaghri's younger son Sulaimān, a virtual nonentity who is hardly mentioned in the sources before this. Yet the union of both eastern and western lands under one Saljuq sultan surely demanded the strongest possible man at the top. Direct, unified rule by one man had never before been achieved, and there were powerful centrifugal forces at work in the Saljuq dominions, including the ambitions of other members of the Saljuq family and the naturally anarchical tendencies of the Türkmen. These latter considerations were probably in the minds of several Saljuq slave commanders, whose own interests lay in a strong central authority and the maintenance of a powerful professional army. Two such men, Yaghī- Başan and Erdem, proclaimed at Qazvin the succession of Sulaimān's brother, Abū Șuja' Alp-Arslan Muḥammad. Sulaimān himself was the candidate of Toghril's vizier and adviser, the 'Amid al-Mulk Kunduri, who doubtless hoped to perpetuate his own influence in the state; it was patent that if Alp-Arslan came to the throne, it would be the star of his own vizier and protégé, Niẓām al-Mulk, which would rise, whereas that of Kunduri would fall. The percipient Niẓām al-Mulk therefore threw his weight into the struggle on his master's side, and since Alp-Arslan already had possession of Khurāsān and was obviously superior in military experience, Kunduri and Sulaimān had to yield. Speedy recognition of Alp-Arslan's claim was imperative at this point, for Qutlumush and a large Türkmen following were lurking in the Alburz mountains to the south of the Caspian, awaiting the chance to descend on the key cities of Ray and Qazvin and thus seize power.¹

ALP-ARSLAN'S REIGN

this evil and blameworthy practice will rebound on the heads of your own children and descendants.” The ‘Abbāsid caliph’s assent was now secured for Alp-Arslan’s assumption of the sultanate. In his embassy Alp-Arslan tactfully allowed Toghrii’s widow, the daughter of al-Qā’im, to return home; he never attempted to emulate his uncle and contract a liaison with the ‘Abbāsids, nor does it seem that he ever even visited Baghdad. The caliph agreed to designate the new sultan “Trusted Son”, and he bestowed on him the honorifics ‘Adud al-Daula (‘Strong Arm of the State’) and Ḍiyā’ al-Din (‘Light of Religion”) in 456/1064.1

Alp-Arslan’s reign of ten years (455-65/1063-73) and the succeeding twenty years’ rule of his son Malik-Shāh form the apogee of the Great Saljuq sultanate. During these decades the Saljuq dominions were united under the rule of one man, and the energetic and unceasing journeys and campaigns of the sultans meant that this unity was far from theoretical. Irān was now enjoying an intellectual and cultural florescence as well as a considerable commercial and agricultural prosperity. The chaos caused by the Türkmen and their flocks was alleviated both by the policy of diverting them westwards as far as possible, and also by the Saljuq governors’ control over the provinces. After the great famine and pandemic of 448-9/1056-7 (its effects were felt in regions as far apart as Egypt, the Yemen, and Transoxiana), Iran was relatively free of the plagues and other misery which had earlier come in the wake of warfare and other devastation.2 There are indications that in the cities of Khurāsān, firmer rule and internal pacification checked the endemic violence of the ‘ayyārs and the sectarian factions (‘asābiyyāt). According to the historian of Bailey, Ibn Funduq, Malik-Shāh’s death was followed by a period of bloody sectarian strife and the dominance of ‘ayyārs in the towns.3 For Iran as a whole, however, trade with Central Asia and the Qipchaq steppe, together with trade through Kirmān and the Persian Gulf, was facilitated. Although there may have been a decline in the commerce of the Persian Gulf during the 5th/11th century—Lewis has surmised that the diversion of trade from India to South Arabia, the Red Sea,

3 Tā’rīkh-i Bāhibq, pp. 274–5.
and Egypt was a deliberate, anti-'Abbâsid policy on the part of the Fātimids of Cairo—Kirmân nonetheless prospered under the descendants of Qavurt. In the last decades of the 5th/11th century and the early ones of the next, the towns of Kirmân or Bardasîr and Jîrufî enjoyed great mercantile activity, and their commercial quarters contained colonies of foreign traders from as far afield as Byzantium and India.¹

This combined period of thirty years may also be characterized as the age of the great Vizier Niẓām al-Mulk, or al-Daula al-Niẓāmiyya as Ibn al-Athîr specifically calls it, and it is worth pausing to consider this outstanding figure of Iranian history. Not only was he mentor to the Saljuq sultans, encouraging them to act as sovereign monarchs in the Iranian tradition, but in his Siyāsat-Nāma or "Book of Government" he provided a precious source of information on the political ethos of the age and on the administrative and court procedures then prevalent in eastern Islam. He typifies the class of Iranian secretaries and officials upon whom the sultans relied, and his book is not merely a theoretical "Mirror for Princes" but also a blueprint according to which Niẓām al-Mulk hoped to fashion the sultan and his empire.

Abû 'Ali Hasan b. 'Ali Tûsî (408 or 410-85/1017 or 1019-92) was given the honorific Niẓām al-Mulk ("Order of the Realm") at some point early in his career, perhaps by Alp-Arslan in Khurâsân. Like so many of the Saljuqs' Khurâsânî servants, he had begun as an official of the Ghaznavids. He never ceased to have as his ideal the centralized despotism of the Ghaznavids, and in the Siyāsat-Nâma it is not surprising to find forceful monarchs such as Mahmûd of Ghazna and the Bûyid Aḍud al-Daula continually held up as models for the Saljuqs to emulate. Niẓām al-Mulk's family background and early life are well-documented by Ibn Funduq, for the family had marriage connexions with the Sayyids of Baihaq.² His studies with the Imam Muwaffaq, one of the outstanding Shâfi'î 'ulamâ of Nîshâpûr, helped to form his enthusiasm for both the Shâfi'î law school and the Ash'arî kalâm, while his zeal for education, and for these two fields of knowledge in particular, were later put into practice by his extension of the madrasa system (see pp. 72-4 below).

² Cf. Ta'rikh-i Baihaq, pp. 73-83.
ALP-ARSLAN’S REIGN

After the expulsion of the Ghaznavids from Khurāsān, the young Nizām al-Mulk spent three or four years in Ghazna and then entered the service of Chaghri and Alp-Arslan in his native Khurāsān. It may be that he saw himself as a representative of the Persian dihqān and official classes, with a duty and mission to perpetuate the traditions of those classes by civilizing their Turkish masters and thereby preserving Irān from Türkmen anarchy. On the death of Alp-Arslan’s vizier, Abū ‘Ali b. Shādhān, Nizām al-Mulk took over the post, and thus with Chaghri’s death he became the administrator of all Khurāsān. We have seen that his fame aroused the jealousy of Toghril’s vizier, Kunduri, who attempted to push the candidature of Sulaimān and so prevent Alp-Arslan and Nizām al-Mulk from gaining supreme power in the Saljuq dominions. During Alp-Arslan’s reign Nizām al-Mulk had a free hand in directing the administration of the empire; in addition, he spent much time on military duties, accompanying his master and also undertaking expeditions of his own, such as those of 459/1067 and 464/1071–2 in Fārs, whose success greatly increased his prestige.

Bowen has tabulated five main points of policy in Alp-Arslan’s reign, although, he says, whether they were formulated by the sultan himself or by his minister is uncertain. First, the Türkmen were employed for raiding the Christian kingdoms of Asia Minor and the Caucasus, as well as the lands of the Shi‘i Fātimids in Syria; hence at the outset of his reign, when his position as sultan was far from secure, Alp-Arslan thought it wise to lead a campaign into Georgia and Armenia (see below, p. 62). Second, the irresistibility of the sultan’s forces was demonstrated—coupled, however, with clemency towards and the reinstatement of rebels who submitted. Next, local rulers, both Sunnis and Shi‘is, were maintained in such regions as Iraq, Fārs, Āzarbāijān, and the Caspian provinces, while members of the Saljuq family were used as provincial governors. Fourth, to prevent the kind of crisis that had occurred on Toghril’s death, there was the early appointment of Malik-Shāh as vali ‘abd (heir) even though he was not the eldest son. And finally, good relations were established with the ‘Abbāsid caliphs. Bearing these policies in mind, we shall now consider the events of the reign, so far as they relate to the history of the Iranian world, under the three headings of dynastic affairs in the heartlands of the empire; the campaigns in the west; and the securing of the east.

1 “Nizām al-Mulk”, Encyc. of Islam (1st ed.); see also Cahen, “Alp Arslan”, Encyc. of Islam (2nd ed.).
When Alp-Arslan obtained the throne, the most immediate problem was to secure it against his uncle Qutlumush b. Arslan Isrā'il. In his claim Qutlumush had voiced the old Turkish idea of seniorate, or the right of the eldest competent male member of the family to have supreme control: “By right, the sultanate should come to me, because my father was the senior and leading member of the tribe.”

There is no doubt that this argument appealed to many of the Türkmen. Qutlumush raised the standard of revolt at Sāveh in 456/1054, accompanied by his brother and by large numbers of Türkmen. Against him, Niżām al-Mulk fitted out for the sultan an army whose chief commanders were, as their names show, slave soldiers; prominent among them was the eunuch Sav-Tegin, who became one of Alp-Arslan’s most trusted generals. In this way the two opposing sides exemplified the dual aspect of the Saljuq military and ruling institution: on one side there were the free-ranging, independent, tribally organized Türkmen; and on the other was the new, professional army of the sultan, predominantly slave soldiers whose only loyalty was to the sultan, on whom they depended for their salaries or for grants of land. With typical Türkmen disregard for the agricultural economy of the region, Qutlumush devastated the neighbourhood of Ray, but was defeated in battle and was afterwards found dead in mysterious circumstances.

Difficulties also arose in Alp-Arslan’s reign when another important member of the Saljuq family, the sultan’s own elder brother Qara-Arslan Qavurt, ceased to be content with a subordinate position. Kirmān had formed part of the Büyid territories in southern Iran held by ʿImād al-Dīn Abū Kālijār (see above, p. 39). The origins of Saljuq rule in the province are not very clear, for the accounts in Ibn al-Athīr and in Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm’s special history of the Saljuqs of Kirmān do not coincide in all points, and the opening pages of the latter work are in any case lost. But the Ghaznavid defeat of Danānqān certainly allowed Saljuq raiders to penetrate southwards through Kūhīstān and the towns of Tabas and Qā‘īn in order to attack the oases of Kirmān province. Whether it was Ibrāhīm Ināl or Qavurt who was attacking Bardasīr, the chief town of Kirmān, in

1 Ṣahir al-Dīn Niṣḥāpūrī, Saljūq-Nāma, p. 22.
434/1042–3 is unclear, but the Būyīd vizier Muḥadhdhib al-Daula was sent out from Fārs to defend it, and it seems to have remained in Būyīd hands for a few years more. However, shortly before Abū Kālijār’s death in 440/1048–9, the Dailami commander of Bardasir, Bahram b. Lashkarsitan, delivered the capital into Qavurt’s hands.1 In this way the rule of Qavurt and of his descendants became established in the province for the next 140 years, and until the irruption of the Ghuzz in the latter half of the 6th/12th century, Kirmān enjoyed a period of comparative stability and prosperity—especially since it lay on the overland trade-route from Khurāsān to the Gulf and to the lands farther east. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhim stresses Qavurt’s just rule: the Türkmen were allotted fiefs in Kirmān, but the amīr himself was careful to pasture his own extensive flocks well out in the steppe, where agricultural land would not be damaged. He also sent an expedition against the Kūfīchīs or Qufs, the Balūchī mountaineers whose banditry had long made the southern and eastern parts of the province insecure; the Saljuq invasion of Kirmān seems to have given a general stimulus to the eastward migration of the Balūchīs into Makrān and the modern Balūchistān.2 Qavurt was even strong enough to mount an expedition across the Persian Gulf and seize the former Būyīd dependency of Oman from the local Khawārij; it was to remain under Saljuq suzerainty until c. 536/1140.3

When his father Chaghri died, Qavurt recognized the succession of Alp-Arslan in the east, and after Toghril died and Alp-Arslan came to Kirmān in 456/1064, Qavurt recognized him as supreme Saljuq sultan and gave him his allegiance. This he withdrew three years later, removing his brother’s name from the khutba.4 Alp-Arslan then came with an army and restored the status quo, granting Qavurt full forgiveness; yet the latter was never fully reconciled to the exaltation of another man over the whole of the Saljuq family, and when Malik-Shāh took over his father’s throne, Qavurt rebelled against the new sultan (see below, pp. 88–9). After the siege of Jiruft in Kirmān in 459/1067, Alp-Arslan’s army marched into Fārs, which five years previously had been conquered by Qavurt from the Shabānkārā’ī

chieftain Faḍlūya, though it had afterwards slipped from Saljuq control. In the course of this campaign in Fārs several fortresses were taken: indeed, the conquest of Iṣṭakhr is said to have given a great fillip to Niẓām al-Mulk’s fame. A further campaign against Faḍlūya was required in 461/1069, but this particular menace was now removed by the capture and killing of Faḍlūya and of his brother Hasan or Ḥasanuya.

It has been noted that Alp-Arslan never visited Baghdad personally. He was nevertheless concerned to maintain his rights in Iraq, and above all to watch over the Arab amīrs there and ensure that they did nothing more to encourage the Fātimids’ ambitions in Iraq. The sultan’s military representative in the Iraq was shahna, a position normally given to one of his ghulām commanders. As far as possible, the sultan always appointed a man who was persona grata to the ‘Abbāsid caliph. Al-Qā‘īm objected to Ai-Tegin, appointed in 464/1071, because his son had killed one of the caliph’s ghulāms; so Alp-Arslan and Niẓām al-Mulk agreed to remove him and substitute Gauhar-Ā’in, a former ghulām of the Būyid Abū Kālijār. As was customary, administrative and diplomatic contact between the sultanate and caliphate was channelled through the respective viziers. When in 450/1058 Ibn al-Muslīma was killed, his successor as vizier to al-Qā‘īm was the capable and energetic Fākh al-Daula Muḥammad b. Jahīr, who had formerly served the ‘Uqailids, Mirdāsids, and most recently the Marwānid Naṣr al-Daula. Over the next fifteen years Ibn Jahīr strove to maintain the influence of the caliphate in Iraq. By a skilful cultivation of the Arab amīrs, most of whom were Shi‘īs, he won their allegiance to the ‘Abbāsids. Niẓām al-Mulk was on friendly terms with his opposite number, and in 462/1069–70 his daughter Ṣafīyya was married to Ibn Jahīr’s son ‘Amīd al-Daula. At the same time he received from the caliph the honorifics Qiwām al-Dīn (“Support of Religion”) and Raḍī Amīr al-Mu‘minīn (“Favoured One of the Commander of the Faithful”). Indeed, in 460/1068 al-Qā‘īm had temporarily dismissed Ibn Jahīr for his subservience to the Saljuqs, “because”, in the words of Ibn al-Jauzī, “you have put on robes of honour from ‘Adud al-Daula

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[i.e. from Alp-Arslan]. The sultan used caliphal support in 458/1066 to make his son Malik-Shah vali 'ahd; at a ceremony near Marv, the assembled amīrs took an oath of allegiance to Malik-Shāh and his name was placed in the khūṭba. At the same time, Alp-Arslan publicly allotted the governorships of Khwārazm, Khurāsān, the upper Oxus lands, and the Caspian provinces, to several of his brothers, sons, and other relatives. The seal was set on cordial relations with the caliph when in 464/1071-2 Alp-Arslan's daughter was married to al-Qā'im's son and heir, who was later to become Caliph al-Muqtadi.

Saljuq policy in Iraq and the Syrian desert fringes was to maintain the existing power of the Arab amirs while keeping them under close surveillance. Thus it was from the sultan in the first place that the 'Uqailid Sharaf al-Daula Muslim b. Quraish of Mosul (d. 478/1085) sought the grant of Anbār, Hit, and other places in central 'Iraq, and only afterwards did he get caliphal confirmation. In Baṣra, the sultan in 459/1067 restored to the governorship and to the tax-farm there the Kurd Tāj al-Mulāk Hazārasp b. Bankir, and he linked his fortunes to those of the Saljuqs by giving Hazārasp one of his own sisters in marriage. After Hazārasp's death three years later, this same sister was again given in a political marriage, this time to the 'Uqailid Sharaf al-Daula Muslim. Thanks to this policy, Iraq enjoyed a period of tranquillity after the violence of Toghril's reign. The Fāṭimids did not dare to interfere there, and their influence also diminished in some parts of the Arabian peninsula. In 462/1070 the sharif of Mecca, Muḥammad b. Abī Ḥāshim, came to Alp-Arslan with the news that the khūṭba in Mecca was now being made for the 'Abbāsid caliph and the Saljuq sultan, and no longer for the Fāṭimid al-Mustansir; and further, the Shi'i adhān (call to prayer) had been abolished. The sultan attempted to make this volte-face permanent by allotting the sharif a generous pension.

It was his activities in the west, and above all his victory at Malāzgird (Mantzikert), which established Alp-Arslan in the eyes of posterity as a Muslim hero. In some respects this victory was a fortuitous one, for a crusade against the Christians does not appear to have been one of the mainsprings of the sultan's policy. Witttek and Cahen have shown that in dealing with the overrunning of Anatolia at this time,

2 Ibid., pp. 34, 48.
4 Ibid. p. 41.
we must distinguish clearly between the official policy of the Saljuq sultans and the uncontrolled activities of Türkmen raiders. The moderate, even magnanimous, attitude adopted by Alp-Arslan towards the defeated Byzantine Emperor Romanus Diogenes shows that his most basic policy at this time was essentially one of co-existence between the two great empires, Christian and Islamic. Just as the Oghuz bands when they first entered Khurāsān had been unable to conceive that the formidable Ghaznavid empire might crack under their puny attacks, so the Byzantine empire, which had withstood many Muslim attacks in the past, was regarded by the Saljuqs as ageless and invincible. The Türkmen, on the other hand, sought plunder and pasture for their herds wherever they could find them. They too had no thoughts of overthrowing Byzantine rule in Anatolia, for they were militarily incapable of besieging and taking the Byzantine strongholds there; but their spreading out through the Anatolian countryside inevitably led to the surrender of the Greek cities, which were now encircled and cut off from their rural hinterland. In effect, the Türkmen on the Byzantine and Armenian frontiers in eastern Anatolia swelled the ranks of older Muslim ghāzi elements, Arab, Kurdish, and Dailami—warriors who had long faced their Byzantine counterparts, the akritai. With this increase of Turks on the frontiers, the Turkish terms aqinj'i (raider) and ufj (properly extremity, border > fighter on the border) came into use side by side with that of ghāzi.1

Shortly after his accession, Alp-Arslan, accompanied by his son Malik-Shāh and by Nizām al-Mulk, campaigned in Armenia, capturing Ani from its Byzantine garrison. Gagik-Abas of Kars submitted and the sultan penetrated into Georgia, where he consolidated his influence by marrying a niece of the Georgian King Bagrat IV, but in 460/1068 a further campaign against Georgia was necessary.2 In 459/1067 Alp-Arslan was in Arrān, where he received the tribute of the Shaddādīd Faḍl b. Shāvur and also of the Shirvān-Shāh Fakhīr al-Dīn Farīburz b. Sallār; in the ensuing years Turkish ghulām governors were appointed for the western shores of the Caspian as far north as Darband.3


Meanwhile, virtually independent Türkmen bands were already raiding far into Anatolia: in 459/1067 Caesarea (Kayseri) in Cappadocia was sacked; in the next year Amorium in Phrygia, and in the next year Iconium (Konya). Despite all this, the Byzantines still occasionally followed their traditional practice of employing predatory bands such as these Türkmen as auxiliaries (*foederati*) against other Türkmen.

The attacks on central Anatolia menaced the Byzantine lines of communication that stretched through the Taurus and Cilicia to their cities of Antioch, Edessa, and Malatya in northern Syria and Diyarbakr. The Emperor Romanus accordingly sent an army to northern Syria, which secured the defence of these cities and then took the offensive against the Muslims: Artah, between Antioch and Aleppo, and Manbij on the Euphrates were both captured, and Aleppo itself was menaced. It is likely that a truce was made in 462/1070 between Alp-Arslan and Romanus, since the sultan now felt free to turn his attention to what had long been a favoured project of his: the expulsion of the Fāṭimids from Syria and even perhaps a march on Egypt. According to two writers, the historian of Aleppo, Ibn al-ʻAdīm, and the Egyptian Ibn Muyassar, an appeal was made to Alp-Arslan at this time by a certain rebel against the Fāṭimids in Egypt. Yet whatever type of truce may have been made, no real cessation of hostilities in Anatolia was possible, for the sultan had very little control over the activity of the Türkmen there.¹

In the spring of 463/1071 Alp-Arslan was in northern Syria when he heard the news that Romanus had assembled a vast army at Erzerum and had marched eastwards into Armenia. The sultan was taken by surprise and treated this as a breach of the truce. With wild exaggeration, Muslim and Christian sources variously number the emperor’s army at between 200,000 and one million; more reliable sources say that it included Frankish, Russian, Khazar, Pecheneg, Oghuz, and Qipchaq mercenaries, as well as Greeks and Armenians. The pitched battle which took place at Malāzgird was the first major one that the Turks had ever ventured against a Byzantine army. It ended in disaster for the Greeks, the supreme indignity being the capture of the Basileus by the Muslims. But even in his hour of victory Alp-Arslan did not endeavour to destroy the Byzantine empire. Romanus was allowed to ransom himself, promising tribute and a

marriage alliance, and it is possible that he promised to cede such cities as Malāzgird, Edessa, Antioch, and Manbij; as it was, the deposition and death of Romanus rendered all these provisions void.\(^1\)

The defeat at Malāzgird was a symptom rather than a cause of the Greeks’ downfall in eastern Anatolia. In the years just before this, the will to resist among the Byzantine akritai had been weakening, especially as many of these warriors were Armenians, resentful of Byzantine political and ecclesiastical policy in their country; moreover the poor quality of Romanus’s army, huge though it may have been in numbers, was reflected in what was at least a trickle of desertions to the enemy. From 464/1072 onwards, eastern and central Anatolia lay open to the Türkmen, who speedily overran all the region except for the strongholds in the Taurus. Alp-Arslan’s victory at Malāzgird also meant that, apart from the districts of Tashir and eastern Siunik\(^4\), Armenia passed definitely into Muslim hands; and within the next decade or so, the Byzantines, resolutely anti-Armenian to the end, exterminated several survivors of the native Bagratid and Ardzrunid dynasties.\(^2\) Thus in succeeding centuries only the tiny kingdom of Georgia survived as an independent Christian power in the Caucasus.

Alp-Arslan took steps early in his reign to secure his eastern frontiers, where there were old rivals such as the Qarakhanids and Ghaznavids whose attitude might flare up into hostility should a favourable opportunity present itself. The western Qarakhanid khanate of Soghdia and Farghāna was at this time under the rule of Tamghach-Khan İbrahim b. Nasr (c. 444–60/1052–68). The historical sources and the “Mirrors for Princes” both portray this khan as a man of outstanding justice and piety: he cultivated the ‘ulamā, was careful not to introduce uncanonical taxation, and protected the common people against banditry and exploitation by commercial interests.\(^3\) Already in Togrul’s lifetime Alp-Arslan had demonstrated by a show of force against the Qarakhanids that his father’s old influence along the Oxus valley was to be upheld; now that Alp-Arslan was supreme sultan, he invaded the territories of Tamghach-Khan İbrahim, causing the latter to protest to the caliph about this unprovoked aggression. Over the following years, however, Alp-Arslan adopted a more pacific policy here and

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\(^2\) Grousset, pp. 616–17, 629–35.

\(^3\) Cf. Barthold, Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion, pp. 311–13.
endeavoured to secure harmony with the Qarakhanids through a series of marriage alliances. He himself married the widowed daughter of Qadir Khan Yusuf, formerly ruler of Kashgar and Khotan; his daughter 'A'isha was given to Ibrāhim's son and successor, Shams al-Mulk Naṣr; and his son Malik-Shāh married another Qarakhanid princess, who eventually gave birth to the future Saljuq Sultan Mahmud (see below, p. 103).1

The links between the two Turkish houses were therefore ostensibly close, though they did not prevent tension from arising at the end of Alp-Arslan's reign between the sultan and Shams al-Mulk Naṣr (460-72/1068-80). In 465/1072 Alp-Arslan crossed the Oxus on a bridge of boats with an army alleged to number 200,000, but this campaign was cut short by his death: he was stabbed by a local castellan whom he had condemned to death. Shams al-Mulk thereupon took the offensive and carried the war over to the Saljuq side of the Oxus. He captured Tirmidh and ejected Ayaz b. Alp-Arslan from Balkh before the new sultan Malik-Shāh could intervene and cause the Qarakhanid forces to retreat.2 Throughout this period relations with the Ghaznavids were harmonious, and the frontier agreed upon by Chaghri Beg and Sultan Ibrāhim b. Mas'ūd remained respected.3

Apart from dealings with these two great powers, Alp-Arslan had had to contend with a certain amount of unrest and rebelliousness on the eastern fringes of the empire, where some local rulers and governors tried to take advantage of the troubled circumstances surrounding the sultan's accession. In 456/1064 he had to subdue and finally kill the rebellious amir of Khuttal and the governor of Chaghāniyān (whether these were the descendants of former local rulers or merely nominees of the Saljuqs is unknown), while a revolt of his uncle Fakhr al-Mulk Mūsā Yabghu in Herāt also had to be suppressed.4 In the following year the sultan undertook an expedition from Marv to Khwārazm and then into the Üst Urt and Qipchaq steppes, the ancestral home of the Oghuz; and at this time he did in fact take the opportunity of visiting Jand, where Saljuq b. Duqaq was buried. These events are

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treated in some detail by Mirkhwând, but both the events and the
personages involved remain somewhat shadowy and mysterious. It
appears that Alp-Arslan was formally recognized in Khwârazm as
sultan and that he then left as governor there his son or brother Arslan-
Arghun; from Khwârazm he led a punitive campaign against the Qipchaq, penetrating as far as the Manqishlâq peninsula on the eastern
Caspian shore.

We have seen that when Malik-Shâh was made heir to the throne in
458/1066, Alp-Arslan chose the occasion to redistribute governorships
in the east among members of the Saljuq family. According to Ibn
al-Athîr, Tabaristan was given to Inanch Yabghu (? Bighu), Bâlkh
went to the sultan’s brother Sulaimân, Khwârazm to his brother
Arslan-Argihan, and Chaghâniyân and Tukhârâstân to his brother
Ilyâs; Mârv was given to his youngest son Arslan-Shâh, the district
of Bâghshâr (near Mârv ar-Rûd) to Mas‘ûd b. Er-Tash, and Isfizar to
Maudûd b. Er-Tash. That he continued to grant the eastern fringes
as appanages for lesser members of the family, despite the opportunities
this gave for rebelliousness, seems to show that the sultan was still
mindful of traditional obligations to family members; it further seems
to imply that he now considered western Iran and Iraq to be the
Saljuq empire’s centre of gravity and the regions most demanding of
his personal presence.

VI. NIẒĀM AL-MULK AND THE ZENITH OF
THE GREAT SALJUQ EMPIRE

continued and in some ways surpassed the triumphs of his father.
The lands of the Great Saljuqs were never more extensive than during
Malik-Shâh’s reign. In the east there was something like a state of
equilibrium with the Ghaznavid Sultan Ibrâhîm, although the pre­
tensions of the Qarakhânids in Tukhâristân and in the other lands to
the south of the Oxus—pretensions which had already caused anxiety
to Alp-Arslan—made the north-eastern frontier a certain source of
worry in the early part of Malik-Shâh’s reign. When internal dissension

1 On the confusion surrounding this personage, see Cahen, “Arslan-Argûn”, Encyc.
of Islam (2nd ed.).
12; Sachau, S.B.W.A.W., pp. 313–14.
within the Qarakhânîd dominions afforded a chance for intervention, the sultan undertook an important campaign into Transoxiana and beyond, carrying Saljuq arms into places where they had never been seen before, such as Talas and Kâshghar. In the north-west, Saljuq troops operated amongst the Muslim amîrs of Mûghân, Arrân, and Shirvân, and also amongst the Christian peoples of the southern Caucasus. In Anatolia, following Malâzgird and the Muslim conquest of Armenia, Qutlumush's two sons Sulaimân and Mašûr took advantage of the collapse of the Byzantine limes (frontier defence line) to raid as far as the shores of the Aegean. The generally hostile attitude of these two Saljuq princes towards Malik-Shâh, the son of their father's rival and vanquisher, makes it questionable whether the Türkmen conquests in Anatolia were in any measure attachable to or dependent upon the Great Saljuq empire. In the Arab lands south of Anatolia, however, the sultan's direct influence was extended by several means: through the agency of such slave commanders as Aq-Sonqur, Bursuq, and Khumar-Tegin; by Türkmen beqs, e.g. Artuq and Atsiz b. Uvâk; by members of the Saljuq royal family, such as Tutush b. Alp-Arsân; and also by the two Ibn Jahîrs, father and son, who were Arab soldier-officials. These latter extinguished the independence of the Marwânîs, whose attitude in the Saljuq-Fâtimid conflict had been at times ambiguous; in addition they reduced the power of other Arab amîrates such as the 'Uqailîs, they mopped up survivals of Greco-Armenian resistance in northern Syria, expelled the lieutenants of the Fâtîmîds from the whole of Syria and the greater part of Palestine, and they even undertook successful expeditions into the Arabian peninsula as far as the Yemen in the southwest and al-Ahsâ' in the east.

Such an achievement is an impressive one for a comparatively young man—Malik-Shâh was only thirty-seven when he died—and it contrasts with the disunity and the squabbling amongst the sultan's children after his death in 485/1092. Thereafter, Saljuq power in Iraq and western İrân was to become increasingly enfeebled. Khurâsân and the east were under the rule of Sanjar, the most capable of Malik-Shâh's sons and the one favoured by a long life, and this region enjoyed the greatest degree of stability and continuity of rule in the first half of the 6th/12th century; yet even here, Sanjar's dominion was to end in tragedy and confusion at the hands of intransigent Türkmen tribesmen.
Malik-Shāh’s achievement was by no means a wholly personal one; indeed, the contribution of Vizier Niẓām al-Mulk was even greater than that of his master. Whereas in the years before 465/1072 Niẓām al-Mulk had served men of maturity and experience, such as Chaghri Beg and Alp-Arslan, now his sultan was a young man of eighteen whom he hoped to control and adapt to his own ideal of a despotic monarch in the Iranian-Islamic tradition. His entire period as vizier to the Saljuq sultans extended over thirty years, not counting his service to the prince Alp-Arslan when Toghri was still sultan.1 His famous boast to Malik-Shāh, made just before his assassination in 485/1092 and when his enemies at court were concerting their plans against him, was tactless but substantially true:

Tell the Sultan, “If you have not already realized that I am your co-equal in the work of ruling, then know that you have only attained to this power through my statesmanship and judgement.” Does he not remember when his father was killed, and I assumed responsibility for the conduct of affairs and crushed the rebels who reared their heads, from his own family and from elsewhere, such as so-and-so and so-and-so (and he named a whole group of those who had risen up in revolt)? . . . Tell him that the stability of that regal cap is bound up with this vizierial inkstand, and that the harmony of these two interests is the means of securing all objects sought after and the ultimate cause of all objects gained. If ever I close up this inkstand, that royal power will topple.2

Nizām al-Mulk acted in effect as the atabeg, or tutor, of Malik-Shāh. This Turkish title, meaning literally “Father-commander”, was not in wide use till after Malik-Shāh’s death, when there were several young Saljuq princes who were provided with atabegs (see below, pp. 111-12); but Nizām al-Mulk himself received the title amongst the epithets bestowed on him at the beginning of Malik-Shāh’s reign, and he was usually addressed by the sultan as “Father”.3

Nizām al-Mulk directed policy primarily through the Great Divān or administrative office (Divān-i Vāzīr, Divān-i Sultan), the executive centre of the state, over which he presided. He had considerable influence within the sultan’s standing army and an important voice in the nomination of amirs for specific campaigns. On occasion he

3 Cahen has pointed out that according to Husainī (op. cit. p. 29), the young Alp-Arslan apparently had an atabeg (“Atabak”, Encyc. of Islam, 2nd ed.).
would still undertake expeditions himself, but increasing age and the feeling of power which he already derived from being at the centre of things in his divan, led him during Malik-Shah’s reign to prefer the role of organizer and diplomat to that of field commander. Either in this divan, which was normally located in the sultan’s capital of Isfahan, or else while he was accompanying the monarch on his campaigns and missions, Nizām al-Mulk supervised the operation of the subordinate departments: those of the Mustaufi (Chief Accountant), of the Munshi or Tughrā’i (Chief Secretary), of the Ārid al-Jaish (Chief of Military Affairs and Organization), and of the Mushrif (Chief of Intelligence and Investigation Services). This central bureaucracy, whose five-part division obviously follows that of the Ghaznavids, he succeeded in moulding largely to his own liking. He filled it with officials who were either from his own family or were his protégés and supporters; in many cases the two categories became coterminous through the marriages which he arranged. In the early part of Malik-Shah’s reign two men are specially mentioned in the sources as having aided Nizām al-Mulk in making the bureaucracy a pliant instrument for the execution of his policy: the Šāhīb Divān al-Insāb wa’l-Tughrā (“Head of the Department of Correspondence and the Seal”), one Kamāl al-Daula Abu Rida Fadlallah; and the Šāhīb al-Zimān wa’l-Istifā (“Head of the Department of Financial Control and Accounting”), a man named Šaraf al-Mulk Abū Sa’d Muḥammad.

Nizām al-Mulk’s own children were a numerous and ambitious clan; Rāvandi numbers his sons at twelve, all of whom, so he says, held some office or other. Certainly we find several of them entrenched in lucrative posts throughout the empire, not only in the central bureaucracy but also in the strategically important provincial governorships, where the vizier required trusty supporters to put his decrees into practice. Shams al-Mulk ‘Uthmān was governor of Marv. Jamāl al-Mulk Mansūr was governor of Balkh till his murder in 475/1082; in Alp-Arslan’s times his pride had made him reject his father’s request that he should act as vizier to the prince Malik-Shah. “It is not fitting”, he said, “for someone like me to act as vizier to a mere boy.” Mu’ayyid al-Mulk ‘Ubaidallāh’s power and influence were almost as great as

1 Bundārī, pp. 59 ff.
2 Rābat al-sudur, p. 133. According to a report in Mirkhwānd (Raudat al-safā’, vol. iv, p. 113), these twelve sons received as much honour in the people’s eyes as did the twelve Imāms of the Shi’a.
those of his father. At one point Niẓām al-Mulk hoped to impose him on the ‘Abbāsid caliph as his vizier, but al-Muqtadī strenuously objected; eventually Mu‘ayyid al-Mulk replaced Kamāl al-Daula as Ṭūghrā‘ī in the Saljuq administration. In 475/1082-3 Mu‘ayyid al-Mulk entered Baghdad from Isfahān and assumed the privilege, normally bestowed only by express royal command on the greatest men in the state, of having a salute of drums and military music (nauba) playing outside his house at three of the daily prayer times; a handsome payment persuaded him to desist from this. Likewise, when Niẓām al-Mulk’s daughter died in 470/1077-8, her father secured for her body the privilege of burial in the grounds of the caliphal palace at Baghdad. It was not surprising that the vizier’s opponents accused him and his family of arrogance and of the abuse of political and social power.

In addition to his own family, Niẓām al-Mulk had a numerous following of secretaries and officials who were seeking his patronage, together with a personal household of ghulāms who were said to number several thousand. According to Anushīrvān b. Khālid, parents hastened to send their children to the great vizier’s household for their education. For his part, Niẓām al-Mulk was always careful to attract useful, capable men into his service and into the administration, and the power of this retinue is shown by their activities after Niẓām al-Mulk’s death. Within a short time his ghulāms had wreaked vengeance on his old rival Tāj al-Mulk Abu‘l-Ghanā‘īm, who was widely suspected of having instigated Niẓām al-Mulk’s murder. More important, his descendants played a prominent part in public affairs for at least half a century after his death, many of them acting as viziers and officials for the Saljuq sultans and for the caliphs, despite the fact that only one or two of these officials seem to have had outstanding ability.

Niẓām al-Mulk also tried to buttress the structure of the Saljuq empire, and to counter the splendour and prestige of the Fāṭimid caliphate in Cairo, by encouraging the progress of the Sunni revival in Iraq and Iran. The sources attribute to him a decisive role as the protagonist of Sunni orthodoxy, saying that he restored political and social order in Iran by repairing the damage to state and religion wrought by the heretical and tyrannical Büyids. Later in Malik-Shāh’s

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1 Bundārī, pp. 52, 60, 73; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. x, pp. 82-3, 85.
2 Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 84; according to Husainī, Akhbār al-daulā, p. 67, he had over 20,000 ghulāms.
3 Bundārī, p. 57.
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reign, the Ismā'īlīs or Assassins appeared in several areas of Iran, disturbing in some measure the course of this return to orthodoxy; since several of the Assassin strongholds were in the Alburz mountains, the region in which the province of Dailam lay, it is not unreasonable to see this outbreak of political and religious heterodoxy as a recrudescence of earlier Iranian opposition to the orthodox institutions of the Baghdad caliphate and of Sunni Islam. However, the Ismā'īlī movement in Iran never constituted a major threat to the established institutions, and it is likely that Ismā'īlism’s conspiratorial methods, in particular its weapon of political assassination, caused contemporaries to exaggerate its importance. [For a detailed treatment of Ismā'īlism in Iran, see below, pp. 422–82.]

It seems that Nizam al-Mulk desired to speed up the provision of educational institutions within the eastern Sunni world and to make them comparable with those still flourishing in Umayyad Spain and Fāṭimid Egypt. There is some controversy about his exact motives in founding these madrasas, or colleges of higher learning, which were named Nizāmīyyas in his honour. Did he seek to create a network of these institutions personally dependent on himself, meaning to further his own political plans; or was his aim the more general one of raising intellectual standards throughout eastern, non-Fāṭimid Islam, with the madrasas fitting into a pattern of state-supported education? The latter view is probably the more likely one in the context of contemporary events. The Sunni madrasa-building movement had begun in the second half of the 4th/10th century and was in full swing well before Nizām al-Mulk’s time. It was a response first to the challenge of Mu’tazili thought, and subsequently to the Fāṭimid institutions for training Shī‘ī dā‘īs or propagandists: i.e. the Azhar mosque of the Fāṭimid general Jauhar and the Caliph al-Mu‘izz (founded in 359/970), the Dār al-Hikma (“House of Learning”) of the Caliph al-Ḥākim (founded in 395/1005), and the various local dār al-da‘was, or rallying-places and centres for propaganda. To implement Nizām al-Mulk’s administrative policies throughout the Saljuq empire required the training of reliable personnel as secretaries and officials, and herein probably lies the key

to his motives. Moreover, not only was madrasa education free, as of course it was in other educational institutions, but generous living allowances were allotted to students at the Nizâmiyyas.¹

Tâj al-Dîn al-Subkî, the 8th/14th century compiler of a biographical dictionary of Şâfi‘î scholars, attributes to Nizâm al-Mulk the foundation of a madrasa in every important city of Iraq and Iran, and he specifically mentions nine of them: the ones at Baghdad and Nişâpûr (the two most famous Nizâmiyyas), and those at Balkh, Herât, Marv, Āmul in Gurgân, Ísfâhân, Başra, and Mosul.² This prominence of Khurâsânian cities may not be fortuitous. During the 5th/11th century Sunni scholarship in Khurâsân was at its most brilliant. It had behind it a long tradition of political and cultural orthodoxy, stretching back through the Ghaznavids and Sâmanîs to the Tâhirîs, whereas central and western Iran were for a long time in the Saljuq period still politically and religiously suspect because of their association with heterodox Dâlîmî dynasties. Nizâm al-Mulk regarded the appointment of suitable scholars to teach at his Nizâmiyyas as a personal responsibility. When the Baghdad Nizâmiyya opened in 459/1067, he took considerable pains to secure for it the scholar Abû Ishâq al-Shirâzî, and later, in 484/1091, he brought the theologian and philosopher Abû Ḥâmid al-Ghazâlî to lecture there when the latter was only thirty-three and little known outside his native Khurâsân. On Malik-Shâh’s first visit to Baghdad in 479-80/1081, after the conclusion of the campaign in northern Syria, Nizâm al-Mulk personally lectured on hadîth or tradition at his madrasa and dictated to the students there.³

The use of scholars from Khurâsân is bound up with another controversial aspect of Nizâm al-Mulk’s educational policy: the degree to which he specifically hoped to further his own Şâfi‘î law school and the Ash’ârî kâlâm. Many of the sources may have overemphasized the Şâfi‘î and Ash’ârî nature of the teaching at the Nizâmiyyas. Before the great vizier achieved such power in the Saljuq state, these doctrines were very suspect to men such as Toghrîl and

¹ Subkî, ʿTabâqât al-ṣâhîfîyya al-kubra, vol. iii, p. 137, rightly refutes the assertion made in many sources, that the great vizier was the first person to build madrasas; but, says Subkî, he may have been the first to assign allowances to the students. However, even this is dubious.

² See his article on Nizâm al-Mulk, op. cit. vol. iii, pp. 135-45.

his minister Kunduri; and Nizām al-Mulk's support for the doctrines did not guarantee their acceptance and recognition, especially outside Khurāsān. In Baghdad and the western provinces they were anathema to conservative religious circles, Ḥanafī as well as Ḥanbalī, who regarded them as alien, Khurāsānian imports. If the Nizāmiyyas were institutions for the propagation of Shāfī‘ism and Ash‘arism, they failed in Iraq and western Iran. Although the ‘Abbāsid caliphs were Shāfī‘is, the Saljuq sultans themselves remained staunch Ḥanafīs, and the fervent Ḥanafī Rāvandi, who wrote his history of the Saljuqs in the opening years of the 13th century, still couples together for denunciation the Rāfidīs (i.e. the extremist Shi‘is and Ismā‘īlis) and the Ash‘arīs. ‘Imād al-Dīn stresses the violent Ḥanafī partisanship shown by several of Sūltān Mas‘ūd b. Muḥammad’s ghulām āms. Between the years 536/1141-2 and 542/1147-8 he speaks of the persecution and expulsion of Shāfī‘ scholars by Saljuq governors and commanders in Baghdad, Ray, and Isfahān, where some Shāfī‘is found it politic to change to Hanafism. In Baghdad the Nizāmiyya declined in the 6th/12th century, and it was the Hanbali colleges which were intellectually the most vital in Baghdad at this time. But perhaps the most significant piece of evidence which we have against any undue partisanship by Nizām al-Mulk is his soothing pronouncement, as reported by the fiercely Ḥanbalī Ibn al-Jauzī, when the Ḥanbalīs of Baghdad were protesting against the public teaching of Ash‘arism:

The Sultan’s policy and the dictates of justice require us not to incline to any one rite [madhhab] to the exclusion of others; we aim at strengthening orthodox belief and practice [al-sunan] rather than at fanning sectarian strife. We have built this madrasa [i.e. the Nizāmiyya] only for the protection of scholars and in the public interest, and not to cause controversy and dis­sension.

Nizām al-Mulk was not by any means the sole person to busy himself with founding madrasas. Makdisi has drawn up an impressive list of the Ḥanafī, Shāfī‘, and Ḥanbalī colleges which were flourishing in Baghdad at this time, and he has pointed out that the madrasa built around the shrine of the Imām Abū Ḥanīfa (this was built in 457-9/1065-7 under the authority of Alp-Arslān’s mustaʿfī, Sharaf al-Mulk Abū Saʿd Muḥammad) was doubtless of equal importance to the

1 Kunduri’s hatred for and persecution of the Ash‘arīs are stressed in several of the sources, e.g. in Ibn Khallikān, Wafaydt al-dīn, vol. xi, pp. 297-8.
Niẓāmiyya, though less publicized in the sources.¹ Niẓām al-Mulk’s example stimulated other leading figures to found educational institutions; in 480-2/1087-9 his own great enemy, the mustaufi Tāj al-Mulk Abū’l-Ghanā’im, founded a Shāfi’ī madrasa in Baghdad, the Tājiyya, where Abū Bakr al-Shāshī and Abū Hāmid’s brother Abū’l-Futūh al-Ghazālī both taught.²

Despite his commanding position in the Saljuq state, Niẓām al-Mulk’s authority did not go unchallenged. His arrogant trust in his own powers and indispensability did not endear him to other courtiers or even to the sultan himself, once he had outgrown his initial dependence on the vizier. Nor was Niẓām al-Mulk without enemies within the Saljuq administration itself, in large measure because of his partisanship and his way of pushing his own relatives and protégés. The officials of the bureaucracy had entered their profession in the expectation of a reasonable rotation of offices in which persons of merit would have a fair chance of obtaining the most coveted and lucrative posts, such as the directorship of the central Divāns and of the provincial administrative organs. Niẓām al-Mulk’s long tenure of office, together with his control of so much of the stream of patronage, upset these expectations; at the best of times not everyone could be satisfied, but Niẓām al-Mulk now stood as a tangible target for frustrated and ambitious rivals. On the whole, his firm policy and his emphasis on military preparedness made him popular in the army, but it was natural that those commanders close to the sultan or personally attached to him should come to share Malik-Shāh’s restiveness.

For the first seven years of the sultan’s reign, the authority of Niẓām al-Mulk had gone unchallenged; then in 472/1079-80 two of Malik-Shāh’s slave generals precipitated a major crisis by their act of defiance of the vizier’s power. The shahna of Baghdad, Sa’d al-Daula Gauhar-Ā’in, and the governor of Fārs and Khūzistān, Najm al-Daula Khumar-Tegin al-Shārābī, were Niẓām al-Mulk’s deadly enemies, and together killed one of his protégés, Ibn ‘Allān, the Jewish tax-farmer of Basra, and despoiled him of his wealth. The sultan sought the vizier’s pardon but no retribution was exacted, which showed that the latter’s partisans were not personally above the law.³ In the next year Malik-Shāh insisted, against Niẓām al-Mulk’s advice, on dismissing from the army

² al-Kāmil, vol. x, pp. 120, 147; Ibn al-Jauzl, ix, pp. 38, 46.
7,000 Armenian mercenaries (see below, p. 81). In an effort to counter the vizier’s influence, he began to encourage the latter’s opponents in the administration, and two rival parties now emerged.

The central figure in the opposition was Tāj al-Mulk Abu’l-Ghana’īm Marzbān b. Khusrau Firūz, who came from a vizierial family in Fārs. Through the patronage of the slave general Sav-Tegin he had risen in royal favour, becoming successively vizier to the sultan’s male children (known as maliks), then treasurer, overseer of the palace buildings, and finally head of the Diwān al-Insā’ wa’l-Tughrā. At his side were other high officials: first the son of Kamāl al-Daula Abū Riḍā, the Sayyid al-Ru’asā’ Abu’l-Maḥāsin Muḥammad, hostile to Nizām al-Mulk even though he was the vizier’s son-in-law;1 next, ‘Amīd al-Daula Ibn Bahmanyār, vizier to the governor of Fārs, Khumar-Tegin; and finally the ‘Arid Sadīd al-Mulk Abu’l-Ma‘āli al-Mufadḍal, one of Tāj al-Mulk’s protégés. Ibn Bahmanyār tried in 473/1080–1 to procure the poisoning of Nizām al-Mulk, but he failed and was blinded by the vizier.2 Another manifestation of the feeling against Nizām al-Mulk was the circulation at court of satirical poetry and slanderous stories aimed at him and his sons. One of Malik-Shāh’s court jesters, Ja’fārak, had been active in this work, and in retaliation Jamāl al-Mulk al-Mansūr b. Nizām al-Mulk, governor of Balkh, came in a rage to Isfahan in 475/1082–3 and tore out the jester’s tongue, killing him in the process. Malik-Shāh made no open protest, but he had the civil governor of Khurāsān, Abū ‘Ali, secretly poison Jamāl al-Mulk at Nišāpūr; he then hypocritically commiserated with Nizām al-Mulk.3

Where Ibn Bahmanyār had failed to secure the vizier’s downfall, the Sayyid al-Ru’asā’ Abu’l-Maḥāsin, one of the sultan’s intimates, now tried, accusing Nizām al-Mulk of amassing wealth and offices for his family. The vizier did not deny this, but retorted that these were the just rewards for his service to three generations of Saljuq rulers; that the thousands of Turkish ghulāms in his service added to the sultan’s military potential; and that much of his wealth was expended on pious and charitable works which redounded equally to the sultan’s glory. Malik-Shāh did not feel able to withstand the power of Nizām al-Mulk’s ghulāms and the general support for him within the Saljuq army.4 He let Abu’l-Maḥāsin be blinded and imprisoned, while the

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1 See above, p. 69.
4 Cf. Ḥusainī, Akhbār al-daula, p. 67.
latter's father Kamāl al-Daula lost to Niẓām al-Mulk's son Mu'ayyid al-Mulk his office of Tughrā'ī (478/1083-4).

In this way Niẓām al-Mulk surmounted a prolonged period of crisis: but opposition would again build up towards the end of his life, this time centred round Tāj al-Mulk and the sultan's first wife, the Qarakhānid princess Jalāliyya Khätun or Terken Khätun (usually spelt "Turkān" in the sources), whom he had married in 456/1064. For although Niẓām al-Mulk achieved a dominant position in the administration, he never enjoyed equal influence at the court (dargāb). It is for this reason that in his Siyāsat-Nāma much is said about how the sovereign should comport himself and how the court institutions and officials should be organized to serve the ideal of a despotic state, but there is little about the procedures of the divāns, which the vizier had already largely moulded to his own satisfaction. Further, the vizier did not consider that the Saljuq court was organized with requisite strictness and care for protocol, especially in comparison with the Ghaznavid court; nor was the sultan distant and awe-inspiring enough. Niẓām al-Mulk expatiates on such topics as the arrangement of royal drinking sessions, the need to keep an open table and thus maintain traditions of hospitality, and the creation of a proper circle of nadīms, or boon companions, around the ruler. Offices vital for the maintenance of order and discipline at court and within the empire at large have been allowed to lapse, he alleges. The fearsome Amir-i Ḥaras (Captain of the Guard), who maintained discipline through his force of lictors or club-bearers, has lost importance; the Vakīl-i Khāṣ (intendant of the court and of the sultan's private domains) has declined in status. The court ghulāms, who perform many personal services for the sultan—one is the armour-bearer, another the keeper of the wardrobe, another the cup-bearer, etc.—are no longer adequately trained. Worst of all, Alp-Arslan has allowed the Barzīd (intelligence network), which Niẓām al-Mulk considers one of the pillars of the despotic state, to decay, on the grounds that it engendered an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion amongst friend and foe alike.

Niẓām al-Mulk is further apprehensive about the relationship between

2 See above, section v, p. 65.
4 Siyāsat-Nāma, chs. x, xiii, xvi, xxvii, xxxix (Darke tr., pp. 74-5, 78 ff., 92, 105 ff., 135); Bundārī, Zubdat al-nuṣra, p. 67; cf. Barthold, Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion, p. 306.
the dargāh and the divāns, and concerned lest the court should interfere in the mechanism of administration. Thus he says the sultan’s nadims should never be allowed to hold official posts; letters sent directly from the court to the divāns should be as few as possible; only in emergencies should ghulāms be used as court messengers, and especial care should be taken with verbal commands from the sovereign, their transmission supervised and their subject matter checked before they are executed.¹

Nizām al-Mulk’s position vis-à-vis the sultan was thus to some extent unsatisfactory, and his influence at the subordinate households of the sultan’s wives and those of the princes (maliks) was still weaker. Terken Khatun’s household became the focus of opposition, for Taj al-Mulk was also her personal intendant (vakil). The vizier doubtless had Terken Khatun in mind when in the Siyāsat-Nāma he denounced the malevolent influence of women at court, citing their misleading advice to the ruler and their susceptibility to promptings from their attendants and eunuchs.² Terken Khatun’s son Dā’ūd had been his father’s favourite, but he died in 474/1082. Six years later Malik-Shāh had caliphal approval when he proclaimed as heir another of her sons, Abū Shujāʿ Ahmad, and gave him a resplendent string of honorifics: Malik al-Mulik (“King of Kings”), Aḍud al-Daula (“Strong Arm of the State”), Tāj al-Milla (“Crown of the Religious Community”), and Uddat Amir al-Muʾminim (“Protecting Force of the Commander of the Faithful”); but in the following year he too died. After these disappointments it was not surprising that Terken Khatun wanted to promote the succession of her third son Māḥmūd (b. 480/1087), despite the fact that he was the youngest of all the possible candidates. Berk-Yaruq, Malik-Shāh’s son by the Saljuq princess Zubaida Khatun (she was the daughter of Yaqūtī b. Chaghri Beg), had been born in 474/1081, and there were also two younger sons, Muḥammad and Sanjar, born of a slave wife in 474/1082 and 477/1084 respectively.³ Nizām al-Mulk and much of the army supported Berk-Yaruq because he was the eldest and, so far as could be seen, the most capable claimant. There were, however, further collateral members of the Saljuq family who thought that they had a claim to the succession, and on Malik-Shāh’s death there was to be a period of civil war and confusion before Berk-Yaruq established his right to the throne.

² Ch. xlii (Darke tr., p. 185).
Despite the ideals of men like Nizām al-Mulk, the constitution of the Saljuq empire remained at this time far from monolithic. Malik-Shāh called himself Sultan-i A'ẓam, “Supreme Ruler”, but the title of sultan was gradually adopted by other members of the family, in particular by Sulaimān b. Qutlumush in Rūm, who was, as we have seen, on cool terms with Malik-Shāh and who acted as a virtually independent sovereign. Normally the Saljuq princes below the supreme sultan were known by the titles of malik (ruler) or simply amīr (prince, commander). We have to conceive of the Saljuq empire as a series of political groupings rather than as a unitary state. The most extensive and powerful grouping was that surrounding Malik-Shāh himself, with his power centred on Isfahān and exercised immediately over central and western Iran, Iraq, and Khūrāsān. But beyond this his direct influence diminished. On the fringes of Iraq and Syria several Arab amirates were his tributaries and their functions were to repel Fātimid influence in the Syrian desert and to supply troops for the sultan’s army. In the mountainous interiors of Fārs and Kurdistān, Kurdish tribes such as the Shabānkāra enjoyed a large degree of autonomy, and their dislike of outside control made them a frequent source of trouble to the sultans.

In the frontier areas of Āzarbāijān, the Caucasus, Armenia, Anatolia, Khwārazm, and the eastern fringes of Khūrāsān, Saljuq influence was upheld by the Saljuq princes and governors and also by Türkmen begs. To the Türkmen tribesmen the sultan in Isfahān was a very remote figure, and it was natural that their first allegiance should be given to their own tribal chiefs who were there with them. The begs themselves regarded the sultan more as a supreme tribal khan than as an autocratic sovereign. For the three generations down to Berk-Yaruq the sultanate had descended from father to son, but in the eyes of Türkmen leaders and even of many members of the Saljuq family, this fact did not establish a precedent. At times of stress and crisis, tribal beliefs about succession—e.g. the idea of a division of the family patrimony, and the traditional supremacy of the eldest capable male in the princely family—came to the surface. On Malik-Shāh’s death, Berk-Yaruq had to contend not only with the claims of his half-brother Maḥmūd, but also with the pretensions of his maternal uncle Ismā‘īl b. Yāqūṭī and of his paternal uncles Tutuşh and Arslan-Arghun.

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Many old Turkish traditions and practices were still of significance during Malik-Shāh’s reign, although this is frequently obscured by the exclusively Arabic and Iranian nature of the historical sources. For example, on his death-bed Alp-Arslan had recommended that his brother Qavurt should marry his widow, according to the Turkish levirate; the purpose of this custom was to keep wealth within the family (and perhaps, in this case, to prevent undue fragmentation of the empire which Alp-Arslan had assembled). Again, the early sultans, from Toghril to Malik-Shāh, kept up the practice of giving regular feasts (shōlen), just like those which tribal leaders held for their retainers. Malik-Shāh gave one in his palace each Friday, where, amongst others, scholars and theologians came and held disputations. On the other hand, he neglected to give the customary banquets for the Chigil tribesmen of the Qarakhanid forces at Samarqand and Uzkand whilst on his Transoxianan campaign of 482/1089, and his consequent loss of prestige is chided by the Siyāsat-Nāma.

Much attention had therefore still to be given to the claims of the Türkmen of the empire, who were established in those regions of Irān suitable for pastoral nomadism, i.e. northern Khurāsān, Gurgān and Dihistān; Āzarbāijān, Arrān, and parts of Kurdistān and Luristān. One would not expect that Nizām al-Mulk, the supreme exponent of the Iranian tradition of order and hierarchy in the state, would have much sympathy with the turbulent and non-assimilable Türkmen. Yet in the Siyāsat-Nāma he recognizes that they have legitimate claims upon the dynasty: in the early days of the Saljuq sultanate, he says, they were its military support, and they are of the same racial stock as the sultans.

It is likely that as early as Malik-Shāh’s reign the fiscal agents of the central administration were trying to extend their operations into the outlying tribal areas. Furthermore, the sultan was now established at Isfahān, not at Nishāpūr, Marv, or Ray, and therefore he was much occupied with events in Irāq and northern Syria. Because he was less accessible to the Türkmen, their just complaints of encroachments on their rights had little chance of being heard at court. This was to be demonstrably true in Sanjar’s reign (511-52/1118-57).

2 Ch. xxxv (Darke tr., pp. 127-8); cf. I. H. Uzungarsili, Osmanlı devleti teşkilatına medhal (İstanbul, 1941), pp. 33-4; Kafesoğlu, op. cit. pp. 137-8.
3 Ch. xxvi (Darke tr., p. 105).
Militarily the sultan no longer depended primarily on the Türkmen bands. Continuity in military and political affairs required a permanent, professional force. The empires of Alp-Arslan and Malik-Shah could not have held together on the deaths of those sovereigns without a loyal core of permanent troops and slaves, directed on the first occasion by Nizâm al-Mulk and on the second by his sons and retainers. The constitution of the army now approximated more to the Ghaznavid pattern. There was in the standing army a nucleus of either ghulâms or slave troops, and the rest were mercenaries. Both groups were drawn from various nationalities, including Turks, Armenians, Greeks, Arabs, and Slavs; Nizâm al-Mulk especially commended the employment of Dailamis, Khurâsânîs, Georgians, and Shabânkârâ'î Kurds. This army was normally stationed in the capital, and its commanders were directly under the sultan’s orders; according to Râvandi, the number of cavalymen was not allowed to fall below 46,000.

The ghulâm commanders were extensively used by the sultan for personal service in the palace and for such administrative posts as provincial governorships; and the course of events during Malik-Shâh’s reign amply demonstrates that, in contrast to the rebelliousness of certain members of the Saljuq family, the faithfulness of the ghulâms towards their master rarely faltered. The sources are not very explicit, but it is probable that the Saljuq maliks in their appanages, as well as the slave generals who were detailed for provincial governorships, also had households of ghulâms and permanent forces of their own. The Siyâsat-Nâma advises the great men of state to expend their wealth on military equipment and the purchase of ghulâms rather than on luxury articles for consumption; and we have seen that the vizier himself justified his extensive following of personal ghulâms by the plea that the sultan’s general striking power was thereby increased (see p. 75 above).

The maintenance of a standing army was naturally expensive. Reliance on a professional army instead of on tribesmen or local levies has in the course of human history generally meant a rise in state expenditure, resulting in fresh taxation and an increase in the central power of the state. Though Malik-Shâh must have welcomed such an accession of power, he was seized at times with desires for economy,

1 For this last, see Bosworth, “Ghaznavid Military Organisation”, Der Islam, pp. 37–77.
2 Siyâsat-Nâma, ch. xxiv (Darke tr., pp. 103–4); Râvandi, p. 131.
Feeling perhaps that the burden was excessive, and that troops could safely be dismissed in the peaceful intervals between campaigns. Against this, Niẓām al-Mulk advocated a permanently high level of expenditure on the army, believing this to be the prime buttress of royal power, and he regarded projects for economies as pernicious. At the beginning of Malik-Shāh’s reign the vizier had increased the soldiers’ allowances by 700,000 dinārs in order to secure their loyalty against possible rivals for the succession. In 473/1080–1, however, the sultan reviewed the army at Ray and, in the teeth of the vizier’s opposition, discharged from it thousands of Armenian mercenaries. Niẓām al-Mulk expostulated:

There are no secretaries, merchants, tailors, or craftsmen of any kind amongst these persons—the only profession they have is soldiering. If they are discharged, we can never be sure that they will not set up some person from amongst their own number and make him Sultan. We shall have to deal with them, and until we overcome them, we shall expend several times more than we normally allot for their salaries.

The sultan would not listen, and the unemployed troops went off to Pūshang and joined his brother Tekish, who used them in a rebellion against Malik-Shāh.1 Again, towards the end of the reign someone at court, probably from the circle of Tāj al-Mulk and Terken Khatun, suggested to Malik-Shāh that because of the general peace then prevailing, the greater part of the standing army could be dismissed and its numbers thereby cut from 400,000 to 70,000. The vizier denounced this project by saying that it would create 330,000 enemies for the sultan, stop the empire’s momentum of expansion, and reduce the kingdom to a state of defencelessness.2

The standing army was supported partly by payments in cash or kind, and partly by revenues from lands or fiefs (iqtā’s) assigned to the soldiers. In the chapter of the Siyāṣat-Nāma, in which Niẓām al-Mulk asserts the necessity of having reserves of cash to pay those soldiers and ghulāms who do not have iqtā’s; he also points to the fact that both systems exist side by side.3 Thus it is inaccurate to say that pay-

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1 Ibn al-Athîr, vol. x, pp. 52, 76.
2 Siyāṣat-Nāma, ch. xli (Darke tr., pp. 170–1). There is a disparity between the vizier’s figure for the army and that given by Râvandî, but the higher figure may perhaps be a grand total that includes provincial levies, Türkmen, and other troops outside the core of the standing army.
ment through fiefs was universal in the Saljuq empire at this time. The central treasury, which held large reserves of cash and treasure, was always sought by claimants to the throne whenever a sultan died; Tāj al-Mulk and Terken Khatun secured it in 485/1092 and used it to buy military support for Maḥmūd’s candidature (see below, p. 103).\(^1\) The system of iqṭā’s was certainly not invented by Niżām al-Mulk, despite the assertions of such authorities as ‘Imād al-Dīn and al-Ḥusainī. The only novelty in the vizier’s use of the system appears to be that mentioned by Rāvandi, namely, that he allotted to each soldier “grants of taxation” in various provinces of the empire so that wherever a soldier was campaigning, he would have at hand some means of support.\(^2\)

It has been stressed that the so-called Empire of the Great Saljuqs, far from being a homogeneous, centralized political entity, was really an assemblage of provinces that differed in their geography, their social systems, and historical backgrounds. In the case of the iqṭā’ system, the distinction between the old Būyid lands in the west and the old Ghaznavid ones in the east is significant. Amongst the Būyids and amongst the Ḥamdānīds in al-Jazīreh and northern Syria, the main prop of the military regime had been a system of grants of taxation issued to each soldier— theoretically for life only—and collected from the peasants by the fiscal agents of the non-resident grantees (this is the type of fief which the jurist al-Mawardi calls iqṭā’at al-istighlāl, or assignments of revenue for living-allowances). This system of iqṭā’s was taken over unchanged by the Saljuqs in the western Iranian lands, and it is this one which Niżām al-Mulk discusses in the Siyāsat-Nāma. His chief concern here is to guard against abuses by the fief-holders (muqta’s) and to prevent the land thus granted from slipping out of the state’s control. Consequently, he asserts the sultan’s ultimate ownership of all land, perhaps in accordance with the Sassanian idea of the ruler’s absolute ownership of his kingdom, or perhaps with the aim of extending the ruler’s authority over the peasants and thus protecting them from any arbitrariness by the fief-holders. Other safeguards suggested by the vizier are that the peasants should have free access to the court; that the muqta’ should collect no more than the sum specified, and only at the appropriate time in the agricultural year; and

\(^1\) Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. x, pp. 142, 145.
\(^2\) Bundārī, Zubdat al-muṣra, p. 58; Ḥusainī, Akhbār al-daula, p. 68; Rāvandi, Rāḥat al-sudār, p. 131.
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that fiefs should be changed round every three years to avoid the perpetuation of abuses.¹

In this system the fief-holders tended to acquire direct rights to exploit the estates granted to them; however, there also existed pure grants of taxed revenue, which carried no rights over the tax-paying land. In 457/1065, in exchange for the fiefs of Qum and Kāshān, Alp-Arslān granted to the Būyid Abū ‘Ali Fanā-Khusrau b. Abī Kālijār 50,000 dinārs from the taxes of Bāṣra, together with the right of residing there but with no further privileges. Al-Husainī says that when Nizām al-Mulk paid the soldiers’ allowances of 1,000 dinārs each, half of this was charged to the revenues of Samarqand (from whose Qara-khānid ruler the Saljuqs drew tribute) and half to the revenues of Anatolia, which again was not under the direct control of the sultan. This report may well be exaggerated, probably to emphasize the extent of the Saljuq empire and the careful control which the vizier kept over it; but it does show that money payments could be assigned where there was no question of tenurial rights involved.² [For more on the iqtā’s, see chapter 2, pp. 230 ff.]

The position was different in Khūrāsān and in the marches along the Atrak, Murghāb, and upper Oxus. As Nizām al-Mulk notes, “former kings”, i.e. the Sāmānids and Ghaznavids, did not generally give land-grants to their soldiers: such factors as the economic richness of Khūrāsān and the proximity of India as an inexhaustible source of plunder enabled them to pay their troops at stipulated points of the year in cash as well as kind.³ It is true that the concepts of the fief and of commendation by the weak to the strong (talji‘a) were known in the east, for the explanation of their technical terminology is given in al-Khuwārizmi’s encyclopaedia of the sciences, the Mafāthīh al-‘ulūm (written c. 367/977).⁴ But their occurrence was exceptional. Under the Saljuqs Khūrāsān remained what it had always been, a border land; now, however, it looked out upon the Saljuqs’ rivals, the Qara-khānids and Ghaznavids, and it formed a corridor through which Türkmen from Central Asia passed to the west. Like Āzarbājān in the north-west—a frontier march, to which similar considerations applied—

² Sibt b. al-Jauzī, Mir‘at al-Zamān, quoted by Bowen, J.R.A.S. (1929), pp. 243–4; Husainī, p. 68. The well-known story that Nizām al-Mulk made financial drafts on Antioch in order to pay the boatmen who ferried Malik-Shāh’s army across the Oxus, clearly has a similar aim of vaunting the extent of the empire.
³ Siyāsat-Nāma, ch. xxiii (Darke tr., p. 103); cf. Bosworth, Der Islam (1960), pp. 71 ff.
⁴ Ed. G. van Vloten, pp. 60, 62.
Khurāsān was peopled extensively with Türkmen pastoralists. They could not be fitted into the Būyids' static framework of fiefs, and their interspersion among the sedentary Tājik agricultural population created many problems for the central financial system. Instead of fiefs, the nomads had been granted collective grazing rights since Ghāznavid times, and in the Saljuq period these rights provided the livelihood and maintenance of the Türkmen. Furthermore the Saljuq military organization, despite increasing emphasis on professionalism, still gave these Türkmen a significant role to play. Kafesoğlu has shown that outside Iran and Iraq, the majority of new territories added to the Saljuq empire or sphere of influence were conquered by Türkmen: men such as Aṭāī b. Īvāk in Syria, Artuq on the fringes of Arabia, and Sulaimān b. Qutlumush in Anatolia; and the number of Türkmen who could be called upon to swell the Saljuq army was probably 300,000 or more.¹

Because of their strategic importance, Khurāsān and the upper Oxus lands were usually granted at this time to members of the Saljuq family. At the beginning of each reign there was a general allocation of these eastern governorships,² and since administrative continuity and a permanent state of defence were necessary, changes were as far as possible avoided; thus conditions favoured the growth of hereditary lines. In the sources, most of which are non-contemporary, these appanages are often called iqṭa’s; but this is probably an anachronism, for in the latter half of the 5th/11th century the land system of the east was clearly different from that of the west. The Saljuq principality of Kirmān under Qavūrt and his descendants was typical of these eastern appanages. Hereditary succession continued here for over a century, not only because the province was somewhat isolated from the rest of Iran, but because it adjoined Sīstān and southern Afghanistan where the Ṣaffārids and Ghāznavids had to be watched. Likewise in the west the positions of Tutūsh in Syria and Sulaimān in Rūm were analogous to those of the Saljuq maliks in the east, and once again a frontier situation helps to explain their existence.

The sources all praise Malik-Shāh and his vizier as the architects of an empire where prosperity reigned and security was established. There is much in this view, for the age of Alp-Arslan and Malik-Shāh

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was one in which the Great Saljuqs were at last in strong control: rebellious members of the family were firmly handled, a powerful fighting machine enabled the momentum of expansion to be kept up, and the leading talents of the Iranian administrative tradition were taken into the service of the regime. The sources contrast this period, if only implicitly, with the dissension among Malik-Shah’s sons and the eventual splitting of the fabric of the empire. Of greater value than the stylized eulogies of Muslim authors is the high praise given to both Alp-Arslan and Malik-Shah by Armenian and Syriac Christian writers.

According to the 8th/14th-century historian and geographer Hamd Allah Mustaufi, who is quoting a certain Rısałat-i Malikşahî, the annual revenue of Iran during Malik-Shah’s reign amounted to 215 million dinārs. Despite heavy expenditure on the administration and army, which was only partly alleviated by the practice of granting iqṭā’s, a good proportion of the sultan’s income was used to erect tangible memorials to his power—roads, walls, charitable and educational institutions, mosques, and palaces. The capital Isfahan benefited especially. There he laid out several palaces and gardens, together with a madrasa, the citadel of the town, and a fortress at nearby Dīzkūh, where his armoury and treasury were housed; it was in fact this stronghold which fell into the hands of the Ismā’īlis during Berk-Yaruq’s reign. In the frontier regions and in those provinces where there was a large proportion of Türkmen pastoralists, the provision of town walls was of prime importance. In the exposed province of Khurāsān, for example, Malik-Shāh built a wall round Marv that measured 12,300 paces, and he laid out the town of Panj-Dih in the district of Marv ar-Rūd; in 464/1071-2 Nizam al-Mulk raised the height of the walls around Baihaq, which were previously only as high as two men. Internal security and the safe movement of travellers and merchants were facilitated by the building of ribāts and caravanserais. In stressing the sultan’s piety, the sources describe his zeal in keeping the pilgrimage route from Iraq to the Hijāz in good order; e.g. he provided beacons, wells, and cisterns, and he compensated the amir of the Haramain (or “two holy places”) with a subsidy, in order that a

1 Nuṣḥat al-Qulūb, pp. 33-4.

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tax levied on pilgrims might be abolished: hence from 479/1086 till the sultan’s death, the pilgrimage was performed each year without mishap. The Saljuq amirs and great men of state were similarly encouraged by the sultan and by Niẓām al-Mulk to expend their wealth on good works. As for Malik-Shāh’s reputation as a just and equitable ruler, Ḥusain b. Muḥammad al-Ḥusainī relates how the sultan sent heralds all round the empire, had boards put up in the towns, and had the khaṭibs (official preachers) proclaiming from the pulpits—all to announce that he would personally hear and investigate every complaint of injustice.

We have little direct information on the economic condition of Iran at this time, although the sources frequently mention that by the middle of the reign, in 476/1083-4, there was unparalleled security on the roads and prices were low throughout the empire. The measures to improve internal security and communications must have helped economic growth, as must the lightening or abolition of many transit dues and market tolls. Khurāsān continued to flourish, once the Türkmen nomads had been assigned a definite place in the agrarian structure of the province, and in the second half of the 5th/11th century it was still the centre of the most lively intellectual currents in Iranian life. Kirmān, according to Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, flourished under the firm rule of the local Saljuq line. There Qavurt suppressed the Balūchī brigands and put watchtowers, cisterns, and caravanserais along the caravan route through the desert to Sīstān; foreign merchants were encouraged to trade with India and the east via Kirmān, so that colonies of foreigners grew up in the capital there, and Qavurt was careful to maintain a high standard of coinage.

Conditions in the adjacent province of Fārs were less encouraging. Whereas Qavurt was largely successful in stopping the depredations of the Balūchīs, Fārs continued to be racked by brigands and by internecine warfare amongst the local Kurdish tribes of the Shābān-kāra. Ibn al-Balkhī, writing in the first decade or so of the 12th century, records that the Saljuq governors in Fārs—first Najm al-Daula Khumar-Tegin and then, after c. 493/1099, Fakhr al-Dīn Chavī—sent many

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1 Bundarī, pp. 69-70; Husainī, pp. 73-4; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 144.
2 Husain b. Muḥammad al-Ḥusainī, Tarjama-yi Mahāzin-Isfahān, pp. 140-1. (al-Ḥusainī’s Persian translation of al-Māfarrūkhī’s local history of Isfahān.)
3 E.g. ibid. p. 85.
expeditions against the bandits but failed to pacify the province. Shârz, once the flourishing capital of the Bûyids, was sacked on several occasions by both Türkmen and Shabânkâra'ís, and she did not recover till the end of the 6th/12th century. The trade from the orient to the port of Sirâf on the coast of Fârs was permanently ruined and the town itself depopulated by the piracy of the amirs of the island of Qais, whom frequent Saljuq expeditions failed to subdue.¹

VII. EVENTS DURING MALIK-SHÂH’S REIGN

The military and political events of Malik-Shâh’s reign can conveniently be reviewed under three headings: first, the crushing of opposition from ambitious members of the Saljuq family; second, the humbling of external foes on the eastern and north-western frontiers of Iran; and third, relations with the caliphate and the extension of Saljuq power into Syria and the Arabian peninsula.

It was fortunate that Alp-Arslan lingered on for four days after he had been fatally wounded on the Oxus banks in Rabi‘ I 465/November 1072 (see above, p. 65); for within these four days he was able to set out his final wishes. He had a numerous family, including his sons Malik-Shâh, Ayaz, Tekish, Tutush, Böri-Bars, Toghan-Shâh, and Arslan-Arghun, but since 458/1066 Malik-Shâh had been recognized as heir. Nizâm al-Mulk now secured recognition for him by sending to Baghdad asking that the khusba be made in his name. Malik-Shâh himself dropped back to Nîshâpûr, the key city of Khurasan, and with the treasure from its citadel Nizâm al-Mulk increased the salaries of the troops by a total of 700,000 dinârs, “and thereby won over the hearts of the regular army [‘askar] and the auxiliary troops [hashar]”. Not only was it necessary at this point to secure the loyalty of the army against possible rivals, but the Saljuqs were in the midst of a campaign against the Qarakhânids, and the vizier did not want the pressure on them relaxed. Alp-Arslan was mindful of the claims of his other relatives when he enjoined Malik-Shâh to look after their due rights. His brother Qavurt, he said, was to continue in Kirmân and the parts of Fârs which he then held, and he was to receive a stipulated sum of money; his son Ayaz should rule the upper Oxus provinces from Balkh, for which he would have his grandfather Chaghri’s annual

allowance of 500,000 dinārs, but Malik-Shāh was to keep a garrison in the citadel of Balkh.\(^1\)

Obviously Qavurt was Malik-Shāh’s most serious potential rival, for he was Alp-Arslan’s brother and a commander of great experience. Moreover he had ruled in Kirmān for over thirty years. His Türkmen followers had settled on estates in the province (Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm calls them *iqṭās*)\(^2\), but Qavurt’s success in taking over Kirmān early in Toghril’s reign had attracted thither larger numbers of Türkmen than that relatively poor region could stand. Qavurt’s policy had therefore been to divert them into those outlying parts that were infested with Balūchī brigands, and he also sent a force under his son Amīrān-Shāh against Sistān. As a further outlet for expansion he mounted an expedition against Oman, and after crossing the Persian Gulf in ships chartered from the local ruler of Hurmuz, he deposed the Büyīd governor and brought Oman under Saljuq suzerainty. Qavurt, in fact, behaved almost as an independent ruler, adopting the royal insignia of a parasol (*chatr*), stamping on documents a *tughra* or official emblem—this was the Saljuq bow and arrow symbol—and assuming regal titles.\(^2\)

On hearing the news of Malik-Shāh’s accession, Qavurt hurried back to Kirmān from Oman, losing several ships and many men in the crossing. He set before Malik-Shāh a claim based on the principle of seniority: “I am the eldest brother, and you are a youthful son; I have the greater right to my brother Alp-Arslan’s inheritance.” Against this, Malik-Shāh asserted the concept of father-son succession: “A brother does not inherit when there is a son.” Qavurt then occupied Isfahān, and in 465/1073 a three-day battle took place outside Hamadān. Fighting with his seven sons at his side, Qavurt expected the support, and even the defection to him, of much of his opponent’s army. The Turks and Türkmen in Malik-Shāh’s forces did show this expected sympathy, although the sultan’s ghulām commanders, such as Sav-Tegin and Gauhar-Ā’in, stood firmly by their master. There was sharp tension in Malik-Shāh’s army between the Turkish elements and the contingents of Arabs and Kurds led by the ‘Uqailid Sharaf al-Daula Muslim b. Quraiš and the Mazyadid Baha’ al-Daula Mansūr b. Dubais. The latter groups played a decisive part in crumpling up

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Qavurt’s right wing, and this blow against their fellow Turks so incensed Malik-Shah’s own Turkish troops that some of them turned aside to plunder the baggage of the Arabs and Kurds as well as that of the caliph’s envoy. This episode brings out the differing outlooks of the two constituents of the Saljuq army, the Turkish tribesmen and the multi-national professional and slave soldiery; the unreliability of the former must now have been quite clear to the sultan.

With Qavurt defeated and captured, Malik-Shah was disposed to be merciful to his uncle, who at one point offered to retire to Oman; but Niẓām al-Mulk was adamant, insisting that clemency would only be taken as a sign of weakness. According to Zahir al-Din Nišāpūrī, the sultan’s army was still restive and threatening to support Qavurt if their pay and shares in the booty were not increased. Qavurt was strangled with a bowstring, presumably to prevent the spilling of royal blood, and two of his sons were at least partially blinded. Malik-Shah then appointed as amirs Rukn al-Daula Qutlugh-Tegin over Fārs and ‘Imad al-Daula Turān-Shah over Kirmān. To mark the prominent role taken by the Arabs and Kurds, they were granted extensive fiefs and extra shares in the plunder.1

Malik-Shah eventually restored Kirmān to Qavurt’s sons; Rukn al-Daula Sultan-Shah ruled from 467/1074 to 477/1085, followed by ‘Imad al-Daula Turān-Shah from 477/1085 to 490/1097. At one point Sultan-Shah’s loyalty to the Saljuqs became ambiguous, and in 473/1080–1 Malik-Shah marched to the capital of Bardasir, receiving there Sultan-Shah’s homage and contenting himself with the destruction of one of the towers in the citadel. Turān-Shah, the last survivor from amongst Qavurt’s sons, was praised for his justice and piety, and his tomb became a place of pilgrimage. His vizier was the capable al-Mukarram b. al-‘Alā’, who won the gratitude of the common people of Bardasir by removing the turbulent Turkish soldiery from quarters within the town to a new suburb (rabad) outside it, where he also built himself a palace and erected several public buildings.2 It seems that the Saljuqs of Kirmān kept control of Fārs, for Ibn al-Athīr records that in 487/1094, presumably just before her death, Terken Khatun deputed

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the Amir Öner to wrest Fars from Türan-Shah. The attempt failed, in part because the sympathies of the local people were with Türan-Shah, who is reported to have been mortally wounded in the fighting.\(^1\) Bahā’ al-Daula Iran-Shah succeeded his father for a reign of five years (490-5/1097-1101), and during this time Fars continued to be a subject of dispute with the Great Saljuq sultans. Öner was again sent into Fars, this time by Berk-Yaruq to subdue Iran-Shah’s allies the Shabankāra’ī Kurds, but he had to retire in defeat to Isfahān.\(^2\) In the eyes of the chroniclers, the most noteworthy feature of Iran-Shah’s reign was his alleged acceptance of Ismā’ili propaganda, which is reputed to have been disseminated in Kirmān shortly after 486/1093. According to Ibn al-Athīr it was brought by a secretary from Khūzistān, one Ibn Zur'a, but Muhammad b. Ibrāhīm says that it originated with the amir’s companion, Kākā Balīmān; it is possible that these two are one person. Iran-Shāh was opposed by his own atabeg, Nāṣir al-Daula (this is the first tutor mentioned in the history of the Kirmān Saljuqs), by the orthodox ulema, and also by his own commanders. The representatives of the religious institution finally issued a fatwā (legal decision) authorizing the heretic ruler’s deposition; Iran-Shāh fled, but was finally trapped and killed.\(^3\)

Shortly after Qavurt’s revolt and death, Malik-Shāh received with much relief the news of his own brother Ayāz’s death. Balkh and Tukhāristān were now granted to another of his brothers, Shīhāb al-Dīn Tekīsh, who installed himself in these territories after 466/1073-4, the year in which Malik-Shāh defeated the Qaraḵhanīd Shams al-Mulk and ejected his troops from the south bank of the Oxus. A further brother, Bōri-Bars, was given the governorship of Herāt, Gharchistān, and Ghūr, while the sultan’s uncle ‘Uthmān b. Chaghri Beg received Valvālij in eastern Tukhāristān.\(^4\) For some years Tekīsh governed his province without recorded incident, until in 473/1080-1 the arrival of the 7,000 mercenaries whom Malik-Shāh had discharged, and who now sought to enter Tekīsh’s service, tempted him to rebel. But the sultan beat him in the race to secure Nishāpūr, the capital of Khurāsān, and after being besieged in Tirmidh, Tekīsh was compelled

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\(^1\) al-Kāmil, vol. x, p. 163. This conflicts with Muhammad b. Ibrāhīm, who places his death in 490/1097.


to yield. His brother pardoned him. Four years later, however, whilst Malik-Shāh was at the opposite end of the empire in Mosul, where Fakhr al-Daula Ibn Jahir and Artuq Beg had been conducting operations against the ‘Uqailids, Tekiš again rebelled in Khurāsān. His forces were held up at the fortress of Sarakhs, and the sultan managed to gain time for the march across Iran. Tekiš was captured and now paid the penalty for his disloyalty: he was blinded and imprisoned, and his territories given to his son Aḥmad. The firmness of Malik-Shāh and Nižām al-Mulk in dealing with rebels from the Saljuq family forms a contrast to Alp-Arslan’s comparatively lenient treatment of such claimants; but it seems to have had an exemplary effect, for there was no more trouble from the rest of the family for the remaining years of Malik-Shāh’s reign.

It has been noted that towards the end of Alp-Arslan’s reign, when warfare had broken out between the Saljuqs and the Qarakhānids Shams al-Mulk Naṣr b. Ibrāhīm, the sultan’s assassination gave the khan the opportunity to invade Tukhāristān (see p. 65 above). Malik-Shāh’s brother Ayāz was unable to withstand the invaders, but once the new sultan was firmly on the throne, he came eastwards in 466/1073–4, drove Shams al-Mulk’s brother from Tirmiḏ, and pushed on to Samarqand; the khan was now forced to seek the intercession of Nižām al-Mulk and sue for peace. Malik-Shāh entrusted the key of Tirmiḏ to Sav-Tegin, with instructions for its refortification with stone walls and a ditch, and it was then that he gave the governorship of Balkh and Tukhāristān to Tekiš. At some point in his reign Shams al-Mulk became involved in a war with the eastern branch of the Qarakhānids, who were ruled by the two sons of Qadir-Khān Yūsuf of Kashgār and Khotan. Forced to abandon to them Farghāna and the province of Ἰλάq north of the Syr Darya, he must have become eager to preserve peaceful relations with the Saljuqs.

Like his father, Shams al-Mulk was famed for his equity and piety, particularly in the sphere of public buildings and charitable works. He built celebrated ribāts at Khardhang near Karminiyā and also at Āq-Kutāl on the Samarqand–Khujand road; the splendid palace of Shamsabād near Bukhārā, and a Friday mosque in that city. Nevertheless he fell foul of the religious classes, and in 461/1069 was driven to

execute the Imam Abū Ibrāhîm Ṣaffârî. In the brief reign of Shams al-Mulk's brother Khîdîr Khân (472-3/1080-1) the western kingdom of the Qarakhânîds is said to have reached its zenith of prosperity and splendour.1

Nothing is recorded of Saljuq-Qarakhânîd relations for several years until the accession in Transoxiana of Aḥmad Khân b. Khîdîr (473-82/1081-9), the nephew of Malik-Shâh's wife Terken Khatun. Saljuq influence beyond the Oxus continued to be strong, and it is in this period that the double honorifics al-Dunya wa'l-Dîn ("... of the Secular World and of Religion") first appear amongst the Qarakhânîds (coin of 474/1081-2).2 However, Aḥmad Khân stirred up the opposition of the orthodox religious institution to such a pitch that in 482/1089 a Shâfi‘î faqîh, one Abû Ṭâhir b. 'Aliyyak, came to Malik-Shâh's court seeking aid.3 The sultan was at this time at the peak of his prestige. He had successfully settled affairs in Syria and al-Jazîra, humbling the pretensions of his brother Tutush and installing several of his reliable ghulâm commanders as governors (see below, p. 98); he had also brought off a diplomatic coup by marrying his daughter to Caliph al-Muqtafi. He was accordingly well disposed to listen to the Transoxianan faqîh's appeal for intervention against the impious khan. The sultan occupied Bukhârâ without difficulty; Samarqand was obstinately defended by its inhabitants, but Malik-Shâh broke into it, captured Aḥmad Khân, and deported him to his capital Isfâhân. Leaving the civil governor of Khwârzm to hold Samarqand, the sultan now pushed on to Talas and into Semirechye with the aim of bringing the eastern Qarakhânîds equally under his suzerainty. At Uzkand he received the personal submission of the Khân of Kâshghar, Hârûn b. Sulaimân b. Qâdir-Khân Yusuf (d. 496/1103); the khan promised to place Malik-Shâh in the khâtba and offered one of his daughters in marriage to one of the sultan's sons.

Meanwhile, the kingdom had become temporarily endangered by revolts among the people of Samarqand and among the Chigil or Qarluq tribesmen who had passed from Qarakhânîd into Saljuq service; Nizâm al-Mulk explains that Malik-Shâh's failure to give the customary feasts for them had displeased them. A three-cornered struggle began with the appearance of Ya'qûb-Tegin, brother of the

1 Barthold, op. cit. pp. 315-16, who is quoting Nîzâmî 'Arûdî Samarqandî.
2 Pritsak, "Karahanlilar", İslam Ansiklopedisi.
Khān of Kāshghar, and Malik-Shāh had to undertake the recovery of Samarqand and a further trip to Uzkand. Saljuq fortunes were helped by the eternally present family conflicts of the Qarakhānid dynasty. A new aggressor appeared, Toghril b. İnal, who drove the khan out of Kāshghar.¹ The sultan’s representatives Tāj al-Mulk now brought the khan and his brother Ya’qūb-Tegin together, and left them to regain their territories as best they could; the sultan himself returned to Khurāsān, and at some unknown time later restored Ahmad Khān to Samarqand.² Soon afterwards, in 488/1095, Ahmad Khān was overthrown and executed by the agents of the religious leaders in Samarqand, on the grounds that he had embraced Ismā‘īlī doctrines (see below, p. 106).³

Although there had been peace between the Ghaznavids and Saljuqs during Alp-Arslan’s reign, the troubled events surrounding Malik-Shāh’s accession tempted Ibrahim of Ghazna to try and regain former Ghaznavid territory in Badaḵšān and Tukhāristān. He attacked Malik-Shāh’s uncle, the Amir al-Umarā’ ʿUthmān b. Chaghārī Beg, at a place named Sakalkand, then he sacked it and carried ʿUthmān ignominiously off to Ghazna. (Since the latter was soon afterwards made Governor of Valvālij, he must have been speedily ransomed or released from captivity.) Malik-Shāh sent an army under Gümüşh-Tegin Bilge Beg and his slave Anush-Tegin Gharča’, and the status quo was presumably restored (465/1073). Little more is recorded of relations between the two sultans, though one other expedition by Malik-Shāh against the Ghaznavids is mentioned. This got as far as Isfizar in western Afghanistan, where it was halted by a clever piece of psychological warfare on Ibrahim’s part which made the Saljuq sultan believe that his own army was disaffected.⁴

The Ghaznavid empire in eastern Afghanistan and northern India flourished during Ibrahim’s forty-year reign, and the sultan acquired a great reputation as a patron of learning and religion, building many mosques, madrasas, and public buildings. He made several fresh

¹ Perhaps originally the ruler of Barskhan, Toghril b. İnal was probably also Qadir Khān Jibrā’l b. ʿUmar who was to invade Transoxiana in 495/1102: see below, sec. x, p. 109.
conquests of fortresses in the Punjab, and after 469/1076–7 he assigned the governorship of India to his son Saif al-Daula Mahmūd, patron of the famous poet Mas′ūd-i Saʿd-i Salmān. Ibrāhīm and Malik-Shāh negotiated as equals, and marriage links between the two houses were kept up. Ibrāhīm’s son, the later ‘Alā’ al-Daula Mas′ūd III (492–508/1099–1115), had married a daughter of Alp-Arslān, and later he was to marry one of Malik-Shāh’s daughters, Jauhar Khatun, known in Ghazna as Mahd-i ‘Irāq, “the wife from Iraq [i.e. western Persia]”.¹
The extent of Saljuq influence in Ghazna at this time can be seen in the Ghaznavids’ formal assumption of a typically Saljuq title—al-Sultan al-Muʿazzam—in addition to their own normal ones of Amir and Malik; the title first appears on the coinage of Farrukh-Zād.²

Sistān had come under Saljuq suzerainty soon after the Ghaznavids’ expulsion from Khurāsān. Though it remained under the general supervision of the Saljuqs of Kirmān, it was left in practice to its own ancient rulers of the Šaffārid line (see above, pp. 50–1). In 465/1073, the year of Malik-Shāh’s accession, it passed to Amir Bahāʿ al-Daula waʿl-Dīn Tāhir, but his authority was soon disputed by other powerful nobles of Sistān, in particular by one Badr al-Dīn Abu’l-ʿAbbās. The mediation of Malik-Shāh’s governor in Khurāsān was sought, yet internal strife ended only when Tāhir was strangled by his opponent in 480/1088. Abu’l-ʿAbbās now moved against Kūhistān, but he too died shortly afterwards. Malik-Shāh himself was at this time occupied in Transoxiana; in 485/1092, however, the Saljuq amir Qizil-Sarīgh linked up with one of the local amirs of Sistān, and until the sultan’s death joint operations were conducted against the Ismāʿilīs of Kūhistān. In Sistān itself, Tāhir’s son Tāj al-Dīn Abu’l-Faḍl Naṣr came to power in 483/1090–1 as a Saljuq vassal, and after a long reign largely coterminous with that of Sanjār, he died a centenarian in 559/1164.³

Malik-Shāh’s concern with the north-western frontiers of Iran was twofold: first, to secure Arrān and thus protect ĀzARBĀJĀn, and second, to hold the route that led up the Araxes into Armenia against any Georgian attack. During his reign, Āzarbājān conserved its importance both as a region of Turkmen concentration and as the base from which Turkmen amirs fighting in Anatolia drew replenish-

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ments for their forces; this importance was recognized by the sultan’s eventually placing the whole of the Arrān–Āzarbājān area under his cousin Qūtb al-Dīn Ismāʿīl b. Yāqūtī, who was given the title Malik.

When Malik-Shāh came to the throne, he considered that he needed to strengthen the somewhat nominal dependence of Faḍl (Faḍlūn) III b. Faḍl II, the Shaddādīd ruler of Ganja and Dvin who had succeeded his father in 466/1073. Accordingly, the sultan sent an expedition to Arrān; Ganja was occupied and Faḍl deposed, receiving in exchange Astarābād in Gurgān. Sav-Tegin, already familiar with the area from his campaigns there in Alp-Arslan’s time, was installed in Ganja as governor (?468/1075–6; the chronology of these events is uncertain). But aggressive activity by the king of Georgia, Bagrat IV’s son Giorgi II (1072–89), led to the temporary recapture of Kars by the Christians. The sultan came personally to Georgia in 471/1078–9, and shortly afterwards he entrusted operations there to the Türkmen amir Āḥmad, who regained Kars in 473/1080 and, after returning to his base in Arrān, sent two more Türkmen begās, Yaʿqūb and ʿĪsā Bōrī, against Georgia. They penetrated as far as Lazistān and the Chorukh valley on the Black Sea coast and they also threatened Trebizond; according to Anna Comnena, this city was in fact taken, but was recaptured soon afterwards by a Byzantine general.¹

A revolt by the restored Shaddādīd Faḍl III, probably after the death of Sav-Tegin in 478/1085, necessitated Malik-Shāh’s appearance in the Caucasus in 478/1086. After receiving the homage and tribute of the Shirvān-Shāh Farīburz b. Sallār, the sultan reached the Black Sea coast, where the slave commander Bozan was detailed to take Ganja. Faḍl was finally deposed and the Shaddādīd line in Ganja extinguished, although the collateral line in Anī, under Amīr Abū’l-Faḍl Manūchīhr, one of Malik-Shāh’s faithful vassals (?464–c. 512/1072–c. 1118), continued to flourish in the 6th/12th century. The Shirvān-Shāh seems to have exercised some influence over Arrān, but much of the Araxes basin was doubtless parcelled out into military fiefs and absorbed into the existing pattern of Türkmen occupation in Āzarbājān; the region as a whole was under the control of Qūtb al-Dīn Ismāʿīl.²

² Caucasian History, pp. 68, 81–2; idem, A History of Shavān and Darband, pp. 68–9; idem, and Cahen, “Le Recueil Transcaucasien de Mas’ūd b. Nāmādār (début du VIe/XIIe siècle)”, J.A. pp. 119–21.
The sons of Qutlumush had arrived in Anatolia at the beginning of Malik-Shāh’s reign and had put themselves at the head of certain of the Türkmen bands which were gradually isolating and compelling the surrender of the remaining Byzantine strongholds in Anatolia. The later historiography of the Rûm Saljuqs posits that Malik-Shāh officially invested these sons with the governorships of Anatolia, intending the region to be an appanage of the Saljuq empire as Khurāsān, Kirmān, and Damascus had been under Tutuş. In fact, relations here were never very cordial. Assumption of the title Sultan by Qutlumush’s sons (this occurred after c. 473/1080-1) seems to have been a unilateral act and cannot have pleased Malik-Shāh, whose own title of Supreme Sultan implied an overlordship of the Saljuq family. Indeed, in 467/1075 two of Qutlumush’s sons—Alp-Ilig and Daulab, in the view of Cahen—were fighting in Palestine for the Fātimids against Malik-Shāh’s lieutenant Atsūz b. Uvak.¹

In Anatolia itself, the other sons Sulaimān and Mansūr were taking advantage of the succession disputes which racked Byzantium until the last and most successful claimant, Alexis Comenus (1081-1118), emerged triumphant. The various contenders—Michael Dukas, Nicephorus Botaniates, Nicephorus Melissenos, and Alexis himself—all sought help from the Turks, with the result that by 474/1081 Sulaimān’s forces had reached the shores of the Sea of Marmara and had taken Nicea (Iznik). Malik-Shāh regarded his cousins in Anatolia as semi-rebels, and he cannot have viewed their successes with enthusiasm; his attitude towards Byzantium was no doubt the same as his fathers: that the two empires of the Greeks and the Saljuqs should exist side by side (see p. 62 above). Barhebraeus speaks of a punitive expedition under Amir Bursuq, sent by Malik-Shāh c. 470/1077-8; though it succeeded in bringing about Mansūr’s death, Sulaimān had to be left with most of the western and southern parts of Anatolia.² In Cappadocia, Pontus, and the east there were several other Türkmen begs, some related to the Saljuqs, others independent of them. Certain of the legends and traditions which surround the beginnings of the Türkmen Dānishmand Beg ascribe to him a part in the victory of Malâzgird, and they ascribe a similar role to Artuq, Mengüjek, and Saltuq, other Türkmen amirs who later became famous.³ In reality,

¹ Cf. Cahen, Byzantium (1948), pp. 35-6. ² Barhebraeus, Chronography, p. 227. ³ This tradition is found in the works of the 8th/14th-century historian of the Rûm Saljuqs, Aqsarāyī, and it is also mentioned by the later Ottoman historians.
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Danishmand Beg does not become a historically authenticated figure till the time of the First Crusade, in Berk-Yaruq's reign, but it is quite possible that the foundations of the important Dānishmanid principality were being laid in the regions of Sivas, Kayseri, Amasya, and Tokat during the latter part of Malik-Shāh's reign.¹

However, events in the Anatolian interior were of less immediate importance to the Great Saljuqs than were those taking place on the south-eastern fringes of Anatolia, in al-Jazireh and in Syria. South of the Taurus and the Anatolian plateau we are outside the Irano-Turkish world on which the Saljuqs' political power and culture were based, and only a brief outline of the extension of Saljuq influence as against that of the Fāṭimids in Syria and Arabia need be given here. The tasks of Saljuq arms and diplomacy in the shifting and complex politics of this region to the south of Anatolia were, first, to ensure that cities like Antioch, Aleppo, and Edessa were in friendly Sunni Muslim hands; and second, to bring into the Sunni-Saljuq sphere of influence the local Arab amirates (e.g. those of the Mirdāsids, the Banū Munqidh of Shaizar, and the Banū 'Ammār of Tripoli) as well as the tribal groups, such as those of Kilāb and Numair, many of which were Shi'i and possibly pro-Fāṭimid in sentiment. Roving Türkmen bands injected a fresh element of unrest into the region; and in the years after Malāzgird an ephemeral but significant Greco-Armenian principality grew up along the Taurus under the leadership of Philetros, a former general of Romanus Diogenes, who extended his power from Ḥiṣn Mansūr, Abulustān, and Mar'āsh, over the cities of Malatya, Samosata, Edessa, and Antioch.²

Malik-Shāh's reign saw the destruction of the Marwānids, the long-established Kurdish dynasty in Diyarbakr, although there are no indications that this action came from deliberate Saljuq policy; it was some decades since Fāṭimid influence had been a danger in this area. After the death of Naṣr al-Daula Ibn Marwān in 453/1061, the power and splendour of the dynasty waned perceptibly under his sons, and its end came when the private ambitions of the Banū Jahir finally worked upon Malik-Shāh and Niẓām al-Mulk.³ Accompanied by a Saljuq army

³ See p. 24 above.
and by the ghulām generals Qasīm al-Daula Aq-Sonqur and Gauhar-Ā’īn, and later helped by Artuq Beg, Fākhr al-Daula Ibn Jahīr conducted a long and strenuous campaign in 477–8/1084 against the Marwānīds in Āmid, Mayyāfāriqīn, and Jazīrat ībīn ‘Umar, afterwards annexing Diyarbakr to the Saljuq empire and appropriating for his personal use the Marwānīds’ treasury.¹

The disappearance of the Marwānīds was a palpable threat to another local power, the ‘Uqailids. By 477/1084 the dominions of the very capable Sharaf al-Daula Muslim b. Quraish stretched from Mosul through Diyar Rabī‘a and Diyar Muḍar to Manbij and Aleppo, and he had reached an entente with the Armenian general Philaretos. At the beginning of his reign Malik-Shāh had sent his brother Tutush to hold Syria as an appanage, and from his base of Damascus, Tutush and later Artuq Beg conquered all the territories in southern Syria and Palestine formerly held by Ātsīz b. Uvāk. The prize of Aleppo brought Tutush into rivalry with its ruler, Sharaf al-Daula Muslim, and in 477/1084 a complex pattern of warfare broke out in the region of Aleppo and Antioch, involving Tutush, Sharaf al-Daula Muslim, Philaretos, Sulaimān b. Qutlumush, and an army from Isfahān under the personal command of Malik-Shāh and his generals Bozan and Bursuq. In the fighting the ‘Uqailid was killed (478/1085), while Sulaimān either died in battle or else committed suicide (479/1086). The sultan’s Syrian campaign was crowned with triumph as one after another Mosul, Harrān, Aleppo, and Antioch submitted, and he was at last able to let his horse stand on the shores of the Mediterranean. When Tutush and Artuq had withdrawn to Damascus and Jerusalem respectively, Malik-Shāh installed ghulām governors in Antioch (Yaghī-Basan), Aleppo (Aq-Sonqur), and Edessa (Bozan).²

Saljuq influence during his reign was even carried into the Arabian peninsula. In 469/1076–7 Artuq marched through al-Aḥsā’ in eastern Arabia as far as Qaṭīf and Bahrayn Island, attacking the local Qarmatian sectaries en route. After the sultan’s second visit to Baghdad, in 484/1091, he conceived the idea of making it the centre of his empire (see below, p. 101), and it was probably in connexion with this that he deputed

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Gauhar-Ā'īn and Chabaq to bring the Hijāz and the Yemen under his power. Through his diplomacy the khutba at Mecca was returned to the 'Abbāsids in 468/1075–6, which meant in effect that he had out-bid the Fātimids for the support of the venal Sharif of Mecca—although according to Ibn al-Jauzī, there was also a project for the sharif to marry one of the sultan’s sisters. In the last year of Malik-Shāh’s life, Gauhar-Ā’īn sent a force of Türkmen under Tirsek and Chabaq, and the Yemen and Aden were temporarily occupied.¹

The exclusion of the ‘Abbāsīd caliphs from secular affairs in Iraq was maintained during Malik-Shāh’s reign, and on his first visit to Baghdad, in 479–80/1086–7, he had received the formal grant of this secular authority from al-Muqtadi. Within Baghdad the sultan’s shahna, or military commander, was Gauhar-Ā’īn, who had been appointed in his father’s reign. Not only did he have the task of keeping public order in the city and of mediating among the hostile factions of Shī’is, Ḥanbalis, ‘ayyārs, and so on, but Gauhar-Ā’īn also had a general responsibility for the security of Iraq; thus when in 483/1090 a force of ‘Āmīrī Bedouins from the Qarmatians of al-Ḥāṣa’ sacked Baṣra, he had to come from Baghdad and restore order.²

Financial and civil affairs in the capital and in Iraq in general—including supervision of those iqṭā’s allotted to the caliph, together with the transmission to him of their revenues—were the responsibility of a civilian ‘amīd or governor. In the latter part of Malik-Shāh’s reign, when relations between sultan and caliph became very strained, the ‘amīd clearly had the power of making life unpleasant in many ways for the caliph. One ‘amīd, Abu’l-Fath b. Abi Laith, even interfered with the caliph’s own court and retinue, until in 475/1082–3 al-Muqtadi complained to the sultan and Niẓām al-Mulk.³

For most of Malik-Shāh’s reign Niẓām al-Mulk was left to mould Saljuq policy towards the caliphate, and this meant that he was thrown into close contact with the caliph’s viziers; down to 507/1113–14, with only a few breaks, the vizierate for the ‘Abbāsīds continued to be held by the Banū Jahīr, namely Fākhr al-Daula and his sons ‘Amīd al-Daula and Za’īm al-Ru’asā’. Saljuq pressure on the caliphate increased during this period, as the firm hand of Gauhar-Ā’īn in Baghdad showed. At the opening of the reign Niẓām al-Mulk had reversed his previously conciliatory attitude, and the climax of this new harshness came in

³ Ibid. p. 81.
471/1079, when he secured Fakhr al-Daula’s dismissal on the pretext that he was behind Ḥanbali attacks on the Niẓāmiyya madrasa. He even tried, without success, to impose on the caliph his own son Mu’ayyid al-Mulk as vizier. The family’s fortunes were restored through the tact of ‘Amid al-Daula Ibn Jahīr, who came personally to Niẓām al-Mulk’s camp to intercede for his father’s restoration, and who in the following years grew so close to Niẓām al-Mulk that he was given successively two of the vizier’s daughters in marriage. Over the next few years the Banū Jahīr oscillated between support for the interests of the sultan and for those of the caliph. In 474/1081–2 Fakhr al-Daula and Niẓām al-Mulk arranged the betrothal of one of Malik-Shāh’s daughters to the caliph, but the condition was imposed on al-Muqtadī that he should take no concubine and no other wife but this Saljuq princess. Hence by 476/1083–4 al-Muqtadī had lost all patience, and he installed as vizier a firm supporter of his own interests, Abū Shujā‘ al-Rūdhrāwari; Niẓām al-Mulk was furious that his ally ‘Amid al-Daula should be dismissed, and according to Sibt b. al-Jauzi he even contemplated abolition of the caliphate.

Harmony was restored for a time when Malik-Shāh, victorious after his Syrian campaign, visited Baghdad for the first time. Niẓām al-Mulk took the opportunity of impressing the caliph with the military might of the sultanate by parading before him the Saljuq amirs—they numbered over forty—while he detailed their iqṭā’s and the number of their retainers. The sultan’s euphoria at this time was such that he increased the caliph’s own iqṭā’s, and at the same time abolished throughout Iraq illegal taxes, transport dues on goods, and the transit payment levied on pilgrims. The marriage alliance with the caliphate was celebrated in 480/1087 with enormous pomp, in the presence of Niẓām al-Mulk, Abū Sa‘d the Mustaufi, Terken Khatun, and the caliph’s vizier Abū Shujā‘. Very soon a son was born, the short-lived Abu’l-Fadl Ja’far. Niẓām al-Mulk’s reception at Baghdad turned him into a warm partisan of the caliphate, but the marriage did not bring the expected harmony between sultan and caliph. As early as 481/1088 the Turks who had accompanied the Saljuq princess were expelled

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from the caliph’s harem because of their rowdiness. By the next year the princess was complaining to her father of al-Muqtadī’s neglect of her, so Malik-Shāh demanded the return of his daughter and his grandson Ja’far; she died shortly after reaching Isfahān, but her son, the so-called “Little Commander of the Faithful”, became the sultan’s favourite.¹

During Malik-Shāh’s second visit to Baghdad relations with al-Muqtadī were at their nadir, and the sultan ignored him. He resolved, however, to make Baghdad his winter capital, and in the winter of 484-5/1091-2 extensive building operations were begun in the city, comprising a great mosque, markets, and caravanserais, while the important ministers such as Niẓām al-Mulk and Tāj al-Mulk were ordered to build houses there for themselves. The sultan came to Baghdad again at the end of 485/1092. Niẓām al-Mulk had just been assassinated and the sultan, freed from all restraint, decided to expel the caliph from his ancient capital, delivering this ultimatum to him. “You must relinquish Baghdad to me, and depart to any land you choose.” It seems that the sultan had the idea of setting up his grandson Ja’far as caliph, even though his tender age of five years made him ineligible according to Islamic law. As events turned out, al-Muqtadī was saved when Malik-Shāh died from a fever, fifty-three days after the passing of Niẓām al-Mulk.²

During the last two or three years of Malik-Shāh’s reign, certain disquieting events occurred which showed that his impressive empire was not unassailable. In 483/1090, for example, Baṣra was savagely sacked by Qarmatians.³ More serious was the emergence of several centres of Ismā‘īlī activities within the empire, notably in Syria, al-Jazīrah, and Persia. Propagandists having connexions with the Nizārī faction in Fāṭimid Egypt began work in such parts of Iran as Kirmān, Tukhāristān, Kūhistān, Qūmīs, the Caspian provinces, and Fārs (see above, p. 90). Those regions where there were already pockets of Shi‘ism or of older Iranian beliefs seem to have been particularly susceptible. The Ismā‘īlīs were even active in the capital city of Isfahān, under the dā‘ī ‘Abd al-Malik b. ‘Attāsh and his son Aḥmad, who in Berk-Yaruq’s reign was to seize the nearby fortress of Shāhdīz. Another dā‘ī, Ḥasan-i Šabbāh, worked in Ray during Malik-Shāh’s time, and in

483/1090 he seized the fortress of Alamūt in the Alburz mountains near Qazvin. In the last year of his life Malik-Shāh, conscious of this threat to the line of communications through northern Persia, sent the amirs Arslan-Tash and Qizil-Sarigh against the Ismā'ilis of Alamūt and Kūhistān, respectively, but operations were broken off at his death.¹

At Şīnna, a place in Fārs on the Isfahan–Baghdad road, Niẓām al-Mulk had met death at the hands of a Dailami youth, ostensibly a fida'i (assassin) of the Ismā'īlīs.² Several sources state that shortly before this killing, the sultan had dismissed him and several of his protégés in the administration, putting in their places Tāj al-Mulk and his friends; it is also possible that Niẓām al-Mulk, now at an advanced age, laid down office of his own accord. Yet one of the earliest sources, Anushirvān b. Khālid, says nothing of Niẓām al-Mulk’s departure from office. Contemporaries generally attributed his death to the machinations of Malik-Shāh and Tāj al-Mulk, and the view is expressed by the later historian Rashīd al-Dīn (d. 718/1318) that the vizier’s enemies at court concocted the murder in association with the Assassins; in view of Rashīd al-Dīn’s access to the Ismāʿīlī records at Alamūt, the story is worthy of consideration. The last weeks of Malik-Shāh’s own life were spent in drawing up his extravagant plans for the deposition of al-Muqtadi. After 485/1092 the caliphs would never again have to fear so powerful a member of the Great Saljuq dynasty.³

VIII. THE FIRST SIGNS OF DECLINE: BERK-YARUQ AND MUḤAMMAD B. MALIK-SHĀH

The twelve years that followed Malik-Shāh’s death were ones of internal confusion and warfare, ended only by Berk-Yaruq’s death in 498/beginning of 1105. Despite this, the external frontiers of the empire held firm thanks to Malik-Shāh and his vizier, whose policy had been to buttress the north-western frontiers through the concentration of

Türkmen in Azarbâijân and Arrân, and to hold the Qarakhânîds firmly in check on the north-eastern borders. Sanjar’s governorship in eastern Khurâsân and Tukhâristân from 490/1097 onwards discouraged possible moves by the Ghaznavids at this time, though they might well have seen in this period of Saljuq confusion a heaven-sent chance to recover their terra irredenta. Only in the extreme west was there potential disquiet with the appearance in 1097 of the First Crusade: within three years the Franks had entrenched themselves on the Levant coast, had advanced as far as western Diyarbakr, and had taken such key cities as Jerusalem, Antioch, and Edessa. Yet the Islamic world had seen aggressive infidels on its borders before. Moreover the Saljuq sultans were never directly threatened by the Crusaders, and they regarded the troubles of Tutush and his family in Syria as his own affair. When the news of the First Crusaders’ successes in Syria first reached Baghdad, Berk-Yaruq wrote letters to the various amirs urging them to go and fight the unbelievers (Rabi‘ II 491/March 1098), but this exhortation seems to have exhausted his concern.1 There are few indications that thoughts of the Frankish threat seriously worried at any time the contestants who fought over the heartland of the empire, Iran and Iraq.

When Malik-Shâh died, Tâj al-Mulk and Terken Khatun acted vigorously. Their policy in building up a party amongst Nizâm al-Mulk’s enemies in the army and bureaucracy, together with the fact that they happened to be in Baghdad at the crucial time, enabled them to place the four-year-old prince Maḥmûd on the throne as sultan, the caliph being reluctantly forced to grant him the honorific Nâṣîr al-Dîn yâ’âl-Dîn (“Helper in Secular and Religious Affairs”). Occupation of Iṣfâhân was now the next aim, for despite large accession subsidies the army was again restive for pay. Maḥmûd was placed on the throne in Iṣfâhân and the royal treasuries thrown open. Meanwhile the rival party of the Nizâmiyya, which contained the great vizier’s relatives and partisans, led by the ghulân Er-Ghûsh, had managed to seize the armaments stored up by the vizier at Iṣfâhân and had taken with them to Ray the twelve-year-old Abu’l-Muzaffar Berk-Yaruq (Turkish for “strong brightness”). At Ray the ra‘îs, or chief notable, crowned him sultan. Anûshirvân b. Khâlid states that only obscure people and opportunists supported Berk-Yaruq and that the majority favoured Maḥmûd; but this merely reflects Khâlid’s partisanship for Berk-Yaruq’s

rival Muhammad, under whom he later became Mustaufi and ‘Ārid al-Jaish.¹

As a youth approaching manhood, Berk-Yaruq was clearly more fitted to hold together his father’s heritage, and in the struggle against Tutush and Muhammad he generally had the support of the Nizamiyya. This does not necessarily imply that the Nizamiyya had a collective policy, for none of the sons of Nizam al-Mulk was his father’s equal in ability, and opportunism and personal factors seem often to have swayed them. At the outset they desired vengeance on Taj al-Mulk, who was captured on the defeat of Terken Khatun in 485/beginning

of 1093. Mindful of his capabilities, however, Berk-Yaruq wished to make him vizier, and Tāj al-Mulk mollified a good proportion of the Niẓāmīyya by judicious payments; but an irreconcilable element of them finally secured his death.\(^1\) In the next few years personal animosities among Niẓām al-Mulk’s sons placed them on opposite sides in the conflict. Berk-Yaruq’s first vizier was the drunkard ‘Izz al-Mulk Ḥusain, and then in 487/1094 the capable Mu’ayyid al-Mulk ‘Ubaidallāh. Unfortunately, the hostility of the sultan’s mother Zubaida Khatun led to his dismissal, and a further son, Fakhr al-Mulk Abu’l Muẓaffar, was appointed in his place. The latter and Mu’ayyid al-Mulk were strong enemies, for they had quarrelled over some jewels left by their father, and henceforth Mu’ayyid al-Mulk became the guiding spirit behind Muḥammad’s bid for the sultanate.\(^2\)

Terken Khatun’s final act was to invite another member of the Saljuq family, Ismā’īl b. Yaqūtī, to march against Berk-Yaruq. Although Ismā’īl collected an army from the Türkmen of Āzarbājān and Arrān, he was defeated and Berk-Yaruq’s former atabeg Gümüş-Tegin put him to death. From Isfahān Terken Khatun tried to make contact with Tutush, but she died suddenly in 487/1094, to be followed a month later by her son Maḥmūd.\(^3\)

Early in this year Berk-Yaruq disposed of two other possible rivals, his uncle Tekish, who had been blinded by Malik-Shāh and imprisoned at Takrit, and Tekish’s son; Tekish, in an attempt to overthrow the youthful sultan, had allegedly been in touch with former supporters in his old appanage of Tukhāristān.\(^4\) Despite the firmness of Alp-Arslan and Malik-Shāh, the traditional idea of a paternal inheritance divided amongst members of the family, coupled with the absence of any clear succession law, came to the surface in these uncertain times. In addition to his struggle with Terken Khatun, Berk-Yaruq was faced with a coup d’état in the east by one uncle, Arslan-Arghun, and in the west by a bid for the sultanate from another uncle, Tāj al-Daula Tutush.

Arslan-Arghun’s rebellion was the less dangerous, for he seems to have had only the limited aim of making Khurāsān an autonomous province for himself. On hearing of Malik-Shāh’s death he left his iqṭā’ in Jibāl, seized several of the cities of Khurāsān, and demanded


\(^{4}\) Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 162.
recognition as tributary ruler of the whole province except for Nishāpūr. Against him Berk-Yaruq sent his uncle Böri-Bars b. Alp-Arslan, who had some initial successes but was captured in 488/1095 and strangled. Arslan-Arghun now began a reign of terror in Khurasān, purging it of disaffected amirs and demolishing the walls and fortifications of potentially rebellious places. It was his excesses which caused one of his own ghulāms to murder him in 490/1097. Berk-Yaruq had meanwhile appointed his half-brother Sanjar as governor in Khurasān, providing him with an atabeg and vizier. A feeble attempt to set up Arslan-Arghun’s young son in Balkh collapsed, and Berk-Yaruq and his army spent seven months at Balkh suppressing a further revolt by a Saljuq claimant, Muḥammad b. Sulaimān b. Toghril, who had received aid from the Ghaznavids (for more on this see p. 136 below). Beyond the Oxus, the situation in the Qarakhanid lands was somewhat troubled after the deposition and death of Aḥmād Khān in 488/1095 (see p. 93 above), which was followed shortly afterwards by the death of his successor Mas‘ūd; Berk-Yaruq now confirmed the succession in Samarqand on Sulaimān and then on Maḥmūd Khān.1

The threat from Tutush was far more serious, for it threatened the whole basis of Berk-Yaruq’s sultanate. Soon after his brother’s death, Tutush had left Damascus accompanied by the ghulām commanders whom Malik-Shāh had installed in Syria, Aq-Sonqur, Yaghī-Basan, and Bozan; and in 486/1093 in the city of Baghdad he proclaimed himself sultan. He routed the Arabs of the ‘Uqailid Ibārahim b. Quraish of Mosul, and in Baghdad itself Malik-Shāh’s former šahna, Gauhar-A‘īn, showed himself favourable to the new ruler. Soon afterwards his plans were disrupted by the desertion of Aq-Sonqur and Bozan, but in the next year Tutuš killed these two undependable commanders and resumed the attack. Berk-Yaruq was recognized in Baghdad by the new caliph, al-Mustaṣāhir (487-512/1094-1118), who granted him the honorific ṫukn al-Dīn (“Pillar of Religion”), but Tutush was soon in occupation of all the western lands of the empire, and Berk-Yaruq had the misfortune to fall into the hands of Maḥmūd’s partisans at Isfahān, who planned to blind him and so render him unfit for the sultanate. Before doing this, however, they decided to wait and see whether the child Maḥmūd should recover from his

smallpox. As we have seen, he did not recover: thus Berk-Yaruq’s sight was saved, and those many amirs who feared Tutush now rallied to the sultan. Even so, his position still seemed desperate, for he himself was suddenly stricken with smallpox; but now he had the help of Mu’ayyid al-Mulk as vizier, and he was even given a breathing space when Tutush withdrew temporarily to Ray, probably because the provisioning of his large army in mid-winter was proving difficult. Berk-Yaruq soon collected 30,000 troops and defeated Tutush near Ray; during the battle one of Aq-Sonqur’s ghulâms avenged his master and slew Tutush (488/1095). The remnants of his army fled to Syria, and Berk-Yaruq seemed secure on the throne.¹

The seat of Berk-Yaruq’s personal power was essentially Iraq and western Iran. Khurâsân, of course, always remained important to the Saljuqs because it had been the cradle of their power, and in the brief period of peace before the rise of his rival Muhammad, the sultan devoted to it as much attention as he was able. He went personally to suppress Arslan-Arghun’s revolt, but shortly after his return to Iraq in the latter part of 490/1097, he had to send the Amir-i Dâd (“Chief Justiciar”) Ḥabašî b. Altun-Taq to deal with Qodun, the governor of Marv, and with another amir, Yaruq-Tash. These two had killed the Saljuq governor of Khwârazm, Ekinî b. Qochqar, and had tried to annex the province for themselves, but Ḥabašî suppressed the outbreak and appointed as Khwârazm-Shâh a man named Qutb al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Anûsh-Tegin Gharçâ’î, founder of the line of shâhs who were to play such a big role in Persian history in the decades before the Mongol invasions (see below, pp. 185 ff.). After this, distractions in the west forced Berk-Yaruq to leave Khurâsân to Sanjar.²

Likewise, he granted Ganja to Sanjar’s uterine brother, Muḥammad, with Qutluq-Tegin as his atabeg; very soon Muḥammad threw off the latter’s control, killing him and taking over the whole of Arrân. Syria was always of peripheral importance to Great Saljuqs, and Berk-Yaruq never went there in person, despite al-Mustazhir’s message to

him in 491/1098 expressing alarm at the successes of the Crusaders. Tutush's two sons Riḍwān and Duqaq were left in Aleppo and Damascus respectively, where they were duly provided with atabegs. The formerly 'Uqailid amirate of Mosul then passed to a succession of Turkish and Türkmen commanders. In central Iraq, Saif al-Daula Ṣadaqa (479-501/1086-1108) made the Mazyadids a considerable power in this period. He intervened frequently in the confused affairs of Baghdad—this city alternated between allegiance to Berk-Yaruq and to his rivals Tutush and then Muḥammad—and in 496/1103 he added the formerly 'Uqailid town of Hit to his possessions.1 Farther south, in the marshlands of the Baṭība, there was the local dynasty of the Banū Abīl-Jabr under Muḥammad ib al-Daula Abu'l-'Abbas. Baṣra and Wāṣiṭ were nominally under Berk-Yaruq's control, but the Turkish muqta's of this region were in practice little troubled.2 In Khūzistān and its chief town Shustar, Toghril's former amir Bursuq and his four sons established themselves as hereditary muqta's. These sons remained generally attached to Berk-Yaruq's cause, and the sultan on more than one occasion dropped back from central Iran into Khūzistān to rest and to assemble fresh armies.3

The remaining years of Berk-Yaruq's reign, from 490/1097 to 498/1105, were taken up with the struggle against his half-brother Abū Shujā' Muḥammad Tapar (Tapar = Turkish for "he who obtains, finds"),4 who, in accordance with his claim to the sultanate, secured from the caliph in 492/1099 the honorific Ghiyāṭh al-Dunyā wa'l-Dīn ("Support in Secular and Religious Affairs").5 These years were full of warfare and of shifting alliances amongst the Turkish amirs. Muḥammad received much help from Sanjar; he also had at his disposal the administrative skill of Muʻayyid al-Mulk, and the bulk of the Nizāmiyya now fought on his side. For his part, Berk-Yaruq had only his own military skill and the loyalty of a nucleus of amirs, including Ayāz and the governor of Hamadān, Il Ghāzi. Even for the support of the sons of Bursuq he had to pay a price: in 492/1099 Zangi and Aq-Böri insisted that he sacrifice his vizier Majd al-Mulk Abū'l-Faḍl

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1 Ibn al-ʿAthīr, al-ʿKāmil, vol. x, pp. 247-8. Several of the sources state that it was Ṣadaqa who built for the dynasty a splendid new capital at Ḥilla, but this is not accurate: see G. Makdisi, "Notes on Ḥilla and the Mazyadids in Mediaeval Islam", J.A.O.S. pp. 249-62.
3 Cf. Cahen, "Bursuk", Enze. of Islam (2nd ed.).
BERK-YARUQ AND MUḤAMMAD

al-Balāsānī, who had Shi‘ī sympathies and was allegedly privy to the Ismā‘īlīs’ assassination of Bursuq. The accusation that he had Ismā‘īlī sympathies was frequently hurled at Berk-Yaruq by his opponents. On the occasions when his fortunes were low he certainly seems to have accepted Ismā‘īlī troops in his army; and it is said that when besieging Terken Khatun and Maḥmūd in Isfahān, he feigned sympathy in order to get the support of local Ismā‘īlīs. But there are no signs of an active sympathy with these schismatics, which would have brought down on his head fierce condemnation from the Sunni religious institution and from the ‘Abbasid caliph.

A former governor of Fārs whose reputation there had been damaged by his failure to quell the Shabānkāra, the Amīr Öner, was persuaded by Mu‘ayyid al-Mulk to rebel against Berk-Yaruq. In 492/1099 Öner took 10,000 troops to Ray, but his rising collapsed when he was murdered by a Turkish ghulām; as so often happened when an army became leaderless, the troops mutinied, plundered the dead commander’s treasury, and then scattered. Mu‘ayyid al-Mulk now fled to Ganja, becoming vizier to Muḥammad, who at this point formally proclaimed himself sultan. The killing of his own vizier al-Balāsānī created a crisis of confidence for Berk-Yaruq. He still had a fair-sized army under Inal b. Anūsh-Tegin, as well as the help of one of Niẓām al-Mulk’s sons, ʿIzz al-Dīn Manṣūr; yet Isfahān refused to admit him, and then his mother Zubaida Khatun was captured at Ray and strangled by Mu‘ayyid al-Mulk. Support for Muḥammad was growing among the Turkish amirs of Iraq and al-Jazīre, men such as Kūr-Bugha in Mosul and Chōkermish in Jazīrat ibn ʿUmar; in Kurdistān the ‘Annāzid Surkhāb b. Badr joined him, and in Baghdad Gauhar-Ā’īn secured the khutba for him. Still further changes of allegiance took place. When in 493/1100 Berk-Yaruq faced his brother in battle, he had at his side Gauhar-Ā’īn, Kūr-Bugha, Surkhāb, and the Mazyadīd ʿIzz al-Daula Muḥammad b. Ṣadaqa. This clash, the first of five between the rival sultans, nevertheless ended disastrously for Berk-Yaruq. He fled from Hamadān to Nishāpūr, seeking for help from the governor Ḥabashi, and it is on this march through northern Iran that he is said to have joined forces with

5,000 Isma‘ili troops, presumably from Dailam or Kūhīstan. He then marched across Iran to Khūzistān, where Bursuq’s sons Zangi and Il-Begi gave him their support, and in the second battle with Mūhammad, in 494/1101, the latter was defeated and Mu‘ayyid al-Mulk captured. In revenge for his mother, and because the vizier had imputed to him Isma‘ili sympathies, Berk-Yaruq killed him personally.\footnote{Mujmal al-tawāriḥkh, pp. 409–10; Bundār, pp. 88–9, 260; Zahir al-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, pp. 58–9; Rāvandī, pp. 148–9; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, pp. 112–13, 123, 129; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 198–202, 205–7.}

Mūhammad now called in Sanjar from Balkh, and the union of their two armies caused support to melt from Berk-Yaruq. Part of his forces had to be detached and sent with Kūr-Bugha to Āzarbayjān, where Maudūd b. Ismā‘īl b. Yāqūṭī was in revolt against Berk-Yaruq and was vowing vengeance for his father. Problems of logistics and an inability to pay his troops troubled the sultan. He appeared in Baghdad with 5,000 unruly cavalrymen who plundered the Sawād and made his cause very unpopular, and when he tried to get a subsidy from the caliph by asking for the arrears of tribute from the Mazyādīd ruler Ṣādaqa, he only caused the latter to declare for Mūhammad.\footnote{For more on Ṣādaqa, see below, p. 115.} Now he had to retreat southwards into Khūzistān, destroy the bridges behind him to prevent pursuit. Mūhammad’s followers had jeeringly called his troops Bātinīyya, and at some point during his withdrawal from Baghdad, Berk-Yaruq carried out a purge of the Ismā‘īlis in his army. The organizer of Ismā‘īli propaganda in the army is said to have been one of the last scions of the Kākūyīds, Mūhammad b. Dūshmanziyār of Yazd; whether this fact is an instance of Dailami heterodoxy, or just a fiction hiding other reasons for his killing, is unknown.\footnote{Bundārī, p. 261; Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, pp. 120, 122–4; Husainī, pp. 77–8; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 207–10, 220–1. According to the Mujmal al-tawāriḥkh, p. 409, another Kākūyīd, ‘Alī b. Fāramūr b. ‘Alā‘ al-Daula, fought for Tutuš and was killed with him at the battle of Dāghilū (see above, p. 107).}

The third battle, at Rūdürāvar in 495/1102, consisted of indecisive personal combats, after which negotiations were opened up and a settlement reached. Muḥammad was to bear the title of Malik and have Arrān, Āzarbayjān, Dīvārbakr, al-Jazīreh, and Mosul; whilst Berk-Yaruq was to have all the rest and the title of Sultān. But Muḥammad repudiated this in less than two months and arrogated for himself the sultan’s privilege of five naubahs (salutes of military music). He was routed in a fourth battle and shut himself in Īṣfahān, after hurriedly restoring the walls around ‘Alā‘ al-Daula Ibn Kākūya’s palace. Berk-Yaruq now
Berk-Yaruq and Muḥammad

began a nine-month siege of the city during which the occupants suffered terrible deprivations, though Muḥammad managed to escape. Simultaneously the struggle for power in Baghdad and Iraq was being carried on by Berk-Yaruq’s šahna, Gümüşh-Tegin al-Qaiṣari, and Muḥammad’s šahna Il Ghāriz b. Artuq. Then in 496/1103 Berk-Yaruq marched into Āzarbāijān against Muḥammad and Maudūd b. Ismāʿīl b. Yāqūṭ, and a fifth and last battle, again a defeat for Muḥammad, took place at Khuy between Lakes Urmiyeh and Vān.¹

Berk-Yaruq’s illnesses and the exhaustion of his resources inclined him to make peace in 497/1104, even though he held at this time most of western and central Iran, along with Iraq and Diyārbakr. There was to be a full divisio imperii, each ruler becoming sultan in his own lands. Muḥammad was to have north-western Iran, Diyārbakr, al-Jazīrā, Mosul, and Syria; Berk-Yaruq was to have the core of the empire, Jībāl, Ṭabaristān, Fārs, Khūzistān, Baghdad, and the Ḥaramain, i.e. Mecca and Medina; whilst Sanjar was to remain in Khurasān, making the khūṭba for Muḥammad. Whether this precarious arrangement would have lasted can only be surmised. A year later Berk-Yaruq died, leaving an infant son Malik-Shāh as his successor and Ayāz as his atabeg. Ayāz and Il-Ghāriz proclaimed him in Baghdad, but Muḥammad marched there via Mosul and Ayaz, and Vizier al-Ṣafī Saʿd al-Mulk Abu’l-Mahāsīn decided that resistance was hopeless. Muḥammad thus became sultan over the whole of the Saljuq territories.²

The verdict of posterity has been that Berk-Yaruq was not a man of his father’s calibre. Yet it is not surprising that he burnt himself out by the age of twenty-five, for he campaigned ceaselessly, was often ill, and was several times wounded by assassins. He was never able to dislodge Muḥammad from Āzarbāijān, and he had continuously to defend the core of his territories, Fārs and Jībāl, while also attempting to maintain his influence in Iraq.

The divisions of power between Berk-Yaruq and Muḥammad demonstrated cogently how vital was the principle of a patrimonial share-out. The role of the ghulām commanders and the Türkmen begs becomes very prominent in this period, and local Türkmen dynasties

begin to form: the sons of Bursuq in Khūzistān; the Artuqids in Diyārbakr; at Khilāt the Shāh-Armanids, descendants of Ismā‘il b. Yāqūtī’s ghulām Sukmān al-Qutbī; and shortly afterwards the Zangids, descendants of Aq-Sonqur, in Mosul. Other local dynasties, e.g. the ‘Annāzids and Mazyadids, persisted and even strengthened their position. After Malik-Shāh’s death there were many young Saljuq princes in provincial appanages, each normally provided with a Turkish ghulām as his atabeg. These tutors not only exercised power on their charges’ behalf, but often succeeded in arrogating effective power for themselves, especially after the death of Sultan Muḥammad in 511/1118; towards the middle of the century, for example, the family of Eldigūz, atabeg of Arslan b. Toghīrīl b. Muḥammad, founded a powerful, autonomous dynasty in the north-west.\(^1\) A further notable feature of the 6th/12th century was a rise in the prestige and actual power of the ‘Abbāsid caliphate, due in large part to the need of rival claimants for caliphal support and confirmation of titles.

Many of the troops of Berk-Yaruq and Muḥammad were furnished by the Turkish amirs, whose frequent changes of side show that their interest lay in opposing the reconstitution of an effective central power; yet their attitude did ensure that, however crushingly any contestant was defeated, he could generally reassemble forces fairly quickly. The worst sufferers were, of course, the populations of Iran and the Sawād of Iraq, across which armies were constantly marching. The rival sultans were rarely able to collect regular territorial taxation, and irregular levies were therefore resorted to, above all when cities changed hands: e.g. Muhammad’s generals Inal b. Anush-Tegin and his brother ‘Ali collected 200,000 dinārs from Isfahān in 496/1102.\(^2\) To satisfy the soldiery, estates were often confiscated and parcelled out as iqṭā’s amongst them; it was said against Berk-Yaruq’s vizier, al-‘Amīd al-A‘azz Abūl-Maḥāsin al-Dihistānī, that he even seized private properties and turned them into iqṭā’s.\(^3\) Practices like these inevitably contributed to economic and social regression after the period of internal peace under Malik-Shāh.

Scorched-earth tactics were another recognized military measure. When in 498/1103 Chōkermish was threatened at Mosul by Muḥammad, he gathered everyone inside the walls of the city and then devastated the surrounding countryside. The ravages of Sanjar’s army in 494/1101

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1 Cf. Cahen, “Atabak”, Encyc. of Islam (2nd ed.).
3 Bundārī, p. 89.
as he marched through Qumis to join Muḥammad at Ray were particularly severe, causing famine and reducing people to cannibalism. This general decline in security also encouraged sectarian and factional disturbance. In the cities of Khurasān, for instance, the old ‘asabiyāt (factions), involving unpopular groups such as the Shi‘a and Karāmīyya, flared up; in Kūristān there was fighting between the ‘Annāzid Šurkẖāb and the Türkmen of the Salghur tribe, who had been dispossessing the indigenous Kurds of their pastures.

Above all, the sources state that disturbed conditions favoured the spread of Ismā‘īlism, especially in Kūhistān and Fārs. In northern Syria Riḍwān b. Tutush earned himself eternal obloquy from Sunni historians by his use of local Ismā‘īlīs in warfare against his brother. Berk-Yaruq massacred Ismā‘īlīs in western Iran and Baghdad, and other amirs carried out operations in Dailam, Fārs, and Khūzistān, without, however, permanently dislodging the sectaries from their strongholds. Some of the greatest successes of the Bāṭinīyya in this period were in Kūhistān, where large stretches of territory were under their regular control. Mentioned amongst their allies is a certain al-Munawwar, a descendant of the Simjūrid family who in the 4th/10th century had held Kūhistān from the Sāmānids. Sanjar sent both regular troops and ghāzīs into the province, but the most he could achieve was an agreement with the Ismā‘īlīs that they should voluntarily limit their activities.

Muḥammad reigned for thirteen years as undisputed sultan (498–511/1105–18), while his brother Sanjar remained at Balkh as his viceroy in the east, receiving the title of Malik. Whilst the sources are lukewarm about Berk-Yaruq, they eulogize Muḥammad as “the perfect man of the Saljuqs and their mighty stallion”, praising his zeal for the Sunna and his hatred of the Bāṭinīyya. They do not, on the other hand, reveal him to be a more capable ruler or soldier than Berk-Yaruq. Several facts explain Muḥammad’s popularity in pious circles. First, it was his fortune to secure sole power after the kingdom had been

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1 Ibn al-Athir, vol. x, pp. 207, 262; cf. Sanaullah, *Decline of the Saljuqid Empire*, pp. 70 ff. In 494/1101 Sanjar is said to have taxed even baths and caravanserais at Nīshāpūr (Ibn al-Jauzī, vol. ix, p. 123), and the violence and oppression of his ghulāms and agents at Bābāq is mentioned by Ibn Funduq, p. 269.


5 Bundārī, p. 118.
gripped by civil war for years, and at a time when it was economically exhausted and ready to accept anyone who could give peace. This period of peace enabled the sultan to give moral encouragement and a certain amount of indirect military help to the Syrian amirs, who were struggling to contain the Crusaders; even more important, he was able to take action against the Isma'īlis in Persia, who, profiting by the previous disorders, had consolidated their position in Dailam, Fārs, and Kūhistān. Finally, Muḥammad was the last Great Saljuq to have firm and undisputed control of western Iran and Iraq, the heartland of the sultanate since Toghril’s time. After his death his sons ruled successively as subordinates of Sanjar, and the centre of gravity of the sultanate tended to shift eastwards to its birthplace, Khurāsān. Since the sources are usually partial to Nizām al-Mulk and his descendants, their picture of Muḥammad is influenced by the fact that he received support from the majority of the Nizāmiyya, which began when Mu’āyyid al-Mulk first espoused his cause in 492/1099. Muḥammad also employed Naṣīr al-Mulk b. Mu’āyyid al-Mulk, first as his chief secretary and then as vizier to his sons; and in 500/1107 Ḫiyā’ al-Mulk Ahmad b. Nizām al-Mulk, became his own vizier for four years, the sultan insisting on having one of the family because of their innate capability and auspiciousness (baraka).¹

The ambiguous attitudes and shifting allegiances of the Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab amirs of Jibāl, Iraq, al-Jazīreh, and Diyarbakr had added much to the confusion of Berk-Yaruq’s reign. Muḥammad now endeavoured to curb these amirs by reducing over-mighty subjects and diverting energies into the holy wars in Syria. But like all preceding sultans, he had to deal first of all with rival claims from members of his own dynasty. In 499/1105–6 Mengū-Bars b. Bōrī-Bars rebelled at Nihāvand. He tried to draw the sons of Bursuq to his side, but the sultan captured and jailed him together with other potential claimants, the sons of Tekish. In the following year Qīlīqh-Arsalan b. Sulaimān, who had been fighting the Franks at Edessa, came to Mosul at the invitation of Zangi b. Chōkermish, established himself there, and claimed the sultanate for himself; eventually defeated by Muḥammad’s general Chavli, and knowing himself to be a rebel who could expect only short shrift from the sultan, Sulaimān drowned himself to avoid capture.²

BERK-YARUQ AND MUHAMMAD

It was a measure of Muḥammad's sense of strength that in 501/1108 he decided to overthrow the Mazyadid Saif al-Daula Šadaqa. During the fighting between Berk-Yaruq and Muḥammad, the so-called "King of the Arabs" had usually lent his support to the latter, but neither side had had a preponderance in central Iraq and the rivalry of the two Saljuqs had probably been helpful to Mazyadid interests. At first Šadaqa continued in high favour. Deputed to recover Başra, he and Muhadhdhib al-Daula of the Banū Abī’l-Jabr expelled from there a Turkish amīr who had installed himself during the previous disturbances, and the city was now restored to Saljuq control. Then in 498/1105 he received the grant of Wāsīt.1 But slanders about Šadaqa seem to have been spread at the Saljuq court by the ‘Amīd Abū Ja’far al-Balkhi; he was even accused of Ismā’ili inclinations, possibly because of his strongly Shi’i beliefs.

Yet the sources unite in stressing how Šadaqa embodied the traditional Arab virtues of liberality and hospitality. His house in Baghdād was "the inviolate refuge of all those in fear" (Ibn al-Jauzi), and "in his reign, Hilla was the halting-place of the traveller, the refuge of the hopeful ones, the asylum of the outcast, and the sanctuary of the terrified fugitive" (Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā). Indeed, it was his sheltering of the refugee Dailamī governor of Āveh and Sāveh which gave the sultan a pretext to move against him; before this Šadaqa had behaved very circumspectly, refusing in 500/1107 to go to the aid of Zangi b. Chökermish in Mosul lest the sultan be offended. In a battle in the marshlands of al-Za’farānīyya, Šadaqa’s Arabs and Kurds were defeated by Muḥammad’s forces, amongst whom were the sons of Bursuq and the Kākūyīd Abū Kālijār Garshāsp; the sultan’s palace ghulāms and Turkish archers played a prominent part in decimating Šadaqa’s front-line troops, and Šadaqa himself was killed. It was not Muḥammad’s aim to occupy the Mazyadid capital of Hilla; he contented himself with carrying off Šadaqa’s son Dubais and even appointed Šadaqa’s old commander-in-chief as governor of the city.2

For several years al-Jazīreh and Mosul had been disputed among various local amīrs. The region was strategically important as a frontier march against the Türkmen elements in Dīvārbakr and

Armenia, many of whom were grouped around the Artuqid ruler of Nisibin, Il-Ghāzi, and around Sukmān al-Quṭbī of Akhlāṭ; it was also a frontier against the Crusaders, who were pressing eastwards from Edessa. Furthermore, in these years Riḍwān of Aleppo was trying to bring Mosul into his own sphere of influence and thereby utilize its resources for his wars against the Franks. Muḥammad tried to stabilize the position by the direct appointment of successive ghulām governors in Mosul: Chavli Saqao, Maudūd b. Altun-Tegin, Aq-Sonqur al-Bursuqī, and Ai-Aba Juyūsh (?Chavush) Beg, the last two being made atabegs to his son Masʿūd. He hoped, too, to use these amirs and their troops against the Franks in Syria. His relations with the spiritual head of Sunni Islam, the ʿAbbasid caliph, were cordial, and in 502/1108-9 a marriage was arranged between al-Mustazhir and Muhammad’s sister, the daughter of Malik-Shāh.1 Appeals for help against the Franks came from the hard-pressed people of Aleppo and even from the Byzantine Emperor Alexis Comnenus. From 501/1107-8 onwards, Fakhr al-Mulk Ibn ʿAmmār, the dispossessed ruler of Tripoli, haunted the Saljuq court, until Muḥammad was moved to send troops and money to his cousin Duqaq of Damascus for the relief of Tripoli.2 Chavli, Maudūd, Aq-Sonqur, and Bursuq b. Bursuq all campaigned in Syria with little success, mainly because of the coolness of Il-Ghāzi and of Tugh-Tegin of Damascus, who in 509/1115 allied with the Franks. The crushing victory of the Crusaders at Dānīth in that year, coupled with the death of the Saljuq rulers in Syria, put an end to Muḥammad’s hopes of intervening in Syria.

Little is mentioned of internal conditions in western and central Iran during Muḥammad’s reign, apart from the continuing activities of the Ismāʿīlis. On the north-western frontier an attack on Ganja by the Georgians was repelled (503/1109-10).3 After the suppression of Mengū-Bars’ revolt in Jībāl, the sultan took the opportunity of exchanging the iqṭāʾs held by Bursuq’s sons in Khūzistān for others in the region of Dināvār, presumably to reduce the concentration of their power in the south-west.4 Fārs was governed by Fakhr al-Daula Chavli Saqao from 498/1104 to 500/1106, and then again from 502/1109 till his death eight years later. According to Ibn al-Athīr’s account, Chavli ruled oppressively, using Muḥammad’s infant son Chaghri, for whom he

1 Ḥusainī, pp. 81-2; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, pp. 330, 339; Sibt b. al-Jauzī, vol. i, p. 27.
3 Ibn al-Qalānī, Dhail taʾrīkh Dimashq, p. 167; Ḥusainī, p. 81.
BERK-YARUQ AND MUHAMMAD

was atabeg, as a cloak for his tyrannies and expropriations. On the other hand Ibn al-Balkhi, Chavli’s contemporary and the local historian of Fārs, mentions several measures taken by the atabeg to restore order and prosperity. The chief obstacle to order in Fārs remained the Shabānkāra’is, and Chavli began systematically to reduce their castles, capturing over seventy of them and dismantling the fortifications of most of them. Campaigns were also launched against the tribal chiefs of the Kurds, such as Ĥasan b. al-Mubāriz of Fasā and Abū Sa’d b. Muhammad b. Masā of the Karzuvi tribe. The chief of Dārābjird, Ibrāhīm, was expelled and forced to flee to Kirmān, where his kinsman by marriage, the Saljuq ruler of Kirmān, sheltered him. Chavli accordingly marched against Kirmān in 508/1114–15 to demand the extradition of the Shabānkāra’is who had fled there, but he was unable to get beyond a point on the frontier between Fārs and Kirmān.1 However, Chavli had many positive achievements in Fārs to his credit: the rebuilding of towns, the restoration of agriculture, and in particular the repair of irrigation works and dams, such as the Band-i Qāssār in the district of Lower Kurbāl and the dam in the district of Rāmjird, which was named “Fakhristān” in his honour. On the whole, Muḥammad’s reign witnessed a distinct improvement in the pacification of Fārs; the sultan himself conciliated the tribal chieftains and kept a group of Shabānkāra’i leaders permanently in his service at court.2

Kirmān was ruled from 495/1101 to 537/1142 by Muḥiyy al-İslām Arslan-Shāh b. Kirmān Shāh. Although he ruled longer than any other Saljuqs of Kirmān, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm has very little to say about his reign, presumably because it was in general peaceful and uneventful. He does mention Arslan-Shāh’s encouragement of the ulema and scholars, and states that in his reign Kirmān reached new heights of commercial prosperity; chaos and piracy in the Persian Gulf meant that much trade was coming overland, and the trading suburb of the capital expanded greatly. The continued existence of this compact Saljuq amirate in eastern central Iran, with its permanent force of Türkmen soldiery, made it a haven for political refugees and for those seeking military help; it was during this period that Kirmān sheltered the Ghaznavid Bahram-Shāh b. Masʿūd III. Arslan-Shāh also intervened at Yazd on behalf of the last members of the Kāḵyid family.

who held their fiefs there, and afterwards he received this town from one of the Kākūyid disputants. Keeping up links with the Great Saljuqs, Arslan-Shāh married one of Sultan Muḥammad’s daughters, and was careful not to infringe on the rights of Sanjar in Khorāsān. Thus whilst welcoming Bahrām-Shāh, he refused to give him military help, referring him to Sanjar as the senior representative of the Saljuqs in eastern Iran; it was in fact with Sanjar’s help that Bahrām-Shāh was placed on the throne at Ghazna in 510/1117 (see below, pp. 158-9).\

The freedom from external pressure left Muḥammad free to tackle the question of the Ismā‘īlis with some success, although he never permanently quelled them. The political assassinations carried out by the Bāṭīnī fīdā‘īs created an unpleasant atmosphere of suspicion and fear within the sultanate, while the denunciation of “heretics” is a common feature of Muhammad’s reign. In 500/1107 Vizier Sa’d al-Mulk Abu‘l-Maḥāsin was denounced by one of his enemies and executed, together with many of the Divān officials; fifteen years later, under Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, the celebrated poet and stylist al-Ṭūghrā‘ī was executed on a trumped-up charge of heresy (see pp. 158-9 below). Under the influence of the ra‘īs of Isfahān, ‘Abdallāh al-Khaṭībī, Muḥammad purged the administration of many allegedly Ismā‘īli sympathizers, and started a policy of favouring Khorāsānīs at the expense of “Iraqīs” (i.e. those from western Iran or ‘Iraq ‘Ajami), on the plea that the Khorāsānīs were stronger supporters of orthodoxy.

Amongst the military operations against the Bāṭīnīyya, the capture of Shāhdiz near Isfahān and that of Khānlānjan in 500/1107 brought the sultan much prestige; despite the fact that some of the defenders escaped to Kūhistān and to other fortresses in Fārs, Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Malik b. ‘Attāsh and his son were both killed. Alamūt, the seat of Hasan-i Șabbāh, was besieged either in 501/1107-8 or two years later by Vizier Diya‘ al-Mulk and Amir Chavli; it was the vizier’s failure here which led to his downfall. In 505/1111-12 the sultan sent the governor of Āveh and Sāveh, Anūsh-Tegin Shirgīr (?b. Shirgīr), who captured various castles in the region of Qazvin and Dailam. Towards

3 Bundārī, pp. 95-6.
the end of the reign Anūsh-Tegin again besieged Alamut and was near to capturing it when the news of the sultan's death arrived and the army thereupon dispersed, allowing all its stores and baggage to fall into the Assassins' hands.\(^1\)

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**IX. THE SALJUQ SULTANATE IN THE WEST UNDER THE SONS OF MUḤAMMAD B. MALIK-SHĀH**

Muḥammad died in 511/1118 and in his last illness he appointed his son Maḥmūd as successor. Maḥmūd reigned for fourteen years (511-25/1118-31) with the honorific Mugḥīḥ al-Dunyā waʾl-Dīn ("Bringer of Help in Secular and Religious Affairs"). But there were four other sons, Maṣʿūd, Toghril, Sulaimān Shāh, and Saljuq Shāh, who at various times and in various parts of the empire also held power. Indeed, Muḥammad's sons held the sultanate in the west for the next three or four decades, and all but Saljuq Shāh reigned in turn.\(^2\)

The centrifugal tendencies of the previous two reigns, held in check for a time by Muḥammad, now had free play. The succession in western Iran and Iraq was permanently in dispute, often with as many as three or four claimants at one time, each backed by his atabeg or guardian. The sultans had to find support amongst the powerful Turkish amirs, and this usually meant the alienation of territory and of fiscal rights in the form of iqtā's, as well as the interference of amirs even within the sultans' own bureaucracy. Anūshīrvān b. Khālid, who was Maḥmūd's vizier in 521/1127 and 522/1128 and thus had first-hand experience of affairs, laments the decline of the Saljuq state after Muḥammad's death: "In Muḥammad's reign", he says, "the kingdom was united and secure from all attacks; but when it passed to his son Maḥmūd, they split up that unity and destroyed its cohesion. They claimed a share with him in the power, and left him only a bare subsistence."\(^3\)

In the east Maḥmūd's uncle, Sanjar, remained the senior member of the dynasty. Although it had become the practice for the supreme sultanate to devolve on the ruler of western Iran and Iraq, Sanjar's

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\(^3\) Bundārī, p. 134. For a detailed account of Maḥmūd's sultanate, see M. A. Köymen, Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğu tarihi, vol. ii, İkinci İmparatorluk Dervi, pp. 5-148, 164-73.
seniority gave him a special standing under Turkish customary law. This seems to be reflected in his decision to assume his father Malik-Shâh's old title Mu'izz al-Dunya wa'1-Din ("Strengthener in Secular and Religious Affairs") as soon as Muhammad had died; and on coins minted by Mahmûd in the west, Sanjar's name is accorded primacy over his own. Whenever there was doubt over the succession in the west, it was to Sanjar that the problem was taken; on Mahmûd's death in 525/1131, the Caliph al-Mustarshid refused to interfere personally, but referred the claimants Mas'ud b. Muhammad and Dâ'ûd b. Mahmûd to Sanjar, who in fact decided in favour of Toghrîl. The later years of Sanjar's rule in the east were clouded by external threats and internal unrest among the Ghuzz tribesmen, but in the earlier period his territories enjoyed relative peace, and this contrasted notably with the instability and confusion of the west, where the atabegs and other amîrs had secured much of the substance of power.

At the outset of his reign, in 513/1119, Mahmûd had to face an invasion of his lands by Sanjar, who alleged that the Chief Hajib 'Ali Bâr had secured an objectionable ascendancy over the young ruler, and that Mahmûd was encouraging the Qarakhânids to attack him from behind. He came with a powerful army, whose commanders were said to include five kings: Sanjar, the rulers of Ghazna and Sistân, the Khwârazm-Shâh Qutb al-Dîn Muhammâd, and the Kâkûyîd 'Âlî al-Daula Garshâsp, Ismâ'îlîs and pagan Turks were among its troops, and there were forty elephants. Sanjar defeated Mahmûd at Sâveh, and pushed on through Jibâl as far as Baghdad. When peace and amity were finally restored, Mahmûd was given one of Sanjar's daughters in marriage and was made his uncle's heir, but he in turn had to relinquish important territories in the north of Iran. Sanjar remained in occupation of Tabaristan, Qûmis, Damâvand, and, most important of all, Ray, which was to serve as a kind of watchtower over western Iran.

Nor did Mahmûd have much direct control over the north-western provinces. His brother Toghrîl had received from Sultan Muhammad the iqâ's of Sâveh, Āveh, and Zanjân, with Amir Shirgîr designated as his atabeg. At the instigation of a new atabeg, Kûn-Toghîl, Toghrîl had rebelled against Mahmûd, and although the rebels were forced to withdraw to Ganja, they strengthened their position through Sanjar's

Diktat to Mahmud. They further obtained Gilan and Dailam, in addition to Qazvin and several towns of the north-west, and from this base Toğhril successfully defied Mahmud for the whole of the latter's reign.\(^1\)

Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad was malik of Mosul, al-Jazīreh, and Āzarbājījān, and Ai-Abā Juyūş Őeg was his atabeg. Ample support for Mas'ūd's ambitions came from the troops of local Türkmen and Kurdish chiefs—especially from ʿImād al-Dīn Zangī, the son of Malik-Shāh's ghulām commander Qasīm al-Daula Aq-Sonqur. Moreover, the Mazyadid Dubais b. Șadaqa was eager to see Muḥammad and Mas'ūd embroiled in warfare. According to Ibn al-Jauzī, "Saif al-Daula [Dubais] rejoiced at the conflict between the two sultans and believed that he and his power would be preserved as long as they were involved together, just as his father Șadaqa's position had been favoured by the hostility of the two sultans [Berk-Yaruq and Muḥammad]".\(^2\) Mas'ūd and Juyūş Beg rebelled openly in 514/1120, but Muḥammad's general Aq-Sonqur Bursuqi defeated them at Asadābād. Only Mas'ūd's vizier ʿHasan b. ʿAli al-Ṭūghrāʾi lost his life; Mas'ūd himself was pardoned and Juyūş Beg conciliated. Two years later Juyūş Beg was deputed to suppress a revolt in Āzarbājījān led by Toğhril and his new atabeg Aq-Sonqur Aḥmadīlī, muqta' of Marāḡheh. Dubais, however, was forced to flee to his wife's relatives, the Artuqids of Mardin, and then to the safety of the inaccessible marshes in the Baṭīḥa of southern Iraq. Mosul was granted to Aq-Sonqur Bursuqi, and in Diyarbakr the death of Il-Ghazi b. Artuq caused a split in the Artuqid family and a division of their territories which for the moment neutralized this quarter for the sultan.\(^3\)

Dissension within the Saljuq family allowed the ʿAbbāsid caliphs to increase their secular power in the course of the 6th/12th century. This process is discernible under the capable caliphs al-Mustarshīd (512-29/1118-35) and al-Muqtafī (530-55/1136-60), and it becomes particularly marked in the long and successful reign of al-Nāṣir (575-622/1180-1225).\(^4\) During Muḥammad's reign the hostility of the Shiʿī Mazyadids


\(^4\) For more on al-Nāṣir, see section xii, pp. 168-9 below.
prevented al-Mustarshid from ever alienating the Saljuqs too much. Indeed, Ibn al-Athir says that the sultans left Dubais in power merely as a check on the caliph; when al-Mustarshid died and Dubais's role here was finished, Mas'ūd executed him.\(^1\) On one occasion the caliph had to implore Maḥmūd to remain in the capital as a safeguard against Dubais, who had sworn to raze Baghdad to the ground. In 516/1122 al-Mustarshid was obliged to accept as his vizier the brother of Maḥmūd's own vizier, Shams al-Mulk 'Uthmān b. Niẓām al-Mulk, and when the latter was executed in 518/1124 al-Mustarshid had to remove the brother from office correspondingly. However, in company with Aq-Sonqur Bursuqī the caliph defended Baghdad against Dubais and in 517/1123 took the field personally against him; this act, together with his seizure and destruction of wine in the sultan's market at Baghdad in 514/1120, signified his growing self-confidence. The sultan's shāhna in Baghdad, Sa'd al-Daula Yūrūn-Qush, was perturbed enough in 510/1126 to warn Maḥmūd of the caliph's rising confidence and military expertise, and he foresaw an attack on the sultan's rights in Iraq if the latter did not come personally to enforce them. Maḥmūd did come to Baghdad and besiege al-Mustarshid in the eastern part of the city, forcing him to make peace and hand over the stipulated tribute.\(^2\)

Dubais joined with Toghril in 519/1125 to harass the sultan and caliph in Iraq; but they were unable to remain there, and Maḥmūd pursued them through Jibal into Khurāsān, where they took refuge with Sanjar. They then aroused Sanjar with stories of Maḥmūd's disaffection and his closeness to the caliph, causing Sanjar to come westwards to Ray in 522/1128. But the two sultans were reconciled there, and Dubais was forced to flee to Hilla, Baṣra, and finally Syria, where he fell into the hands of Zangī and narrowly escaped death. Two years later Mas'ūd came to Sāveh from Khurāsān, where he had been staying with Sanjar; it was feared that the latter was instigating him to rebel, but the two brothers made peace at Kirmānshāh, and Maḥmūd granted to Mas'ūd the iqṭā' of Ganja.\(^3\)

Being so pre-occupied with internal difficulties, Maḥmūd could give

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only intermittent attention to the external frontiers of his part of the empire. During his reign the main danger zone was in the north-west, Arran and the Caucasus, where the Georgians became very active under "The Restorer", David IV (1089–1125). He not only brought into Georgia large bands of slave troops and Qipchaq mercenaries, but he ceased the payment of tribute to the Saljuqs and interfered with the seasonal migrations of the Turkmen into Georgia. Maḥmūd sent an expedition against him in 515/1121 in which the Artuqid Il-Ghāzi, Toghril, Dubais, and Kūn-Toghdī took part, but the Muslim army was destroyed and the triumphant Georgians entered Tiflis, dislodging the local Muslim family of the Banū Ja'far. It was probably in 517/1123, shortly after the fall of Tiflis, that David scored a further success by entering Ani without striking a blow. There he deposed the Shaddādīd amīr Abu’l-Asvār II b. Manūchīhr (? 503–17/1110–23), restored the Armenian cathedral to its Christian usage, and installed in Ani an Armenian governor. This governor was later threatened by a Saljuq army under Sanjār, probably in 520/1126, and returned the city to Faḍl III b. Abu’l-Asvār II (reigned c. 520–4/1126–30). Georgian expansion eastwards to Shāmākhi and Darband also affected the Muslim principality of Shīrvān, and in 517/1123 Maḥmūd came to this province. He seized the Shīrvān Shāh (possibly Manūchīhr II b. Farīdūn) and behaved so repressively that Shīrvān’s annual tribute to the Saljuq treasury now dried up; in the end, a threatened attack by David the Restorer compelled the sultan to withdraw. Ibn al-Athīr alleges that in the course of an expedition in 524/1130, just before his death, Maḥmūd captured the Ismā‘īlī stronghold of Alamūt; but the verdict of another source, that the sultan achieved no successes here, is probably nearer the truth.

In judging Maḥmūd as a ruler, the sources praise his justice and clemency and also his excellence as an Arabic scholar, saying that he attained a level of literacy not common among the Saljuqs. Conversely, Anūṣhīrvān b. Khālid assesses his conduct of administration severely. He lists ten great faults of his reign, including the alienation of Sanjar

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and Dubais, the dispersal of royal ghulāms, a moral deterioration at court, and the squandering of the treasure amassed by his father. Much obloquy is heaped on his viziers, such as the tyrannical Shams al-Mulk 'Uthmān, but above all on Qiwām al-Din Abu'l-Qāsim al-Darguzini, or al-Ansābādhi, who acted as 'Ārid al-Jaish and then as vizier for Maḥmūd; on his dismissal he acted as vizier for Toghril in Āzarbājān, again achieving a reputation for tyranny, till in 527/1133 Toghril executed him. Anushirvān sneers at his peasant origin; he also accuses him of friendliness towards the Bāṭiniyya, of using his official position to get rid of enemies, and of financial rapacity. Yet it must be remembered that the sultan's financial position was usually parlous. His direct rule extended only to Jībāl, northern Fārs, and the Baghdad area, with a summer capital in Hamadān and a winter one in Baghdad, and from these regions he had to find iqṭā's for the soldiers directly in his employ. Because of financial problems, the sphere of operations of his divāns was drastically reduced, and the vizier was compelled to get money by seizures and confiscations. One vizier, Kamāl al-Mulk 'Ali al-Simirumī, earned great unpopularity in 514/1120 by reimposing the local tolls and market taxes (mukās) which had been abolished thirteen years previously by Sultan Muhammad. Accordingly, it is not surprising that Maḥmūd got through the greater part of the treasure chest—it contained eighteen million dinārs in cash alone—which his father had assembled.

A further period of crisis and chaos occurred in 525/1131 when Maḥmūd died. At Hamadān his young son Dā'ūd was proclaimed sultan by al-Darguzini, with Aq-Sonqur Aḥmadīlī assuming the office of atabeg. Dā'ūd was recognized in Jībāl and Āzarbājān, but in Iraq Mas'ūd proclaimed himself sultan, and in Fārs and Khorāsān another brother, Saljuq-Shāh, supported by the Atabeg Qaracha, also claimed the throne. The caliph referred the disputants to Sanjar, as senior member of the dynasty, but Sanjar's intervention only brought into the arena his own protégé, Toghril, whose claim he now pushed. Sanjar came to Jībāl in person and set Toghril on the throne, giving him al-Darguzini as his vizier; he also invited Dubais b. Šadaqa and Zangi to invade Iraq and embarrass Mas'ūd's ally the caliph. Complex military operations followed, but Sanjar's withdrawal to Transoxiana,

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where a Qarakhanid revolt had broken out, left Toghril in a very shaky position (see below, p. 139). He could find no popular support in Jibāl, where the people of Isfahān refused to admit him to their city, and after being twice defeated by Mas'ūd, he fled to Ray and then to Tabaristan, where the Bāvandid Ispahbadh 'Alā' al-Daula 'Ali b. Shahrīyār (511-34/1117-40) sheltered him during the winter of 527/1132-3. Mas'ūd's involvement with Dā'ūd, who was holding out in Azarbājān, permitted Toghril to gather together an army and make a successful revanche. Mas'ūd was driven from Hamadān and fled to Baghdad in a wretched state. When at last Toghril seemed secure on the throne, he fell ill at Hamadān; and at the beginning of 529/1134, after a troubled reign of only two years, he died.1

A race for the throne occurred when the news spread of Toghril's end. Mas'ūd was in Baghdad, but he managed to clear a way through the mountain snows, using camels to trample a road; he was received in Hamadān by the amirs and proclaimed sultan with the honorific Ghiyāth al-Dunyā wa'l-Dīn. In this fashion he began a reign of nearly twenty years (529-47/1134-52), the longest of any sultan in the west since Malik-Shāh's time. He employed as his vizier Anushirvān b. Khālid and entrusted to his tutelage his brother Dā'ūd b. Muḥammad.2

As in Mahmūd's time, the sultan's authority was in practice confined to Jibāl and central Iraq. When Mas'ūd obtained the throne, the rival claimant Dā'ūd b. Mahmūd, who had been cheated of the succession on his father's death two years before, remained in Azarbājān, and over the following years he made several attempts from this base to seize the sultanate. Eventually conciliated by Mas'ūd's recognition of him as the vālī 'ahd, he now married one of the sultan's daughters and settled down at Tabrīz, but in 538/1143-4 he was assassinated by the Ismā'īlīs, allegedly at the instigation of Zangi, who feared that Mas'ūd was about to send Dā'ūd to take control of his own region of northern Syria.3 In the later years of Mas'ūd's reign the north-west passed into the hands of a series of powerful Turkish amirs who behaved as virtually independent rulers. After the death of Qara-Sonqur in 535/

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1140-7, Chavli Jandar took over in Azarbaijan, Arran, and Armenia, finally becoming the atabeg to Mas'ud's son Malik-Shah.¹ Chavli's own death occurred in 541/1146, after which 'Abd al-Rahman Toghan-Yurek succeeded him as atabeg to the young prince and added the governorship of Arran and Azarbaijan to his existing iqta of Kakhkhal; but in 541/1147, alarmed at Toghan-Yurek's power, the sultan procured his murder (see p. 132 below).² Nevertheless, the end of Mas'ud's sultanate saw power in Azarbaijan being monopolized by two Turkish amirs, Shams al-Din Eldigüz, the atabeg of Arslan b. Toghril, and Aq-Sonquor (or Arslan) b. Aq-Sonquor Ahmadil of Maragheh.

Fars was for many years ruled by the Amir Boz-Aba, the irreconcilable enemy of Sultan Mas'ud ever since 531/1136-7, when the sultan had killed Boz-Aba's companion, the atabeg Mengü-Bars. Boz-Aba maintained himself in Fars till Mas'ud captured him in battle and executed him (542/1147-8).³ In the years before this violent end, the amir had successfully fought off attempts by other amirs to oust him from possession of Fars, in favour of the princes for whom they were atabegs. Thus in 533/1138-9 the atabeg Qara-Sonquor, together with Da'ud and Saljuq-Shah, the sons of Sultan Muhammad, had invaded Fars and placed Saljuq-Shah on the throne at Shiraz as local malik; but once Qara-Sonquor had departed, Boz-Aba came back, seized Saljuq-Shah, and jailed him. At the end of his life Boz-Aba espoused the cause of two of Mahmud's sons, Muhammad and Malik-Shah, and for a brief moment before his final downfall placed them on the throne in Jibal (see below, p. 131).⁴

With regard to Saljuq influence in Iraq and al-Jazīreh, the most significant event in Mas'ud's reign was the meteoric rise of 'Imad al-Din Zangi b. Aq-Sonquor, a Turkish amir of slave origin. Zangi's sphere of expansion was essentially that of the Arab lands in al-Jazīreh, Diyārbakr, and northern Syria, but the possession of Mosul gave him an important base for penetration northwards and eastwards into Kurdistan, and on several occasions he allied with the discontented Turkish amirs in Iran against the sultan and caliph. Indeed, Mas'ud, came to regard him as the arch-instigator of the rebellious coalitions which encompassed him. As governor of Wāsīt and Baṣra in Sultan Mahmud's time, Zangi had successfully administered the difficult and confused delta region of Iraq, and in 521/1127, with the death of the

governor of Mosul, 'Izz al-Din Mas'ud al-Bursuqi, Mahmud appointed Zangi in his stead; he also gave him the custody of his sons Alp-Arslan and Farrukh-Shah, so that Zangi now became an atabeg.¹

From Mosul, Zangi began a policy of conquest against the Arab and Türkmen rulers of Diyarbakr and northern Syria, as well as against the Franks and Byzantines. First he captured Aleppo, Hims, and Hamah, and then in 539/1144 he achieved the success which made him the idol of Sunni historians, the capture of Edessa from Count Jocelyn II. His death came in 541/1146 at the hands of his own ghulâms whilst he was besieging the 'Uqailid Sâlim b. Mâlik in Qalât Ja'bar.² Although his exploits had made him a Sunni hero, Zangi was always hostile to the 'Abbasids. In Mas'ud's reign he allied with the Shi'i Mazyadids and with the deposed Caliph al-Râshid against the Caliph al-Muqtâfî of Baghdad; and in 528/1134, during Toghril's reign, his extensive operations in the Hakkârî region of Kurdistân and Armenia were provoked by the Kurdish chiefs' help to al-Mustarshid, given in the previous year when the caliph had besieged Zangi in Mosul and expelled him from it.³

At the close of the year in which Mas'ud was acknowledged sultan (529/1135), Caliph al-Mustarshid was assassinated by a Batinî, thus ending a reign full of military and political activity. His son al-Râshid reigned only for one year (529-30/1135-6), and his deposition at Mas'ud's instigation marks the high tide of Saljuq influence in Baghdad at this time. The new caliph, al-Muqtâfî b. al-Mustâqîr (530-55/1136-60), proved to be a capable and energetic warrior as well as a religious figurehead. Receiving at the outset of his reign the revenues which his father had held, he began to build up a personal army of Armenian and Greek ghulâms, excluding Turks because he found them unreliable.⁴ He strengthened the wall which al-Mustarshid and his vizier Abû Naṣr Aḥmad b. Niẓâm al-Mulk had built round Baghdad in 517/1123, and he also dug a trench around the city.⁵ He was therefore able on several occasions to defy the sultans, and when Mas'ud died and a period of even greater disunity within the Saljuq dynasty ensued, he extended caliphal authority over the whole of lower and

central Iraq to a degree unknown since the early 4th/10th century. As Ibn al-Tiqtaqa says: “In his reign there occurred much civil strife and warfare between him and the Sultan of Persia, in which the victory lay with him; his reign was also characterized by much activity on the part of ‘ayyārs and evil-doers [the sources stress the sharp rise of ‘iyāra, i.e. brigandage and mob violence, in the capital at this time], for the suppression of which he took firm steps.”

In the early months of Mas‘ūd’s sultanate, relations with al-Mustarshid deteriorated rapidly. The caliph prepared for war, helped by some Turkish amirs who had deserted Mas‘ūd, and also by Bursuq b. Bursuq of Khūzistān, who linked up with him in Jībāl; whilst Dā‘ūd in Āzarbāijān arranged to join forces with the caliph at Dināvār. Nevertheless, Mas‘ūd coped easily with this coalition. In a battle at Dāi-Marg near Hamadān, which was really little more than a skirmish, the caliph’s Turkish troops deserted to the Saljuq army. The caliph himself was taken prisoner, and shortly afterwards was murdered by Īsmā‘īlīs in the sultan’s camp at Marāgheh, whither Mas‘ūd had gone in pursuit of Dā‘ūd. Mas‘ūd confiscated al-Mustarshid’s estates and property in Baghdad and is said to have looted ten million dinārs worth of goods, the chests of coin alone requiring one hundred and seventy mules to carry them away. From Khurāsān, Sanjar had written enjoining Mas‘ūd to treat the caliph with respect, although according to ʿImād al-Dīn, contemporaries whispered that Sanjar himself was really behind al-Mustarshid’s assassination.

The new caliph al-Rāshid was quickly involved in hostilities with Mas‘ūd over the non-payment of a tribute customarily due to the sultan. Barring Mas‘ūd’s representative Yūrūn-Qūsh from Baghdad, he formed a grand coalition against the sultan, embracing Dā‘ūd from Āzarbāijān, Ẓangi from Mosul, Ṣadaqa b. Dubais, and his “atabeg” ʿAntara b. Abī’l-ʿAskar (the appearance of this typically Turkish office amongst a purely Arab dynasty is interesting), together with Bursuq b. Bursuq, the son of Aq-Sonqur Aḥmadili, and the Turkish governors of Qazvin and Iṣfahān. In the extreme south Mas‘ūd’s brother Sāljuq-Shāh came from Khūzistān and seized Wāsīt. But Mas‘ūd remained master of events. He captured Baghdad, and the caliph fled with

Zangī to Mosul. Mas'ūd now assembled the religious dignitaries of the capital and pointed out how al-Rāshid had broken his vow of allegiance and his promise never to take up arms against the sultan. Al-Rāshid's financial requisitions for his soldiers had made him unpopular; a fatwā, or judicial opinion, was secured for his deposition, and his uncle set up as al-Muqtafi (530/1136). This triumph was the peak of Mas'ūd's career. His general Qara-Sonqur followed it up by routing Dā'ūd at Marāḡeh; Saljuq-Shāh's position in Khūzistān became unsafe and he actually had to appeal to Mas'ūd for assistance. The sultan obtained the loyalty of Šādaqa by marrying the latter's daughter, and he also appointed Šadaqa's brother Muḥammad to govern Ḥilla, while the new caliph married Mas'ūd's sister Fāṭima.

There still remained the threat from Malik Dā'ūd and the ex-caliph al-Rāshid, who gathered round themselves in Āzarbāijān a group of amīrs fearful of a rise in the sultan's power. Al-Rāshid had already appealed to Sanjar for help against Mas'ūd, but Sanjar's preoccupations with Transoxianan affairs compelled him to refuse. Mas'ūd defeated and killed the chief of these rebellious amīrs, Mengū-Bars, governor of Fārs, but he was in turn defeated by Amīr Toghan-Yurek, who captured and killed the Mazyadid Šadaqa and the sons of Qara-Sonqur, the atabeg of Āzarbāijān. From the south Saljuq-Shāh made an attempt on Baghdad. Al-Rāshid, Dā'ūd, and Boz-Aba established themselves in the Saljuq capital Hamadan; but al-Rāshid was unable to make any further headway, and a group of his Khurāsānian soldiers, possibly having Ismā'īlī sympathies, murdered him at Isfahān in 532/1137-8.

Dā'ūd seems now to have despaired of achieving the sultanate for himself, and to have settled for a limited sphere of authority in Āzarbāijān, where for the remaining six years of his life he was governor under the Atabeg Ayaz. To Saljuq-Shāh, Mas'ūd allotted the governorship of Akhlāt, Malāzgird, and Arzan in eastern Anatolia, all the former territories of the Shāh-Armanid Nāṣir al-Dīn Sukmān II; and the amir of Tabrīz, Qīz-Oghlu (Qhuzz-Oghlu), led an expedition thither to take up possession. In the next year, 533/1138-9, seeking

3 Husainī, p. 109.
5 Bundārī, p. 185; Husainī, p. 111.
revenge on Boz-Aba for the killing of his son, Qara-Sonqur took with him both Dā'ūd and Saljuq-Shāh (the latter having been recalled from Akhīl) on an expedition to Fārs. Saljuq-Shāh was placed on the throne as malik of Fārs, but in the following year he was deposed by Boz-Aba, thenceforth disappearing from history and probably dying in captivity. Thus Fārs and Khūzistān remained in the hands of Boz-Aba.¹ In 535/1140-1 Mas'ūd sent two generals against him, Ismā'īl Chahārdāngī and Alp-Qush Khūn-Kar, but they were unable to collect sufficient funds in Iraq for the expedition, and after some futile operations in the Bāṭiḥā it was abandoned.²

Shortly before this expedition, Qara-Sonqur had had to deal with a descent of the Georgians on Ganja. During Maḥmūd's reign Ganja had been recaptured for a while by one of its ancestral Shaddāḍid rulers, Faḍl III b. Abīl-Asvār II, but soon afterwards it fell under the power of a Turkish amīr, Togḥān-Aslān al-Aḥdāb ("the hump-backed"), ruler of Bitlis and Arzan, whose son Qurtī was probably responsible for Faḍl's death in 524/1130. The Georgian attack was led by a noble of the Orbeliani family, Ivane b. Abī Laith; it came on top of a serious earthquake at Ganja and caused great loss of life and property, but was repulsed by Qara-Sonqur when he arrived in Arrān.³

In the middle years of his reign, Mas'ūd fell more and more under the influence of the Turkish amīrs. Their ability to dictate to the sultan, even in matters concerning the central bureaucracy, was clearly shown in 533/1139 when they secured the dismissal and death of Mas'ūd's vizier. Mas'ūd had found his first vizier, Anūshirvān b. Khālid, too mild and lenient; his second one, al-Darguzīnī, a relative of the vizier to Maḥmūd and Toghrīl, was useless and incompetent, so in 533/1139 Mas'ūd appointed to the vizierate his treasurer, Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad. Distinguished for his equity and probity Kamāl al-Dīn abolished vexatious taxes and investigated complaints of tyranny. He was zealous in asserting the sultan's financial rights, and uncovered thefts and embezzlements. Not surprisingly he made many enemies, so that Qara-Sonqur threatened a refusal to march against Fārs and a withdrawal of allegiance in favour of one of the Saljuq claimants if the overzealous vizier were not removed; Mas'ūd was obliged to agree to this and to appoint Qara-Sonqur's personal vizier as his own chief minister.

¹ Bundārī, pp. 188-9; Zahir al-Dīn Nišāpūrī, p. 57; Rāvandi, p. 231; Ḥussainī, pp. 111-13; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, p. 49.
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After this, says Ibn al-Athir, "Things became difficult for Sultan Mas'ud. He was impotent to prevent the amirs from parcelling out the whole land as iqṭā’s for themselves, so that in the end he had no territory left at all for himself, but merely the name of Sultan."¹

Qara-Sonqur died at Ardabil in 535/1140-1, much mourned by the people of Azarbāijān. When he was dying, he named the Amir Chavli Jāndār as his successor in Azarbāijān and Arrān, and Mas'ud had to agree to this. In Ray, the Amir 'Abbās—he was a slave of Jauhar, Sanjar's former governor there—consolidated his power. He collected round himself a large slave guard and soon acquired a reputation as a hammer of the Ismā'īlis in the Alburz area, who had killed his master Jauhar; and on one occasion he led an expedition against Alamūt.² At the sultan's court, the loyalty of the Chief Hajib 'Abd al-Rahmān Toghan-Yūrek was a dubious quantity, in part because of jealousy of Mas'ud's favourite, Khaṣṣ Beg Arslan b. Palang-Eri. In his struggle against the disaffected amirs centred round 'Abbās of Ray, Toghan-Yūrek, and Boz-Aba of Fārs, Mas'ud could generally count upon the support of the two leading figures in Azarbāijān, Chavli (until his death in 541/1146), and Eldigūz, who was atabeg to Arslan b. Toghrīl and for a time had been Mas'ud's shahna in Baghdad.

The sultan resolved to bring 'Abbās to heel and came to Ray with an army, but he was bought off by rich presents from the amir. A series of conspiratorial negotiations between 'Abbās and Boz-Aba now began, culminating in 540/1145-6 in a definite rebellion. Boz-Aba brought to Iṣfahān and Hamadān the two princes Muḥammad and Malik-Shāh, sons of Sultān Maḥmūd, while the sultan left Baghdad for Kirmānшāh, and was joined by Eldigūz and other amirs of Azarbāijān whose assistance he had invoked. 'Abbās marched from Ray with yet another Saljuq prince, Mas'ud's brother Sulaimān-Shāh. Meanwhile, the sultan had pushed on to Marāğheh, where he was joined by Chavli. A battle near Kāshān was imminent, but Sulaimān-Shāh and 'Abbās withdrew towards Ray and then to Ardahān, pursued by Mas'ud. Boz-Aba was compelled by these desertions to fall back on Iṣfahān with the two Saljuq maliks; from there, with Chavli in pursuit, he escaped to Fārs. Despite this apparent success, Mas'ud's position was far from strong; the loyalty of his Chief Hajib, Toghan-Yūrek, was

uncertain, for it was believed that his sympathies inclined towards the rebels. The sultan made peace with 'Abbās and received the custody of Sulaimān-Shāh, who was now consigned to imprisonment. When Chavli died, Toghan-Yürek received what he had long coveted, the governorship of Arrān and Āzarbāijān, and at the same time he was made atabeg to Masʿūd's son Malik-Shāh. Moreover the sultan was compelled to accept as his own vizier the personal vizier of Boz-Abā, Tāj al-Īn Ibn Dārūst, and Toghan-Yürek directed all his efforts towards bringing Boz-Abā back into favour at court.¹

In the west the spectacular successes of Zangī were continuing, and from his Mosul base he was gradually mopping up the remaining independent amirs of al-Jazīreh and Diyārbakr, while also making war on the Kurdish chiefs of the Hakkārī region. Zangī had in his care a Saljuq prince, Sultān Mahmūd's son Alp-Arslan, and was waiting to place this candidate on the throne as soon as Masʿūd should die. In 538/1143-4 Masʿūd prepared a punitive expedition against Zangī, regarding him as a source of persistent rebelliousness, but again he was bought off by the promise of a payment; even then, the sultan did not exact the whole of the sum due, hoping that he could still conciliate Zangī.² In central Iraq Baghdad was racked by 'iyāra and the Mazyadid 'Ali b. Dubais roused the local Arab population of the Hilla district and wrested the capital from his brother Muḥammad. He defeated an army sent by the shaḥna of Baghdad, and, despite a brief occupation by Masʿūd's troops in 542/1147-8, retook Hilla and remained in possession of it.³

The death of Zangī in 541/1146 relieved the sultan of this source of worry, and in the same year he also succeeded in breaking out of the iron grip of the Turkish amirs. He procured the assassination of Toghan-Yürek at Ganja, and that of 'Abbās, who was then deputy-chief ḥājīb, at the court in Baghdad.⁴ In place of Toghan-Yürek, Khāṣṣ Beg Arslan b. Palang-Eri was appointed atabeg to Malik Muḥammad, while the obnoxious vizier Ibn Dārūst was sent back to Boz-Abā in Fārs. Boz-Abā, his position obviously weakened by the elimination of his two great allies, now marched to Isfahān and Hamadān, accompanied by the princes Muḥammad and Malik-Shāh,

whom he set up in the khūṭba of those two cities. Masʿūd hurried from Baghdad, summoning aid from Khāṣṣ Beg, Eldigüz, and Shīrḡīr in the north-west, and their forces united at Hamadān before Boz-Aba was able to give battle to Masʿūd alone. There followed a fierce engagement at Marg-i Qara-Tegin, in which the army of Fārs was routed and Boz-Aba and the son of ‘Abbās were killed. At the conclusion of this campaign, Masʿūd married his nephew Muḥammad to his own daughter Jauhar, the widow of Dāʿūd b. Maḥmūd, granted him Khūzistān, and proclaimed him the official heir to the throne.1

The sultan’s excessive favour to Khāṣṣ Beg, together with fears among the remaining amirs that their fate would be similar to that of Boz-Aba and his allies, contributed to the formation of a fresh coalition of rebellious amirs in 543/1148, this time including many of Masʿūd’s former supporters. Forces were sent from Arrān and Āzarbājījnān by Eldigüz and Qaiṣār; from Jibal by Alp-Qūṣ and Tāṭār; from Wāṣīt by Turūntāi; from Hilla by ‘Alī b. Dubais. Other amirs provided further troops, and they were all joined outside Baghdad by Malik Muḥammad. Masʿūd entrusted the defence of the city to the caliph, who deepened the protective trench round Baghdad and issued to the citizens a general summons to arms; the sultan himself then withdrew to the fortress of Takrit. After heavy fighting, the allies dispersed. Alp-Qūṣ then attempted to place Malik-Shāh b. Maḥmūd on the throne at Baghdad, but his attack on the city was repelled by al-Muqtafi. Sanjār came to Ray in the winter of 544/1149-50, a reconciliation with Masʿūd took place, and he promised to end Khāṣṣ Beg’s ascendancy.2

During Masʿūd’s absence at Ray, several of the previous rebels, including Yūrūn-Qūṣ, Turūntāi, and ‘Alī b. Dubais, again massed their troops in Iraq, this time in company with Malik-Shāh. They sought the caliph’s assurance that he would make the khūṭba for their nominee, but on Masʿūd’s return to Baghdad the coalition fell apart. During the last year or so of the sultan’s life Malik-Shāh’s pretensions remained an active threat to security until finally, when he raided Isfahān and drove off cattle from there, Masʿūd sent troops against him. Masʿūd’s death came in the next year, 547/1152, at Hamadān. “With him”, says Ibn al-Athīr, “the fortunes of the Saljuq family

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died; after him, there was no banner for them to depend on or rally round—'Qais's death was not the death of a single man, but rather the collapse of a whole tribe's foundations.'

All this time the local Saljuq line in Kirman obtruded little on the wider scene of events in Iran. The long and peaceful reign of Arslan-Shâh had ended in a burst of violence in 537/1142, when, during a quarrel over the future succession, the most aggressive and capable of Arslan-Shâh's sons, Muḥammad, seized his father, killed him, and then imprisoned and blinded some twenty of his own brothers and nephews. The claims of another brother, Saljuq-Shâh, were dashed in a battle outside Jiruft, and he fled across the Persian Gulf to al-Ahsâ' and Oman. There he assembled a force with the intention of invading Kirman, but Muḥammad's agents obtained his imprisonment in Oman. Thereafter, Muḥammad was undisturbed on his throne; only at the end of his reign did Saljuq-Shâh manage to escape and return to Kirman, where he met defeat and death at the hands of the new amir, Toghril-Shâh b. Muḥammad.

Muḥammad b. Arslan-Shâh assumed the honorific Mughîth al-Dunya wa'l-Din and reigned for fourteen years (537-51/1142-56). His prestige was such that neighbouring potentates sought his protection and help. The governor of Tabas in southern Khurâsân, menaced by the Ghuzz tribesmen who got out of control towards the end of Sanjar's reign in the east, yielded up his town to Muḥammad, in whose hands it remained until the rise of Sanjar's former ghulām, Mu'ayyid al-Din Ai-Aba, in Khurâsân (see below, pp. 154-5). More important was the temporary acquisition of Isfahân, transferred to Muḥammad by the commander who had governed it on behalf of the Saljuqs of the west. Although Muḥammad was clearly a bloodthirsty tyrant, he contrived by his ostentatious piety to make a good impression on the chroniclers. Muḥammad b. Ibrâhîm, the local historian, praises the amir for his pensions to the ulema and his bursaries to poor students. He encouraged astronomy and the compilation of astronomical tables (taqwims); he built mosques and libraries in the chief towns of Kirman, e.g. Bardasîr, Jiruft, and Bam; and he never killed anyone without first obtaining for this a fatwâ from the religious authorities.

1 Bundārī, pp. 226-7; Zahir al-Din Nishâpûrî, p. 65; Râvandi, p. 245; Ibn al-Jauzî, vol. x, pp. 147, 151; Ibn al-Athîr, vol. x, pp. 94, 105.
2 On Arslan-Shâh, see above, pp. 117-18.
3 al-Kâmîl, vol. xi, p. 121.
X. SANJAR’S SULTANATE IN THE EAST, AND THE RISE OF THE KHWARAZM-SHĀHS AND QARA-KHITAI

The fortunes of the eastern provinces of the Saljuq empire were directed for over fifty years by Abu’l-Hārīth Āḥmad Sanjar (Sanjar = Turkish for “he who thrusts, pierces”) b. Malik-Shāh. After the death of Arslan-Argun in 490/1097, Berk-Yaruq had appointed his half-brother Sanjar, then a lad of ten or twelve years, to the governorship of Khurasan (see above, p. 107). Sanjar remained ruler of the east until shortly after his escape from captivity amongst the Ghuzz; the hardships which he had suffered there seem to have hastened his death in 552/1157.

In the civil strife of Berk-Yaruq’s reign, Sanjar took the side of his full brother Muhammad Tapar, but from the constitutional point of view he regarded himself during this period as subordinate to the sultan in Iraq and western Iran; thus on a coin of his from Marv, probably minted in 499/1105-6, he calls himself simply Malik al-Mashriq (“King of the East”) and gives the title al-Sultān al-Mu’azzam (“Exalted Sultan”) to Muhammad. However, when the latter died in 511/1118, Sanjar was not disposed to accept a similar status in regard to his nephew Mahmud b. Muhammad. In the past, as we have said, the supreme sultanate had gone to the Saljuq who held Iraq and western Iran, and at the beginning of his reign Mahmud’s alliance with the Qarakhanids against his uncle might have been a sign of his determination to assert himself as head of the family and thus reduce Sanjar’s pretensions. But the older Turkish principle of the seniorate now came to the fore, and Sanjar became generally regarded as supreme head of the family. Indeed, Maḥmūd had to acknowledge his own subordination at an early date: coins struck by him at Isfahān and dated 511/1118 and 512/1118-19 give Sanjar the title al-Sultān al-Mu’azzam, whereas Maḥmūd is given simply his name and patronymic.

Sanjar’s campaign in western Iran and his defeat of Maḥmūd at Sāveh in 513/1119 gave him the opportunity clearly to demonstrate his superior status (see pp. 119-20 above). At Ray he treated Maḥmūd as his close vassal. Out of deference to Sanjar, Maḥmūd had to abandon

2 Köymen, Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğu taribi, vol. ii, p. 25. On the general topic of Sanjar’s constitutional relations with the other Saljuqs, see Köymen, pp. 5-27, 250-4.
4 Köymen, op. cit. p. 25.
his personal privileges as sultan, such as the five-fold nauba (salute of military music). He had to hold Sanjar’s bridle when he mounted; to prostrate himself before Sanjar; to walk on foot by his side from the audience chamber to Sanjar’s personal tent, and to reside in the quarters of Sanjar’s children and wives. Mah茂d’s chief officials received investiture patents directly from Sanjar, and Sanjar kept in his hands the city of Ray, perhaps not merely because of its strategic importance but also because during Toghril Beg’s time it had been the capital of the Saljuqs in Iran. In Iraq Sanjar ordered the reappointment there of the shahna whom Mah茂d had dismissed. In return, Sanjar made Mah茂d his heir, and the two names henceforth appear together on Sanjar’s coins. Whilst it is true that after 519/1125 Mah茂d minted coins on which he himself was styled al-Sult茂n al-Mu茂azzam and Sanjar was not mentioned, he remained essentially subordinate to his uncle.¹

The relationship of Sanjar to his nephews stayed the same during the succeeding reigns of Toghril and Mas茂d, particularly since Toghril was directly beholden to him for his authority. However, at the outset of his reign Mas茂d rejected a command from Sanjar to execute certain amirs in his entourage, and thereby announced that he would not be a blind puppet of his uncle.² Sanjar, increasingly preoccupied with such problems as the rise of the Khwarazm-Shahs and of the Qara-Khitai, allowed Mas茂d more freedom of action than might otherwise have been the case; yet with the passage of time the unparalleled length of Sanjar’s rule in the east only strengthened his moral position as supreme sovereign.

After Berk-Yaruq nominated him to the governorship of the east, Sanjar and his amirs had been faced with a certain amount of opposition from rival Saljuq princes. In 490/1097 Muhammad b. Sulaim茂n b. Chaghri Beg D茂s茂d, whom the sources call Am茂r-i Am茂r茂n (“Supreme Commander”), obtained a force from the Ghaznavids and attempted to seize power in Khuras茂n; he was defeated by Sanjar’s army and blinded. In the following year a Saljuq named Daulat-Sh茂h, apparently a descendant of Er-Tash b. Ibrahim Inal, collected in Tuk茂rist茂n a force of Türkmen malcontents, but was likewise defeated and blinded by Sanjar.³

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In the early years of Berk-Yaruq's reign, the central and western parts of Khurasan (i.e. Nishāpūr, Tūs, Isfara'in, Nasā, etc.), together with Qūmis and Gurgān, were governed from Dāmghān by the Amīr-i Dād Ḥabashi b. Altun-Taq. Sanjar's base was at this time farther east, at Balkh, and it was a prime task for him and his amirs, Kūndigūz, Er-Ghush, and Rustam, to dislodge Ḥabashi from Khūrāṣān. In the ensuing warfare Ḥabashi secured the help of 5,000 Ismāʿīlī troops from Tabas—then in the hands of a Bāṭīnī governor, Ismāʿīl Kalkālī—and he was also joined by Sultān Berk-Yaruq, who had been compelled to flee eastwards after his defeat in 493/1100 at the hands of Muḥammad (see above, p. 109). Ḥabashi and Berk-Yaruq were nevertheless defeated by Sanjar and his amirs at a place called Naushājan, Ḥabashi being captured and then killed, and Berk-Yaruq retiring to Gurgān and later Isfahān.¹ From this time onwards the whole of Khūrāṣān up to and including Qūmis was firmly in Sanjar's hands, and he subsequently moved his capital to the more central city of Marv. Now he could take direct action against the troublesome Ismāʿīlīs of Kūhistān; two expeditions against Tabas by the Amīr Boz-Qush are recorded, in both of which regular troops and volunteers took part (494/1101 and 497/1104).²

Thus in these years, when he was still just one of the Saljuq maliks and subordinate to the sultans in the west, Sanjar was primarily concerned to consolidate his power within Khūrāṣān and to provide financial help or refuge to his brother Muḥammad in his struggle against Berk-Yaruq.³ But this period was also one of turmoil and instability in the neighbouring kingdom of the Qarakhanīds, vassals of the Saljuqs from Malik-Shāh's time, and Sanjar was soon drawn into the affairs of Transoxiana. As pointed out on pp. 5–6 above, the rule of the Qarakhanīds in Transoxiana, Semirechye, and Kashgharia was essentially that of a loose tribal confederation, and internal dynastic conflicts were frequent. Sanjar was able to follow his Saljuq predecessors' examples and utilize these disputes for his own purposes.

An important religious and political phenomenon is discernible in the Qarakhanīd cities of Samarqand and Bukhārā from the middle years of the 5th/11th century onwards. This is the tension between the

¹ Ibid. x, pp. 201–2 (the fullest and most convincing account); Bundārī, pp. 219–60; and Husainī, p. 87 (a divergent account); cf. Hodgson, The Order of Assassins, pp. 86–7.
khans and the orthodox religious institution, despite the ostentatious Sunni piety and zeal for charitable works shown by many of the khans.

It is difficult in any period of Islamic history to discern the true feelings of the urban masses; at certain critical points, for example, they seem to have supported the khans, and it was a revolt of the artisans of Bukhārā which in 636/1238-9 ended the domination of the Burhānī šudūr. On the other hand the military leaders, always jealous of any increase in the central power, gave direct assistance to the religious classes on several occasions. The just and devout Tamghaḫ Khan Ibrāhīm was driven to execute Shaikh Abū’l-Qāsim Samarqandī; then in the reign of Āḥmad b. Khīḍr the faqīhs called in the Saljuq Malik-Shāh and in the end had the khan deposed and executed for alleged Ismāʿīlī sympathies (pp. 92-3 above). The power of this clerical caste can be seen in the appearance of lines of hereditary religious leaders, especially in Bukhārā, who often bear the honorary titles of šudūr or “prominent men” (sing. Šadr). Similarly in the 5th/11th century there had been the imāms (religious leaders) of the Šaffārī family; but Sanjar, in the course of his Transoxianan expedition of 495/1102, deposed the reigning ra’s and imām of Bukhārā, Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm Šaffārī, and replaced him by the well-known scholar ‘Abd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿUmar of the Burhān family. He invested him personally with the šadāra (religious leadership) and gave him a sister in marriage, so that ‘Abd al-ʿAzīz and his successors of the Āl-i Burhān became immediate vassals of the Saljuqs. Some decades later these šudūr dealt directly with the Qara-Khitai invaders of Transoxiana and collected the taxes of the Bukhārā region for them. The authority of the Burhānīs accordingly had a political and fiscal aspect as well as a religious one. The family retained its power under the Khwārazm-Shāhs and early Mongols, in spite of a dark period when the Shāh ‘Alāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad deposed Šadr Burhān al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Āḥmad, and subsequently permitted his mother Terken Khatun to execute the imām. The line ended only with the popular rising of 636/1238-9 in Bukhārā, after which a fresh series of šudūr, that of the Mahbūbīs, begins.

The western Qarakhānid throne in Transoxiana had been given by Berk-Yaruq to Sulaimān b. Dāʿūd b. Tamghaḫ Khān Ibrāhīm in

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490/1097; the throne then passed quickly to a Mahmūd-Tegin and to Hārūn b. Sulaimān b. Qadīr Khān Yūsuf, who died in 495/1102. In this year Transoxiana was invaded by Qadīr Khān Jibrā’il b. ‘Umar of Talas and Balāsāghūn, who led an army which included both Muslim and pagan Turks. Berk-Yaruq and Muḥammad were at this time involved in warfare, whilst Sanjar was in Baghdad, and the Qarakhānid Muḥammad b. Sulaimān b. Dā‘ūd fled to Sanjar’s capital at Marv; but Qadīr Khān Jibrā’il pressed through Transoxiana, across the Oxus, and into Khurāsān, aided by the defection of one of Sanjar’s own amirs, Kun-Toghdī. In the end the invader was halted and then defeated and killed near Tirmidh by Sanjar, who had hurried eastwards, whilst Kun-Toghdī fled to the court of the Ghaznavid Mas‘ūd III b. Ibrāhim. Sanjar then sent troops into Transoxiana and placed Muḥammad on the throne in Samarqand; the latter took the Turkish ruling title of Arslan-Khān and remained ruler there till 524/1130. Sanjar also concerned himself with the religious leadership in Transoxiana, and it was at this point that he gave the leadership of the Hanafis there to Sadr ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. ‘Umar of the Āl-i Burhān. Like his father, Arslan-Khān Muḥammad was linked to the Saljuqs by a marriage alliance with one of Sanjar’s daughters, and on two occasions in the next few years (496/1103 and 503/1109) Sanjar gave him military help against another Qarakhānid claimant, Saḥūn Beg.¹ This rival has been identified by Pritsak as the Ḥasan b. ‘Alī whom Sanjar was to place on the throne of Samarqand in 524/1130. The poet and literary stylist Rashīd al-Dīn Vaṭvāṭ gives Ḥasan Khān the title of Kōk-Saḥūn, and it is probable that he came from the line of ‘Alī b. Bughra Khān Hārūn, known as ‘Alī-Tegin, who had ruled in Sogdian a century before and whose descendants had remained in Farghāna.²

This rivalry excepted, Arslan-Khān Muḥammad enjoyed a reign which was peaceful almost to the end of this life. He became noted as a great builder, rebuilding the citadel and walls of Bukhārā and constructing there a fine Friday mosque and two palaces. He undertook regular campaigns into the surrounding steppes, presumably against pagan Qipchaq, bringing back slaves and gaining the title Ghāzi.³ Despite these laudable activities, the tension between the dynasty and the religious classes was not stilled. It may well have been

religious elements who in 507/1113-14 complained to Sanjar about the khan’s tyranny, a trait which does not accord with the rest of our knowledge of him. In any case the khan was obliged to seek the intercession of the Khwarazm-Shah Qutb al-Din Muhammad and of Sanjar’s Amir Qaimaz, and to go personally and meet the sultan. At the end of his reign Arslan-Khan Muhammad became embroiled with the Saljuqs. By now a sick man, he ruled in association with his son Naṣr. But an ‘Alid faqih and the ra’is of Samarkand, leaders of a group representing religious interests, conspired together and killed Naṣr, wherupon the khan appealed to Sanjar for help and appointed another son, Ahmad, in Naṣr’s place. Ahmad assumed the title of Qadīr-Khān and took draconian measures against the leaders of the plot, but Sanjar was now on his way with an army. Friction occurred between the khan’s followers and the Saljuq army, and Sanjar captured Samarkand, plundering part of the city (524/1130). The sick Arslan-Khān surrendered to Sanjar, and, because he was the father of Sanjar’s Qarakhānid wife Terken Khatun, was allowed to stay in the sultan’s harem. He died soon afterwards, and in his place Sanjar appointed Ḥasan b. ‘Āli; on his death in 526/1132, Sanjar chose Arslan-Khān’s brother Ibrāhīm, and he was followed by a third son of Arslan-Khān, Maḥmūd, later to be ruler of Khurāsān during Sanjar’s captivity amongst the Ghuzz (see below, pp. 153–7). It was this Maḥmūd who was reigning in Transoxiana when the Qara-Khitai appeared there a few years later.

The province of Khwarazm had passed into Saljuq hands on the defeat of Shāh Malik, the son of the Oghuz Yabghu of Jand and Yengi-Kent (see p. 18 above). It had then come under governors representing the Saljuqs, and for the next few decades Khwarazm made little impact upon eastern Islamic history. Alp-Arslan came thither in 457/1065 to suppress a revolt, visiting Jand and pushing westwards across the Üst Urt plateau towards the Manqīshlaq peninsula (see p. 65 above). He then appointed Arslan-Arghun as governor, and this man remained in office during the early part of Malik-Shāh’s

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3 The Soviet authority on this region, S. P. Tolstov, has surmised from the name of one of these rebels in Khwarazm, given by Mirkhwand as Faghfur, that this man might possibly have been a survivor from the old Afrīghid line of Khwarazm-Shāhs. See Auf den Spuren der altschorsischen Kultur, p. 292.
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reign: an exception to the general rule of the time, for Khwārazm was usually granted to ghulām commanders rather than to members of the Saljuq dynasty itself, who, by the province's isolation, might rebel. It seems that the revenues of Khwārazm were used in Malik-Shāh's reign to defray the expenses of a particular office in the royal household, that of the keeper of the wash-bowls (tasht-dār), for the ghulām Anūsh-Tegin Gharcha'i held this office and also bore the title "shāhna of Khwārazm".¹

The presence of Turkish governors in Khwārazm after the overthrow of the Ma'mūnid Shāhs in 408/1017—at first they had ruled on behalf of the Ghaznavids, and then on behalf of the Saljuqs—must have favoured the process whereby Khwārazm was gradually transformed from an ethnically and culturally Iranian land into a Turkish one. For many centuries the distinctive local language of Khwārazm had been an Iranian tongue with affinities to Soghdian and, to a lesser extent, to Ossetian. It was still in full use during the Saljuqs' hegemony, not merely for speech but also for writing, with special diacritical marks added to the Arabic alphabet to express the sounds peculiar to Khwārazmian; these are found in some manuscripts of the Khwārazmian al-Birūnī's works. Khwārazmian speech probably lasted in upper Khwārazm till the end of the 8th/14th century, but in lower Khwārazm and Gurgānj, the region nearest to the Aral Sea, the process of Turkicization was complete in the 7th/13th century, according to information deducible from the travel narrative of the Franciscan John of Plano Carpini. Today the Khwārazmian language has to be reconstructed from such materials as odd words and phrases in al-Birūnī's works, from the glosses on an Islamic legal text, and from a single literary work, a Khwārazmian version of an introduction to Arabic grammar and language by the famous exegete and grammarian, al-Zamakhshari (d. 538/1141).

Geographically Khwārazm was a peninsula of advanced cultural and economic life jutting out into the Turkish steppes, and thus its Iranian character was made vulnerable to external ethnic and political as well as linguistic pressure. In the second half of the 5th/11th century these steppes were controlled by Turks of the Qipchaq, Qanghli, Qun, and Pecheneg groups, not all of whom had yet become Muslim; the middle stretches of the Syr Darya were still Dar al-kufr ("lands of unbelief") in the 6th/12th century. The Saljuq governors recruited auxiliary troops

from these nomads, and in the latter half of the 6th/12th century the Khwārazm-Shāh Atsiz and his successors relied heavily on the Qipchak, Qanghli, Yimek, and associated tribes for their armies. Hence they were brought within the boundaries of sedentary Khwārazm, and by settlement and intermarriage the older Iranian population was eventually diluted; already in the 5th/11th century the physical approximation of the Khwārazmian people to the Turkish type was noted.\(^1\)

This linguistic and ethnic change was not, however, accompanied by any material or cultural impoverishment. Under the dynasty of Atsiz, Khwārazm became for the first and last time in its history the centre of a great military empire which embraced large parts of Central Asia and Iran. The Khwārazmians were always great travellers, and their merchants continued to journey across the Eurasian steppes as far as southern Russia and even the Danube basin, where certain place-names attest their presence. Intellectually, Khwārazm was never so brilliant as in the 6th/12th and 7th/13th centuries, when it produced great theologians and literary men, and in particular remained a centre of Arabic learning. The much-travelled geographer Yāqūt (d. 626/1229), writing on the eve of the Mongol invasion, said that he had never seen such urban and agricultural prosperity as in Khwārazm; and the walled cities and fortified villages, canals and irrigation works disclosed by Soviet archaeologists confirm the view that the area of cultivated land expanded in the course of the 6th/12th century.\(^2\)

In the latter part of Malik-Shah's reign the governor of Khwārazm was, at least titularly, the ghulām Anūsh-Tegin Gharcha'i. (The nisba probably refers to the region of Gharchistān in northern Afghanistan, where Anūsh-Tegin had been originally bought by a Saljuq amir; Kafesoğlu has conjectured that he was of Khalaj Turkish origin.)\(^3\) Ekinchi b. Qochqar, a ghulām of Qun origin, was appointed as Khwārazm-Shāh, probably on the occasion of Berk-Yaruq's expedition to Khurāsān in 490/1097 against Arslan-Arghun. As Minorsky has


\(^3\) See his long discussion of Anūsh-Tegin's origin in his Harezmshahlar devleti taribi, pp. 38-43.
pointed out, Ekinchi must have had considerable renown, as well as a
great knowledge of events in the region of Khwārazm and the steppes,
to be nominated to this important post. At the end of the same year,
however, Ekinchi was killed by rebellious Saljuq amirs, so that Berk-
Yaruq’s representative in Khurasan, the Amir-i Dād Ḥabashi, appointed
in his stead Anāsh-Tegin’s son Qutb al-Din Muḥammad. As Khwārazm
Shāh from 490/1097 till his death in 521/1127 or 522/1128, Qutb al-Din
had the reputation of being a just ruler who was always obedient to his
master Sanjar. At various points during the Saljuq succession-disputes
in western Iran, he fought for Sultān Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh and
for Sanjar, and in 507/1113–14 he mediated between Arslan-Khān
Muḥammad of Samarqand and Sanjar (see above, p. 140).

‘Ala’ al-Din Aṭsiz succeeded his father and reigned as nominal vassal
of the Saljuqs till his death in 551/1156. He came to the governorship
of Khwārazm with a reputation, like that of Qutb al-Din Muḥammad,
for loyalty and submissiveness towards Sanjar. Despite this, the course
of events was to show that Aṭsiz had his own ambitions to make
Khwārazm as autonomous as possible, and although he had many
reverses he pursued this goal with determination, feeling his way
between the two neighbouring powers of the Saljuqs and the Qara-
Khitai, and laying the foundation for the fully independent policy of
his successors. Juvainī and ‘Aufī also praise Aṭsiz for his culture and
learning, ascribing to him the composition of verses in Persian.

In his early years as Khwārazm-Shāh, Aṭsiz aimed primarily at
securing the long and vulnerable frontiers of his principality against
the nomads; since many of these were still pagans, his efforts earned
him amongst the orthodox the title of Ghāzi. Of particular strategic
importance here were the steppes between the Aral and Caspian seas,
together with the adjacent Manqīshlaq peninsula where many
nomads had summer pastures, and the lower Syr Darya region from
Uṯrār down to Jand. Both these areas had long been spring-boards
for attacks on Khwārazm, and it was to Manqīshlaq and Jand that
the followers of Ekinchi b. Qochqar’s son Toghril-Tegin had fled in
490/1097 after the latter’s bid to regain Khwārazm had been frustrated
by Qutb al-Din Muḥammad. Aṭsiz attended Sanjar regularly, being

1 Minorsky, Sharaf al-Zamān Tāhir Marvazī on China, the Turks and India (London, 1942),
pp. 101–2.

Mashābīr al-taḥārīb (probably also the source for Ibn al-Athīr).

with him, for example, in the Transoxianan campaign of 524/1030, but he did not neglect the frontiers of Khwārazm. According to Ibn al-Athīr, he had already secured Maqīshlaq during his father's lifetime, and in 527/1133 he led a campaign from Jand into the Qipchaq steppes; Yaqūt quotes a line of verse in praise of the Manqīshlaq victory. After 536/1141 he secured the lower Syr Darya against the Qara-Khitai by paying them an annual tribute in cash and kind.1

It was not long before Atsīz’s relation with his suzerain Sanjar became strained. The sultan allegedly began to grow cold towards the Khwārazm-Shāh during the campaign of 529/1135 against the Ghaznavid Bahram-Shāh (p. 159 below), and in a proclamation of victory issued after his triumph at Hazārāsp, Sanjar accused Atsīz of killing Muslim ghāzis and murābītan (frontier fighters) at Maqīshlaq and Jand. In 533/1138 Atsīz rebelled openly, flooding much of the land along the Oxus to impede the advance of Sanjar’s army. Yet this did not prevent the sultan from defeating the Khwārazmian army, which included some pagan Turks, at the fortress of Hazarasp; he then executed Atsīz’s son Atlīgh. He occupied Khwārazm and granted it to his nephew Sulaimān-Shāh b. Muḥammad, providing him with a vizier, an atabeg, and other administrative officials, but the advent of direct Saljuq rule proved irksome to the Khwārazmians. As soon as Sanjar had left for Marv, Atsīz returned from his refuge in Gurgān, and the people rose and expelled Sulaimān-Shāh. Then in 534/1139-40 the Khwārazm-Shāh took the offensive, capturing Bukhārā from its Saljuq governor and destroying the citadel there. The extent to which Atsīz clearly commanded the sympathies of the Khwārazmians is an indication of the province’s continued individuality and its need for a local ruler who could look after its special political and commercial interests. For all this, Sanjar’s power and prestige were still formidable, and in 535/1141 Atsīz found it expedient to submit to him.2

Four months later, Sanjar’s unexpected and crushing defeat by the Qara-Khitai in the Qatvan steppe was obviously opportune for Atsīz, so much so that several sources accuse him of having incited the

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Qara-Khitai to rise against the sultan as an act of revenge for the killing of his son Atligh; but according to Juvainî, the invaders also passed from Transoxiana into Khwârâzm, devastating the province and compelling Atsîz to pay tribute. When Sanjar fell back before the Qara-Khitai to Tîrmîdîh and Balkh, Atsîz made two incursions into Khwârâsân in the course of 536/1141-2. In the first expedition he took Sarakhs and Marv, either killing or carrying off several of the local ulama, and appropriating the state treasury at Marv; he then returned the next spring to occupy Nîshâpûr (where the khutba was made for him over the next three months), Baihaq, and other parts of Khwârâsân. Through his court poet Rashîd al-Dîn Vâtâf, the Khwârâzam-Shâh boasted that the power of the Saljuqs was at an end and his own dynasty was in the ascendant, but early in 537/1142 Saljuq rule was re-established in Khwârâsân. In retaliation, the sultan in 538/1143-4 invaded Khwârâzam, besieged Gurgânj, and compelled Atsîz to submit and to return the treasuries taken from Marv; but once more the country proved too hostile for the Saljuqs to remain there.²

To Sanjar’s troubles with the Qara-Khitai were now added the first rumbles of discontent from the Ghuzz in Khwârâsân. Atsîz again showed himself rebellious, plotting the sultan’s assassination by means of hired Ismâ‘îlîs and executing an envoy sent from the court at Marv. In 542/1147 Sanjar marched into Khwârâzam for the third time, capturing Hazârasp and Gurgânj, but in 543/1148 he allowed the Khwârâzam-Shâh to make a grudging submission. Atsîz’s adventures in Khwârâsân and his attempts to throw off Saljuq suzerainty accordingly came to nought, so he turned once more to his original sphere of activity, the steppes surrounding Khwârâzam. One of the consequences of his preoccupation with events in Khwârâsân and the south had been the loss of Jand, which had passed to one Kamâl al-Dîn b. Arslân-Khân Mahmûd, apparently a Qârakhânîd and son of the khan who ruled in Samarqand from 526/1132 to 536/1141. An expedition left Khwârâzam in the summer of 547/1152 and occupied Jand without striking a blow. Although Juvainî states that Kamâl al-Dîn had been a friend of Atsîz and of Vâtâf, he was seized and jailed for the rest of his life. Jand was now placed under the governorship of Atsîz’s son and

successor Il-Arslan—an illustration of the importance attached to the
town. During Sanjar’s captivity amongst the Ghuzz, Atsiz remained essen­
tially loyal to the Saljuq connexion. He did try to get Sanjar to grant
him Āmul-i Shāṭṭ, the strategically important crossing on the river
Oxus, but its castellan refused to yield up his charge. At one point
the Khwarazm-Shāh’s brother İnal-Tegin marched into Khurāsān,
where he devastated the Baihaq oasis in 548–9/1154; Ibn Funduq
says that the resultant destruction and depopulation were still visible
fourteen years later. The Qarakhanid Maḥmūd Khān, who had been
chosen as ruler of Khurāsān by that part of Sanjar’s army which had
not joined the Ghuzz, now began negotiating with Atsiz for the dis­
patch of a Khwārazmian army into Khurāsān to quell the Ghuzz.
Atsiz and his son Il-Arslan set out for Khurāsān, leaving a further son
Khitai-Khān as regent of Khwarazm (551/1156), and whilst at Shahr­
istān they received news of Sanjar’s escape from the Ghuzz. Maḥmūd
Khān and the other Saljuq amirs now regretted having invited the
ambitious Atsiz into Khurāsān, but in fact the latter behaved with
restraint and did nothing provocative. He met Maḥmūd Khān and
summoned for aid the ʿAffārid Abu’l-Faḍl, the Bāvandid Ispahbadh
Shāh Ghāzī Rustam, and the Ghurid ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Ḥusain; he sent
Sanjar a florid letter of congratulation; and he warned Ṭūṭi Beg, most
prominent of the Ghuzz leaders, of the consequences of further
rebelliousness. Whatever Atsiz’s real intentions, all was now ended, for
he died at this point, nine months before Sanjar’s own death. Thus he
died as a vassal of the Saljuqs, yet the conquests he had made in the
steppes and the assembling of a powerful mercenary army enabled his
successors to make Khwārazm the nucleus of a powerful empire in the
decades before the Mongol invasion: an empire whose part in attracting
the Mongols westwards was to have incalculable consequences for the
greater part of the Islamic world.

Until the eighth century A.D., there had been a certain amount of
direct contact between the Iranian and the Chinese world. The T’ang
dynasty (618–906) never believed that Transoxiana and the formerly
Buddhist lands on the upper Oxus were totally lost to the Chinese

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empire, although the immense distances involved made any direct control almost impossible. Nevertheless, after the disintegration of the Western Türk’s steppe empire in the first half of the eighth century, the Chinese tried to assert their authority in Transoxiana. In 133/751 the Arab general Ziyād b. Šāliḥ defeated near Talas a Chinese army that had appeared in the Syr Darya valley, and the possibility of Chinese political control in this region vanished forever.¹ But commercial and religious movements across Central Asia continued for many centuries to bring some Chinese cultural influences and some luxury imports into the Iranian world. Chinese prisoners taken by Ziyād b. Šāliḥ are said to have taught the Muslims of Samarqand the art of paper-making, and fine porcelain brought from China became highly prized in the Islamic world.²

In the early part of the 6th/12th century there was an intrusion of the Chinese world into eastern Iran, in the shape of the Qara-Khitai invaders from northern China, although the Mongol invasions of the 7th/13th century were to prove more important in spreading Far Eastern cultural and artistic ideas in the Persian world. The domination of the Qara-Khitai affected only Transoxiana and, for a brief while, a strip to the south of the Oxus around Balkh; they did not exterminate existing ruling houses, as the Mongols were to do, but were content to receive tribute and to exercise a supreme overlordship. Perhaps the most significant feature of their dominion in Transoxiana and Semirechye was the temporary check it gave to the spread of Islam in the steppes. The Qara-Khitai possessed the traditional tolerance of the steppe peoples, who have always been at the receiving end of the great religions of Asia.³ They accorded the indigenous Muslims of Transoxiana no special preference among the adherents of other faiths; but neither did they persecute them. Ibn al-Athîr says that the first Gür-Khān (“Supreme, Universal Khan”) was a Manichaean;⁴ indeed, when the Christians of Europe first heard dimly of the defeats suffered by the Muslim Saljuqs and Khwārazm-Shāhs, they thought that a great Christian power had arisen in Central Asia, and in this way legends about “Prester John” began to circulate in the West. What is

certain is that Qara-Khitai impartiality allowed the repressed adherents of non-Islamic faiths to flourish more openly, and this can be seen in the missionary enterprise and expansion begun in this period by the Nestorian Christians of eastern Iran and Central Asia. Grousset's verdict, that "the foundation of the Qara-Khitai empire may be viewed as a reaction against the work of Islamization accomplished by the Qarakhanids", may in this wise be true.

Ethnically the Qara-Khitai were most probably Mongols. In Chinese sources they are first called the "K'i-tan" and then, after 947, the "Liao"; over the next two centuries they became deeply Sinicized and in the Chinese annals are accounted a native dynasty. In the tenth century they founded a vast empire stretching from the Altai to the Pacific, with its centre in northern China. The name of their empire, in the form Khatā or Khitā, was first applied by the Muslims to northern China, passing from them to the Europeans, whence the older English Cathay. Between 1116 and 1123, however, the K'i-tan were overthrown in China by a fresh wave of barbarian invaders, the Jurchet, a Tungusic people from the Amur valley and northern Manchuria. A section of the K'i-tan migrated westwards into Central Asia, where Islamic historians knew them as the Qara-Khitai, i.e. Black (or perhaps "Powerful, mighty") Khitai.

This section came in two groups. One went into eastern Turkestan and came up against the branch of the Qarakhanids ruling there. Arslan-Khān Ahmad defeated them before they could reach Kāshghar and captured their leader (whom Ibn al-Athir calls al-Awar, "the One-eyed"); in a letter from Sanjar to the caliph in 527/1133 this victory is mentioned as a recent event. The other group, numbering some 40,000 tents, took a more northerly route through the Altai and came into the territories of the Qarakhanid ruler of Balasāghūn, who tried to use the invaders against his own Qarluq and Qanghli enemies but instead found himself deposed. The Qara-Khitai leader, whose name appears in Chinese sources as Yeh-lü Ta-shih (d. 537/1143), now made the Chu valley the centre of his empire and assumed the title of Gur-Khān. His followers campaigned against the Qanghli in the steppes stretching

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2 L'Empire des steppes, p. 221.
3 Cf. Sir Gerard Clauson, "Turk, Mongol, Tungus" Asia Major, N.S. vol. viii (1960), pp. 120–1; but in a postscript on p. 123 he admits the possibility that the K'i-tan spoke a language of their own, unrelated to the Altaic tongues.
towards the Aral Sea, against the Kirghiz in the steppes to the north of the Chu, and against the Qarakhânids in Kashghar and Khotan. In 531/1137 they made contact with the Transoxianan Qarakhânids and defeated Maḥmūd Khān b. Arslan Muḥammad of Samarqand in the Syr Darya valley at Khujand.

The Qara-Khitai halted here for four years, but in 536/1141 internal disputes in Samarqand opened the whole of Transoxiana to them. Several years earlier, Maḥmūd Khān had invoked the aid of his suzerain Sanjar against the unruly Qarluq. According to ‘Imād al-Dīn, their families and flocks had increased in number in the Samarqand region and had been damaging property and tillage; yet ‘Imād al-Dīn also stresses the initial peaceableness of the Qarluq, who were harried by the sultan’s agents, had their pastures reduced and their women and children enslaved, but still offered to pay Sanjar an extensive tribute in beasts. Only after this did they appeal to the Qara-Khitai to intercede for them with the sultan. Sanjar brusquely rejected this approach, and seems deliberately to have made it a casus belli against the Qara-Khitai. The latter now invaded Transoxiana in force, and in 536/1141 a bloody battle was fought in the Qatvān steppe in Ushrūsana, to the east of Samarqand. The Muslim losses were huge, and Amir Qumach, the amīr of Sistān, and Sanjar’s Qarakhânīd wife were all captured. Sanjar and Maḥmūd Khān abandoned Transoxiana and fled to Tirmidh; the Gūr-Khān occupied Bukhārā, killing the Burhānī sādr Ḥusām al-Dīn ‘Umar, and he sent an army under his commander Erbüz to ravage Atsīz’s dominions in Khwārzam.¹

Sanjar’s defeat meant the permanent loss of Saljuq sovereignty beyond the Oxus, while the Muslims there fell under “infidel” control. In practice the Qara-Khitai were not fanatics, and Islamic sources speak of the equitable government of the first Gūr-Khāns, whereas there had been frequent complaints about the oppression of Sanjar’s amīrs. According to the later historian Muṣliḥ al-Dīn Lārī, the people of Herāt rejoiced in 542/1147 when their city passed from the tyranny of the Saljuqs to the just rule of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Ḥusain Ghūri; and the

boundless justice of the first Gür-Khân forms the subject of one of Nizâmi 'Arûdî's anecdotes in the Chahâr Maqâla.¹ Within their newly acquired territories the Qara-Khitai allowed a wide degree of local autonomy: often, for example, existing political and tribal institutions were retained and their members required to collect and forward taxation to the Gür-Khâns' ordû (military camp) in the Chu valley; this was the arrangement eventually made with the şudûr of Bukhârâ.

What did suffer irreparably was Sanjar's own prestige, and he spent the rest of his reign striving to preserve his remaining possessions. Beyond Khurâsân were young and expanding powers such as the Khwârazm-Shâhs and Ghûrîds; within there was mounting insubordination among the Saljuq amirs and increasing lack of control over the Türkmen. Atûz seized his chance to invade northern Khurâsân in 536/1141-2, and in a proclamation to the people of Nishâpûr he said that Sanjar's defeat was a divine retribution for ingratitude towards his loyal servant the Khwarazm-Shâh.² News of the Qara-Khitai victory reached the Christian West, causing an access of hope that the tide might now be turning against Islam. In letting Sanjar be defeated, writes Sibt b. al-Jauzî, "God took vengeance for [the murdered caliph] al-Mustarshid and let loose on him ruin and destruction". From this we may conclude that caliphal circles in Iraq at this time enjoyed a certain amount of Schadenfreude, even though Sanjar had in the preceding year attempted to improve relations with Baghdad by returning to al-Muqtaﬁ the Prophet's cloak (burda) and the sceptre (qadîb), which had been taken from al-Mustarshid.³

The historians describe Khurâsân as being in a flourishing state during Sanjar's time, and this may well be true of at least the first decades of his reign. He preserved an unusually long continuity of administration, during which the seat of government, Marv, became a vital centre for culture and intellectual life.⁴ A comparatively rich documentation, in the form of collections of official correspondence, shows that the sultan was aware of his responsibility for provincial administration, even though this was usually delegated to ghulâm military commanders or occasionally to Saljuq maliks. However, it is not so clear from these documents how much check and control from the centre there really was. In an investiture patent for the governor-

¹ Nizâmi 'Arûdî, loc. cit.
² Barthold, Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion, p. 327.
ship of Gurgān, given to his nephew Mašūd b. Muḥammad (later sultan in the west), Sanjar points out the importance of such duties as the defence of the region against the pagan Turks of Dihīstān and Manqīsḥlaq, a strict adherence to the tax rates laid down by the central divān in Marv, and the adoption of a generally kind attitude towards the people. Nevertheless, social unrest in the countryside and the violence of ‘ayyārs and religious factions in the towns were certainly not stilled in Sanjar’s reign. There was, for instance, an ēmeute in 510/1116–17 at Tūs when the tomb of the Shi‘ī Imām ‘Alī al-Ridā was attacked, presumably by Sunni partisans; the local governor then built a high wall round the shrine. The Ismā‘īlīs continued to be active, especially in Kūhistān. In 520/1126 troops under Sanjar’s Vizier Mu‘īn al-Mulk Abū Naṣr Aḥmad marched against Turāthī, or Tūrshīz, in Kūhistān, and also against Tārẓ in the Bāihuq district, and Ibn Funduq mentions operations in others years against the Ismā‘īlīs of Tārẓ. In 530/1136 the Saljuq governor at Tūrshīz was forced to call in Ghuzz tribesmen against the Ismā‘īlīs, but on this occasion the cure proved worse than the disease. Sanjar’s captivity amongst the Ghuzz and the breakdown of all central government in Khūrāsān inevitably favoured the activities of the Bāṭiniyya. In 549/1154 a force of 7,000 Kūhistān Ismā‘īlīs banded together to attack Khūrāsān whilst the Saljuq forces were being distracted by the Ghuzz. They marched against Khwāf in northern Kūhistān, but were decisively repelled by the amīrs Muḥammad b. ʿOnēr and Fārrukhs-S̄āḥ al-Kāsānī. However, in 551/1156 they sacked Tābās, causing great bloodshed and capturing several of Sanjar’s officials and retainers.

One of Sanjar’s most pressing problems was that of controlling the pastoralist nomads, who, since the Saljuq invasions of the previous century, had become a permanent element in the demography and economy of Khūrāsān. These Türkmen increased in numbers in the latter part of Sanjar’s reign, perhaps because of pressure both from ethnic movements in the Qipchaq steppe and from the rising power of the Qara-Khitai in Transoxiana. It was of course always difficult for the Saljuq administration to maintain a firm external frontier along

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the Atrak and Oxus, but by exacting taxation either on flocks or individual tents, it did try to control those nomads who were within the boundaries of the empire. Although the Türkmen were an unruly and intractable class, a permanent drag on the machinery of settled government, the Saljuqs always felt that they had obligations to them because they had been the original support of their dynasty, and Nizām al-Mulk’s opinion concerning the Türkmen’s rights continued to have validity (see p. 79 above). Since they were a clearly defined class of the population, special administrative arrangements were often made for the areas where they were most numerous. One such region was that of Gurgān and Dīhistān, and there is extant the text of a diploma from Sanjar’s chancery to ʻInanch Bilge Ulugh Jāndār Beg appointing him military administrator of the Türkmen there. In this document ʻInanch Bilge is enjoined to treat the Türkmen well, to share out water and pasture fairly, to refrain from imposing fresh taxes, and generally to act as the channel between the nomads and the sultan.1

The military campaigns which increasingly occupied Sanjar after 529/1135 imposed fresh financial burdens on his subjects; the sultan is said to have expended three million dinārs on his campaign of 536/1141 against the Qara-Khitai, not counting the cost of the presents and robes of honour which had to be offered during the course of this expedition into Transoxiana.2 Both sedentaries and Türkmen began to feel increased pressure from the sultan’s financial agents, and it was a group of Oghuz or Ghuzz who occupied pastures in Khuttal and Tukhāristān, on the upper Oxus banks, who finally rebelled against these demands.

Ibn al-Athīr quotes “certain historians of Khurāsān” (presumably including Ibn Fundūq, author of the Mashārib al-tajārib), and asserts that these particular Ghuzz had been driven from Transoxiana by the Qarluq, and had then been invited into Tukhāristān by the local amir Zangī b. Khalīfa al-Shaibānī. Whilst in their previous home they had been allowed by Aṭsīz to spend the winter pasturing on the borders of Khwārzm. They were divided into two tribal groups, the Bozq under Qorqut b. ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd, and the Ürb-Oq led by Ṭūṭī Beg b. Ištāq b. Khīḍr; other amirs are named as Dinār, Bakhtiyyār, Arslan,

2 Ḫusainī, p. 95.
Sanjar's representatives at Balkh was the ghulam amir 'Imad al-Din Qumach, formerly the sultan's atabeg, who is described as both governor of the province of Tukhāristān, where he held extensive iqṭā's, and šahna of the Türkmen there. The capture of Sanjar in 548/1153 was only the climax of a period of discord—a discord aggravated by Qumach's harshness; before this, Tūṭī Beg and Qorqut had been faithful attendants at Sanjar's court. 2

When Qumach defeated his enemy Zangī b. Khalīfa, he at first confirmed the Ghuzz in their Tukhāristān pastures. He also recruited them as auxiliary troops when the Ghūrid 'Alā' al-Dīn Ḥusayn attacked Balkh in 547/1152, but the Ghūrids, enabling 'Alā' al-Dīn temporarily to capture Balkh. 3 Henceforth, Qumach's hostility towards the Ghuzz was sharpened. They were accustomed to paying an annual tribute of 24,000 sheep for the sultan's kitchens, but this was being extracted with increasing brutality, and when at last the Ghuzz killed a tyrannical tax collector (muḥāṣṣīl), Qumach had a pretext for attacking and expelling them. He assembled against them an army of 10,000 cavalry. To placate him, the Ghuzz offered a payment of 200 dirhams per tent. Qumach refused this, and in the ensuing battle he and his son 'Alā' al-Dīn Abu Bakr were both slain. Fearing the sultan's wrath, the Ghuzz offered a large propitiatory payment in cash, beasts, and slaves, together with an annual tribute; under the influence of his amirs, Sanjar rejected this peace-offering and in 548/1153 set out from Marv with an army. Twice defeated by the Ghuzz, he fell back to Marv but was forced to evacuate the capital, and on leaving it he and several of his amirs were captured by the Ghuzz.

Marv, meanwhile, was plundered and claimed by the Ghuzz leader Bakhṭiyār as his personal iqṭā', and the Ghuzz swept on through the other towns of Khurāsān. In 549/1154 Nīshāpūr was attacked and, after a struggle, its citadel taken; Ibn al-Athīr's source says that corpses were piled up in the streets and that the Ghuzz dragged out those sheltering in the Manfūl mosque and burnt its famous library. Only the

1 Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, p. 116; Barthold, A History of the Turkman People, pp. 119-20. The whole episode of the Ghuzz rebellion has been examined in detail by Köymen in two articles: "Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğu'nda Öğuz İsyanı", and "Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğu Tarihinde Öğuz istilası", in Ankara Üniv. Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi, pp. 159-73, 563-620 (German tr., 175-86, 621-60); see also his Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğu tarihi, vol. ii, pp. 399-456.
2 Bundārī, p. 281.
Mashhad ‘Ali al-Rida at Tus, and those towns such as Herat and Dihistan which had strong walls, escaped them. Initially the Turkmen seem to have been actuated by a special animosity against the Saljuq court and administration; all the amirs captured with Sanjar were executed, and many members of the religious institution, which was closely linked with the established order, were put to death. Even so, the sources may well exaggerate the numbers of those killed. Koymen has added up all those scholars whom the sources say were murdered by the Ghuzz, and his figure of fifty-five is hardly a colossal one.1 The limited numbers of dead given by contemporary biographers such as Samhani and Ibn Funduq are clearly more reliable than the vast figures given by later historians. It is also certain that indigenous anti-social elements in Khurasan seized the opportunity offered by the Ghuzz rebellion to pursue their own paths of violence and rapine; it is recorded, for example, that in Nishapur at this time the local ‘ayyars behaved worse than the Ghuzz.2

On first being captured, Sanjar did not realize the serious position he had fallen into—for were not the Ghuzz from the same stock as himself? They placed him on the throne each day and, initially at least, kept up the pretence that he was the master and they his obedient slaves. But he was closely guarded, and Juvaini says that after an attempted escape Sanjar was kept in an iron cage; it is likely that towards the end he suffered contemptuous treatment, hunger, and other deprivations, for according to Sibt b. al-Jauzi, Sanjar’s name became proverbial amongst the people of Baghdad for wretchedness and humiliation.3 The Saljuq army was left headless, and ambitious amirs were now able to indulge their desires for power. Many of the less-disciplined rank-and-file either joined the Ghuzz or else ravaged the province independently; in 522/1157 a section of the army of Khurasan attacked the caravan of the Pilgrimage of Khurasan at Bişām, killing, plundering, and leaving the pilgrims in such a defenceless state that they were an easy prey for the local Isma‘ils.4

The most important of Sanjar’s amirs, together with his vizier Nāṣir al-Dīn Tahir b. Fakhr al-Mulk b. Nizam al-Mulk, came to

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Nishapur after the sultan's capture and decided to set up the Saljuq Sulaiman-Shah b. Muhammad as their sultan; Sulaiman-Shah had long lived at the court, and as Sanjar's vali 'ahd had been mentioned in the khutba of Khurásan. He and a detachment of the Saljuq army left Marv to engage the Ghuzz and recapture Sanjar, but they fled at the first encounter with them. Indeed, Sulaiman-Shah proved a feeble and ineffective ruler at a time when strong leadership in the face of two centrifugal forces, the ambitious Saljuq amirs and the destructive Ghuzz, was necessary. After the Vizier Tahir died, to be succeeded by his son Nizam al-Mulk Hasan, Sulaiman-Shah decided to abandon the struggle to enforce his rights as sultan. In 549/1154 he finally left Khurásan for Atsiz’s court, where for a time he was well received and married one of the shah’s nieces. But he fell out of favour and had to leave Khwārazm; so he decided to try his luck in western Iran and Iraq, where the succession after his brother Mahmūd’s death had not been satisfactorily settled; finally he arrived in Baghdad (see p. 176 below).

The army of Khurásan now offered the throne to the Qarakhanid Mahmūd Khān. After the Qara-Khitai victory of 536/1141 Mahmūd had fled with Sanjar, while the Qara-Khitai had set up Mahmūd’s brother Tamghach-Khān Ibrahim III as their ruler in Samarkand; he retained the throne as their tributary until he was killed in 551/1156 by his own Qarluq troops (see p. 187 below). Mahmūd was the son of Sanjar’s sister, who had married Arslan-Khān Muhammad, and this Saljuq connexion, together with his princely blood from the house of Afrasiyāb, made him a suitable candidate for the throne. The Saljuq sultan in the west, Muhammad b. Mahmūd, agreed to the choice and sent from Hamadan an investiture diploma. Yet the fact that the Saljuq amirs were quite prepared to abandon the direct line of the Saljuqs illustrates clearly the decline in Sanjar’s prestige and that of the dynasty in general.

The real power in Khurásan was falling into the hands of the Saljuq amirs, and in the next few years the province became parcelled out amongst these commanders. The most powerful and successful of these was Sanjar’s former ghulām Mu’ayyid al-Dīn Ai-Aba (d. 569/1174), who for almost twenty years was to be one of the most prominent figures in Khurāsānian affairs. Ibn Funduq calls him the “Khusraw [Emperor] of Khurásan, King of the East”. Ai-Aba began by driving the Ghuzz out of Nishapur, Tūs, Nasā, Abīvard, Shahristān, and

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1 Bundārī, p. 284; Zuhīr al-Dīn Nishapūrī, p. 52.
2 Ibn Funduq, p. 284.
Dāmghān, henceforth establishing himself at Nishāpūr as the local ruler. There he became known for his justice and good rule—e.g. he lowered taxation and conciliated the landowning classes—so that his effective power began to spread all over the province. Similarly another one of Sanjar’s ghūlāms, Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Ai-Taq, left Khurāsān when the Ghuzz rebellion broke out and assumed power at Ray, where, his power legitimized by the western sultan Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd and by Sulaimān-Shāh in Marv, he built up a large army and made himself a considerable power in northern Iran. When Maḥmūd Khān was made sultan of Khurāsān, Ai-Aba at first refused to hand over power to him; only after long negotiations did he agree to become Maḥmūd’s tributary, whilst nevertheless keeping effective control over the parts of Khurāsān which he held. ¹ Maḥmūd felt unable to subdue the Ghuzz single-handed and invited in the Khwarazm-Shāh Atsiz, who died, however, before any practical steps against them could be taken (see above, p. 146).

As for the Ghuzz themselves, their disunity and low level of political and social sophistication prevented them from establishing a territorial administration in Khurāsān, despite their military successes. Hence they did not emulate the Saljuq invaders of a century or so before; on this situation Rāvandi comments that the Ghuzz had the military power but lacked the essential qualities of justice and righteousness without which no state can be founded.² They do, however, seem to have had some slight diplomatic contact with those powers outside Khurāsān who had seized on Sanjar’s embarrassments as a chance to advance their own claims. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Ḥusain corresponded with them over the extradition of the poet Anvari, who had satirized the Ghūrid ruler. And we have seen that under Shāh Ghāzi Rustam, the Bāvandids of Ṭabaristān expanded beyond their mountain principality into Qūmis and Dailam, where in 552/1157 Shāh Ghāzi devastated Alamūt and enslaved a large number of Ismā’īlīs (pp. 28–9 above). It seems that early in Shāh Ghāzi’s reign the Ismā’īlīs had murdered his son, and this would account for his unrelenting enmity towards them. The Ghuzz leaders Tūṭī Beg and Qorqut, who exercised some degree of authority among them, sent envoys to Shāh Ghāzi, encouraging his ambitions for the conquest of western Iran and promising him a share of Khurāsān in return for his alliance.³

² Rāvandi, p. 186.
³ Köymen, Büyük Selçuklu, pp. 424–8; Hodgson, Order of Assassins, p. 145.
Towards the end of Sanjar’s three-year captivity, the disunity and fragmentation of the Ghuzz became more pronounced. Then in 551/1156 a group of the Ghuzz were suborned, and Sanjar succeeded in escaping to Tirmidh and Marv. A year later, at the age of seventy-one, Sanjar died, and with him the authority of the Saljuqs in eastern Iran virtually ceased; Sanjar himself while on his deathbed appointed the Qarakhānid Mahmūd Khān as his successor. The death of a monarch who had reigned for over sixty years as malik and then as sultan seemed to contemporaries the end of an epoch, and they expressed wonder at the might of a man whose name was in the kḥūṭba from Mecca to Kashghar.¹


Under Ibrāhīm of Ghazna’s son ‘Alā’ al-Daula Mas‘ūd III (492–508/1099–1115) the Ghaznavid empire extended over the regions of Ghazna, Kabul, Bust, Qusdār, Makrān, and northern India. It continued to be oriented primarily towards the Indian subcontinent, and the dynasty continued to be respected as the spearhead of the faith in the Islamic world. Mas‘ūd had close marriage ties with the Saljuqs—his wife Mahd-i ‘Iraq was Sanjar’s sister—and all through his reign peaceful relations were maintained with the Saljuqs.

Between the Ghaznavid territories and Saljuq Khūrāsān lay the buffer province of Ghūr, in central Afghanistan, a mountainous and inaccessible region which was at times subordinate to Ghazna, or to the Saljuqs, but on the whole little disturbed by either. At one point Ibrāhīm of Ghazna had marched into Ghūr at the invitation of some of the chiefs there and had deposed Amir ‘Abbās b. Shīth of the local Shansabānī line. He then set up ‘Abbās’s son Muḥammad as amir of Ghūr, and Muḥammad remained till his death a faithful vassal of the Ghaznavids. In his grandson ‘Īzz al-Dīn Ḥusain, however, who came to power in 493/1100 and began a long reign in Ghūr as tributary to Sanjar and the Saljuqs, we see an indication of the relative decline of the Ghaznavids. It seems that in 501/1107–8 Sanjar led a raid into Ghūr; the stimulus for this is not known, but it is likely that the Ghūrī tribesmen, always notorious for their banditry, had been harassing the fringes of Saljuq territory in Bādgīs and Kūhistān. Sanjar captured

Husain, and Ghur must now have passed into the Saljuq sphere of influence. According to the Ghurid historian Juzjani, Husain sent annually to Sanjar the specialities of his region, arms and armour and dogs of the fierce local breed.\(^1\)

Therefore the energies of Mas'ud III of Ghazna were in large part deflected towards India, where his son 'Adud al-Daula Shir-Zad was viceroy at Lahore. During this time the general Toghan-Tegin is said to have penetrated farther across the Ganges than anyone had ever done since the great Mahmud's time.\(^2\) Mas'ud died in 508/1115, and after the brief reign of Shir-Zad another son, Arslan-Shah, became sultan for three years (509-12/1115-18).

A succession struggle between Arslan-Shah and another brother of his, Bahram-Shah, brought about the intervention of Sanjar and a Saljuq declaration of suzerainty over the Ghaznavid empire. Arslan-Shah imprisoned all his numerous brothers, and only Bahram-Shah managed to escape to Khurasan, where he sought Saljuq assistance. Arslan-Shah also treated with indignity his father's widow, Sanjar's sister, even though she was probably his own mother.\(^3\) Hence Sanjar had a double pretext for intervention. To Sultan Muhammad in western Iran, the supreme head of the dynasty Arslan-Shah complained about Sanjar's threatening attitude, but this did not avert a Saljuq invasion from Khurasan. Accompanied by a contingent under the tributary Saffarid amir of Sistan, Tadj al-Din Abu'l Fa'dl, the Saljuq army appeared at Bust and defeated Arslan-Shah. Sanjar now came personally, refusing all peace offers. In a battle outside Ghazna Arslan-Shah had 30,000 troops and 120 elephants, each with four armed men on its back. But Sanjar gained the victory, and he entered Ghazna to acquire an immense booty of treasure and jewels, and to place Bahram-Shah on the throne (510/1117). The latter agreed to pay an annual tribute of 250,000 dinars and to make the khutba for Muhammad and Sanjar—the first time that the Saljuq khutba had ever been heard in Ghazna. Not even Malik-Shah had achieved this, for when he had desired to introduce it Nizam al-Mulk had deterred him, out of respect for the old-established Ghaznavid dynasty. On Sanjar's departure Arslan-Shah came back


\(^3\) This filiation is put forward by Gulam Mustafa Khan in "A History of Bahram Shah of Ghaznin", *Islamic Culture*, pp. 64-6.
GHAZNAVIDS AND GHŪRIDS

from Lahore and reoccupied Ghazna briefly, but Bahram-Shāh, again securing Saljuq help, captured and executed his brother.¹

Bahram-Shāh now began a reign of thirty-five years (512–47/1118–52) as a vassal of the Saljuqs; this we know because all his coins, except those of Indian type minted at Lahore, have Sanjar’s name before his own. His reign was one of particular cultural splendour, and it forms a late flowering of the civilization of the Ghaznavids. Led by Sayyid Hasan and Sanā’ī, there was a numerous circle of court poets; it was to the sultan that the latter dedicated his magnum opus, the Ḥadīqat al-ḥaqīqa, and likewise to him that Abu’l-Ma’ālī Naṣrallāh dedicated his Persian translation of Kalīla wa Dimna. However Bahram-Shāh had to quell revolts by the governor of India, Muhammad Bahlim; and then in 529/1135 the sultan himself became restive under Saljuq domination. Despite wintry conditions, Sanjar, accompanied by the Khwārazm-Shāh Atsiz, marched through northern Afghanistan and occupied Ghazna. Bahram-Shāh, who had meanwhile fled, returned shortly afterwards and submitted to Sanjar, who restored him to his throne and then returned to Balkh.²

But Bahram-Shāh’s reign was not to end peacefully. The long dominion of the house of Sebük-Tegin was drawing to its close, and the instrument of its overthrow was not to be Sanjar, occupied as he was in Khurāsān and Transoxiana, but the Shansabānī rulers of Ghūr. That this line of petty chiefs should burst forth and compete on equal terms with such dynasties as the Saljuqs, the Ghaznavids, and the Khwārazm-Shāhs, is one of the most remarkable phenomena of the period. Yet the forces underlying this dynamism are very imperfectly understood. The medieval topography and history of Ghūr are known only fragmentarily for its isolation made the Islamic geographers and historians neglect it almost totally; and our knowledge of the Shansabānī dynasty would be meagre indeed were it not for the Tabaqāt-i Nāṣirī of the 7th/13th-century author Jūzjānī, in effect a special history of the Ghūrīds.³

Until the 5th/11th century, Ghūr remained a pagan enclave ringed

with Muslim ribâts and known chiefly as a source for slaves. Islam first came with the early Ghaznavids. After his expedition of 401/1010-11 Maḥmūd left teachers to instruct the Ghūrīs in the precepts of Islam, and he appointed as ruler there a pliant member of the Shansabānīs, a family from Āhangarān on the upper Hari Rūd. This chieftain is praised by Jūzjānī as the man who firmly implanted Islam in Ghūr, but it is likely that paganism persisted there at least till the end of the century. Originally the Shansabānīs were merely one family of petty chiefs among many in Ghūr, but by their ruthlessness and ambition they gradually made themselves supreme there. The main branch of the family became established in the 6th/12th century at Firūzkūh, and pari passu with the decline of the Ghaznavids the fortunes of the Ghūrids rose.¹

With ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Husain b. ‘Izz al-Dīn Husain (544-56/1149-61) the Ghūrids broke out of the confines of their own province and succeeded to the heritage of the Ghaznavids, eventually becoming the greatest single power on the eastern fringes of the Islamic world. As early as 542/1147 the Ghūrids were tempted to intervene at Herāt, when its governor rebelled against Sanjar. Bahrām-Shāh feared the nascent strength of the Ghūrids, and although ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s brother Qutb al-Dīn Muḥammad was related by marriage to the Ghaznavids, the sultan nevertheless had him poisoned; Jūzjānī traces the enmity between the two dynasties to this event.² Bahrām-Shāh killed a further brother, Saif al-Dīn Sūrī, and it was left to ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Husain to take vengeance. He led an army from Firūzkūh into Zamīndāvar, where, despite the formidable array of elephants fielded by Bahrām-Shāh, he defeated the sultan three times and pursued him into Ghazna. The capital was now given over to a frightful seven days’ orgy of plundering and destruction, which earned for ‘Alā’ al-Dīn the title Jahān-Sūr (“World-Idolizer”); as a final gesture of spite, the corpses of all but three of the Ghaznavid sultans were exhumed and burnt (545/1150-1).³


Bahrām-Shāh fled to his Indian possessions. Only when the Ghūrid army had left did he return to Ghazna, and there he died shortly afterwards (547/1152). His son Khusrau-Shāh succeeded, but Ghūrid pressure compelled him to retire to Lahore, where he died in 555/1160. \(^1\) The final Ghaznavid sultan, Khusrau-Malik, was, like his father, ruler in the Punjab only. The fifteen years’ occupation of Ghazna by a group of Ghuzz from Khurāsān, who had seized the city after ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Ḥusain’s death, temporarily held up the Ghūrid advance into the Indian plain; but ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s nephew, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sām, attacked and expelled the Ghuzz from Ghazna, and by 579/1183–4 he was besieging Lahore. In 582/1186–7 Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad finally annexed the Punjab, deposing Khusrau-Malik and carrying him off to imprisonment in Ghūr, thus extinguishing the Ghaznavid line. \(^2\)

To the west of Ghūr the main obstacle to the Shansabānīs’ expansion was at first the Saljuqs. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, elated by his capture of Ghazna, was little disposed to continue as Sanjar’s tributary. He stopped the payment of tribute and in 547/1152 advanced down the Hari Rūd, but after being decisively defeated by Sanjar at Nāb near Herāt, he was captured and held prisoner until a large ransom was paid over. Before his death ‘Alā’ al-Dīn abandoned the title of Malik, with which his dynasty had so far been content, and in imitation of the Saljuqs and Ghaznavids called himself al-Sultān al-Mu‘azzam. \(^3\) From this time onwards the Ghūrid dynasty split into two and ultimately three lines. The main one established itself in Ghūr proper, where Qūtb al-Dīn Muḥammad (540–1/1145–6) founded the fortress of Firūzkūh in a strategic position on the headwaters of the Hari Rūd, and this became the sultans’ summer capital. \(^4\) The second branch reigned from Bāmiyān over Tukhāristān and Badakhshān (and also, according to Jūzjānī, over the Transoxianan territories of Chaghāniyān and Vakhs); these regions had been conquered by ‘Alā’ al-Dīn after his Ghazna victory and given to his brother Fakhr al-Dīn Mas‘ūd, who bore the title Malik. And third, after expelling the Ghuzz from Ghazna in 569/1173, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad set up his brother Shihāb al-Dīn or Mu‘izz al-Dīn Muḥammad, as sultan in Ghazna, while he himself retained the

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ancestral territory of Ghūr and ruled from Firūzkūh as supreme head of the dynasty.¹

The empire reached its apogee in the generation or so spanned by the reigns of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad (sultan in Ghūr, 558-99/1163-1203) and of his younger brother Muʿizz al-Dīn Muḥammad (sultan in Ghazna, 569-602/1173-1206). The partnership and amity between the two was a rare phenomenon for the age, but the dual aspect of the empire—i.e. its expansionist policy in Khurāsān and the west, and its succession to the Ghaznavid ghāzi-tradition in India and the east—favoured such a division of power. In India Muʿizz al-Dīn campaigned in the Punjab and the Ganges valley, capturing Delhi in 589/1193; he wrested Multan from the local Ismāʿīlīs in 571/1175-6, and he penetrated to the coasts of Sind and Gujerat.² Although latterly he became preoccupied with the defence of the Khurāsānī conquests, his Turkish ghulām commanders, such as Qūṭb al-Dīn Aibeg, Ikhtiyyār al-Dīn Muḥammad Khaljī, and Nāṣir al-Dīn Qabacha, continued to carry on raids in India; and such was the quality of Muʿizz al-Dīn's leadership and the loyalty which he inspired that these slave amirs in India continued proudly to call themselves “Muʿizzī”, and to place the dead sultan's name on their coins for some decades after the Ghūrid dynasty proper had disappeared.³

The “World-Incendiary” 'Alāʾ al-Dīn Ḥusain was briefly succeeded by his son Saif al-Dīn Muḥammad (556-8/1161-3), who reversed his father's policy of toleration towards the Ismāʿīlīs in Ghūr and drove them out to Kūhistān.⁴ Indeed, the Ghūrids now become conspicuous for their Sunni piety, earning laudatory mention in the sources. Abandoning their support of the literalist Karamīyya sect, which was strong amongst the people of Ghūr, they adhered to the Shāfī‘ī law school, with its greater social prestige and intellectual reputation.⁵ Ghiyāth al-Dīn kept up cordial relations with the ‘Abbāsid caliphs in Baghdad. Ambassadors were frequently exchanged, and the sultan sought membership in one of the chivalric orders, known collectively

² See the list of his conquests ibid., vol. 1, p. 407 (tr., vol. 1, p. 491).
as the *sufuwwa*, by means of which al-Nāṣir was seeking to restore the secular and moral power of the caliphate (see p. 168 below).\(^1\) The caliph also encouraged Ghūrid ambitions in Khurāsān as a counter-weight to the Khwārazm-Shāhs, whose advance into western Iran was causing deep concern in Baghdad.

When Saif al-Dīn Muḥammad was killed in battle with the Ghuzz near Marv, his cousin Ghiyāth al-Dīn was raised to the throne at Fīrūzḵūh by the army.\(^2\) Ghiyāth al-Dīn had first of all to deal with a coalition of his enemies raised up by his uncle Fakhr al-Dīn Masʿūd of Bāmiyān, who claimed that the throne should have passed to him by right of seniority. In a battle at Rāgh-i Zar, between Herāt and Fīrūzḵūh, he defeated Fakhr al-Dīn and killed the Turkish governors of Balkh and Herāt, Qumāch and Yīldīz, both former ghulāms of Sanjar. Fakhr al-Dīn was restored to Bāmiyān in 559/1163, and Ghiyāth al-Dīn began to extend his authority over outlying parts of Afghanistan. Gharchistān, Gūzgān, Bādghis, and Zamindāvār were all secured, and the Ghuzz were ejected from Ghazna. Khurāsān, where the collapse of Saljuq power had left a vacuum, now claimed his attention. In 571/1175-6 Sanjar’s old ghulām Bahā’ al-Dīn Toghīrl had to abandon Herāt to the sultan. Shortly afterwards the amīr of Sīstān, Tāj al-Dīn Ḥarb b. Muḥammad, acknowledged Ghiyāth al-Dīn as his suzerain and on several occasions sent troop contingents to the Ghūrid armies; even the amirs of the Ghuzz in Kirmān, who had succeeded there to the local Saljuq dynasty, sent envoys to Fīrūzḵūh.\(^3\)

Jūzjānī alleges that there was originally an *entente* between Ghiyāth al-Dīn and the Khwārazm-Shāh Tekish, yet this seems unlikely, for a clash between these two great powers of the east was not long delayed.\(^4\) For some time Ghiyāth al-Dīn sheltered Tekish’s fugitive brother Sultān-Shāh, although he refused to give him military aid. Sultān-Shāh eventually got help from the Qara-Khitai and assembled at Marv an army with which to attack the Ghūrid province of Bādghis. In response Ghiyāth al-Dīn summoned troops from Bāmiyān and Sīstān, as well as from his brother Muʿīzz al-Dīn in Ghazna, and in 586/1190 he defeated Sultān-Shāh near Marv, taking over some of his Khurāsānian territories.\(^5\)

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3 *ibid.* vol. i, pp. 354-8, 385-6 (tr., vol. i, pp. 371-8, 424-5).
4 *ibid.* vol. i, p. 360 (tr., vol. i, p. 382).
In addition to their territories north of the Oxus, the Qara-Khitai had a foothold in Tukhāristān, south of the river. Dislodging the infidels from here became the goal of the Bāmiyān Ghūrids, who, as supporters of orthodoxy, welcomed this opportunity for jihad. In 594/1198 Bahā’ al-Dīn Sām occupied Balkh after the death of its Turkish governor, who had paid tribute to the Qara-Khitai. In the same year a general war broke out in Khūrāsān between the Ghūrids on one side and the Khwārazm-Shāhs and their Qara-Khitai suzerains on the other. Fighting had begun in 590/1194, when the death of the last Saljuq sultan in the west, Toghril b. Arslān, had brought the Khwārazm-Shāhs to the borders of Iraq (see p. 182 below). Although the caliph al-Nāṣir had wittingly set this train of events in motion, he now sent envoys to Firuzkūh imploring Ghūrid help. Ghiyāth al-Dīn accordingly threatened to attack Tekish’s Khūrāsānian possessions unless the latter abandoned his threatening attitude towards the caliph. For his part, Tekish sought the help of the Qara-Khitai, and together they sent an army into Gūzgān, threatening Firuzkūh and demanding of the Bāmiyān Ghūrids that they pay tribute for Balkh. Tekish himself marched against Herāt, but in a battle on the Oxus banks the Qara-Khitai were routed by the amirs of the Ghūrids. Ghiyāth al-Dīn and Mu’īzz al-Dīn then took over Marv, Sarakhs, Nasā’, Abīvard, Tūs, and Nīshāpūr, and they installed in Marv Tekish’s fugitive grandson Hindū Khān. Finally Mu’īzz al-Dīn conducted some operations in Kūhistān against the Ismā’īlīs, after which Khūrāsān was entrusted to a Ghūrid prince, Diyā’ al-Dīn or ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad (597/1200).

The Ghūrids were unpopular among the people of Khūrāsān, and they found it hard to maintain their authority there. According to Juvainī, Mu’īzz al-Dīn imposed financial levies and confiscated properties in Tūs, and carried off for his army grain which had been committed to the protection of the Imām ‘Alī al-Riḍā’s shrine. He was compelled to spend much of his time attending to the defence of these western conquests, especially as Ghiyāth al-Dīn was becoming incapacitated by gout or rheumatism and eventually died in 599/1202.

On his brother’s death, Mu’īzz al-Dīn allotted various parts of the Ghūrid empire to his relatives, with Ghūr itself going to Diyā’ al-Dīn

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The Khwārazm-Shah 'Alā’ al-Din Muḥammad came to besiege Herāt; Mu‘izz al-Din pursued him back into Khwārazm, but the flooding of the Khwārazmian countryside made progress impossible for the Ghūrid troops. The shah also called in the Qara-Khitai once more, and a large army, whose commanders included Tayangu of Ṭārāz and the Qarakhānid ruler of Samarqand, ‘Uthmān b. Ibrāhīm, joined Muḥammad and drove the Ghūrids out of Khwārazm; then, in a great battle at Andkhūi on the Oxus, the Qara-Khitai routed Mu‘izz al-Din (601/1204). Only the mediation of ‘Uthmān Khan, who did not want to see the Ghūrid sultan captured by pagans, permitted Mu‘izz al-Din’s withdrawal to his own land. Of his former lands in Khurāsān, only Herāt remained to him, and he found it expedient to make peace with the Khwārazm-Shāh even though the caliph continued to incite him against Muḥammad, urging an alliance with the Qara-Khitai if this would further their design. The suppression of a revolt in the Punjab occupied Mu‘izz al-Din’s closing months, for on the way back to Ghazna he was assassinated, allegedly by emissaries of the ʿĪsmāʿīlīs whom he had often persecuted during his lifetime (602/1206).

Within a decade of his death the Ghūrid empire fell apart, passing briefly into the hands of the Khwārazm-Shāhs. The Ghūrid forces comprised not only local Ghūrī, Afghan, and Sagzī troops, but also the Turkish ghulāms who were found in almost all eastern Islamic armies at this time. Mu‘izz al-Din’s skill had kept all these elements together, but now the Turkish commanders in Ghazna and India began to act as an independent body. The dead sultan had no son of his own; for his successor the Turkish troops inclined to his nephew Ghiyāth al-Din Mahmūd b. Ghiyāth al-Din Muḥammad, whereas the Ghūrī commanders favoured Bāḥā’ al-Dīn Sām of Bāmiyān and then, after the latter’s death, his two sons. In the end Ghiyāth al-Din Mahmūd prevailed, driving out the governor of Ghūr, Diyā’ al-Dīn Muhammad, who was the candidate of the local Karāmiyya adherents, and ascending the throne at Fīrūzkuh.

However, the new sultan was inferior to his predecessors, and never managed to establish his direct authority over the eastern fringes of the Ghurid empire. The Turkish commander Tāj al-Dīn Yıldız squashed the Bāmiyān Ghurids' pretensions to rule in Ghazna, but only reluctantly and tardily did he recognize Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd. The latter dared not leave Ghūr unprotected and march to Ghazna; the full measure of his clumsiness was seen when he called in the Khwārazm-Shāh and Ḥusain b. Kharmīl, governor of Herāt, to expel Yıldız from Ghazna and enforce his rights there (603/1206-7). The end of the Firūzkūh Ghurids was now near. Balkh and Tirmīdīh had both fallen to the Khwārazm-Shāh, the latter being handed over to the Qara-Khitai. The shah was defeated and temporarily held captive by the Qara-Khitai, but he returned to the attack and after a thirteen months' siege took Herāt, the key to the Hari Rūd valley. His forces then invaded Ghūr and captured Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd (605/1208-9). The latter remained sultan, but only as the Khwārazm-Shāh's puppet. He was assassinated either two or four years later, and his son Bahā' al-Dīn Sām was carried off to Khwārazm shortly afterwards. Ghazna was taken in 612/1215-16, Yıldız was driven into India, and the shah's son Jalāl al-Dīn was installed as governor of Ghazna. In the same year the Bāmiyān line of the Ghurids was extinguished, and Ghūr now relapsed into an obscurity almost as deep as before.

The "Ghurid interlude" in eastern Iranian history thus lasted for only a few decades, yet it constituted a remarkable achievement for the chieftains of such a remote corner of Afghanistan. The Ghurid sultans had drawn upon the manpower resources of their native Afghanistan as well as upon professional mercenaries from outside, and they had skillfully utilized Sunni religious sentiments in their struggles with the 'Abbāsids' enemies, the Khwārazm-Shāhs, and with the pagan Qara-Khitai. Unfortunately for the Ghurids' ambitions, the resources which they could command, human and moral, did not prove quite enough for the double role in Khūrāsān and northern India which the sultans aspired to play.


XII. THE LAST DECADES OF SALJUQ RULE IN THE WEST

The last forty years of Saljuq rule in Iraq and western Iran were characterized by three main trends, each of which was the accentuation of an earlier trend. First, the political and military influence of the ‘Abbāsid caliphate continued to rise. Second, the Turkish amirs and atabegs in the various provinces of the western Saljuq empire consolidated their power, in some cases forming hereditary lines. And finally, the real power of the Saljuq sultans themselves, their dynasty now deeply disunited within itself and dependent on the military support of the Turkish amirs, continued to decline, and not even the despairing revival of activity on the part of Toghril b. Arslan, last of the sultans, could arrest this process and stave off total ruin. Hence the last decade of the 6th/12th century sees western Iran, the territory up to the edge of the Iraqi plain, incorporated into the vast empire which the Khwārazm-Shāhs assembled on the eve of the Mongol invasions.

As we have seen, Caliph al-Muqtafi began vigorously to assert the secular rights of his office (pp. 128–9 above). Two centuries of Buyid and Saljuq control in Baghdad had fostered the idea that the caliph’s power was purely spiritual, and that temporal affairs should be left to the amir or sultan who held the military and political supremacy at the time. This idea was now challenged. Ibn al-Athīr sums up this novel trend in his obituary notice on al-Muqtafi:

He was the first Caliph to get sole power over Iraq, to the exclusion of any Sultan, since the time when the Dailamīs [the Buyids] first appeared. He was also the first Caliph to have firm control over the Caliphate and over his troops and retainers since the time when the slave troops secured an ascendancy over the Caliphs in al-Munstaṣir’s time [i.e. in the latter part of the 3rd/9th century] to the present day, with the possible exception of al-Muṭʿāḍid’s reign.¹

Al-Muqṭafī recruited troops extensively and was said to have a network of spies and intelligence agents in all lands, while in the field of diplomacy he supported Turkish amirs in the provinces, e.g. the Eldigūzīds in Āzarbājān, as a check on the Saljuq sultans. After the death of Maṣʿūd b. Muḥammad the sultans were excluded from Baghdad; Maṣʿūd’s shāhna there, Maṣʿūd Bilālī, was expelled when his master died, the caliph took over the sultan’s palace and properties and henceforth no shāhnas were tolerated in Baghdad.²

al-Muqtafi’s reign and throughout the following one of al-Mustanjid (535-66/1160-70), the rights of the caliphate were strongly upheld by the viziers ‘Aun al-Din Yaḥyā Ibn Hubaira (d. 560/1165) and his son ‘Izz al-Din (d. 561/1166 or 562/1167). ‘Aun al-Din was a staunch Ḥanbali, and his fiscal policy of making lands once again directly taxable alienated those Shi‘is whose shrines were in central Iraq. He was also a capable general, and in 549/1154, after he defeated the Turkish amirs and their protégé Arslan b. Toghril, he was rewarded by the unusual honorifics of Sultan al-‘Irāq (“Sultan of Iraq”) and Malik al-Juyush (“Monarch of the Military Forces”).

With the accession of al-Nāṣir (575-622/1180-1225), the caliph became a central figure in eastern Islamic diplomacy and politics. He gave little attention to the west, leaving the struggle with the Crusaders to Saladin and the Ayyūbids, but he was intensely concerned with such events in the East as the expansion of the Khwarazm-Shāhs, whom he endeavoured to check first through the Ghūrids and then through the Mongols. On the moral and ethical plain he made use of the futuwwa, or chivalric orders, becoming himself a member of the Rahhāsiyya order in 578/1182-3. He reorganized these futuwwa bands and sought to enroll in them the rulers of the Islamic world, with himself as the head, thus linking together both Sunni and moderate Shi‘i elements. Rulers such as the Ayyūbids, the Rūm Saljuqs, and the Ghūrids became affiliated with the Rahhāsiyya order, and under al-Nāṣir’s grandson al-Mustansīr even the Khwarazm-Shāh Jalāl al-Dīn, son of al-Nāṣir’s old enemy ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad, was admitted.

An event which caused a great sensation in the Islamic world was al-Nāṣir’s success in securing the return of the Persian and Syrian Ismā‘īlīs to the fold of orthodoxy. In 608/1211-12 the Grand Master of Alamūt, Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥasan III b. Muḥammad, restored the practices of orthodox Islam in the regions under his control, building mosques, burning heretical books, and receiving from the caliph titles of honour such as no previous Grand Master had ever enjoyed. On the Talisman Gate which he built at Baghdad the victorious caliph was depicted tearing apart the jaws of two dragons; the great epigraphist Max van

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Berchem interpreted these dragons to represent the two great enemies of the caliphate, the Isma'ili Grand Master and the Khwârezm-Shâh ‘Alâ’ al-Din Muḥammad.¹

The death of Sultan Mas'ûd without direct heir nevertheless left several Saljuq princes with claims to the sultanate, including his brother Sulaimân-Shâh and the sons of his brothers Maḥmûd and Toḡhrîl. With the exception of Muḥammad b. Maḥmûd, whom ’Imâd al-Din praises as the most majestic, most learned, and most just of the Saljuqs,² these contenders were of mediocre capability. They were almost wholly dependent on the Turkish amirs for support, since in this period several of the provincial amirs kept Saljuq princes at their courts, using them as shields for their own ambitions. Eldigûz, atabeg of Arrân and of part of Azarbâijân, at first pushed the claims of Malik-Shâh b. Maḥmûd; but he also had with him Arslan b. Toghrîl, who was moreover the atabeg’s own stepson—for Eldigûz had married Toghrîl’s widow, and it was the children of this union, Pahlavân and Qızil-Arslân, who continued the line of the Eldigûzîds.³ Ibn Aq-Sonqur, the Aḥmadîlî Atabeg of Marâqheh and Tabriz, likewise had with him a Saljuq prince, apparently a son of Muḥammad b. Maḥmûd. Sulaimân-Shâh b. Muḥammad b. Malik-Shâh was held prisoner for some time by the Zangid ruler of Mosul, Qûtb al-Dîn Maudûd, until he was released to reign for a brief period in Hamadân as sultan (555/1160-1). On the death of Malik-Shâh b. Maḥmûd, his son Maḥmûd was taken by his supporters to Fârs, where the Salghûrid atabeg Muṭaffar al-Dîn Zangî seized him and held him at Iṣṭâkhîr as a possible claimant.⁴

The north-western provinces of Iran remained quite outside the sultans’ sphere of direct influence. Power here was divided between the Eldigûzîds and the Aḥmadîlîs. Shâhs al-Dîn Eldigûz (d. 570/1174-5 or possibly 571/1175-6) was originally a slave of Sultan Maḥmûd’s vizier, al-Kamâl al-Simirumi; then he passed into the possession of


² Bundârî, Zuhdat al-nûra, p. 288.


Sultan Mas'ūd, who appointed him governor of Arrān. For some time he kept aloof from the quarrels over the sultanate, until the fortunate marriage which he had made with Toghril's widow Mu'mina Khatun enabled him to champion the succession of Arslan b. Toghril; the latter he duly set up at Hamadān on the murder of Sulaimān-Shāh in 556/1161. His son Nuṣrat al-Din Pahlavān Muḥammad was Sultan Arslan's half-brother, and Pahlavān succeeded not only to the paternal territories in Arrān and much of Āzarbāijān, but also to Jībal, Isfahān, and Ray, with his brother Qizil-Arslan 'Uthmān ruling in Tabrīz as his subordinate. Pahlavān held Arslan and his young son and successor Toghril under close tutelage until his death c. 581/1186. Only with Qizil-Arslan's rule did Toghril manage to burst out of this constriction, and after the Eldigüzids' murder in 587/1191 he briefly turned the tables on Qizil-Arslan's successor, Qutluğ Inan b. Pahlavān. The Eldigüzid line did not, however, survive beyond the first quarter of the 7th/13th century. For much of Iran, the irruption of the Khwārazm-Shāhs marked the end of an epoch, and in 622/1225 Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn finally deposed Öz-Beg b. Pahlavān. Thus the historical significance of the Eldigüzids lies, first, in their virtually undisputed rule over much of north-western Iran for several decades (just before his death Qizil-Arslan was even bold enough to claim the sultanate for himself); and second, in their role as champions of Muslim arms on the north-eastern frontier, where they faced the resurgent power of the Georgian kings (see pp. 178–9 below).

The Aḥmadīlīs of Maraḡeh took their name from the Rawwādīd Aḥmadīl b. Ibrāhīm of Tabrīz, who was murdered in 510/1116. In accordance with the prevalent practice, his Turkish slave Aq-Sonqur took the surname of his master's family, Aḥmadīlī, and founded a line which endured in Maraḡeh for over a century, until, like the Eldigüzids, it was extinguished by the Khwārazm-Shāhs. Aq-Sonqur became atabeg to Dā'ūd b. Mahmūd and supported his brief tenure as sultan in Āzarbāijān and Jībal in 525–6/1131–2. The name of his son and successor is somewhat uncertain, but in the sources he is often

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1 Minorsky has pointed out (B.S.O.A.S. [1949–50], p. 877) that the date 568/1172–3—which Ibn al-Athir gives as the year of Eldiguz's death—is wrong; the correct date is either that of Ḥusaynī (570) or of Fārūqī and Rāvandi (571), and probably the latter.
3 See Houtsma, “Ildegiz” and “Tughrīl II b. Arslān”, and Zettersteen, “Pehlewān, Muḥammad b. Ildegiz” and “Kızıl Arslan”, in Encyc. of Islam (1st ed.).
4 Bundārī, p. 302; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xii, p. 49.
5 On the Rawwādīds, see above, pp. 32 ff.
called Aq-Sonqur; he now became the Eldigüzids’ rival for power in the north-west. Whereas Eldigüz pressed the claims of Arslan b. Toghrıl, Aq-Sonqur II was in 554/1159 entrusted with the infant son of Muḥammad b. Mas‘ūd; he refused to recognize the succession of Arslan in 556/1160, and the Caliph’s vizier ‘Aun al-Dīn Ibn Hubaira incited him to set up as a rival the Saljuq child whom he had in his keeping.\(^1\) Falak al-Dīn b. Aq-Sonqur II lost Tabriz in 570/1174–5 to Pahlavān b. Eldigüz, and conflict between the two families persisted into the next century. The Ahmadīli ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Qara-Sonqur or Körp-Arslan, patron of the poet Nizāmī, attempted in 602/1205–6 to despose the drunk and incompetent Eldigüzīd Nuṣrat al-Dīn Abū Bakr b. Pahlavān, but the latter reacted with unwonted vigour and captured Marāgheh from ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, allotting him in exchange Urmiyeh and Ishnū. When in 603/1208–9 ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s infant son and successor died, almost all the Ahmadīli lands fell to Abū Bakr, although scions of the family are still heard of after the engulfing waves of the Khwārazm-Shāhs and Mongols had passed over Azarbāiǰan.\(^2\)

In Armenia the Shāh-Armanīds, descendants of the ghulām Sukmān al-Qūṭbī, were frequently involved in the politics and warfare of Azarbāiǰan, tending to take the side of Aq-Sonqur II against the Eldigüzīds. But when Naṣr al-Dīn Sukmān died without heir in 581/1185, a bloodless struggle for power took place between Pahlavān b. Eldigüz, who had married a daughter to the aged Shāh-Arman in order to acquire a succession claim, and the Ayyūbid Salādin. In the end, Pahlavān took over Akhlāt, whilst Salādin annexed Mayyāfarīqīn in Diyarbakr, a possession of the Artuqīds of Mārdīn which had been latterly under the protectorship of the Shāh-Arman.\(^3\) Mosul and the Jazīreh remained under Zangīd rule, although the relentless advance of Salādin into the Jazīreh posed a serious threat to the Zangīds, driving the last Shāh-Arman and the atabeg ‘Īzẓ al-Dīn Mas‘ūd b. Qūṭb al-Dīn Maudūd into alliance against Ayyūbid aggression.\(^4\) After the death of Salādin in 589/1193, the Zangīds recaptured most of the towns and fortresses of the Jazīreh.

From c. 550/1155 till his death in 570/1174–5, a Türkmen of the Avšhār tribe of the Oghuz, named Ai-Toghdī or Shumla, maintained

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1 Zahir al-Dīn Nišāpūrī, p. 76; Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, p. 177.
control in Khûzistân. Between 553/1158 and 556/1161, Malik-Shâh b. Muhammad took from him part of Khûzistân, but thereafter it reverted entirely to Shumla, who held it till his death in battle against Eldigûzid forces. On two occasions, in 526/1167 and 569/1173-4, Shumla had tried to encroach on caliphal territory in Iraq, but was repulsed by forces from Baghdad; in 564/1169 he temporarily occupied Fârs at the invitation of the army of the Salghurid ruler of Fârs, Mu'azzâr al-Din Zangi, who had become unpopular for his tyranny. Like other provincial amirs, Shumla sheltered a Saljuq prince, the son of Malik-Shâh b. Mahmûd, and after Shumla’s death this prince continued to harry the borders of Iraq. One of Shumla’s sons reigned in Khûzistân for a further twenty years till his death in 591/1195, when al-Nâsir’s vizier Mu’ayyid al-Dîn Ibn Qâşâb invaded the province, annexing it and carrying off Shumla’s grandsons to Baghdad. The caliph then appointed ghulâm commanders to rule Khûzistân, but in 603/1206-7 he was faced with a rebellion there of one of his former ghulâms, who had built up a coalition of local Kurdish chiefs, the Salghurid ruler of Fârs, 'Izz al-Dîn Sa’d, and the former Eldigûzid ghulâm Ai-Toghmîsh, now ruler of Ray, Isfahân, and Hamadân. The threat was surmounted, but the caliph had to suppress a further revolt in Khûzistân in 607/1210-11.

In Fârs the Salghurid family of Atabegs ruled for some 120 years as tributaries first of the Saljuqs, then of the Khwârazm-Shahs, and then of the Mongols. They were of Türkmen origin, and the Salghur (or Salur) tribe seems to have played an important role in the establishment of the Saljuq sultanate of Rûm. The line of atabegs is usually said to start in 543/1148 with Mu'azzâr al-Dîn Sonqur, who took advantage of the troubles of Sultan Mas'ûd b. Muhammad by extending his power over Fârs; the sources state that Sonqur was a nephew of the previous ruler in Fârs, Boz-Abâ, though this affiliation is uncertain. Sonqur’s son Zangi (d. 570/1174-5) was confirmed in Fârs by Sultân Arslan b. Toghrîl, and the province seems to have enjoyed a moderate prosperity under his rule; but the real florescence of this minor dynasty came in

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the reign of 'Izz al-Din Sa'd (590–628/1194–1231). It was from this ruler that the poet Sa'di derived his takhallus (nom de plume), his father having been in the atabeg's service. After an eight-year struggle with his cousin Toghril, Sa'd had to restore internal prosperity to his devastated province; he subdued the Shabankara'i Kurds and attacked Kirmān, but finally had to submit to the Khwārazm-Shāh 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad and to cede part of his territory to him (see p. 184 below).1

Just as the rebellion of the Ghuzz in Khurāsān led directly to the decline and disappearance of Saljuq power in that province, so the irruption of these nomads into Kirman brought about the end of the local Saljuq dynasty there. In 582/1186 the last Saljuq of Kirmān, Muḥammad Shāh b. Bahram-Shāh, fled before the Ghuzz leader Malik Dinār; yet for some years before that the Saljuq family in Kirmān had been seriously weakened by internecine conflict, for Toghril-Shāh b. Muḥammad² left four sons, Bahram-Shāh, Arslan-Shāh, Tūrān-Shāh, and Terken-Shāh, all of whom except the last subsequently achieved the throne.³

Bahram-Shāh ruled in Jīrūft from 565/1169–70 to 570/1174–5, proclaimed ruler there by the eunuch atabeg Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Raiḥān, in whose hands lay much of the real power. But the other important town of Bardasīr, was held by Qutb al-Dīn Muḥammad (son of an earlier and now displaced atabeg, Boz-Qush), who eventually espoused the cause of Arslan-Shāh when he made a bid for the throne. On his behalf Tūrān-Shāh also appeared from Fārs with forces supplied by the Salghurid Zangi. Bahram-Shāh got aid from Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Ai-Aba in Nishāpūr, but Arslan-Shāh returned to the attack, this time with forces lent by Sulṭān Arslan b. Toghril and the atabeg Eldigūz. In the end, Arslan-Shāh and Bahram-Shāh agreed to partition Kirmān between them, the former to have two thirds and the latter to have the eastern third of the province.⁴

Both were in fact dead by 572/1176–7, and the third brother Tūrān-

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2 On Toghril-Shāh b. Muḥammad, see p. 134 above.
Shāh came to the throne for a seven years' reign (572/1176–7 to 579/1183–4). His reign, too, was stormy; at the outset the Salghurid Zangi allied with the atabeg Muḥammad b. Boz-Qush to force Tūrān-Shāh off the throne, and shortly afterwards a force of Ghuzz invaded Kirmān penetrating as far as Makrān and Fārs. Expelled from the Sarakiš area of Khūrasān by the Khwārazm-Shāh’s brother Sultan-Shāh, these Ghuzz comprised 5,000 mounted men plus their dependants. Their arrival threw Kirmān into chaos, and their own depredations together with the nibbling of their flocks brought economic dislocation and then famine. The trading suburb or rabad of Bardasīr, once an international resort for merchants and caravans, was destroyed, and never in this period did it revive. Kirmān now became the base for Ghuzz raids as far as Isfahān, Fārs, and Sistān. Tūrān-Shāh’s nephew and successor Muḥammad-Shāh (579–82/1183–6) found the old centre of Bardasīr too stricken by ruin and famine to serve as his capital, so he transferred to Bam. Nevertheless he was unable to withstand the pressure of the Ghuzz, and in the end he abandoned Kirmān, seeking help first in Fārs and Iraq and then from Tekish in Khūrasān. Despairing of recovering Kirmān, Muḥammad-Shāh finished his days in the service of the Ghūrids.

Kirmān was now fully in the hands of the Ghuzz leader Malik Dinār, who had come there in 582/1186 from Nīshāpūr after the death of Toghan-Shāh b. Ai-Aba (p. 190 below). As ruler of Kirmān, Malik Dinār showed statesmanship and foresight; he took measures for the restoration of agricultural and economic prosperity, conciliated the ulemas, and tried to legitimize his rule by marrying a Saljuq princess, the daughter of Togrīl-Shāh. He led expeditions against the local rulers of Hormuz and the island of Qais and made them his tributaries. When Malik Dinār died in 591/1195, his incompetent son Farrukh-Shāh was unable to control the Ghuzz, and as a ruling force the horde now disintegrated. Farrukh-Shāh had been ready to recognize the suzerainty of the Khwārazm-Shāhs, by then the greatest single power in Iran, and after his death in 592/1196 Tekish’s authority was established in Kirmān through the agency of the atabeg Nuṣrat al-Dīn b. Muḥammad Öner. Faced by a powerful Khwārazmian army, the Ghuzz of Kirmān gave up the attempt to retain their power there and

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abandoned the province, entering the ranks of the Khwârazmian army after a twenty-year domination of Kirmân.¹

Thus in the second half of the 6th/12th century, the Saljuqs of Iraq and western Iran ruled no more than the province of Jîbâl; Hamân and Iṣfâhân were the centres of their power, though they did have occasional control over Ray. When the fugitive Sulaimân-Shâh came in 550/1155 to Baghdad, Caliph al-Muqtâfî recognized him as sultan but required in return that Sulaimân-Shâh should never make any hostile move against Iraq; and after the failure of Sulṭân Muḥammad’s siege of Baghdad in 551-2/1157, the sultans never again seriously tried to assert their former authority there.²

On the death in 547/1152 of Sulṭân Maṣʿûd, the Amir Khâṣṣ Beg Arslan, in accordance with the dead monarch’s wishes, proclaimed Malik-Shâh b. Maḥmûd as his successor. Al-Muqtâfî seized the opportunity for a great onslaught on Saljuq authority in Iraq. Maṣʿûd’s old ʿshaṭa in Baghdad, Maṣʿûd Bilâlî, was driven out, the sultan’s properties expropriated, and even poets attached to the Saljuq court circle, including the famous Ħâis-Bâis, were arrested, whilst caliphal forces took over the outlying towns of Hîlla, Kûfâ, and Wâṣît.³

Malik-Shâh was allowed to reign only for a few months, and in 548/1153 he was replaced by his brother Muḥammad, who was brought from Khûzistân. During his six years as sultan, Muḥammad tried energetically to restore the slipping authority of his dynasty in Iraq. The caliph was at this time clearing Iraq of the remaining Turkish elements, who had rallied round Maṣʿûd Bilâlî in Takrit. These amîrs brought out from captivity in Takrit the young Saljuq prince Arslan, and set him up as sultan; according to ʿImâd al-Dîn, the commanders had said to Maṣʿûd Bilâlî, “Fetch Malik Arslan b. Toghrîl, the Sultan’s nephew, so that the troops and the Türkmen contingents may take heart from his presence”. At first forced back on Baghdad, the caliph assembled an army of Arabs and Kurds, and with his vizier, ‘Aun al-Dîn Ibn Hubâira, he led them in 549/1154 to victory at Bazîmzâ near Baghdad against Maṣʿûd Bilâlî, Al-Qûsh, and their protégé Arslan.

The latter fled into Kurdistan and eventually found shelter with his stepfather Eldigüz.¹

The Saljuq prince Sulaimān-Shāh b. Muḥammad Tapar had been his uncle Sanjar’s heir in Khurāsān, but the ascendancy of the Ghuzz drove him westwards, and in 550/1155 he appeared at Baghdad with a small force. Al-Muqtaṣī saw in him a useful weapon against Sulṭān Muḥammad, and he recognized Sulaimān-Shāh as a rival sultan, placing his name in the khutba. He also provided him with an army, but his bid for power in Jībāl was easily defeated by Muḥammad. The latter was naturally incensed at the caliph’s aid to his rival, and he summoned all his forces for a siege of Baghdad in 551-2/1157. As well as the Saljuq army from Hamadān, Zangid forces under Zain al-Dīn ‘Alī Kīchūk came from Mosul, and contingents came from the Mazyadids in Hilla and from southern Iraq. Heavy fighting, both on land and on the rivers, followed. Ibn Ḥubaira had laid in good stocks of food for the army, but the interruptions to commerce made the spirits of Baghdad’s merchant classes flag. The vizier distributed money and presents amongst the besiegers, together with skilful propaganda about the impiety of attacking the caliph; he also wrote to Eldigüz inciting him to make a countermove in Jībāl and to set up there a Saljuq prince as rival to Muḥammad. This diplomacy had its effect. The army of Mosul grew lukewarm, and when Muḥammad received the news that Eldigüz had come with the princes Arslan and Malik-Shāh and had occupied the capital Hamadān, he lifted the siege. He drove Eldigüz back into Āzarbājān and cleared his partisans from Ray and Ḳatifān, but by now he was a sick man. He was unable to consummate his marriage with the daughter of Muḥammad b. Arslan-Shāh of Kirmān, and remained in Hamadān till his death in 554/1159 at the age of thirty-two.²

There was dissension among the amīrs regarding a successor. Muḥammad’s own infant son was committed to the Aḥmadīlī Aq-Sonqūr II at Marāḡeh. Some amīrs favoured Malik-Shāh b. Maḥmūd, to whom Muḥammad had latterly allocated the province of Fārs; and though he managed to conquer part of this from Shumla, he died at

Iṣfahān in 555/1160, reputedly poisoned by the Vizier Ibn Hubaira, for Malik-Shāh had been threatening to march against the caliph in Baghdad. Others supported Arslan b. Toghril, but a majority, including Inanch Sonqur, the powerful governor of Ray, favoured Sulaimān-Shāh on grounds of seniority and acceptability to al-Muqtāfī. Saulaimān-Shāh was accordingly released from captivity at Mosul, and with difficulty established himself at Hamadan. He reigned for a few months only in the year 555/1160, during which time he leant heavily on the support of such amirs as Inanch Sonqur and Sharaf al-Din Gird-Bāzū, while from fear of Eldigüz he was compelled to invest Arslan with the governorship of Arrān and make him his heir. Sulaimān-Shāh dreamed of re-establishing Saljuq influence in Baghdad by the appointment there of a shāhna, but the negotiations with al-Mustanjid were inconclusive. Sulaimān-Shāh’s drunkenness and general ineffectiveness soon lost him the amirs’ support. They invited Eldigüz to set up Arslan as sultan; Gird-Bāzū arrested Sulaimān-Shāh, who was first imprisoned and then in 556/1161 strangled with a bowstring.

In this fashion Arslan was installed at Hamadan in 556/1161 as nominal sultan. He remained under the tutelage of Eldigüz, who took the title of Atabeg al-Aḍām (“Supreme Atabeg”) and his vizier was Shihāb al-Dīn Muḥammad Nishāpūrī, formerly minister to Inanch-Sonqur of Ray. Arslan now married Muḥammad’s widow, the Khatun-i Kirmānī. This succession was nevertheless disputed. Inanch of Ray was temporarily mollified by the marriage of his daughter to Pahlavān b. Eldigüz, but the caliph refused to recognize Arslan as sultan, fearing the constitution of a powerful Saljuq–Eldigüzid state in western Iran. His vizier stirred up Aq-Sonqor II Aḥmadīlī, who had with him the son of Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd, and Aq-Sonqur in alliance with the Shāh-Arman of Akhlat routed the army of Pahlavān on the banks of the Safīd Rūd. Ibn Hubaira further encouraged the Salghurid Zangi in Shīrāz to press the succession claims of Maḥmūd b. Malik-Shāh b. Maḥmūd.

A coalition of discontented amirs, including Inanch-Sonqur, Izz al-Dīn Satmaz, and Alp-Argbūn of Qazvin, marched on Hamadan,
but in a battle at Marg-i Qara-Tegin they were defeated by Sultan Arslan, Eldigüz, and Gird-Bażû. İnânc fled first to the Bavandid Caspian territories and then to the Khwârazm-Shâh Il-Arslan. Despite the support of a Khwârazmian army, his invasion of the Qazvin-Zanjân area proved a failure, and the excesses of his troops alienated the local people (562/1166–7). İnânc then took refuge in Gurgân, returning later with Bavandid support, and this time recapturing Ray. But Eldigüz came in 564/1169 with an army to besiege İnânc in the citadel of Tabarak, after which he suborned some of İnânc'ı’s ghulâms to kill him. Ray was then granted to Pahlavân, with the Vizier Sa’d al-Dîn al-Âshâll left there to administer it.¹

Eldigüz’s diplomatic and military activity reached well beyond the borders of his territories of Azarbâijân and Jîbâl. Mu‘ayyîd al-Dîn Ai-Aba of Khurâsân had long been one of Eldigüz’s friends, and in 558/1163 he placed Sultan Arslan in the khtîba of the towns in his possession. Therefore in 562/1167, when Khwârazmian pressure seemed to be uncomfortably close, it was natural that Ai-Aba should write to Eldigüz, warning him of Il-Arslan’s ambitions not merely in Khurâsân but in the whole of Iran; Eldigüz wrote to the shâh warning him that Khurâsân was part of Sultan Arslan’s territories, and he came himself to Bistâm to check a Khwârazmian move against Khurâsân.² In 563/1168 Pahlavân led an army against the Ahmadiis and forced them to make peace; Eldigüz sent to Mosul and had Qutb al-Dîn Maudûd read the khtîba for Arslan, and in 564/1169 he sent an army to Kirmân to aid the claimant Arslan-Shâh.³

The defence of the north-west was one of Eldigüz’s particular concerns, for the period of the Eldigüzids in Azarbâijân coincided with a phase of renewed activity by the Bagratid kings of Christian Georgia. Under Dmitri (1125–54 or 1156), the Georgian monarchy was largely occupied with internal struggles against the Orbeliani family of nobles, but in 549/1154, apparently at the invitation of the local Shâddâdîd ruler Fâkhr al-Dîn Shâddâd, the Georgians descended on Ani and defeated and captured ‘Izz al-Dîn Saltuq of Erzerum.⁴ The reign of

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Dmitri’s son Giorgi III (1156–84) was one of internal prosperity and warfare against the Muslims. In 556/1161 Ani passed from Faḍl IV b. Maḥmūd to the Christians, and in the next year a Georgian army took Dvin. These successes provoked a grand Muslim coalition of Sultan Arslan, Eldigüz, Aq-Sonqur Aḥmadili, and the Shāh-Arman Sukmān b. Ibrāhīm, which in 557/1162 invaded Georgia and defeated King Giorgi. Eldigüz’s efforts gradually slowed down Georgian expansion, though we still find the Christians raiding as far as Ganja in 561/1166 and even intervening at Darband to assist the Shīrvān-Shāh Akhsitan, who was related by marriage to the Bagratids.

Under Queen Tamara (1184–1212) the dynamism of the Georgians reached its peak. Guided by her Amir-Spasalari (Commander-in-Chief) Zakaria Mkhargrdzeli and his brother the “atabeg” Ioanne, she deliberately diverted attention from internal questions by directing Georgian energies outwards. The later Eldigızids were not of the calibre of Eldigüz and Pahlavān. In the succession struggles amongst the latter’s sons, Amir Amirān ‘Umar fled at one point to Queen Tamara, and from her and her vassal the Shīrvān-Shāh he received help against his brother Abu Bakr. Later realizing that he could not stand up to Georgian arms, Abu Bakr contracted a marriage with a Georgian princess in order to safeguard his position. In the succeeding years the Georgians took Dvin, Kars and Ardābil; they operated in the west without hindrance as far as Malāzgird, Akhlat, Arjish, and Erzerum, eventually coming up against the Saljuqs of Rūm; and after 600/1204 Tamara gave aid to the fugitive Comneni in Trebizond. Most of these conquests were not held for very long, and though Giorgi IV (1212–23) continued to draw tribute from Erzerum, Ganja, Nakhchivan, and Akhlat, the Mongols appeared in the Caucasus in 617/1220 and a period of disaster began for the Georgians.

When Eldigüz died at Nakhchivan in 570/1174–5 or 571/1175, his son Pahlavān Muḥammad succeeded to his position as atabeg. Sultan Arslan had long resented his subordination to Eldigüz, and it seems that at this juncture he endeavoured to break away from Eldigızid

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2 Husainī, pp. 185 ff.
3 Ibid. pp. 185–6; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. xi, pp. 120, 160.
control. Some discontented amirs having provided him with money and troops, he moved to Zanjân intending to conquer Āzarbāijān; but in 571/1176, at the age of forty-three, he fell ill and died. ‘Imād al-Dīn asserts—and it is not improbable—that Pahlavān had conveniently poisoned the sultan. Pahlavān now set up Arslan’s young son Togrūl as sultan, and successfully fought off an attempt to seize the throne, made by Arslan’s elder brother Muḥammad, who had been living in Khūzistān.¹

Pahlavān died in 582/1186, and in accordance with the Turkish practice of seniorate his position as atabeg fell to his childless brother Qızıl-Arslan ‘Uṯmān. But Pahlavān also divided his personal territories among his four sons, who were to be under Qızıl-Arslan’s general supervision, and this partition was to prove a source of dissension and weakness. Pahlavān’s wife Ênânc Khatun, daughter of Ênânc-Sonqur of Ray, supported the claims of her two sons against the other two children, sons of Pahlavān by slave mothers; one of these latter, Abū Bakr, was particularly favoured by Qızıl-Arslan and seemed likely to succeed, as in fact he did, to the whole of the Eldigüzid inheritance.²

The new Sultān Togrūl, last of the Saljuqs in Iran, is praised in the sources for his manifold qualities, scholarly as well as soldierly. He soon became restive under Qızıl-Arslan’s tutelage, for whereas he had been on good terms with Pahlavān, the new atabeg treated him harshly.³ Togrūl allied with the forces supporting Ênânc Khatun’s son Qutlugu Ênânc Muḥammad in opposition to Qızıl-Arslan and Abū Bakr. In 583/1187 he was in Māzandarān seeking help from the Bāvandid Husām al-Daula Ardašīr. Also in this year he sent an envoy to Baghdad asking that the old palace of the Saljuq sultans be repaired in order that he might occupy it. Al-Nāṣir’s answer was to raze the palace to the ground and to send an army of 15,000 troops, under his vizier Jalāl al-Dīn ‘Ubaidallāh b. Yūnus, to support Qızıl-Arslan, who agreed to become the caliph’s direct vassal. Togrūl defeated the caliphal forces at Dāī-Marg near Hamadān in 584/1188, but he lost support by his arbitrary behaviour and his execution of opponents in Hamadān. Qızıl-Arslan now set up Sanjar b. Sulaimān-Šāh as a rival sultan and drove Togrūl into the Lake Urmiyeh.

³ Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, Dhaḥ-i Salluq-Nāma, p. 86.
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region; and though he tried despairingly to obtain help from the Ayyūbid Saladin and to conciliate the caliph, even sending one of his infant sons to Baghdad as a hostage, Toghril was obliged in 586/1190 to surrender to Qizil-Arslan, who imprisoned him and his son Malik-Shāh in a castle near Tabriz.1

Qizil-Arslan now claimed the sultanate for himself, assuming the appropriate style and privileges; but in the next year he was mysteriously murdered, possibly by one of his own amirs, possibly by Īnanch Khatun, whom Qizil-Arslan had married on his brother’s death. Toghril’s subsequent execution of Īnanch Khatun may point to the second alternative.2 After two years’ incarceration, Toghril was released by one of the amirs of Āzarbāijān. Near Qazvin he speedily defeated Īnanch Khatun’s two sons, Qutlugh-Īnanch and the Amir-Amirān ‘Umar, and drove them into Āzarbāijān (588/1192). There they were again defeated, this time by their half-brother Abū Bakr who was then at Nakhchivan, but they later returned with help from Georgia and Arrān and defeated Abū Bakr. Toghril was now master of Jībāl, Hamadān, and Iṣfahān, and he had also secured the treasuries left by Pahlavān. But an enemy more dangerous than the Eldigūzīds had meanwhile appeared.3

Qutlugh-Īnanch had summoned help from the Khwārazm-Shāh Tekish, who in 588/1192 came to Māzandarān and then Ray, and demanded that the khūṭba of western Iran recognize his name immediately after that of the caliph. After this was granted, however, he was obliged to return to Khurāsān on receiving news of a projected attack on Khwārazm by his brother Sultan-Shāh. Tekish therefore made peace with Toghril, but the sultan felt that a Khwārazmīan army in Ray, with its commanding position of the roads into Jībāl and Āzarbāijān, was a threat which could not be endured; and no doubt he felt too that his prestige was involved. Tekish had distractions in Khurāsān, and does not seem at this point to have been implacably hostile towards Toghril, despite urgings from Caliph al-Nāṣir.

In 589/1193 Toghril marched eastwards and cleared the Khwārazm-

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ian garrison out of Ray; and in the following year he defeated Qutlugh-Inanch there, despite the 7,000 Khwarazmian reinforcements which the Eldigüizid had obtained from Dammghan. Tekiş returned to Ray in 590/1194. Against the advice of his amirs, Tughrü refuted to withdraw and negotiate a peace, or even to wait for additional troops to come up from Isfahān and Zanjān. In a battle outside Ray the Saljuq army was defeated and Tughrü killed at the age of twenty-five, his head being sent by Tekiş to Baghdad. In this fashion, the sources note, the Saljuq dynasty ended as it began, with a Tughrü; though in fact two of the dead sultan's sons remained in the custody of the Khwarazm-Shāhs till their execution at the time of the Mongol invasion of Khwarazm in 616/1219-20, and a daughter of Tughrü survived to marry first the Eldigüizid Öz-Beg b. Pahlavān and then the Khwarazm-Shāh Jalāl al-Dīn himself.

Tekiş occupied Hamadān and the whole of Jibal, making Qutlugh-Inanch governor over it, but much of the land was divided into iqṭā’s for his amirs, and he left his sons Yūnus Khān and Muḥammad Khān in control. It was readily predictable that the caliph would find the proximity of Tekiş uncomfortable, and deep mutual suspicion arose. Al-Nāṣir’s vizier, Mu’ayyid al-Dīn Ibn al-Qaṣṣāb, had taken over Khūzistān on the death of Shumla’s son, and in 591/1195 was joined there by Qutlugh-Inanch, who had quarrelled with the Khwarazmian Commander-in-Chief Shams al-Dīn Mayanchuq. The two of them invaded Jibal and drove the Khwarazm-Shāh’s son from Hamadān and then Ray into Qūmis and Gurgān. Returning to Hamadān in 592/1196, Tekiş disinterred and mutilated the body of Ibn al-Qaṣṣāb; but disorder in his territories on the lower Syr Darya compelled his withdrawal once more (see p. 191 below).

The caliph judged it wise to bow in some degree to the military superiority of the shah, and in 595/1199 he sent to Tekiş an investiture patent for the sultanate of Iraq, Khūrāsān, and Turkestan. Reports about Mayanchuq’s misconduct brought Tekiş westwards once again

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in this same year, and after the rebellious governor had been pursued into Dailam and defeated, the shāh turned to attack the Ismā'īlīs there, capturing the fortress of Arslan-Gushāi near Qazvin. In all these campaigns the Khwārazmian army included a large proportion of Türkmen troops from the Qipchaq steppes, many of whom were still pagan; the army became hated in western Iran for its violence and rapine, which Rāvandi says were worse than the excesses of the Christian Georgians and Franks and even of the pagan Qara-Khitai. When in 596/1200 Tekish died, the people of Jībāl rose and massacred all the Khwārazmians they could find.

Al-Nāṣir now agreed to partition western Iran between himself and Nūr al-Dīn Gökche, a former Eldīqūzīd ghulām who had taken over Ray, Sāveh, Qum, and Kāshān; the caliph was to have Iṣfahān, Hamadān, Qazvin, and Zanjān. Thus the nominal authority of the Eldīqūzīds survived in northern Jībāl and Dailam, and when in 600/1203-4 Gökche was killed in battle with another of Pahlavān’s old ghulāms, Shams al-Dīn Ai-Toghmish, the latter set up Öz-Beg b. Pahlavān as titular ruler of Gökche’s territories. In Āzarbāijān, Abū Bakr b. Pahlavān held on and secured a reputation with posterity for his patronage of scholars and his foundation of mosques and madrasas. With Ai-Toghmīsh’s aid in 602/1205-6 he fought off an attack by the Ahmādīlī ruler of Marāqheh, ‘Ālā’ al-Dīn Qara-Sonqur, and three years later he took over almost all the Ahmādīlī possessions (see above, pp. 170-1). The Eldīqūzīd ghulāms remained a potent force in Jībāl and in 608/1211-12 a further upheaval took place in which Ai-Toghmīsh was replaced by Mengli. Mengli’s power soon excited the fears of neighbouring powers, however, and in 612/1215-16 the caliph organized a grand coalition against him, including Öz-Beg, the amirs of al-Jazīreh and Kurdistān, and the Ismā’īlī Grand Master Hasan III, newly returned to the fold of orthodoxy (see p. 168 above). Mengli was defeated in battle and eventually executed by Öz-Beg, who now appointed the ghulām Saif al-Dīn Ighlamīsh as governor of Jībāl.

Tekish was followed as Khwārazm-Shāh by his son ‘Ālā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad. At the end of his life Tekish had demanded of al-Nāṣir

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2 Rāvandi, pp. 393 ff.; Barthold, Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion, pp. 347-8.
that his son's name be put in the khutba at Baghdad, but for many years his successor was too occupied with his opponents the Ghurids, the Qara-Khitai, and the Qipchaq to contemplate expansion in the west. However, in 614/1217, on the very eve of the Mongol invasion, 'Alā' al-Din Muḥammad demanded recognition by the caliph and came westwards. Ighlamīšh in Jībāl recognized him, but was shortly afterwards murdered by an Isma'īli assassin. The Salghurid atabeg Sa'd b. Zangī, seeing a chance to add Jībāl to his existing province of Fārs, marched on Ray only to meet defeat and capture at the hands of the Khwārazmian army. He was forced to pay a tribute of a third of his annual revenues for the rest of his life, and to allot certain of his territories as fiefs for Khwārazmian commanders. In return, Sa'd was given a Khwārazmian bride together with help to recover his province, for in his absence his son Abū Bakr Qutlugh Khan had taken over Fārs; later one of Sa'd's daughters was to marry Sūlṭān Jalāl al-Dīn.¹

'Alā' al-Din Muḥammad knew from captured diplomatic correspondence that the caliph had in the past incited the Ghurids against him and was now using Isma'īli assassins to remove his opponents.² Because of his anti-caliphal attitude he was unable to count on Sunni opinion, and so the shāh adopted a pro-Shī'i policy. He secured a fatwā from the religious authorities of his empire saying that al-Nāṣir was unfit to rule and that the 'Abbāsids had usurped the caliphate from the house of 'Alī, and he proclaimed the Sayyid 'Alā' al-Mulk Tirmidhī as Anti-Caliph. He began a march on Baghdad, but in the winter of 614/1217-18 snowstorms of unparalleled ferocity, together with harrying by hostile Türkmen and Hakkāri Kurds, halted him on the borders of Iraq and Iran. Hearing of the Mongols' appearance in the east, the shāh returned to Khurasan, leaving his son Rukn al-Dīn Ghūr-Sanji with the care of eastern Iran.³

KHURÄSÄN AND THE KHWÄRAZM-SHÄHS

XIII. KHURÄSÄN IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 6TH/12TH CENTURY, AND THE EXPANSION OF THE KHWÄRAZM-SHÄHS

After Sanjar's death in 552/1157, Khuräsan remained politically fragmented. For despite the authority which should have come to him when Sanjar nominated him as heir, the Qarakhänid Maḥmūd Khān was never able to enjoy more than a limited authority. Amongst the former ghulāms of Sanjar's army the most powerful single figure was Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Ai-Aba of Nishāpūr. Maḥmūd Khān, unable single-handed to make much headway against him, allied with Ai-Aba, confirmed him in the governorship of Nishāpūr and Tūs, and fell more and more under his influence.\(^1\)

The end of the eastern branch of the Saljuqs left a power vacuum in Khuräsan, and this inevitably invited the intervention of external powers such as the ambitious Bāvandid Shāh Ghāzi Rustam (534–58/1140–63) and the Khwärazm-Shāh Taj al-Dunya wa'l-Din Il-Arslan (551–68/1156–72). The internal politics of Khuräsan were for twenty years dominated by the disputes of the Turkish amirs and the Ghuzz tribesmen, with the Khwärazm-Shāhs stepping in only so far as their dependence on the Qara-Khitai allowed. But after the capture of Herät by the Ghūrids in 571/1175–6, a new major power appeared in the province, and down to the last decade of the century there was a three-cornered struggle for hegemony in Khuräsan involving the Ghūrids, the Khwärazm-Shāh Tekish, and his estranged brother Sultan-Shāh. Squeezed among these combatants, the Ghuzz tribesmen were either compelled to migrate to adjacent regions such as Kirmān, or else they were absorbed into the Khwärazm-Shāns and Ghūrid armies.

In the rivalry after Sanjar's death between Ai-Aba and Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Ai-Taq, the latter received help from Shāh Ghāzi Rustam (p. 156 above). Ai-Taq collected an army in Māzandarān, but was defeated by Ai-Aba and Maḥmūd Khān. A peace between the two sides in 553/1158 freed Ai-Aba to deal with Sonqur 'Azīzī, another of Sanjar's former ghulāms, who had rebelled in Herät during Ai-Aba's preoccupation with Ai-Taq. Ai-Aba and Maḥmūd Khān then attempted to subdue the independent Türkmen bands who were established in several parts of Khuräsan, but found this an uphill task; they were defeated by the Ghuzz, who followed up this victory by occupying Marv and then raiding Ai-Aba's towns of Sarakhs and Tūs. The Ghuzz now

offered their allegiance to Mahmūd, and the khan, although personally distrustful of the Türkmen, saw a chance to reduce his dependence on Ai-Aba. From his refuge in Gurgān he sent his son Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad to the Ghuzz, who had meanwhile taken Nishāpūr and temporarily expelled Ai-Aba (554/1159).1

However, Ai-Aba returned in the same year and firmly resumed power in Nishāpūr, taking stern measures to repress the fitna, or internal strife, which had been raging there.2 It seems that the collapse of Saljuq authority in Khurāsān had given free rein to local faction and violence. Agriculture was interrupted by the trampling of opposing armies as well as by the nomads’ flocks, and famine resulted. Religious and social sectarianism, the curse of the Khurasānian cities, flared up on several occasions: in Astarābād Shāh Ghāzī Rustam had to mediate between Shi‘īs and Shāfī‘īs, and in Nishāpūr in 556/1161 Ai-Aba jailed the naqīb (head) of the ‘Alīds, holding him responsible for clashes which had ruined much of the city and had caused the destruction of such a famous library as that of the ‘Uqaili mosque.3 Mahmūd Khān soon tired of his entente with the Ghuzz, and in 556/1161 decided to make his peace with Ai-Aba; but the latter seized, blinded, and imprisoned the khan and his son Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad, and made the khutba in Nishāpūr for himself alone.4

Ai-Aba was now systematically extending his power. He disputed the possession of Pūshang and Herāt with the Ghūrids; he conquered Qūmis and installed as governor of Bistām one of his ghulāms, although this last was in 559/1164 driven out by the Bāvandids. In the previous year the sultan in the west, Arslān b. Toghrīl, had given him presents and an investiture patent, and he accordingly placed Arslān in the khutba of those parts of Khurāsān held by him (i.e. Nishāpūr, Tūs, Qūmis, and the region between Naṣā and Tābās).5 The Amīr Ai-Taq had been defeated by a group of Ghuzz under the Yazīr chief Yaghmūr Khān, but had obtained help first from the Bāvandids and then from the Khwārazm-Shāh; he finally planted himself in Gurgān and Dihistān, and there made the khutba for Il-Arslān. Other towns of Khurāsān, such as Balkh, Marv, Sarakhs, Herāt, and Tāliqān, along with the region

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1 Ibid. pp. 146-7, 149-50, 152-5.  
of Gharchistān, were in the hands of Ghuzz amirs or former ghulām commanders of Sanjar’s army, who made the khūṭba first for the dead Sanjar and then for themselves. The amir of Herāt, Ai-Tegin, died in 539/1164, and rather than face an occupation by the Ghuzz, the local people handed the city over to Ai-Aba. The latter also sent expeditions against the Ghuzz in Marv and Sarakhs, but his attempt to occupy Nasā was forestalled by the appearance of a Khwārazmian army. Il-Arslān’s troops threatened Nišāpūr for a while, but then turned westwards and drove the shāh’s erstwhile protégé Ai-Taq from Dihis-tān (560/1165). Ibn Funduq mentions the presence of Khwārazmian troops at Baihaq and Nišāpūr in 561–2/1166–7, but the time for the shāh’s full-scale intervention in Khurāsān was not yet come, for they still had many problems to face north of the Oxus.

Both the Khwārazm-Shāhs and the Qarakhānids remained vassals of the Qara-Khitai, though the latter were little disposed to interfere in the internal administration of Khwārazm or of Bukhārā and Samarkand, provided that order was kept and the required taxation forwarded to the Gūr-Khān’s ordu (military camp) in Semirechye. Unfortunately for the Qarakhānids, many elements within their territories made for disorder, and the ensuing troubles brought about interference in Transoxiana from both the Khwārazm-Shāhs and the Qara-Khitai. The endeavours of the khans to consolidate their authority had often in the past caused clashes with the military classes, whose interests lay in a weak central power. Disputes with the Qarluq tribal divisions culminated in the murder of Tāmghāch-Khān Ibrāhīm III of Samarkand in 551/1156. His successor Chaghri Khān, or Kōk-Saghīr ‘Alī Khān, sought revenge by slaying the leader of the Qarluq and driving out others of their chiefs to Khwārazm. According to the account in Ibn al-Athīr, Chaghri Khān tried to carry out the orders of his suzerain the Gūr-Khān by disarming the Qarluq and planting them in Khashgharia as agriculturists—and this, not surprisingly, provoked a Qarluq revolt.

Whatever the exact sequence of events, the result was an invasion of Transoxiana by Il-Arslān on behalf of the Qarluq (553/1158). Chaghri Khān appealed to the Qipchaq of the lower Syr Darya and to the Qara-Khitai, but the Qara-Khitai army was reluctant to face a battle with the

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Khwārazmian troops, and a peace was arranged whereby Chaghri Khān had to take back the Qarluq chiefs with full honours.1 There was a further revolt of the Qarluq in the reign of Chaghri Khān’s brother and successor Qilich Tamghach-Khān Mas’ūd II (556-74/1160-78), but this was suppressed, and the khan was then free to send an expedition across the Oxus and carry on warfare against the Ghuzz of Khurāsān.2

The Khwārazm-Shāh Il-Arslan died in 567/1172, after fighting off an invasion of the Qara-Khitai provoked by tardy payment of tribute to the Gūr-Khān.3 He was eventually succeeded by his eldest son ‘Alā’

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Map 4. The Iranian world, c. 575/1180.
al-Din Tekish, in whose long and important reign (567–96/1172–1200) Ghurid ambitions in Khurasan were combatted and Khwārazmian arms carried into western Iran against the last Saljuq sultan. At the moment of Il-Arslan’s death Tekish was governor of Jand, a strategic outpost against the Qipchaq, but distant from the centre of power in Khwārazm. Hence the Queen-Mother Terken Khatun placed Tekish’s younger brother Sultan-Shāh on the throne. Tekish appealed to the Qara-Khitai, and an army under the first Gur-Khān’s son-in-law Fuma (Chinese fu-ma = son-in-law of the emperor) placed him on the throne before the end of 567/1172 without bloodshed. Sultan-Shāh in his turn sought help from Al-Aba of Nishāpūr; Al-Aba led an expedition into Khwārazm, but it ended in disaster for him, as he was captured by Tekish and killed. Sultan-Shāh fled successively to Dihistan, to Nishāpūr, and finally to Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s court at Firūzkuh in Ghūr.¹

Tekish owed his throne to the Qara-Khitai, yet he looked for an early opportunity to throw off their authority. The sources stress that whereas the first Qara-Khitai in Transoxiana had behaved with exemplary impartiality and equity, their tax collectors became increasingly arrogant and oppressive. Moreover the central power of the Qara-Khitai dynasty, never very cohesive, was weakened by the long periods of regency exercised by women, and this may well have caused a relaxation of control over subordinate officials.² It was of course convenient for the shahs to raise the banner of jihad against the infidels, and towards the end of Tekish’s reign and in that of his son ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad, this crusading attitude had some value as a counterbalance to the shāhs’ unpopularity in orthodox circles, which was due to their anti-caliphal policy (see above, p. 184).

Tekish’s pretext for revolt came from the alleged extortions of the Qara-Khitai tribute collector. Sultan-Shāh, who was to be a thorn in his brother’s flesh for a number of years, judged it a suitable moment to get Qara-Khitai help in regaining the throne which he had briefly occupied in Khwārazm. The Qara-Khitai army under Fuma was halted in Khwārazm by the traditional manoeuvre of opening the dykes, but Sultan-Shāh, aided by a detachment of Qara-Khitai troops, was more successful in Khurasan. He drove the Ghuzz Malik Dinār out of Sarakhs and defeated Ai-Aba’s son and successor Toghan-Shāh, so

that Nishāpūr and Tūs both fell into his hands (576/1181). It seems also that Sulṭān-Shāh harried the fringes of Ghūrid territory in Bādghis, and during the following years he held several towns in Khurāsān, acting as a third force between Tekish and Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad. He occasionally lent his support to the Ghūrids, but in general he pursued an independent policy.

Tekish’s immediate interests lay in preserving a balance of power in central Khurāsān between Sulṭān-Shāh and Toghan-Shāh, and in turning his brother against the Ghūrids in Marv and other cities. The unwarlike Toghan-Shāh found his position in Nishāpūr increasingly untenable; he failed to get adequate help from Tekish or from the Ghūrids, despite his marriage with one of Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s daughters, and many of his amirs drifted to the side of Sulṭān-Shāh. In 1181 or the next year he died, leaving a son, Sanjar-Shāh, as his successor, but real power was now held by Sanjar-Shāh’s atabeg, Mengli Beg or Mengli-Tegin. On hearing about the disorders in Khurāsān, Tekish came southwards in 582/1186, avoided Sulṭān-Shāh, now ruling in Marv, and besieged Sanjar-Shāh and Mengli Beg in Shādyāk, the suburb of Nishāpūr to which the city had been moved after the Ghuzz devastations. After a second siege in 583/1187, Tekish captured Shādyāk and executed Mengli Beg. Sanjar-Shāh was carried off to Khwārazm and later blinded for continuing to intrigue with the people of Nishāpūr. This city was now placed under Tekish’s son Malik-Shāh, the former governor of Jand; and though Sulṭān-Shāh still coveted Nishāpūr, he was forced to make peace with his brother in 585/1189 when Tekish came once more to Khurāsān. Sulṭān-Shāh was, moreover, hard-pressed by the Ghūrids; in that same year Ghiyāth al-Dīn came from Flruzkuh and by 586/1190 had defeated him and stripped him of many of his possessions. But from his centre of Sarākhs, Sulṭān-Shāh once again came to blows with his brother, for while Tekish was absent in western Iran during 588/1192 he prepared to attack Khwārazm (see p. 181 above). Tekish had to hurry back, but

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1 Malik Dīnār later passed into Kirmān and extinguished the local Saljuq line there: see above, section xii, pp. 174–5.
4 Cf. Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. xi, pp. 180–1; and for the general history of Shādyāk, see the copious materials collected by Sa’id Nafisi in the notes to his edition of Baihaqi’s Ta’rīkh-i Mas’dūl, vol. ii, pp. 897–914.
the death of Sultan-Shah in the following year relieved him of danger from this quarter.¹

Tekish was also concerned with the northern frontiers of his empire. Along the frontiers of Khwārazm and the lower Syr Darya, where Jand was held by the shāhs, there lived a number of Türkmen, and even though many of them were still pagan, the Khwārazm-Shāhs had to achieve some sort of modus vivendi with them. As part of this policy marriage links were cultivated, and the famous Terken Khätun, wife of Tekish and mother of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Muhammad, is variously described in the sources as being from the Qanqlī or the Baya’ut tribe of the Yemek, being the daughter of the Qipchaq Khān.² Tekish admitted large numbers of the Qipchaq and their associated peoples into his armies, and it was in large measure these barbarians who gave the Khwārazmian troops in Iran a reputation for excessive violence and cruelty. According to Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn’s biographer Muhammad Nasawi, the majority of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Muhammad’s top commanders were from Terken Khätun’s tribe (which he names as the Yemek), and the need to attach them to his side was one reason why the shah leant so heavily on his mother for advice.³

But diplomacy did not always work, and punitive expeditions into the steppes were also necessary. In the winter of 591/1194–5 Tekish led an expedition to Sīghnaq and Jand against the Qipchaq chief Qayīr Buq Khān; and though he was defeated after some of the Qipchaq troops in the Khwārazmian army defected to the enemy, Tekish was nevertheless able to utilize a dispute between the khan and his nephew Alp-Direk, first to capture the khan and then to release him against the refractory nephew.⁴

With regard to Khwārazmian policy in Transoxiana, there is a mention in some of the shāhs’ official correspondence of an expedition to Bukhārā in 578/1182, when the local sūdar surrendered to Tekish.⁵ Alone of the historians, Ibn al-Athīr records a further expedition in

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In his struggle with the Ghūrids, it is said, Tekish had sought help from the Qara-Khitai, and the latter had crossed into Tukharistan hoping to recover from the Ghūrids of Bāmiyān the town of Balkh, formerly tributary to the Gūr-Khān. The Qara-Khitai were soundly beaten, and they now blamed Tekish for involving them with the Ghūrids (see pp. 164-5 above). After rapidly making peace with the Ghūrid Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn, Tekish turned on the Qara-Khitai. He repelled an invasion of Khwārazm and pursued the enemy to Bukhārā, whose population rallied to the Qara-Khitai and held out against the shāh until the city was at last stormed. From the silence of Juvainī and the other sources, Barthold has doubted the historicity of this last campaign in Transoxiana.¹

Tekish died in 596/1200 and was succeeded by his second son Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad, who now assumed the honorific ʿAlī al-Dīn ("Eminence of Religion"). Muḥammad’s nephew Hindū-Khān b. Malik-Shāh had pretensions to the throne, and his cause was espoused by the Ghūrīds, who seized several towns of Khūrāṡān from the new Khwārazm-Shāh and set up Hindū-Khān at Marv.² Ghūrid rule in Khūrāṡān was unpopular, and Muḥammad soon restored the position there. On his return from India in 601/1204, Muʿizz al-Dīn Ghūrī took the offensive and invaded Khūrāṡān, but he was defeated by the Khwārazm-Shāh and his Qara-Khitai allies (pp. 165 above). After Muʿizzal-Dīn’s death in 602/1206, the threat from the Ghūrīds’ imperial policy receded. Herāt was finally taken in 605/1208–9, and in the same year a rebellion led by Kozli (governor of Nīshāpūr) and his son was suppressed.³ In the Caspian provinces there was a succession struggle after the death of the Bāvandid Ḫūṣām al-Daula Ardāshīr in 602/1205–6, which permitted Muḥammad’s brother ʿAli Shāh to step in and make the new Bāvandid ruler a Khwārazmian vassal.⁴ As for western Iran, it was neutralized by the rivalries of the caliph, the last Eldigūzids, and other Turkish amīrs (see pp. 182–3 above). Yet despite this secure position, Muḥammad was not yet prepared definitely to defy his Qara-Khitai suzerains. In 602/1206 he restored to them the recaptured town of

¹ Ibn al-Āthīr, vol. xii, pp. 88–90; Barhebraeus, p. 347; Barthold, op. cit. pp. 344–6; Kafesoğlu, op. cit. p. 97 n. 84.
KHURĀSĀN AND THE KHWĀRAZM-SHĀHS

Tirmidh, and indeed Juzjāni alleges that before Tekish died he enjoined his son never to quarrel with the Qara-Khitai.¹

In Muḥammad’s subsequent struggle with the Qara-Khitai, the last Qarakhānid ruler of Samarqand, the “Sultan of Sultans” ʿUthmān Khān b. Ibrāhīm (600-8/1203-4 to 1212), played a prominent role; but the details and chronology are unclear, for our main authority, Juvaini, gives two parallel but widely differing accounts of events. Barthold thought that on the whole the second one accorded best with what is known from other sources, and it is this version which is essentially followed below.² Like his father, Muḥammad had to safeguard his northern frontier, and he led a successful campaign against the Qipchaq (probably to be placed in the summer of 605-6/1209). Elated with this victory, and no longer requiring the Qara-Khitai for his struggle with the Ghurids, Muḥammad began preparing the ground in Transoxiana. He came to Bukhārā and negotiated with ʿUthmān Khān and with other local magnates who were discontented with the exactions of the Qara-Khitai financial agents.³ It is dubious, however, whether the Muslim cause in Transoxiana would have made much headway against the still-formidable Qara-Khitai power had it not been for the general revolt of the Gūr-Khān’s Muslim vassals in eastern Turkestan.⁴ On the crest of these disorders the Naiman Mongol chief Küchlüg rose to power in the eastern part of the Qara-Khitai empire after his flight westwards from his rival Chingiz-Khān.⁵ In Samarqand, ʿUthmān Khān had been offended by the Gūr-Khān’s refusal to give him a daughter in marriage and had proclaimed his allegiance to the Khwārazm-Shāh, but this assertion of independence ended in failure for the Qarakhānid, whose capital was occupied by a Qara-Khitai army (probably in 606/1209-10).⁶

However, Küchlüg’s successes in Semirechye compelled the Gūr-Khān to leave Samarqand. The Khwārazm-Shāh Muḥammad, in alliance once more with ʿUthmān Khān, followed the retreating Qara-

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⁴ Juvaini, vol. 1, p. 359.
Khitan and won a victory near Talas, capturing the Qara-Khitai general Tayangu. Although the Gür-Khan defeated Küchlüg, his army mutinied and Küchlüg successfully put himself at the head of the rebels. A Mongol detachment under Qubilai Noyan, one of Chingiz-Khan's generals, had appeared in northern Semirechye, and the Gür-Khan was obliged to surrender to Küchlüg and abdicate all real power; he died shortly afterwards. The substitution of Muslim Khwarazmian rule for that of the pagan Qara-Khitai in Transoxiana proved unwelcome both to the local rulers there and to the population at large. The Qarakhanid ruler of Utrar, Taj al-Din Bilge-Khan, rebelled against the Khwarazm-Shah, and 'Uthmān Khan decided, despite his marriage to Muhammad's daughter, to renew his connexion with the Qara-Khitai. After a general massacre in Samarqand of the hated Khwarazmians, the shah came and took a terrible vengeance: the city was ruthlessly sacked, and 'Uthmān Khan and other members of his dynasty executed (608/1212). In the general slaughter of the Qarakhānids, only Taj al-Din Bilge-Khan of Utrar seems to have survived for some years more.

Extinguishing the remnants of the western Qarakhānids was not difficult for Muhammad, but he was much less successful against Küchlüg, who had taken over the former Qara-Khitai territories. Even after his Talas victory the Khwarazm-Shah was unable to bring relief to the Muslim inhabitants of Balasagun, a town that had then been sacked by the Gür-Khan's army; and he was equally impotent to protect the Muslim population of Kāshghar against Küchlüg's fiercely anti-Muslim policy there. Nor could he even guard the people of northern Transoxiana: according to Muslim sources, he had to evacuate the inhabitants of Farghana, Chāch, and Isfījāb and devastate these provinces, thereby rendering them useless to Küchlüg; on the other hand, a Chinese traveller who passed through the Syr Darya valley a few years later does not mention any signs of ruin there. 


2 Nasawi, p. 22 (tr., pp. 38-9—with Ibn 'amm, “cousin”, mistranslated as “nephew”), says that Taj al-Din Bilge-Khan was 'Uthmān Khan's cousin.


Although Küchlug’s transient empire would eventually crumble before the advance of Chingiz-Khán, the removal of Küchlug only postponed the day of reckoning for the Khwārazm-Shāh.

XIV. THE PERIOD IN RETROSPECT

Between A.D. 1000 and 1200 the Islamic cult and faith became completely accepted in the Iranian world: herein lies the social and religious significance of these two centuries. The process of conversion actually went on till the early 5th/11th century, by which time the only substantial remaining pockets of paganism were on the far eastern fringes, in what is now Afghanistan; the remote region of Ghūr was probably the last to accept the new faith (see p. 157 above). On the whole, the Iranian peoples accepted Islam speedily and peacefully; this was especially true of the landowning classes, anxious to preserve their social and tenurial privileges under the new Arab regime. Nevertheless, the period up to the 4th/10th century was punctuated by several socio-religious protest movements, in some of which elements of the older faiths of Iran, such as Mazdakism and Zoroastrianism, rose to the surface; and on one occasion the political and military leader Dailamī Mardāvīj b. Ziyār (d. 323/935) ostentatiously paraded his hostility to Islam. After the year 1000 such anti-Islamic currents die away. It was not that feelings of social protest and resentment against the ruling and official classes disappeared altogether, but rather that they were channelled into such activities as ‘ījāra (brigandage and mob violence) and into such movements as Ismā‘īlism and radical Shi‘ism. Only in the Šāfavid period did Shi‘ism become the dominant faith in Persia proper (the Iranian parts of Central Asia and Afghanistan were only marginally affected by this process); but in the pre-Mongol period we hear of lively Shi‘i activity in several towns of Persia, and it is probable that the bases of later dominance were quietly being consolidated amongst the ‘Alid communities of these places.

Of significance to the whole of the Middle East, and not merely to the Iranian world, were the ethnic, political, and military changes caused by the incoming movements of Turkish peoples from beyond the Oxus and Syr Darya. Turks had long been familiar enough in the Iranian world as peaceful settlers on the north-eastern frontiers, as nomadic predators on the agricultural lands there, and as mercenary soldiers in the armies of the Baghdad caliphs and their provincial epigoni, but it
was only in the Saljuq period that this trickle of individuals became a flood. However, the Turks' westward movement was not confined to the period of the Saljuq invasions in the middle 5th/11th century—the number of incomers at this time was not unduly large; rather, it continued steadily up to and after the Mongol invasions. Some tribes of southern Iran, such as the Bahärlü, the Ainällü, and the Qashghai traditionally date their migration thither to post-Mongol times. In the Saljuq period there were always many outlets for Türkmen energies in the frontier warfare with the Byzantines and the Christian powers of the Caucasus, as well as in the complex warfare between Arab amirates and the Crusaders in Syria and Palestine, and many Türkmen passed through Iran to these western battlefields. Others, however, found suitable pasture grounds for their flocks within Iran, especially in such favourable regions as Äzarbaijän, the Caspian coastlands of Mughān, Gurgān and Dīhistant, and in the oases of Khūrāsān. Hence there begins the process of settlement that has made Äzarbaijän, parts of Kurdistān, including the Hamadān region, and a large section of Fārs, Turkish-speaking.¹

The migrating peoples were originally the rank and file of Turkish tribal and military aristocracies, and in our period these leaders imposed their political authority over the Iranian world at large. This trend towards Turkish political domination began when the Iranian Sama­nids and the Afʹrīghid and Maʹmūnid Khwārazm-Shāhs were replaced by the Ghaznavids and Qarakhānids. The Ghaznavids were of servile origin, but their steppe beginnings were speedily overlaid by the Iranian culture and the Iranian administrative techniques which they adopted. The Qarakhānids initially represented a still lower level of assimilation into the Iranian-Islamic culture. In 5th/11th- and 6th/12th-century Transoxiana the trend towards this assimilation was always offset by the fresh arrivals of Turkish peoples from the outer steppes. The Saljuqs and the Oghuz approximated at first to the social and cultural level of the earliest Qarakhānids—if, indeed, they were not at a lower one. Yet, like the Ghaznavids, the Saljuq leaders soon discovered practical advantages in the Iranian-Islamic tradition of statecraft and government: its exaltation of the sovereign above his people; its ideal of state centralization, and of a professional, standing army to buttress the ruler's power; and its concepts of passivity and obedience with which the subject masses were inculcated. Aided by Iranian advisers such as Kunduri and Niżām al-Mulk, the Saljuq Toghril, Alp-Arslan, and

Malik-Shâh passed from the position of mere tribal chiefs, with only circumscribed authority, to that of “Most Exalted Sultans” (Salāṭīn-i Aʿẓam) with the full panoply of a hierarchical court, an Iranian-staffed bureaucracy, and a multi-national, partly slave army to execute their plans.

It is not surprising that tension arose between the sultans in their newly acquired splendour and aloofness, and the Türkmen rank and file. In the early stages of the Saljuq invasions these Türkmen had been the Saljuq family’s ladder to power, but in the later years of the 5th/11th century the new professional and slave army was making them militarily less vital. Concentrated as they tended to be in the remoter parts of Āzarbājān or Khurāsān, Gurgān or Fārs, the Türkmen—who in any case were never a very articulate group—could be heard only with difficulty in the sophisticated, Iranian atmosphere of the sultans’ court in Iṣfahān, Hamadān, or Baghdad. It soon became apparent to the Türkmen that there had grown up a gulf between themselves and the sultans, and that the latter were quite prepared to use Arab or Kurdish or any other troops against their fellow Turks. Hence they tended to rally round those members of the Saljuq family who were discontented or who had been passed over for the succession despite their valid claims of seniority within the family; such aspirants as Ibrāhīm Īnāl, Qutlumush b. Arslān Isrāʾīl, and Qavurt were accordingly able to use Türkmen resentment against the sultans to support their own pretensions. A clear-sighted statesman like Nizām al-Mulk recognized the Türkmen’s legitimate claims to gratitude and advocated attention to their needs; but after his death such counsels were heard less often. It was the blundering and officious handling of the Türkmen by Sanjar’s officials and commanders that led to the outburst of Ghuzz violence in Khurāsān at the end of his reign, resulting in the capture and detention of the sultan himself, the nomads’ overrunning the main towns of Khurāsān, the end of direct Saljuq power in north-eastern Iran, and the eventual destruction of the Saljuq principality of Kirmān (see above, pp. 152 ff.).

During the second half of the 6th/12th century the trend towards a uniform Turkish domination of the Iranian world was temporarily halted in the east by the Ghūrid dynasty in Afghanistan, whose rulers, originally mountain chieftains in Ghūr, had become sovereigns of an empire that stretched from Bistām in the west to the Ganges valley in the east. This achievement was only transient, for it was destroyed by the dynamism of the Khwārazm-Shâh ‘Alāʾ al-Din Muḥammad. Yet
the shāh’s victory was largely Pyrrhic: he overstrained his military resources in fighting the Ghūrids and in mounting a campaign in western Iran against the ‘Abbāsid caliph (a campaign that brought him much obloquy in orthodox Sunni circles), and he himself went down before the rising power of the Mongols. In Afghanistan today the Ghūrids have been assigned an important place in the country’s history—they are described as the first native Islamic dynasty to make Afghanistan the centre of an empire—and attempts have been made to show that the Ghūrids were Pashto-speaking, and that the earliest Pashto literature sprang from their court circle.¹

Already by the latter part of Toghril’s reign the Saljuq sultan depended to a considerable extent on a professional, standing army, which comprised a nucleus of slave commanders and their retainers (ghulāms) drawn from a multiplicity of nationalities: Turks, Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Caucasians, and even negroes. This nucleus was supplemented by contingents from tributary Arab, Kurdish, and Persian rulers in Iraq, Kurdistan, the Caspian provinces, Sistan, and so on. The Türkmen tribesmen continued to be of military significance in the 5th/11th century, but the sultans gradually adopted a policy of diverting the Türkmen begs and their followers to the frontiers of the empire, to Anatolia, the Caucasus, Syria, etc., where there were plentiful opportunities for jihād against the Christians or against heterodox Muslim groups such as the Syrian Ismā‘īlīs and the Fātimids.

Maintaining a standing army was expensive; and since an increase was required in the state’s revenue, the degree of centralization and administrative complexity inevitably grew also. Nizām al-Mulk built up a nexus of relatives and clients within the central government and in the key posts of the provincial administrations, and in this way surveillance over the empire was far-reaching in Malik-Shāh’s reign. The basic solution for paying the army was an extended and regularized system of iqtā’s, land grants, whose revenues were used to support the soldiers. Here the Saljuqs were not innovators, for the system had its roots in the Arab caliphate, and had been widely used in the 4th/10th century by such dynasties as the Būyids and Ḥamdānids; but with the political decline of the Būyids and their inability to control their troops,

their iqtā‘ system in western Iran became disordered and riddled with abuses. In the 5th/11th century the Saljuq central government regularized the position of the iqtā‘-holders (muqta’s). In his Siyāsat-Nāma Niẓām al-Mulk regards the system as firmly established in his time, and he is mainly concerned to prevent the muqta‘ from becoming over-powerful, i.e. oppressing the peasantry and denying the sultan his ultimate rights over the land. Nevertheless, the power of the muqta’s over the estates grew steadily, especially in the 6th/12th century when control from the centre weakened. Many estates originally granted as iqtā‘s (and therefore revocable, at least in theory) must at this time have passed into legally private ownership (milḵ).

What was in effect a large-scale application of the iqtā‘ system was the Saljuq sultans’ practice of granting provinces or regions as appanages for other members of the family. This arose originally from Turkish tribal practice, where a tribal chief’s patrimony was often divided amongst his male relatives while the most senior relative remained overlord. Given the size of the Saljuq empire in the second half of the 5th/11th century, such a measure of administrative devolution was sensible enough; it was only in the next century, when the empire was losing its cohesion, that the Saljuq maliks in the provinces successfully used their appanages to defy the central power and further their own ambitions.¹

The degree of unity achieved in the Saljuq empire under Alp-Arslan and Malik-Shāh could not be maintained by their successors. Yet the power of the dynasty, at least in the first half of the following century, was far from ineffective. Undoubtedly as capable an administrator and as vigorous a campaigner as his father Malik-Shāh had been, Sanjar ruled directly over Khurasan and the east, and after his brother Muhammad’s death in 511/1118 he exercised ultimate sovereignty over his relatives the Saljuq sultans in western Iran and Iraq. Some western sultans, e.g. Maḥmūd and Maṣ‘ūd b. Muḥammad, Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd, and the last of the line, Toghril b. Arslan, were vigorous and capable rulers, but their freedom of action decreased and their resources became more exiguous as the century progressed.

There are three main reasons why the Saljuqs found their effective power reduced during the 6th/12th century.²

¹ Cf. Lambton, op. cit. pp. 53 ff.
First, the institution of the atabegate developed and flourished in this century, especially after the death of Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh. Beginning as genuine tutors attached to the households of young Seljuk princes, Turkish slave commanders often secured an ascendancy over their charges and then set them aside, ruling themselves as provincial governors or in the end as independent potentates. By the second half of the century, Turkish provincial governors were founding dynasties and calling themselves atabegs even when they had never had a Seljuk prince in their charge (e.g. the Salghurids of Fārs: see above, p. 172).

In the succession disputes which now racked the Seljuk empire in the west, the atabegs espoused various Seljuk candidates and gave them military support, hoping thereby to place a weak and pliant ruler on the throne. For their part, the sultans could not easily control these centrifugal tendencies. The rise of such atabeg dynasties as the Zangids in Mosul, the Eldigüzids and Ahmadijīs in Āzarbāijān and Arrān, the Salghurids in Fārs, and so on, meant that the territory in the west directly administered by the sultans was shrinking. Yet they still had to maintain armies against rivals to the succession, against overbearing atabegs, and against the increasingly activist policy of the ‘Abbasid caliphs. The territory which they controlled was inadequate for granting iqṭā’s to their troops, and the troubled social and political conditions of the period cannot have favoured the regular collection of taxation from the population. The sultans were forced willy-nilly into alliances and coalitions with the atabegs and other Turkish military commanders in order to draw upon their troops. Thus the sultans had little space in which to manoeuvre, and by the time of Arslan b. Toghril, the creature of the Eldigüzids, it had shrunk to narrow proportions.

Second, the century sees a rise in the material power and prestige of the ‘Abbasid caliph of Baghdad. The end of the “Dailamī interlude” in Iranian history meant the failure of the Shi‘ī bid for supreme authority in Iran. The Fāṭimids were repulsed from Iraq and northern Syria by the incoming Seljuqs, and after the death in 487/1094 of al-Mustaṣfir, they were no longer a vigorous and expansionist power. Although Ismā‘īlism increased in strength after the Nizārī split from the main Fāṭimid line of al-Mustā‘ī, it was notable more for its terrorism than for its political and territorial achievements; only in Kūhīstān, parts of Dailam, and in parts of Fārs did the Ismā‘īlis control substantial stretches of territory.
The ‘Abbasids, having survived a period of degradation in the 4th/10th century, now had the secular support of the strongly Sunni Saljuqs. The early Saljuqs allowed the caliphs little more practical political power than had the Buyids. However, they had to defer to the caliphs, who were the moral and spiritual leaders of the Sunni world, for it was by no means obvious even in Malik-Shāh’s time that the Fatimids’ ability to harm the Saljuqs had passed its peak. Only at the very close of his reign, when the steady influence of Niẓām al-Mulk had just been removed, did Malik-Shāh seem to harbour thoughts of displacing the ‘Abbasids from Baghdad (see p. 101 above); but the sultan’s own death ended this project. After the nonentities and weaklings of the early Buyid period, the ‘Abbāsid family was now yielding some capable and effective caliphs: e.g. al-Mustaẓāhir, al-Mustarshid, al-Muqtāfī, and al-Nāṣir. They in turn were aided by such outstanding vizierial families as the Banū Jahir in the 5th/11th century and the Banū Hubaira in the next one. When disputes arose over the succession to the sultanate, the caliphs seized the opportunity first to consolidate their hold over Baghdad and central Iraq (after 547/1152 no Saljuq shāḥna was allowed in the capital), and then to intervene directly in the warfare in Iraq and western Persia; such caliphs as al-Mustarshid, al-Rāshid, and al-Muqtāfī personally took the field at the head of their forces. The rise in the caliphate’s power and prestige reached its peak under al-Nāṣir, who, by his patronage of the Futuwwa, together with a diplomacy that embraced such distant dynasties as the Ghūrids, the Ayyūbids, and the Rūm Saljuqs, made the caliphate for the first time in centuries an international power in the Islamic world.

Thirdly, a final blow to Saljuq power came from the Khwārazm-Shāhs, a new and aggressive power that arose in the north-east of the Iranian world during the 6th/12th century. Their origin was not dissimilar to that of several other provincial lines which sprang from atabegs or local slave governors, but the peripheral position of Khwārazm and its old traditions of independence favoured a long and uninterrupted tenure of power by Anūgh-Tegin Gharcha’ī and his descendants. The shāhs became virtually independent after Sanjar’s death, subject only to the suzerainty of the Qara-Khitai. Their imperialist ambitions, blocked in the east by the Qara-Khitai, accordingly turned southwards and westwards into Iran. A struggle with the Ghūrids for power in Khurāsān long prevented the shāhs from taking advantage of the fragmented condition of western and central Iran, and it was only in the
last years of the 6th/12th century that Tekish vanquished the last Saljuq Sultan Toghril b. Arslan and moved Khwârazmian troops to the borders of Iraq (see above, pp. 182–3). Al-Nâṣîr deployed all his diplomatic weapons against the Khwârazm-Shâh, encouraging the Ghûûrîds and Qara-Khitai against him and organizing in Iran coalitions of atabegs and local governors threatened by the Khwârazmian advance. (It does not seem, however, that the caliph encouraged the Mongols to attack the Khwârazmians from the rear.)1 Also, the caliph threw his moral and spiritual weight against the shâhs for their impiety in threatening the caliphate and their pro-Shî’i activities. Certainly the Khwârazmians made themselves intensely unpopular in Iran, but whether the caliph’s could have stayed the Khwârazmian march on Iraq is an unsolved question of history. The distant pressure of the Mongols was already being felt on the borders of Transoxiana and Khwârazm, and within the next fifty years both the caliphs of Baghdad and their opponents the Khwârazm-Shâhs were to go down for ever before the hordes of Chingiz-Khân and Hülegû.

1 This accusation appears only in late sources; see Barthold, Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion, pp. 399–400.
CHAPTER 2

THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE SALJUQ EMPIRE

The period of the Great Saljuqs can largely be regarded as representing or corresponding to the early Middle Ages. To make this division is not to underestimate the fundamental fact of the unbroken thread of Persian history in Islamic times. Stretching back behind the Saljuq period is a long continuity of administrative practice, but under the Saljuqs the old institutions gained a new meaning; developments that had begun in the preceding period crystallized, and new elements of worth were added to the Persian heritage. The Saljuqs did not formulate the details of the new system: this was mainly the work of the officials of the bureaucracy and of the religious institution, who were for the most part Persians and not Turks. But the Saljuqs were in some measure responsible for the spirit in which the new system worked.

Many Saljuq institutions lasted in their outward forms (though the terminology was in some cases changed) until the twentieth century; and without a knowledge of these, and an attempt to trace them back to earlier times, we cannot fully comprehend the questions that began to agitate Iran in the nineteenth century and the solutions sought to them. Politically and religiously Iran has travelled far from the theory of a theocracy in which the caliph exercised constituent authority and legitimized the sultan’s assumption of power; and economically from the *iqta* in its various forms and the guilds and corporations of Saljuq society. But it was not until the twentieth century that the Constitutional Revolution separated modern Iran from medieval Persia.

In many ways the Saljuq period did not differ from the preceding or succeeding periods. It was a time of chronic wars; and hardship, famine, pestilence, violence, ignorance, and superstition were all common. But, on the other hand, it was a time during which Iranian civilization reached heights of religious and secular achievements that have not been easily surpassed. Men such as Ghazâlî, Shahrîstânî, Nasâî, Niẓâm al-Mulk, ‘Umar Khayyâm, Abu Sa‘îd b. Abîl Khair, Anvârî, and Mu‘izzî all lived in these years. Important technical innovations were made in pottery and metal-work. A high degree of technical skill was
achieved by weavers; and new elements of scale and spatial composition were introduced into architecture. The Saljuq state was the organizing force that brought about conditions in which the arts flourished, and the talents of these men and many others burgeoned and thrived. It must not be supposed, however, that uniformity was established throughout the empire at any one time or throughout the period in any one place. There was a great diversity of climatic and physical conditions within the empire; and in spite of the unifying factor of Islam and the general levelling tendency of Turkish military government, there was much local particularism and variety in the social ethics of different groups and communities. There was, for example, a standing opposition between the settled and the semi-settled population; between Turk and non-Turk; and between the military and the rest of the population. There was also a dichotomy between the men of the cities, with their highly developed crafts and industries and traditions of civilization, and the population living on the land, whose main function was to provision the cities and above all to provide for the needs of the army.

The sources, unfortunately, do not tell us much about the daily life of the people, or how this was affected by the influx of large numbers of Türkmen nomads. Presumably the produce from the nomads' flocks made an important contribution to the supplies of the towns; and there was a constant infiltration of nomads into the towns and villages. The sources are also silent on the details of the sultan's administration. It is also difficult to interpret such information as they give, owing to a frequent lack of precision in the use of technical terms. Nor is it possible to obtain a clear picture of the characters of the sultans and their officials. The achievements of the period have been attributed by many writers to the viziers, in particular to Nizām al-Mulk (d. 485/1192), the vizier first of Alp-Arslan and then of Malik-Shāh. A close examination of the sources would suggest that this view is too general. There can be little doubt of the competence of Toghril Beg and Alp-Arslan as leaders of men; Malik-Shāh was not a mere figure-head; and Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh seems also to have had a more than ordinary degree of competence. The sources attribute justice and good government to Malik-Shāh and Sanjar, as they do to Nizām al-Mulk; while many of the later sultans are charged with dissipation and negligence in state affairs. In general the sultans were men of action and men of affairs. Their lives were largely spent travelling about their empire on
expeditions of one sort or another. Their main recreation was probably the chase; the breeding of horses and falcons was widely maintained. Their personal attainments in the arts may not have been high, but under their rule and patronage great development took place. The relatively stable and effective administration established under their leadership enabled the various classes to carry on their lives and occupations in comparative security. Men of learning and of religion, including the Şûfîs, were held in high respect; and the local people were left to practice their local customs. This is not to say that injustice and oppression did not occur, but on the whole it did not reach lengths which the population felt to be intolerable. There was unusually little internal rebellion (as distinct from struggles for power among rival amîrs), though the spread of the Ismâ‘îlî movement suggests that a strong undercurrent of social discontent existed.

In spite of the fragmentation of the dâr al-Isldm, the function of the state was still to defend the Muslim community and Muslim lands; and its purpose was to create conditions in which the Muslim could live the good life. The traditional view that stability was assured by the maintenance of right religion and justice was broadly accepted. Ibn al-Balkhî, who wrote during the reign of Muḥammad b. Malik-Shâh, is expressing this view when he states, "Those possessed of learning have said, 'When a king is adorned by religion and his rule is stable because of justice, kingship will not disappear from his house unless, God forbid, some disorder appears in religion or he commits tyranny'.”1 There was no separation between church and state; men were not conscious of belonging to two communities. Rather, dîn (religion) and daulat (state) were two sides of one coin. Non-conformity and political opposition were thus inseparable. Patriotism was an unknown virtue. All the sultan expected of his subjects was that they should pay their taxes and pray for his welfare, while they expected from him security and justice. The state did not demand, or receive, the loyalty of the common man. Loyalty, so far as it transcended the bounds of the tribe, guild, quarter, or city, was accorded not to the state but to Islam or the şari‘a. So long as the sultan represented the şari‘a he commanded, in some measure, the loyalty of the people, but as soon as he ceased to represent the şari‘a they too ceased to feel any loyalty towards him.

By the time of the rise of the Saljuqs, the classical theory of the

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caliphate no longer corresponded—if it ever had—with practice. The caliphate had become merely a symbolic office maintaining links with the past; and the conception of the sultanate as a simple delegation of authority by the caliph to the temporal ruler could hardly be maintained in the political circumstances which prevailed. For some governors had seized their provinces by force, while others, though they were not rebels, were not subject to the appointment of the caliph: an irregular situation, which threatened the life of the community. The latter was supposed to exist in order to carry out the precepts of the shari'a; and unless the shari'a was its basis, there was no reason for its existence. It was thus imperative that the situation should be regularized; and Mawardi (d. 430/1058), writing during the Buyid domination, made an attempt to legalize what was in effect a usurpation of power. He asserted that even if the caliph was placed under restraint ("control over him having been seized by one of his auxiliaries, who arrogates to himself the executive authority"), he could still hold the office of caliph, and such an anomalous situation could stand provided the usurper conformed to the ordinances of the faith and the requirements of justice.1 Having in mind perhaps such independent rulers as Mahmūd of Ghazna, Mawardi also put forward the view that "certain concessions might be made to the governors of outlying regions, without prejudice to the rights of the caliph as effective ruler of the central provinces", provided, first, that the governor agreed to preserve the dignity of the caliphate and show such respect for it as would preclude any idea of insubordination; and secondly, that he undertook to govern according to the shari'a. The caliph for his part should validate all religious appointments and decisions hitherto made by the governor, and the two parties would make a pact of friendship and mutual assistance.2

By thus keeping those who had usurped power within the framework of the community Mawardi enabled it to survive and prepared the way for the new relationship between the caliphate and sultanate which was to be worked out under the Saljuqs. The early Saljuq sultans insisted on receiving diplomas from the caliphs, partly to place themselves on a level with the Ghaznavids and to legalize their rule, and partly to acquire prestige by adopting the role of the defenders of orthodox Islam. The sultans after Malik-Shāh also endeavoured to obtain the

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2 Ibid. p. 163.
caliph's recognition, largely in order to strengthen themselves against rivals. The early period saw not merely the reimposition of Sunnism after a time of Shi'i supremacy, but a reaffirmation of the caliph's position as head of the Islamic community, together with the incorporation of the sultanate as a necessary element into the ideal of Islamic government. From this stemmed a new system of administration composed of a series of interconnected jurisdictions whose stability depended, not on a separation of the civil arm from the military, but on orthodoxy or "right religion" and the personal loyalty of sultan to caliph and of subordinate officials to the sultan. The man who formulated this new relationship between the caliphate and the sultanate was Ghazâlî (d. 505/1111). He envisaged a new association between the caliph and the sultan and assumed co-operation between them. On the one hand the caliph was to be designated by the sultan, who, through his exercise of constituent authority, recognized the institutional authority of the caliph; and on the other hand the validity of the sultan's government was established by his oath of allegiance to that caliph who authorized his rule. In this way the sultan recognized that the shari'a was the organizing principle of the Sunnî community, while the caliph acknowledged that the sultanate, by establishing order and maintaining discipline, provided conditions in which Islamic institutions could continue and the Muslim fulfil his true destiny.¹

Because the power of the Saljuqs rested upon the shari'a, it differed from the power of the Buyids, which had been usurped.² This was of more than theoretical importance. The Saljuqs made possible the preservation of the religious life of the community, and religion for the Muslim embraced virtually all aspects of the life of the community. This is not to say that Ghazâlî regarded the Saljuqs' government as a truly Islamic government. His works contain several allusions to the injustice of the Turks. In an undated letter to Abu'l Fath 'Ali b. Husain Mujîr al-Dîn (Sanjar's first vizier, who was succeeded in 488/1095 by Fâkhîr al-Mulk b. Nîzâm al-Mulk), Ghazâlî stated that he had left Tûs so that he need not witness the actions of merciless tyrants.³

² The new relationship between the caliph and the sultan is reflected in the lâqâbs given to the Saljuq sultans, which contained the word din (religion) in contradistinction to those of the Buyids, which contained the word daula (state). Toghrîl Beg was given the lâqâb Ruîn al-Dîn and Jalâl al-Daula. Alp-Arslan was an exception to the general rule: his lâqâb was 'Ajud al-Daula.
In Dhu'l Qa'da in 488/1095 he abandoned all the occupations in which he had been engaged, including the office of mudarris (head) of the Niẓāmiyya in Baghdad, and a year later he vowed never to take money from a sultan, to attend the audience of a sultan, or to engage in legal disputations (muğārara) in public.1 In 499/1106, however, he resumed teaching in the Niẓāmiyya in Nishāpur on the orders of Sanjar.

In the Nasihat al-mulūk, addressed to Sanjar, Ghazālī puts forward his conception of the sultanate as distinct from the caliphate. Describing the sultan as the Shadow of God upon Earth, he maintains that the divine light has been given to him. This, at first sight, seems incompatible with his theory of the caliphate. In the Nasihat al-mulūk, however, Ghazālī was not concerned with the relationship between the caliphate and the sultanate. What he had in mind here was not the preservation of the religious life of the community, which he had discussed elsewhere, but the maintenance of the power of the sultanate, which, if that life was to be preserved, was necessary for the establishment of order. Nor was he concerned to argue the ūrf basis of the sultanate (this he had already established elsewhere), but rather to ensure that the power of the sultanate should be used with justice. “Know”, he writes, “that God has singled out two groups of men and given them preference over others: first prophets, upon them be peace, and secondly kings. Prophets He sent to His servants to lead them to Him and kings to restrain them from [aggression against] each other; and in His wisdom He handed over to them (kings) the well-being of the lives of His servants and He gave them (kings) a high status.”2 Obedience to and love for kings was therefore incumbent upon men, and, conversely, opposition and enmity towards them were unseemly; but only he who acted with justice was the true sultan.3

The advice which Ghazālī gives to Sanjar in the Nasihat al-mulūk is concerned mainly with ordinary political moral duties based on grounds of political expediency. Ghazālī’s exposition of government here is permeated by the Islamic ethic, but it also contains a theory of government that derives from, or is strongly influenced by, the old Persian theory of state. In that theory there was a strong connexion between the Zoroastrian religion and the Sassanian state. This state in turn was

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1 Ibid. p. 45.
identified with the social order; and the king, whose power was absolute, ruled by divine right and was the centre of the universe.\(^1\) Ghazāli’s theory of the caliphate was in due course to be forgotten, but the theory of government put forward in the \textit{Naṣīḥat al-mulūk} was to have considerable influence on later thinkers.

A similar theory is clearly seen in the documents for the investiture of governors, and in other writings of the Saljuq period.\(^2\) In this theory the sultan was regarded as the Shadow of God, by whom he was directly appointed and endowed with justice and wisdom. The historic imamate was completely ignored, and no authorization or validity was sought for the sultan’s government. Thus a diploma \textit{(taqlīd)}, issued by Sanjar’s divān for a certain ‘Imād al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ahmad for the office of qāḍī of Nishāpūr, begins: “Since God... has placed the reins of kingship in our grasp and caused the shadow of His great favour and compassion to be spread over our affairs and raised us to the rank and status of [having] the name of ‘The Shadow of God upon Earth’...”\(^3\) Similarly, a diploma \textit{(manshūr)} for the nā‘īb of Ray opens, “Since God, glory and exaltation be to Him, by His perfect action has bestowed upon us the lordship of the world and placed in our control the affairs of the kingdoms of the world (ball va ‘agāl-i maṣālik-i mamālik-i jābhān) and the ordering of the affairs of the people of the world, and has caused the standards of our rule to be signs of His power and might, may He be honoured and glorified...”\(^4\)

The basic importance of justice is recognized. A taqlīd for the office of vālī of Gurgān, also issued by Sanjar’s divān, states: “The foundation of kingship and the basis of rulership (jabāndārī) consist in making [the world] prosperous; and the world becomes prosperous only through


\(^{2}\) A number of documents belonging to the Saljuq period have been preserved in various collections: notably the ‘\textit{Atabat al-kataba} of Muntajab al-Dīn Bādī’ Atabeg Juwainī, who was head of Sanjar’s \textit{divān-i inšād}. This collection contains a number of diplomas of appointment of various officials. The \textit{Munshād}i ‘abd-i Saljūqī va Khwārzmshāhī va an‘al-i ‘abd-i Mughāl which to some extent duplicates the ‘\textit{Atabat al-kataba}, and the \textit{Munshād}i of Evoghlī Haidar, a later collection, also contain some Saljuq documents. These are supplemented by various collections of model diplomas and letters, mainly of the second half of the sixth/ twelfth century, notably \textit{al-Tawassul ila‘l-tawassul} of Bahā al-Dīn Baghdādī and the \textit{Dastūr-i Dāhī} of Muḥammad b. ‘Abdīl-Khālīq al-Maihānī. For a brief discussion of these and other collections see H. Horst, \textit{Die Staatsverwaltung der Grosselguqen und Hōrāzmnābs} (1038-1231) (Wiesbaden, 1964).


\(^{4}\) Ibid. pp. 69-70.
INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE SALJUQ EMPIRE

justice and equity; and the justice and equity of a ruler (jābdār) are attainable only through efficient governors of good conduct and officials of praiseworthy beliefs and laudable ways of life, and only so does prosperity reach the people of the world.”¹ The first duty of the sultan was to rule, and the justification both of his authority and of the political and social order was that they enabled the classes to fulfil their different functions. Thus a manshrūr for the offices of vālī and shahna of Balkh opens:

The stability of the empire (daulat) and the ordering of the affairs of the kingdom (mamlakat) are among the fruits of the spreading of justice and the dispensation of compassion (ibṣīn), to which we are commanded by the creator, may He be exalted and sanctified... Justice consists in... keeping every one of the people of the world—the subjects (raḍyād), servants (mustakhdamin), officials (mutaqallidan-i amāl), and those charged with religious or secular affairs (mubāzhirān-i umūr-i din va dini)—in their proper ranks and due stations.²

The interdependence of kingship and religion is emphasized. Kings were needed for the preservation of Islam, and temporal stability was guaranteed by the protection of religion. An authorization (tafvid) to teach in a number of madrasas in Balkh states. “The foundation of kingship (daulat) and the basis of dominion consist in the observation of the laws of God, glory and exaltation be to Him, and in giving precedence to the raising of the banners of religion and the revivication of the signs and practices of the shari'a, and in respecting and honouring the sajjids and 'ulamā who are the heirs of the prophet...”³ In return for the favour conferred upon him by God, the sultan was not to neglect in any way the ordering of the affairs of the world and the interests and protection of the people, who were a trust from God. The righteous were to be rewarded and the unrighteous punished.

A similar theory to that contained in these documents and in the Naṣīḥat al-mulūk is expressed more explicitly in terms of political expediency by Niẓām al-Mulk in the Siyāsat-Nāma. “God most high”, he states, “chooses someone from among the people in every age and adorns him with kingly virtues and relegates to him the affairs of the world and the peace of his servants.”⁴ The sultan was to order the world so that the people might be secure in their various pursuits, and he was to strive to make the world prosperous by such means as the improve-

ment of irrigation and communications and the building of cities. The object of temporal rule was to fill the earth with justice; this was to be achieved by the maintenance of each man in his rightful place, which, in turn, would assure stability.

Nizām al-Mulk’s view of religion was largely utilitarian. His apparent horror of and opposition to Shi‘ism in all forms was based on political rather than religious grounds. He saw a close connexion between stability and right religion.

What a king needs most is right religion, because kingship and religion are two brothers [he writes]. Whenever any disturbance appears in the kingdom, disorder also occurs in religion; and people of bad religion and malefactors appear. Whenever there is disorder in the affairs of religion the kingdom is disturbed, and the power of malefactors increases; and they cause the kings to lose their dignity and make them troubled at heart; innovations appear and rebels become powerful.¹

Justice, however, rather than right religion was the ultimate basis of Nizām al-Mulk’s theory. “Kingship”, he states, “remains with the unbeliever but not with injustice.”² But there were no sanctions except moral sanctions, and Nizām al-Mulk clearly believed that rights were acquired and maintained by force. The power of the ruler was absolute, it required no authorization, and the administration was centralized in his person. Against his arbitrary power the population had no rights and no freedom. It was this theory of kingship which was ultimately to prevail in Persia. Under the Saljuqs, however, the rule of the sultans still had a shar‘i basis. This did not stop the arbitrary use of power by the government and its officials, but on the whole it prevented it from reaching lengths which were intolerable to the people.

During the Saljuq period the ruling and orthodox institutions were drawn more closely together, although the functional division between them was more sharply defined than heretofore.³ All affairs, religious and temporal, became the concern of the sultan. This was inevitable when “right religion” was regarded as the basis of the stability of the state. The caliph remained the supreme authority in matters relating to the legal administration; but once he had authorized the sultan’s assumption of power, his main function concerned the performance of prayers and religious leadership. When Toghril Beg brought the caliph back to Baghdad in 451/1059–60 after Basāsīrī had fled, his minister

¹ Siyāsät-Nāma, p. 55.
² Ibid. p. 8.
‘Amid al-Mulk Kunduri took charge of the administration of Baghdad, and as compensation for this he gave an allowance to the caliph. From this time onwards the caliph was no longer liable to arbitrary deposition, as he had been in Buyid times. He was allowed to enjoy his allowance and the income of his personal estates without fear of any demand being made on him or of his estates being confiscated. The dignity and good name of his office were in some measure restored. But the respect the Saljuqs showed him, although considerable, was limited; and whereas his residence in Buyid times had been the refuge for all who feared the Buyids, a like situation was not tolerated by the Saljuqs. Further, they sought to control the caliph through marriage alliances and occasionally through appointments to his vizierate.

In Muharram 448/1056 Arslan-Khatun, Chaghri Beg Dâ’ud’s daughter, was betrothed to the Caliph al-Qa’im. Bundârî states that al-Qâ’îm intended by this marriage to strengthen the sultan’s prestige and cement his friendship with him.¹ In 453/1061 Toghril Beg sent the qâdi of Ray to Baghdad to ask for the hand of the caliph’s daughter in marriage. Ibn al-Jauzi states that Toghril Beg’s former wife, who had died in 452/1060-1, had recommended him to take this step.² The demand caused the caliph great vexation: even the Buyids had never forced him to such an action. He tried to get it withdrawn and commanded his envoy to demand 300,000 dinârs from Toghril Beg if he insisted on the marriage. Kunduri told the caliph’s envoy bluntly that a refusal was out of the question. Eventually, after a series of threats and counter-threats, the marriage contract was ratified outside Tabriz in Sha’bân 454/1062. In the following year Toghril Beg came to Baghdad and demanded the caliph’s daughter. It was pointed out to him that the object of the marriage had been honour and not union, and that if the caliph’s daughter was to be seen by him it should be in Baghdad. Eventually she was taken to the sultan’s residence in the city and he paid her elaborate homage. When Toghril Beg left Baghdad in the following year, the caliph unwillingly gave permission for his daughter to accompany him.

In 464/1071-2 al-Qâ’îm asked the hand of Alp-Arslan’s daughter on behalf of his vali ‘âbd (heir apparent), who was to become caliph as al-Muqtadi. The latter also demanded the hand of Malik-Shâh’s

¹ Daulat al-Saljuq (Cairo, a.h. 1318), p. 11.
² Al-Muntaṣâm (Haidarabad, a.h. 1357-59), vol. vii, p. 218.
daughter by his favourite wife Terken Khatun. This alliance caused the relations between the caliph and the sultan to become strained, because after being taken to the caliph’s residence in 480/1087, Malik-Shah’s daughter complained of the caliph’s neglect of her, and returned to her father in 482/1089. As a result of his daughter’s unhappy marriage to the caliph, Malik-Shah appears to have conceived a hatred of him. In 484/1091, when he came to Baghdad, he ignored the caliph’s presence and insisted that the caliph should revoke the nomination of his eldest son (who subsequently became caliph as al-Mustazhir) in favour of Abu’l Faḍl Ja’far, the caliph’s son by Malik-Shah’s daughter and retire to Baṣra (or, according to some accounts, to Damascus or the Hijāz).

The caliph was loth to agree and asked for a delay to make plans for his departure. Meanwhile Malik-Shah left Baghdad in Rabi‘ I 485/1092 for Isfahān, taking Abu’l Faḍl Ja’far with him. Shortly afterwards Malik-Shah was assassinated and al-Muqtadi was relieved of the demand. There are several subsequent instances of marriages between the houses of the sultan and the caliph.

In Baghdad, from the time when Toghril Beg took over the administration until the caliphate of al-Mustarshid (512-29/1118-35), administrative authority in Iraq was under the sultan and his officials. The chief of these, the ṣaḥnā, was the sultan’s ambassador to the caliph, and his duty was to watch over the power of the caliph and his officials; he was normally a Turkish amir and had certain military functions also. In the city of Baghdad there was to some extent a conflict of jurisdiction. The population tended to refer to the caliph, who was always accessible to them, even though he could do little but refer back to the sultan or his representatives. Responsibility for local order and security seems to have been shared somewhat between the ṣaḥnā and the caliph’s officials. The caliph’s vizier also exercised some kind of judicial authority in Baghdad, and from time to time he held a māqālim court. Certain taxes, including jīzā, were levied by the caliph’s officials. There are also instances of the caliph’s making levies on the population for the repair of the city walls.

During the reign of Malik-Shāh various attempts were made by Niẓām al-Mulk to establish his nominee in the caliph’s vizierate. This strained the relationship between Niẓām al-Mulk and the Caliph al-Muqtadī, but the vizier’s hostility to the caliph was subsequently transformed by al-Muqtadī’s gracious reception of him on the occasion of his first visit to Baghdad for the wedding of Malik-Shāh’s daughter. In
the enmity which later developed between the caliph and Malik-Shah, Niẓām al-Mulk championed the caliphate.

After the death of Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh in 511/1117, the caliph, reaping the benefit of the first three sultans’ policy to strengthen the caliphate, began to play an important part in the struggle for temporal power; and ultimately a state was established in Iraq over which he exercised full control, temporal as well as religious. But as he began to take part in the struggle for temporal power, the religious sanctity of his office declined and he became subject, like any other temporal ruler, to attack and capture. The first caliph to assemble an army and lead it in person in Saljuq times was al-Mustarshid. Finally after the death of Masʿūd b. Muḥammad in 547/1152, al-Muqtāfī turned the šahāna and the sultan’s other officials out of Iraq and took possession of their iqṭā’s (assignments) and allowances, appointing his own officials over the districts of Iraq, and sending spies and sāḥibān-i khabār (official informants) to all the cities of Iraq.¹

In addition to the reaffirmation of the caliph’s position as head of the Islamic community, an important step towards strengthening and regimenting the religious institution was the development of the madrasas. The initiator of this movement was Niẓām al-Mulk, whose purposes were presumably to provide government officials trained in the tenets of orthodoxy who would replace the former secretarial class and implement his political policies; and secondly, by using the ‘ulamā educated in the madrasas, he hoped to control the masses and combat the spread of the Ismā’īlī sect, which had begun to threaten the existence of the state.² One of the results of the development of the madrasas was to bring about the integration of the members of the bureaucracy with the religious classes. Under the early ‘Abbāsids there had been a separation between the ‘ulamā on the one hand and the secretarial class and literary men on the other. Converts to Islam from the secretarial class, such as Ibn al-Muqaffāʿ, had played an immensely important part in the intellectual life of the community. On the whole, however, they had failed to resolve fully the tension between Islamic

¹ Bundārī, p. 215.
² Cf. Asad Talas, La Madrasa Niẓamīyya et son histoire (Paris, 1939), p. 1; and G. Makdisi, “Muslim institutions of learning in eleventh-century Baghdad”, in B.S.O.A.S. pp. 51 ff. In the device of forming an administrative class belonging to the religious institution, Sir Hamilton Gibb also sees an attempt “to preserve the spiritual independence of the orthodox institution against the increasing power and absolutism of the temporal princes, and at the same time to maintain (or to re-create) the unity of the Community”, “An Interpretation of Islamic History”, in Studies on the Civilisation of Islam, p. 24.
teaching and the traditions and ideals inherited from the old Persian theory of state. Even Nizām al-Mulk for all his orthodoxy failed to create an acceptable synthesis of the two. With the growth of the madrasas the secretarial class and the literary men on the one hand, and the 'ulamā on the other, moved closer together because they shared a common training in the madrasas, which became in effect Sunnī strongholds. The former became more fully Islamicized, and the latter perhaps more Persianized. The dichotomy between the two traditions, the old Persian and the Islamic, remained, but under the Saljuqs more integration was achieved than ever before.\footnote{Cf. also Gibb, loc. cit. pp. 24-5.}

The madrasas were not, as is sometimes alleged, founded by Nizām al-Mulk, nor were they the only centres of higher learning in the Saljuq period.\footnote{See G. Makdisi, “Muslim Institutions”, op. cit. pp. 4 ff.} But he was responsible for the new era of brilliance which began under the Saljuqs and which caused his schools to eclipse all other contemporary institutions of learning. He was also responsible for turning them into seminaries of Sunni orthodoxy, in the same way the dār al-hikma in Egypt, founded in 395/1005, had been a centre of Shi‘ī propaganda. Already in the fourth/tenth century there had been madrasas in Nishāpūr, which, in size of population and development of culture and industry, was able to compete with the Fāṭimid capital and with Baghdad. The madrasas in Khurāsān were possibly influenced by the convents or hospices belonging to the Karrāmiyya—an Islamic sect founded by Abū ‘Abdullāh Muhammad b. Karrām al-Sagzi (d. 255/869), which flourished in Khurasan in the early fifth/eleventh century\footnote{See Ribera y Tarragó, “Origen del Colegio Nidami de Bagdad”, in Disertaciones y opúsculos, i (1928), pp. 361-83.}—and perhaps they were also influenced by the Buddhist vihāra. They were a powerful means of propagating Islam independently of the Islamic government.\footnote{See V. V. Bartold, Zwölf Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken Mittelasiens, tr. into German by Theodor Menzel (Berlin, 1935), p. 60.} Their transformation into Sunnī strongholds under the Saljuqs was due to the necessity for combating both Shi‘ī propaganda, whether Ismā‘īli or Ithna ‘Ashari, and the dissident Sunnis of the Karrāmiyya convents.\footnote{L. Massignon, “Les Medresehs de Bagdad”, in Bulletin de l’Institut français d’archéologie orientale (1909), pp. 77-8.}

Numerous madrasas were built by the Saljuq rulers, by their ministers and others. Nāṣir-i Khusrau relates that a madrasa was being built in Shawwāl 437/1046 by order of Toghrīl Beg in Nishāpūr; Chaghrī Beg...
Da’ūd founded a madrasa in Marv; Alp-Arslan in Baghdad, Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh in Iṣfahān, and Toghṛl b. Muḥammad in Hamadān. The most famous madrasas, however, were those founded by Nizām al-Mulk, and they were known as Nizāmiyya. The best known was in Baghdad, which was opened in Dhu’l Ḍa‘dā 459/1067. There were also Nizāmiyya in Nishāpūr, in Āmul, Mosul, Herāt, Damascus, Jazirat Ibn ‘Umar, Balkh, Ghazna, Marv, and Baṣra. These were probably not all founded by Nizām al-Mulk as a private individual, but were at least partly paid for and endowed by the royal revenue of which he had control (see below, pp. 249 ff.). Others emulated him in the building of such schools. For example, Ṣharaf al-Mulk, Malik-Shāh’s mustaṣfī, built a madrasa in Baghdad in 459/1066–7. Its construction began after work on the Nizāmiyya had started, though it appears to have been inaugurated before the Nizāmiyya. Ṣharaf al-Mulk also built a madrasa in Marv. Tāj al-Mulk Abu’l Ghanā’im (d. Muharram 486/1086–7), Nizām al-Mulk’s rival who succeeded him in the vizierate, founded the Tajyya madrasa in Baghdad. The building began in 480/1087–8 and the inauguration took place two years later. Many of the amirs also built madrasas. Thus Khumar-Tegin, who was in the service of Tutush b. Alp-Arslan, built a madrasa in Baghdad and called it after his master. Muḥammad b. Yaghi-Siyan (d. 501/1107–8) built a number of madrasas in his iqṭāʿ in Āzarbājjan. Several existed in Fārs, including the one built by ‘Alā al-Daula in Yazd in 513/1119–20. Jamāl al-Dīn Iqbāl, the jānḍār, founded one in Hamadān. There were also madrasas founded by women. For example, Zāhida Khatun, wife of the amir Boz-Aba, built and endowed one in Shīraz.

Many of the madrasas were founded for the followers of a particular rite; sometimes for a particular scholar. Nizām al-Mulk, who was himself a Shāfiʿi, laid down that the mudarris, vā’īq, and librarian of the Nizāmiyya in Baghdad should be Shāfiʿis. The teaching programme of the Baghdad Nizāmiyya comprised the Qur’ān, ḥadīth (traditions), usūl al-fiqh (jurisprudence) according to the Shāfiʿi rite, kalām (scholastic theology) according to Ašʿari doctrine, ‘arabiyya (Arabic language and literature), adab (belles lettres), riyaḍiyya (mathematics), and farā’id (laws of inheritance). It is possible that Nizām al-Mulk first made general the

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1 The building was begun in Dhu’l Ḍa‘dā 457/1065. Tūturshi in the Sirāj al-mulūk relates the story of its construction and the embezzlement of part of the funds allocated for this (Alexandria, A.H. 1289), pp. 216–18. See also Hindu-Shāh b. Sanjar, Tājīrīb al-Salaf, ed. Ṣabbās Iqbāl (Tehran, A.H. 1313), pp. 270 ff.

practice of establishing allowances for the students (jullâb) of the madrasas, and stipends for those teaching there.¹ Endowments were administered by a mutawallî (an administrator or trustee), appointed usually by the founder, and after his death, if no other arrangements had been laid down, he was succeeded by the qâdi.

The head of the madrasa, the mudarris, was in charge of its affairs and responsible for the general conduct of the students, some of whom, like some of the teachers, appear to have been organized in guilds. Both students and teachers lived in the madrasas. Frequently, the mudarris held some other office also, such as that of qâdi or khatîb (preacher). His tenure of office varied; it was normally for life except in the Nizâmiyyas. The office of mudarris in the large madrasas was one of importance, and if the holder had a reputation as a scholar, students would come from great distances to study under him. Exceptionally there were women students and teachers.²

The Nizâmiyya madrasas, the one founded by Sharaf al-Mulk, the mustaufî, and various others had libraries attached to them. There were also a number of independent libraries, some dating from before the Saljuq period, and also libraries in some of the Sûfî ribâts (hospices). A few madrasas had hospitals attached to them. Presumably the hospital founded by Nizâm al-Mulk in Nishâpûr was connected with his madrasa there.

The power of the sultan was in theory limited by the shari'a, to which he, like all Muslims, was subject. But the sanction of the shari'a in this case was simply moral because no means was devised to enforce his subjection to it. Under the Saljuqs there was, besides the Islamic and old Persian elements, a third element in the theory of the sultanate which, though not formally expressed in any written exposition, had some influence on practice. This was tribal custom. The Saljuqs had come to power with the support of the Ghuzz tribes, and their claim to the leadership of these tribes rested in the first instance on military prowess. Originally they were the hereditary leaders of a small group; gradually, as success attended their activities, the majority of the Ghuzz became associated with them. Their leadership, once established, was maintained by military might coupled with conciliation and consultation, though they never succeeded in establishing full control and unity.

over the Ghuzz. The outlying groups, although nominally acknowledging the overlordship of the sultan, acted independently or semi-independently. Politically the Saljuq empire was a loose confederation of semi-independent kingdoms over which the sultan exercised nominal authority. Saljuq princes were known as *maliks* in contradistinction to the paramount ruler, the sultan. Only for a brief period towards the end of Malik-Shah's reign was any degree of unity achieved.

Originally the Saljuqs seem to have held that their leadership was vested in the family as a whole; and that the various sections of their loose confederation were each led by a member of the family. They were thus in the beginning the leaders of their people but not territorial sovereigns, and they probably thought that their rule extended wherever their people roamed in search of pasture, and not, in any case at first, that it was tied to a given area. During the early period of expansion the khatuba was read in some cities in Khurasan in the name of Toghril Beg, and in others in the name of Chaghri Beg Da'ud, although Chaghri Beg never disputed the primacy of his brother.

This conception of the Saljuq family as the guardian of a tribal confederation had already been considerably modified before the death of Toghril Beg in 455/1063, and under Alp-Arslan the Persian ideal of an autocratic sovereign was to some extent adopted. It was almost inevitable that once the Saljuqs were no longer merely the leaders of a tribal migration but were the rulers of a territorial empire, they would be forced to seek some more stable basis of power than the Ghuzz, or the "Türkmen", as the Islamicized Ghuzz within the Saljuq empire were called. This change of basis began to take place under Alp-Arslan, perhaps even under Toghril Beg, and it was finally completed under Malik-Shah. From then the ultimate guarantee of the sultan's rule was the standing army composed of slaves and freedmen. This change was gradual: any sudden rupture with the past would have alienated the Türkmen tribes, who continued to be an important element in the Saljuq forces. Niẓām al-Mulk recognized this danger. In his *Siyāsat-Nāma* he stated that the Saljuq dynasty was under an obligation to the Türkmen, owing to blood ties and to the part they played in the foundation of the empire. For this reason the disorders they created could not be suppressed by severe measures. He recommended therefore that a thousand young Türkmen should be enrolled in the service of the sultan and trained as *ghulāms* (slaves) of the court, the number to

1 After the Saljuq period the title *malik* was debased and applied to prominent amirs.
be increased if necessary to five or even ten thousand. Many Türkmen were enrolled in the sultan’s service in this way.

As the sultan’s basis of power changed, so the custom of the steppe and of government by consultation and conciliation were replaced by the absolutism and arbitrary power of the old Persian ruling tradition, and also by a distrust of all to whom power was delegated. In spite of this, the original conceptions—of the leadership of the group being inherent in the Saljuq family, and of the empire as a loose confederation whose different parts were led by members of the family—never entirely disappeared; and they are discernible in the atabegate as well as the iqṭā’ (see p. 231 below).¹

It was perhaps natural that the conception of the sultan as arbitrary ruler should first be challenged by members of the Saljuq family itself; and the fact that there was no stable system of succession encouraged them to dispute when a weak prince or a child succeeded to the throne. The normal practice was for the sultan to nominate his vali ‘āhd. No regulations governing his choice were laid down, and sometimes the wives of the sultan exerted influence in the matter. If a prince’s mother was free-born and a Saljuq, for example, this was probably favourable for his chance of succession. Berk-Yaruq’s mother was free-born and a Saljuq, and this was allegedly one of the reasons that led to his becoming sultan.

The fact that the sultan proclaimed one of his sons as his vali ‘āhd did not always ensure his succession, however. Toghril Beg, who had no children himself, married one of Chaghri Beg Dā‘ūd’s wives after Chaghri Beg’s death, and proclaimed her son Sulaimān as his vali ‘āhd. On the death of Toghril Beg, his vizier, ‘Amid al-Mulk Kunduri put Sulaimān on the throne; but seeing that the amirs opposed that accession he proclaimed Alp-Arslan, an older son of Chaghri Beg by another wife, as sultan in Qazvin, and he had the kḥūṭba read in Ray in the names of both. Yabghu b. Mīkā’il, governor of Herāt, and Qutlumush each rebelled in 456/1063–4. Alp-Arslan defeated them and was later reconciled to both. Qara-Arslan in Kirmān also rebelled some three years later (459/1066–7). He too was reinstated after being defeated. It may well be that the opposition which Alp-Arslan encountered from Yabghu and Qutlumush marked a turning-point in the relations between the sultan and his family. As the conception of autocratic ruler replaced that of ruling khan, the moral basis of Saljuq

¹ Various tribal influences are also to be seen in the royal insignia of the Saljuqs.
authority was weakened. Alp-Arslan may well have realized that some substitute had to be found for the former tribal loyalties to which the Saljuqs owed their position, and that if he was to keep even a limited control over the members of the family, then a standing army loyal to himself was necessary.

In 458/1065–7 Alp-Arslan determined to appoint Malik-Shāh as his vali 'āhd, and he had his name included in the khutba after his own. This was probably normal practice. At the same time as this nomination, Alp-Arslan divided part of the kingdom among his relatives in order to abate any quarrel with the succession of Malik-Shāh (see p. 235 below). In spite of this, various members of the family disputed his accession on the death of Alp-Arslan. Qavurd, the ruler of Kirmān, wrote to Malik-Shāh stating that it was more fitting for him to succeed, on the grounds that he was Alp-Arslan’s eldest brother while Malik-Shāh was only a young son.1 Malik-Shāh, who was then aged about eighteen, replied that a brother did not inherit if there was a son. This, however, was Islamic and not tribal law. Qavurd made a determined effort to seize the throne, but he was defeated and killed. Tekish, to whom Balkh and Tukhāristān had been assigned, rebelled twice, in 473/1080–1 and 477/1084–5; on the second occasion he was captured and blinded. Tōghrīl b. İnāl also made an abortive attempt in 482/1089–90 to establish his independence in the neighbourhood of Nasaf. In Syria, which Malik-Shāh had assigned to Tutush in 470/1077–8, the sultan’s nominal authority seems to have been recognized, though he twice had to intervene in person.2 Tutush came himself to pay his respects to Malik-Shāh in Baghdad in 484/1091.

Malik-Shāh nominated Ahmad, the eldest son of Zubaida Khatun, as his vali ‘āhd, and he died in 481/1088–9. A new heir was not nominated, and when Malik-Shāh died four years later, civil war ensued. Terken Khatun, his last wife, a Qarakhānid princess, succeeded in persuading the caliph to have the khutba read in Baghdad in the name of her son Maḥmūd, in return for which she handed over Abu’l Faḍl Ja’far, the son of Arslan Khatun and al-Muqtadi, who had been with Malik-Shāh since his mother had returned from the caliph’s court. (Ja’far died the following year; and Terken Khatun herself died in 487/1094.) Meanwhile the Nizāmiyya mamluks (slaves) carried off Berk-

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1 Akhbar al-daulat al-Saljuqiyya, ed. Muhammad Iqbal (Lahore, 1933), p. 56. Sanjar later opposed the accession of Maḥmūd b. Muhammad on the grounds of his youth.
Yaruq, who had been imprisoned in Isfahān on Terken Khatun's orders, and proclaimed him sultan. He was at this time a boy of thirteen and in no position to assert himself as the leader of his people.

İsmâ‘îl b. Yâqūtî, his maternal uncle, who was in Āzarbâijân, was persuaded by Terken Khatun to side against Berk-Yaruq. He was eventually killed by the Niţâmiyya mamlûks, as was Tâj al-Mulk Abu‘l Ghanâ‘îm, who had collaborated with Terken Khatun. Tutuşh and Arslan Arghûn, both brothers of Malik-Shâh, also rebelled in Syria and Khurâsân respectively. The former was defeated in 487/1096, and the latter three years later. Berk-Yaruq's half-brother Muḥammad rebelled in 492/1098-9. After many vicissitudes, Berk-Yaruq established a slight supremacy in 497/1103-4 at the cost of much disorder throughout the country and a decline in the prestige of the sultanate. By the terms of the peace concluded between them, Muḥammad's status was virtually that of an independent ruler. On his deathbed in 498/1105, Berk-Yaruq nominated his son Malik-Shâh as his vali ‘ahd, but although the khûţba was read in his name in Baghdad, Muḥammad soon succeeded in establishing himself as sultan. During the reign of Muḥammad, his full brother Sanjâr (whom Berk-Yaruq had sent with his atabeg Qumâch to Khurâsân in 490/1097) was nominally the ruler of Khurâsân on behalf of Muḥammad, but he was virtually independent. On the death of Muḥammad, Sanjâr defeated Maḥmûd b. Muḥammad, whom Muḥammad had nominated as his vali ‘ahd at Sâveh in 513/1119, and he then made himself sultan. He did not, however, move to a more central position but reinstituted Maḥmûd in those districts which he had held in western and southern Persia and Iraq, while he himself returned to Khurâsân. Maḥmûd and his successors are referred to in the sources as sultans, but although they enjoyed a certain measure of independence, their status, until the death of Sanjâr, was only that of maliks. It is not clear why Sanjâr remained in Khurâsân: he may not have had any personal following outside that province, or he may have considered it unwise to absent himself permanently from the eastern frontiers since the tribes of Central Asia were again in a state of unrest and pressing in upon the Saljuq empire; or it may be that he was influenced by the wishes of his mother, who was Maḥmûd's grandmother and who is alleged to have persuaded him to make peace with Maḥmûd. Whatever the causes, the arrangement was unsatisfactory. Sanjâr was forced to intervene in the western provinces on various occasions, and was unable either to restrain the increasing ambitions of the
amirs and atabegs or, ultimately, to prevent the disintegration of the empire.

Geographically the Saljuq empire was divided into provinces which corresponded broadly with the provinces that had formed the Sassanian empire. An elaborate system of roads, which also went back to the pre-Islamic period, radiated from Baghdad to serve not only the movement of armies but also that of merchants. The most famous of these was the great Khurāsān trunk road going east from Baghdad via Kirmānshāh, Hamadān, Ray, Nīshāpūr, and Marv to the frontier towns on the Jaxartes. Cross-roads branched off from Kirmānshāh to Tabrīz and Ardabil; from Hamadān to Isfahān; from Ray to Zanjān and Tabrīz; and from Nīshāpūr roads went to Tabas, Qā'īn, Herāt, and Sistān. Another route led south-east from Baghdad to Baṣra, from whence there lay a road to Ahvāz and Shīrāz, where roads from Isfahān and Ray, from Yazd and Nīshāpūr, and from Sirjān, Kirmān, and Sistān all converged. The administrative divisions of the empire did not correspond precisely with the provincial divisions, although when the empire began to fragment it tended to break up into geopolitical units centred on the major provinces of Khurāsān, Āzarbāiǰan, Iraq, Kirmān, and Fārs. Administratively the empire fell into two broad divisions: an area directly administered by the sultan's divān, and an indirectly administered area. In general, the former tended to increase up to the end of the reign of Malik-Shāh and subsequently to decrease. The indirectly administered area was alienated from the direct control of the sultan's divān and assigned to the amirs and others as iqṭā's (see p. 235 below). These did not correspond to a fixed area, and they varied greatly in size. They tended to be smaller than the geographical provinces and to be centred on the most important town of a district.

The main centres of the empire under Toghril Beg at the beginning of his rule were Nishāpūr and Ray, the latter being his capital for a time. In his final years he spent much time in Iṣfahān, his chief residence for some twelve years, where he expended on public buildings and improvements a sum exceeding 500,000 dinārs. Nasir-i Khusraw, who passed through Iṣfahān in 444/1052, stated that it was the most populous and flourishing city that he had seen in Persian-speaking lands.

1 See further, G. Le Strange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate (Cambridge, 1903).
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patronage continued under Alp-Arslan, who was greatly pleased with Isfahān and treated its people with marked favour. Malik-Shāh chose it as his capital and did much building in the city and the neighbourhood. Marv, too, enjoyed a special position, as the capital of Chaghri Beg Dā'ūd and later of Sanjar; and Malik-Shāh also built a suburb there called Panj Dih. Toghril Beg built a new quarter at Baghdad on the Tigris, which included a Friday mosque and bazaars, and was surrounded by a wall. There Malik-Shāh built his mosque known as Jāmī‘ al-Salṭān, the foundations of which were laid in 485/1092.

The sultans spent much of their time on military campaigns and travelling about their empire. The dargāb, or court, did not remain in the capital but was to be found wherever the sultan was. Government officials such as the vizier, accompanied him, and presumably the "private" treasury often went with him as well. To what extent a distinction was made between the sultan’s private treasury and the state treasury is not clear, nor do we know what monies were paid into the former. The vizier was in charge of the state treasury, but there appears to have been a special treasurer directly under the sultan in charge of the private treasury. Malik-Shāh is said to have built a fortress outside Isfahān, known as Shāhdiz (this the Bāṭinīs subsequently captured), in which his treasury, armoury, and young slaves in training were kept when he was absent on campaigns.¹

Alp-Arslan and Malik-Shāh also had stores of money in strongholds in different parts of the kingdom, chiefly to facilitate their military expeditions. Alp-Arslan is said to have had a store in the fortress of Gīv near Farahān so that if he was travelling between Khurāsān and Iraq he could obtain from there anything he needed. On one occasion when he reached Farahān on his way to Anātolia, he is reported to have taken from it one million dinārs for the expenses of the expedition.² Malik-Shāh had similar strongholds: one such was the fortress of Quhandiz near Nīshāpūr.³ Sanjar’s treasury was apparently kept in Marv, his capital. When he was absent fighting the Qara-Khitai in 532/1137-8, the Khwārazm-Shāh, Atṣīz, captured Marv and took Sanjar’s jewels. Subsequently Sanjar invaded Khwārazm and recaptured them.⁴

The sultan’s wives and womenfolk also frequently accompanied him

² Nasā’ī’s Nama, attributed to Nizām al-Mulk; MS. in my possession, fol. 30, cols. a-b.
³ Cf. Akhīr al-dawla al-Saljuqīyya, p. 56.
⁴ Bundārī, p. 217.
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on expeditions. In 536/1141, when Sanjar was defeated on the Qatvān steppe by the Qara-Khitai, his wife Terken Khatun was captured, but she was subsequently released. Some of the sultan's wives wielded unusual influence. Toghril Beg's wife, who died in Zanjan in 452/1060-1 and was buried in Ray, was, according to Ibn al-Jauzi, a wise woman to whom Toghril Beg entrusted his affairs. Terken Khatun played an active part in the struggle for the succession after her husband Malik-Shāh's death. Some of the wives had their own divāns and viziers, and were women of substance; Sanjar's mother, for instance, had her own mamlūks. It appears to have been usual for the sultans' wives to have personal estates. Simīrūm was part of the pension of Guhar Khatun, Muhammad b. Malik-Shāh's wife. There are also many instances of a sultan's granting iqṭā's to Saljuq women and to women who married into the Saljuq house. For example, when Toghril Beg married the caliph's daughter in 454/1062, he assigned to her Ba'qūbā and all that his late wife had held in Iraq. After putting down the rebellion of Qara-Arslan in Kirman and reinstating him in the province, Alp-Arslan allocated to Qara-Arslan's daughters, in response to their father's request, 100,000 dinārs, iqṭā's, garments, and money for the expenses of marriage celebrations.

Marriage alliances played an important part in Saljuq policy. In addition to the marriage alliances made with caliphs, there were numerous marriages between Saljuqs and members of former local ruling houses such as the 'Uqailids, the Būyids, Kākūyids, Mazyadids, and others. Members of the bureaucracy, the religious classes, and learned men frequented the court, but except for the sultan's private household, it was essentially a military court, composed, from the reign of Alp-Arslan onwards, mainly of amirs and members of the standing army ('askar). Those amirs who held "administrative" iqṭā's (see p. 233 below) often found it necessary to have their agents at court to keep them informed of current developments and to watch over their interests. In addition, there were numbers of hostages taken from various tribal groups—Türkmen, Kurds, Shabānkāra, and others—and from former ruling families, and they remained at court as sureties against the rebellion of their relatives.

The amirs were mainly mamlūks (slaves) or freedmen. Their status was

2 Al-Muqarrab Jauhar had originally been her mamlük and was transferred to Sanjar on her death in 517/1123 (Bundāri, p. 250).
not originally equal to that of the free-born, but they could and did attain to the highest positions in the state, and then they themselves acquired mamluks. In some cases both slaves and freedmen married into the royal house. The atabegate is further proof that no social stigma attached to the slave or freedman from the time of Malik-Shah on. Whether this was the case in the early days of Saljuq expansion, however, is not clear. Isrā‘il b. Saljuq, when he sent a message to his family urging them to fight for the kingdom of Maḥmūd b. Sebūk-Tegin, is alleged to have spoken of him with contempt as the son of a freed slave (mauld).¹ By Islamic law the possessions of a mamlük escheated to his master; in practice, however, on the death of a royal mamlük the sultan often granted his possessions to one of the mamlük’s descendants. Freedom was bought by the mamlük, given by the sultan, or else usurped; and if a mamlük attained to a position of power he became virtually free. Many of the later sultans, who came to the throne in extreme youth, were dominated by the amirs. Even Sanjar, if Bundārī is to be believed, fell under the influence of successive mamluks, whom he singled out for special favour. At least two of them are alleged to have been murdered on his orders after they fell from favour.

The amirs were divided broadly into three groups: those at the sultan’s court; “landed” amirs, i.e. those holding “administrative” iqṭā‘s; and “wandering” amirs, who owed no permanent allegiance to anyone, but moved about the empire serving different leaders and taking possession of districts as opportunity arose. The grouping of the amirs was not constant, however. Those at court frequently changed, and the distinction between a “landed” and a “wandering” amīr was not fixed; thus a wandering amīr who usurped possession of a district and was then confirmed in his possession of it by the sultan became a landed amīr. As a class the amirs had no community of interest. Apart from rare instances their jealousies prevented close co-operation among them except for a limited time. Just as the sultan used marriage alliances to strengthen his position, so the amīrs by intermarriage among themselves and with the ruling house sought to strengthen their own position. Their power, relative to that of the sultan on the one hand and the bureaucracy on the other, increased noticeably after the reign of Malik-Shāh. They were quick to resent any attempt to reimpose control over them, and their disobedience after the accession of Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad was a marked feature of the times.

¹ Rāvandī, p. 91.
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The chief official of the court until towards the end of the reign of Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh was the vakil-i dar, who appears to have been a kind of intermediary between the sultan and the vizier. According to Bundārī his position was more privileged than that of the ḥājibs (chamberlains). He had to be “eloquent and able to triumph in difficult situations in matters of speech, independent in establishing proof if necessary; [his words] free from banality and distinguished by grace, and able to understand the different moods and characteristics of the sultan”.¹ His precise relation to the vizier, the head of the divān, is not entirely clear. Ibn Balkhī states that in his time the vakil-i dar was the vizier’s deputy.² Towards the end of Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh’s reign the vakil-i dar was replaced by the amir ḥājib, who was a member of the military classes and not of the bureaucracy. Although this change was apparently provoked by the incompetence of a certain Zaki, who had been appointed vakil-i dar by Sa’d al-Mulk Abu’l Mahāsin Āvajī, the vizier of Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh, it may signify a decline in the position of the vizier, as well as the increased militarization of the state.

Nizām al-Mulk describes the functions of the ḥājib in terms of those of a court official. But since the court was a military court, the amir ḥājib was normally a Turkish amīr and the men under him military slaves. He was therefore concerned with the maintenance of military discipline as well as with court ceremonial. He became the most important official at court, while the amīr haras (chief of the guard) and the jāʿdār (chief executioner) ranked after him. Bundārī states that the amir ḥājib (or amir-i bār) regulated the audiences of the sultan and transmitted the sultan’s commands to the vizier.³ ‘Ali b. ‘Umar, the amir ḥājib of Mahmūd b. Muḥammad, eventually became ārid al-jaish (muster-master) of the army. Many of those who held the office of amir ḥājib were among the most powerful amīrs of the day.

There were a series of other officials at the court, such as the aḵbur-sālār (master of the horse), who looked after the royal stables. Sanjār appears to have had extensive herds of horses, as probably did many of the other sultans; and there was also a khwān-sālār, who was in charge of the royal kitchens. The latter was no small charge, for tribal custom demanded that the ruler should keep an open table, and this involved the daily provision of food for large numbers. Alp-Arslan was stated to have fifty head of sheep slaughtered daily, which, together with other

¹ Bundārī, p. 86. ² Fārs-Nāma, p. 91. ³ P. 107.
food, were eaten by the amirs and the poor. Under Sanjar the Ghuzz paid an annual tribute of 24,000 sheep to the royal kitchen.

Among the sultan’s most important functions—and in this the traditions of the steppe and of Islamic government coincided—was to judge. Both traditions required that he should be accessible to his people. His chief medium as a judge was the mazâlim court, which, according to Islamic theory, it was his prerogative to hold. This court was also the main channel of contact between the sultan and his subjects, though its effectiveness as such was limited. The procedure of the court and its rules of evidence differed from those of the shar‘i courts: it was necessary that the man who presided over the mazâlim court should possess the power to exercise his functions and to apply the rules of justice, which was not the case with the qâdi, who presided over the shar‘i courts. The first reference to a mazâlim court held by a Saljuq sultan is to the one held by Toghrîl in Nishâpûr in 429/1038. Malik-Shâh is also alleged to have given justice personally. Nizâm al-Mulk maintained that it was indispensable for the ruler to hold a mazâlim court twice a week to exact redress from the unjust, to dispense justice, and to listen to the words of his subjects without an intermediary.¹ This recommendation, however, was based on expediency rather than on a love of justice. “Always”, states Nizâm al-Mulk, “there will be many persons at the court demanding redress for injustice, and if they do not receive an answer they will go away, and foreigners and envoys who come to the court and see this complaining and disturbance will think that great tyranny takes place at this court.”²

The majority of the Saljuq sultans, however, in all probability delegated their function of presiding over the mazâlim court to the vizier or the qâdi and in the provinces to the great amirs and Saljuq maliks who held large areas as “administrative” iqṭa’s and often in turn delegated their functions to their representatives. Thus under the Saljuqs as under earlier rulers the mazâlim court became, not an exceptional appeal to the sultan in person, but an everyday application to his representative to be dealt with according to a settled practice.³ The general tendency was for the mazâlim jurisdiction relative to the shar‘i courts to extend. Many of the cases coming before the mazâlim court were probably concerned with the collection of taxes and general

¹ Siyāsat-Nāma, p. 10.  
² Ibid., p. 207.  
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litigation. It also dealt with cases against government officials. Its decisions were carried out by the shahna and his officials, or by the military.

Another of the sultan’s important functions was to defend his country and his people in war. In this, too, the tradition of the steppe and of Islamic government coincided. The first three sultans led the army in person. After the death of Malik-Shāh, with the accession of young boys to the throne, this was not always the case. As a result the ties between the sultan and the army were weakened, and the soldiers tended more and more to give their loyalty to their immediate commanders rather than to the sultan. Desertions in the later period became relatively frequent. Moreover the jealousies and quarrels of the amirs detracted from the efficiency of the army as a fighting force. The core of the standing army was formed by mamluks and freedmen. On campaigns they were joined by contingents furnished by the amirs and by tribal auxiliaries. The armies of the amirs were also in many cases composed round a nucleus of slave troops. The mamluks and freedmen of the amirs and others, if they did not pass on the death of their masters to their heirs, were sometimes incorporated into the royal ‘askar, forming a division known by the name of their late master. Throughout the Saljuq empire there were also bodies of unemployed soldiery, who were ready to join the standard of any leader in the hope of plunder. Their existence facilitated the assembling of an army at short notice, but it also made easy the rebellion of discontented maliks and amirs.

For the most part the mamluks of the standing army were Turks who had been captured or bought on the eastern frontiers of the Islamic world. A number of Georgians, Greeks, and Armenians, who had been captured on the western frontiers—or, like some of the Turks, were the children of such captives—were also enrolled in the standing army. Many of the mamluks were carefully trained to fulfil their various functions, which were administrative as well as military.¹ The most important group in the army after the Turks, however, were the Dailamites, who were chiefly infantry, whereas the Turks were cavalry. Nizām al-Mulk advocated that the army should be “mixed”, half Turkish and half Dailamite. In practice, although the army was composed of different elements, the Turkish greatly predominated.

¹ Nizām al-Mulk states that the system of training that had prevailed under the Sāmānids had fallen into disuse by his day (Siyāsat-Nāma, p. 94).
Tribal auxiliaries were provided mainly by Türkmen. There were also Kurds, Arabs, and Shabānkāra. Quite apart from the family ties between Saljuqs and Türkmen, it was a matter of moment for the sultan to treat them well, because, in addition to their being a useful reinforcement to his army, they were a potential source of strength for the enemy. They were extremely mobile and could assemble in a short space of time. Their guiding motive was plunder. Tribal auxiliaries were in some cases employed by the amirs, and by local rulers such as the Mazyadids.

The chief weapon of the army was the bow and arrow. This the cavalry used from the saddle, shooting without dismounting or halting. Spears, of which the khaṭṭī spear was the most renowned, swords, clubs, shields, and a kind of horse armour, were in use. The Khūrāsān army under Sanjar had elephants. Greek fire was used and a siege engine known as the manjānīq. This latter was not particularly effective, and if the provisions of the besieged town held out the defenders were usually able to withstand the besiegers. A more deadly siege weapon was the mine, which was used by the Saljuq armies in Syria. The army was in some cases accompanied by a field hospital. The one attached to Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad’s army was equipped with instruments, medicines, and tents, and staffed by doctors and orderlies (ghulāms); for its transport it had two hundred Bactrian camels.\(^1\)

The cavalry manoeuvred with speed and flexibility: one of their favourite manoeuvres was the feigned retreat. Warfare was necessarily seasonal. Most of the forces assembled by the amirs tended to disperse at harvest time; and they were generally reluctant to be absent from their iqṭā’s for long periods, lest a rival should attack their possessions during their absence or the sultan should assign them to some other amir.

It is difficult to arrive at accurate figures for the size of the standing army. The numbers given by the sources, which are probably only broad approximations, often include the armies of the amirs and tribal auxiliaries which joined the sultan when he went on a campaign. Toghril Beg’s standing army was probably fairly small. Alp-Arslan at the time of his assassination was accompanied by 2,000 slaves. Malik-Shāh, when he was valī ‘ahd, had 15,000 soldiers attached to him; as sultan, he is said to have had 40,000 horses always in his service. In 473/1080–1 he is alleged to have dismissed 7,000 Armenians, who then

\(^1\) Bundārī, p. 124. Ibn al-Khallikān, however (vol. II, p. 82), gives the figure of camels needed to transport it as forty.
joined Tekish in his rebellion. Nizām al-Mulk complains of an attempt made by one of Malik-Shāh’s entourage, probably towards the end of his reign, to induce him to economize on military expenditure and cut down the size of his army. He points out that the strength of the empire lay in proportion to the strength of the sultan’s army, and that if men were dismissed they would be a potential centre of disorder and rebellion. Generally speaking, it would seem that in the later period the standing army decreased and numbered only 10–15,000. Against this the number of troops mustered by the amirs tended to increase.

The army was accompanied by a military bazaar and a host of camp followers. Berk-Yaruq, when he came to Isfahan in Jumādā I 495/1102, was reported to have been accompanied by 15,000 horses and 100,000 camp followers. The army did not always move with its followers, however. When Alp-Arslan marched against the Byzantines and defeated them at Mantzikert in 463/1071, for example, he sent his baggage and women to Tabriz.

The provisioning of the army as it moved through the country was a matter of no small difficulty. Nizām al-Mulk recommended that fodder and stores should be kept at different places in the country through which the ruler was likely to pass with his army. Land was to be acquired in the neighbourhood, and its produce, when not required by the army, was to be sold and the proceeds remitted to the treasury. Under Malik-Shāh this plan was followed to some extent; later it probably fell into disuse. Whereas Malik-Shāh does not appear to have suffered any major obstacle to the provisioning of his army, the later sultans encountered difficulties.

The pay of the standing army and of the amirs who provided contingents for the royal army was controlled by the Military Inspection Office, the divān-i ‘ard (also called the divān al-jaish), which was a department of the central divān (see below). They were paid partly by cash and partly by drafts on the revenue and by iqṭā’s. Nizām al-Mulk urged that the wages of the soldiers who did not have iqṭā’s should be held liquid, that they should be paid at the right time, and if possible by the sultan in person. In practice their pay was often in arrears, though

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1 Siyāsāt-Nāma, p. 144.
2 Bundārī states that Nizām al-Mulk would allot to a soldier (jundī) 1,000 dinārs annually, half of which would be on a town in Asia Minor (Rum) and half on a place in the most distant part of Khurasān; and that the total would be paid immediately without any charge (p. 53). Cf. also Akhbār al-daulat al-Saljuqīyya, p. 68. Houtsma thinks, probably rightly, that 1,000 dinārs is a scribe’s error for 100 dinārs.
INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE SALJUQ EMPIRE

a part of it was commonly given to them at the outset of a campaign. After the death of Malik-Shâh difficulties in financing the army became more frequent; and insubordination in the army was especially noticeable from this time onwards. This stringency was due partly to the fact that there was a decrease in the directly administered area, and hence a decrease in the revenue coming into the treasury; and partly to the fact that civil war had brought about a general decline in prosperity. In addition to their regular pay the soldiers received *ad hoc* payments such as accession gratuities and presents on special occasions, as well as a share of the booty taken in battle.

Bundârî's well-known statement that Nizâm al-Mulk introduced the practice of granting iqṭāʾs to the soldiery is manifestly untrue. Such grants were already common practice under the Bûyids. What Nizâm al-Mulk probably did was to regularize the practice and in some measure to unify the "military" and the "administrative" iqṭāʾ. Both existed under the Bûyids, but the "administrative" iqṭāʾ was the exception then, whereas under the Saljuqs it became the dominant type of iqṭāʾ and the most important institution of their empire. In order to appreciate its nature and the way it developed, the earlier history of the iqṭāʾ must be briefly considered.

The iqṭāʾ emerged in the fourth/tenth century against a background of change in the economic and social environment (though not in the purpose of government) of the 'Abbâsid caliphate. As it evolved, in response to the state's dominant need to finance its operations and to pay its civil and military officers, the iqṭāʾ seized upon and transformed two institutions: the amirate or provincial government on the one hand; and, on the other, the tax farm, whether the āmân or the qabâla which was an undertaking to pay the tax quota of a community, assessed at a fixed sum and paid according to the lunar year. The provincial government had its vicissitudes. Eventually the difficulty of finding money to pay the officials of the bureaucracy and the army led to a breakdown of the administrative system and a wholesale extension of the farming of the taxes. Already by the death of the Caliph al-Ma’mûn in 218/833 the balance between the civil and military arms of the administration had been upset, and the money received from the farming of taxes soon ceased to be sufficient to pay the army leaders and their troops. As the revenue came in with increasing irregularity, the practice grew of assigning the taxes, not to the tax-farmers, but to the military themselves.

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Once a military leader was assigned the right to collect the taxes of a large area, it became relatively easy for him to establish his semi-independence. Moreover, when the taxes still failed to come in regularly, rights over the land itself were then assigned to him: in other words, the tax-farm swallowed up the land-revenue system and in turn became assimilated to the provincial government. These grants to the military were known as iqṭā'. The militarization of the state was marked not only in Iraq and the neighbourhood under the Būyids, but also in the east under the Sāmānids and more especially under the Ghaznavids. The growing tendency of the military to be occupied, not only with the arts of war, but also with administration, obscured to some extent the true nature of the iqṭā' system, the origins of which were bureaucratic and not feudal.

In still earlier times hereditary grants of 'ūṣhr land were called iqṭā', whereas non-hereditary grants made from land other than kharāj land were called ṭu′ma.¹ Land that paid a fixed sum to the treasury and was immune from the entry of the tax-collector was called igḥār; and an annual but renewable tax-free grant was called tasvij. Both were made on kharāj land. The iqṭā's granted to the military under the Būyids were probably made mainly on kharāj land and not 'ūṣhr land, though by that time the distinction between these two types had become somewhat blurred. They were thus an extension of the igḥār and tasvij rather than the original iqṭā'. In fact, jurists such as Māwardi distinguish between the new and the old iqṭā' (which were properly grants of 'ūṣhr land), calling the latter iqṭā' al-tamlik and the former iqṭā' al-istighlāl. The difference between them was that the iqṭā' al-tamlik was a grant of ownership, its purpose the extension of cultivation, whereas the iqṭā' al-istighlāl was a grant of the usufruct, and its purpose was remuneration for services.

Under the Būyids the men to whom the new type of iqṭā', the military iqṭā', was granted did not normally live in the area granted to them, but merely sent their agents to collect their revenues. In theory these iqṭā's were not hereditary but were subject to periodic redistribution. The holder had to perform military service and was theoretically subject to detailed regulations and inspection. The amirs who held these iqṭā's had no responsibility for the payment of the soldiery, who

¹ 'Uṣhr land was land which paid land tax at the rate of one-tenth of the produce; kharāj land paid at a higher rate. The classification of lands on the basis of these two rates was an intricate problem; see F. Løkkegaard, *Islamic Taxation in the Classic Period* (Copenhagen, 1950), pp. 72 ff.
received iqṭā'īs or pay from the state. A provincial governor distributed the area under his jurisdiction as iqṭā'īs, but he did this as an official of the state and not because the area formed part of his private domain. Legally the possession of an iqṭā' did not give the muqṭā' (the holder or grantee) any juridical rights over the inhabitants, but in practice there were widespread usurpations by the military under the Būyids. Moreover, the tendency for the functions of the provincial governor, the provincial military commander, the tax-collector, the tax-farmer, and the muqṭā' to be combined in one person led to the emergence of large properties virtually independent of the central government. The tendency for the de facto powers of the muqṭā' to increase was also strengthened by the fact that governors frequently received some areas in their provinces by way of iqṭā'īs; in such cases they combined in these districts their economic power as muqṭā' with their functions as governor, and tended to exercise the powers of both throughout the province.¹ There were also cases under the Būyids where a muqṭā' was given, in addition to his functions as muqṭā', the administrative duties and obligations of a provincial governor; but this type of iqṭā' was the exception in Būyid times, and did not become widespread until the Saljuq period.²

The “military” iqṭā' under the Būyids was controlled by the military divan, the diwān al-jaish, at whose head was the ‘ārid or muster-master. Thus the military divān was concerned not only, or even primarily, with military administration, but rather with the fiscal value (‘ibrā) and characteristics of each iqṭā', and with the re-allocation of iqṭā'īs as they fell vacant.³ This intimate connexion between the assessment of taxes and the levy of troops continued in the Saljuq period; but as the “military” iqṭā' became assimilated to the “administrative” iqṭā', the careful estimate of the exact fiscal value of each tended to be replaced by an approximate value; eventually the iqṭā' came to be defined not by fiscal value but by service; and then, through usurpation, it became an hereditary domain over which the muqṭā' had governmental prerogatives.⁴

Throughout the Saljuq empire there was considerable variety of practice as well as of terminology, and the term iqṭā' is used in the

⁴ Cf. C. Cahen, p. 43.
sources to cover a number of different types of grants. Thus it was used to mean (1) a grant on the revenue, or a grant of land for (a) military service and (b) in lieu of salary; (2) the grant of a district, and jurisdiction over it, to Saljuq maliks, amirs, and others, which was virtually a grant of provincial government; (3) a tax farm (though this is more often referred to as damān); and (4) the grant of (a) a personal estate and (b) an allowance or pension. Iqṭā’s to the sultan’s wives and other Saljuq women, to the caliph, and to members of the religious classes fall into the last category. It must not be assumed, however, that all iqṭā’s fall neatly into one or other of these categories, or that all iqṭā’s belonging to the same category necessarily conformed to the same pattern. There was no doubt a general tendency to follow accepted precedent, which resulted in a general similarity of usage, but this does not exclude the possibility of a variety of special provisions according to circumstances.

Niẓâm al-Mulk, discussing the relations of the muqṭā’s to the population, states:

Let those who hold iqṭā’s, know that they have no authority over the peasants beyond this, that they should take the due amount which has been assigned to them from the peasants in a good way, and that when they have done so the peasants shall be secure in their persons, and their money, wives, children, goods, and farms shall be secure and the muqṭā’s have no claim over them... Let the muqṭā’s know that the country and the subjects (raʿīyyat) all belong to the sultan. The muqṭā’s, who are set over them, and the governors (vālīn) are like shāhnās in relation to the subjects, as the king is to others [i.e. those subjects not on assigned lands].

Though it would seem from the above that Niẓâm al-Mulk has primarily in mind the “military” iqṭā’, his coupling of the muqṭā with the vālī suggests that he was discussing something rather different from the “military” iqṭā of the Būyid period. In another passage he states that if attention were ever drawn to the ruin and dispersal of the inhabitants of any district, the matter should at once be investigated and the condition of the muqṭā and ‘āmil inquired into, in order to prevent the land becoming waste, the peasants dispersing, and money being levied unjustly. This suggests that the idea of increasing cultivation had to some extent been carried over from the old iqṭā’ al-tamlik to the new type of iqṭā’ which was developing under the Saljuqs; and, further, that the “military” and the “administrative” iqṭā’ were becoming assimilated to each other. This is borne out by Bundārī’s statement

1 Siyāsat-Nāma, p. 28.  
2 Ibid. p. 119.
that Nizām al-Mulk, seeing the disorder of the country and the irregularity of the payment of taxes, assigned the country to the soldiers (ajnād), handing over to them its produce so that they had an interest in its prosperity. It is thus difficult in Saljuq times to make a clear distinction between the “military” and the “administrative” iqṭā'. All grants were entirely a matter of grace, and revocable at will by the sultan.

Grants of “administrative” iqṭā’s to Saljuq maliks do not differ materially from similar grants to the great amīrs, though in the former it is possible to see the influence of the custom of the steppe, according to which the ruling khan did not exercise power, to the exclusion of the other members of his family but rather as the head of a council of elders. The Saljuq malik normally resided in the area assigned to him. These grants were not intended to be permanent, but a tendency arose for different branches of the family to regard certain districts as their own iqṭā’. In the case of the Saljuqs of Kirmān, Rūm, and Syria, this led to the establishment of three independent kingdoms.

When he appointed Malik-Shāh as his valī 'ahd in 458/1066, Alp-Arslan gave iqṭā’s to various members of his family: Inānch Yabgu received Māzandarān; Sulaimān b. Dā'ūd received Balkh, his sons Arslan-Arghu and Arslan-Shāh were given Khwārazm and Marv respectively; Alp-Arslan’s brother Ilyās received Chaghāniyān and Tukhāristān; Mas'ūd b. Er-Tash had Baghshūr, and Maudūd b. Er-Tash had Isfīzār. On his deathbed Alp-Arslan made further assignments. He bestowed upon his son Ayāz what had formerly belonged to Dā'ūd in Balkh, and he also earmarked for him 500,000 dinārs; but the fortresses in those districts he assigned to Malik-Shāh, and he gave Fārs and Kirmān to Qavurt b. Dā'ūd, allocating to him also a sum of money.

These and similar grants made by later sultans are referred to in the sources as iqṭā’s. They were in all cases simply delegations of authority and did not contain any implication of vassalage or permanent rights, though these were sometimes usurped. The duties delegated were the normal duties of a Muslim ruler, including the patronage of religion and of the religious classes, preservation of public order, holding or supervising the mażālim court, collecting taxes, and paying salaries and allowances. In some cases the duty of consultation was also enjoined upon the malik. This derived from two sources: the custom of the steppe and the Quranic principle of “Consult them in affairs”. The

1 P. 55.
terms of the grant varied. In most cases complete financial control was
given to the malik, in the sense that all revenue was collected by him. He was usually instructed not to increase taxation, and was in any case
limited in this by local custom and Islamic theory. The degree to which
he could sub-assign the area under him varied. Sanjar, reinstating Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad after his rebellion in 513/1119, appears to have acted exceptionally when he retained Ray as a precaution in case Maḥmūd should rebel again. During the reign of Maṣūd b. Muḥammad, Ray was also excluded from the area he ruled, and was assigned by Sanjar to al-Muqarrab Jauhar. It was subsequently held by the latter’s mamlûk ‘Abbās, whom Maṣūd killed in 541/1146-7.

Similarly, the assignments made to the great amîrs, which were also
delegations of some or all the ruler’s normal duties within the area
assigned, are usually referred to in the sources as iqṭâʾs when they are
in the western provinces, and their holders are called muqṭaʾs. Occasionally the term wâli is used, apparently as a synonym for muqṭaʾ. In Khurāsān, Gurgān, and in the neighbouring districts, these grants
during Sanjar’s reign were known by the traditional terms for a provincial government, vilâya, ‘amal, rijāsa, and nihatba, and the term iqṭâʾ appears to have been used in a more specific sense, corresponding rather to the “military” iqṭâʾ. Each iqṭâʾ was supposed to bring in a definite sum of money, in return for which the holder furnished the ruler with a specified number of troops; and a register of the iqṭâʾs and of the number of troops the muqṭaʾs were supposed to furnish was kept in the divān. Thus the diploma issued by Sanjar’s divān to Aḍud al-Dīn for the office of governor of Gurgān required him to look carefully into the iqṭâʾs according to their original descriptions, and to recover for the divān anything that had been fraudulently incorporated into someone’s iqṭaʾ without his or the sultan’s permission. Any grant that had fallen into disuse was not to be conferred on a new holder without the sultan’s order.

In the early period of Saljuq expansion much of the country was
administered by the former local ruling families who acted first as
Saljuq tributaries, and finally, so far as they retained part or the whole
of their possessions, as Saljuq governors or muqṭaʾs. These governor-


2 ‘Atabat al-kastaba, p. 31.
ships, like the grants to the amīrs, are also called in the sources iqṭāʾs, and the conditions under which they were granted were virtually the same as for the amīrs. From the death of Malik-Shāh, an increasing amount of the country was alienated from the central government as “administrative” iqṭāʾs granted to the amīrs, until finally the area directly administered by the sultan became almost negligible. These grants also derived from the absolute sovereignty of the sultan and were entirely arbitrary, subject to re-grant at irregular intervals and to revocation without cause. The holder owed the obligation of obedience and service to the sultan. He was required to furnish the sultan with troops, and also with money when called upon to do so. In the event of his making fresh conquests, he was probably expected to remit something in cash or kind to the sultan. There was no obligation of protection or maintenance on the part of the sultan, nor was there a contract involving mutual fealty.

The extent to which the muqtaʿ exercised financial control varied. Niẓām al-Mulk’s exposition in the Siyāsat-Nāma gives the impression that it was limited; and Bundārī’s statement, concerning Niẓām al-Mulk’s alleged practice of assigning the pay of the military on different districts (p. 55) suggests that either considerable areas of the empire were at that time directly administered, or that the central government retained control over all or some of the provincial taxes. Usually, however, despite the statement of Niẓām al-Mulk, the muqtaʿ probably exercised complete financial control over an “administrative” iqṭāʾ. Moreover, within his iqṭāʾ he was able to make sub-assignments to his own followers; and their relation to him was similar to that existing between him and the sultan. Amīrs who attained to a status of semi-independence as local rulers freely assigned the area under their control. There were also muqtaʾs who farmed out the taxes of some of the territory assigned to them. They usually had freedom of choice in the appointment of administrative officials in their assignments. If the muqtaʿ held an extensive area, of necessity he appointed deputies and subordinate officials to act for him; and the fact that the muqtaʿ was often absent from his iqṭāʾ on military campaigns with the sultan, or on the sultan’s behalf, also sometimes made it necessary for him to appoint a deputy to act for him.

No means were devised by the central government to maintain

1 The iqṭāʾs granted as personal estates to members of former local ruling families fall into a different category.
control over the “administrative” iqṭāʾ or to prevent a muqṭaʾ’s injustice or rebellion except the threat of superior forces. In theory the oppressed could seek redress from the sultan, but in practice the latter was accessible only if he happened to be passing through the area or its neighbourhood. Ibn al-Athīr relates a case of two men from Lower Iraq demanding redress from Malik-Shāh in 485/1092 against their muqṭaʾ Khumar-Tegin, the shāhna of Baghdad, who, they alleged, had extorted 1,600 dinārs from them. Malik-Shāh dismissed Khumar-Tegin from his iqṭāʾ, returned the money to the plaintiffs, and gave them both an additional 100 dinārs.1 Niẓām al-Mulk states that the muqṭaʾ should be forbidden from preventing his subjects coming to court to demand redress, and he should be punished and his iqṭāʾ cancelled if he does so.2

Acts of usurpation were common; and as the power of the amirs increased, the grant of an “administrative” iqṭāʾ tended to become merely the recognition of an amir’s possession of a district. Further, the sultan would sometimes play off one amir against another by assigning the same district to them simultaneously; and frequently an amir had to take possession of his iqṭāʾ by force. In theory the grant of an “administrative” iqṭāʾ was not hereditary; but as their power grew, a hereditary tendency appeared, and several amirs transferred their iqṭāʾs to their sons or dependants by inheritance or by disposing of them by testament.

Certain court offices had particular districts attached to them as iqṭāʾs to provide for their upkeep, or else the iqṭāʾs were a special charge on the revenue of a particular district. Thus the tash-khāna (the royal pantry) in the time of Malik-Shāh was a charge on the kharāj of Khwārazm, and the jāma-khāna (Royal Wardrobe) on the revenue of Khūzistān. Atsīz, who was the tash-dār of Malik-Shāh, eventually established virtual independence in Khwārazm and founded an independent dynasty. Various officials were also paid by grants of land or grants on the revenue, both also known as iqṭāʾs. A number of the shāhnas of Baghdad, for instance, held Takrīt as an iqṭāʾ. Wāsīṭ and Hulwān at different times were also held as an iqṭāʾ by the shāhnas of Baghdad. The vizier was paid in part by iqṭāʾs (see below, p. 261). Ibn Balkhī states that in his time (i.e. during the reign of Muhammad b. Malik-Shāh), Jahrum, in Fārs, was part of the allowances (mavājib) of the valī ‘ahd;3 but this may have resembled the kind of iqṭāʾ granted as

1 Vol. x, p. 144.  
2 Siyāsat-Nāma, p. 28.  
3 Fārs-Nāma, p. 157.
The iqṭā' system did not in itself involve decentralization or even a relaxation of the authority of the central government. Under a strong ruler it contributed to the strength and cohesion of the state, but under a weak ruler it led to political disintegration. When, after the death of Malik-Shah, the muqta’s began to establish their semi-independence by usurpation, the link between the sultan and his subjects became increasingly tenuous. Thus by abuse the system contributed to the political disintegration of the empire, but not necessarily to its economic decay, since the individual muqta was restrained, by self-interest if nothing else, from reducing his iqṭā' to a state of ruin; indeed, he often succeeded in transforming it into a virtually hereditary domain. Also by abuse the system contributed to the growth of "private" armies, and to the virtual subjection of the peasantry; but against this the muqta protected them from both the depredations of neighbours and the extortions of government officials.

After the death of Malik-Shah it became increasingly common for iqṭā’s to be granted to maliks who were still boys, in which case the land was administered by the malik’s atabeg. The atabegate was an institution belonging especially to the Saljuq period, though its origins are possibly to be sought in the social organization and customs of the Türkmen. The first well-attested grant of the title atabeg is the one to Niẓām al-Mulk by Malik-Shah when he succeeded to the throne. According to the Akhbār al-daulat al-Saljīqiyya, Alp-Arslan also had an atabeg during the lifetime of his father, in the person of Qutb al-Dīn Kūl-Sarīgh (?Qızıl-Sarīgh); and Ibn Khallikān states that when Chaghri Beg Da’ūd appointed Niẓām al-Mulk to look after Alp-Arslan, he said to the boy, “consider him as a parent and do not disobey his counsels”. If this was so, it would seem that the atabegate in its original form was primarily a social institution, and that the later and more familiar form was an aberration due to the militarization of the state. All or most of the later atabegs, with the exception of ‘Alī b. Abī ‘Alī al-Qummi, who was one of Berk-Yaruq’s atabegs, were amirs. Normally, too, the atabeg was married to the mother of the malik who was entrusted to his care.

The atabegate as it developed under the Saljuqs had two aspects,
a social and a political. The atabeg was in charge of the prince's education. This presumably was the object of the appointment of 'Ali b. Abi 'Ali al-Qummi as atabeg to Berk-Yaruq—who was not, contrary to the usual custom, given an iqṭā' during the reign of Malik-Shāh. If a young malik was assigned a province or district the atabeg attached to him was responsible for its administration and therefore it was natural that those appointed to the office were almost without exception Turkish amīrs.

In its political aspect, one of the objects of the atabegate was to control the malik and prevent his rebellion in the province assigned to him. This was probably Berk-Yaruq's dominant motive in appointing atabegs to his brothers Muḥammad and Sanjar. Muḥammad, however, when he felt strong enough to be independent, killed his atabeg, Qut-lugh-Tegin, and took possession of Arrān. Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, in appointing Kūn-Toğdī as atabeg to his brother Tophrīl in 513/1120, had apparently a similar end in view; but Kūn-Toğdī, although he had instructions to bring Tophrīl to Maḥmūd, instead induced him to rebel.

As the power of the amīrs increased relative to that of the sultans, the atabegate came to be used, not so much to prevent the rebellion of a Saljuq prince, as to retain the nominal allegiance of a powerful or rebellious amīr; and such conquests as the latter made were nominally under the sultan's ultimate sovereignty. This was the general tendency from the reign of Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh onwards. As it became more marked, the atabeg was often made the nominal as well as the actual governor of the province, and the malik was sent with him only as a matter of form. Thus in 502/1108–9 Fārs was assigned to Chavli Saqaq and not to his two-year-old ward Chaghri b. Muḥammad.

The career of Chavli Saqaq is typical of that of the great amīrs of the time, and illustrates the prevailing instability, the mutual jealousies of the amīrs, and the growing weakness of the sultan vis-à-vis the amīrs. Chavli Saqaq was a native of the district lying between Rām Hurmuz and Arrajān, and in due course he established himself on the borders of Fārs and Khūzistān. Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh after his accession sent Maudūd b. Altun-Tegin to besiege him, and after seven months Chavli submitted and came to Muḥammad in Iṣfahān. In 500/1106 he was assigned Mosul and other districts, which were then in the possession of Chökermişh. Chavli set out for Mosul and captured Chökermişh near Irbil. The people of Mosul thereupon made Zangi b. Chökermişh governor in his father's stead, and wrote for help to Şadaqa, the Mazyadid, Qīlīč-Arslān, and to Bursuqī, who was then šaḥna of Baghdad.
Chavli laid siege to Mosul, but retired to Sinjar on the approach of Qilich-Arslan. There he was joined by Il-Ghazi b. Artuq and by a number of Chökermish's followers; later he joined Riḍwān and took Rahlba. He then defeated Qilich-Arslan on the Ḫābūr River and returned to Mosul, the gates of which were opened to him. Having established himself there he withdrew his allegiance from Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh; and when Muḥammad made preparations to march against Ṣadaqa in 501/1107-8, Chavli, together with Il-Ghazi b. Artuq, sent an offer of support to Ṣadaqa. Meanwhile the spoliation of Chavli's domains was proposed by Muḥammad to the Bani Bursuq, Maudūd b. Altun-Tegin, and to a number of other amirs. Chavli, accordingly having prepared Mosul for siege, left his wife to defend the city and himself went to collect reinforcements. At Niṣibin he was joined, somewhat unwillingly, by Il-Ghazi b. Artuq, and also by Abū Najm and Abū Kāmil Maṃṣūr, the sons of Ṣadaqa. He agreed to go with them to Hilla and they decided to make Bektash b. Tutush b. Alp-Arslan their spokesman. But the Ispahbud Sabāvū, who had subsequently joined them, advised Chavli to go again to Syria because the sultan was in or near Iraq. Chavli accepted his advice. Allying himself to Baldwin of Edessa and Jocelin, he went to Syria but was defeated by Tancred in 502/1108. Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh meanwhile sent Ḥusain b. Qutluḡ-Tegin to Chavli to win back his allegiance. Chavli agreed to submit if the siege of Mosul was raised, and he offered to send his son to the sultan's court as a hostage. However, Maudūd, who was besieging Mosul, refused to raise the siege, and Mosul fell shortly afterwards. Realizing that he could not hope for success in Syria or the Jazīreh, Chavli then determined to go to Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh in the hope that Ḥusain b. Qutluḡ-Tegin would intercede for him. He reached Ḫīšāhān, surrendered Bektash b. Tutush to Muḥammad, and made his peace with him. Muḥammad then sent Chavli to Fārs as atabeg to his son Chaghṛī. Fārs at the time was in a state of disorder and not under the effective control of the sultan; hence the sultan in sending Chavli to Fārs was not running any immediate risk of renewed rebellion, since Chavli would first have to restore obedience in the province. In fact, Chavli was largely successful in subduing the Shabānkāra, who had reduced the Shāpūr district of Fārs to a state of ruin and disorder, and in bringing back a considerable measure of prosperity to the province. He died in Fārs in 510/1116-17.

As the political aspect of the atabegate began increasingly to dominate
its social aspect, a malik was sometimes entrusted to a succession of different atabegs, as happened, for example, with Masʿūd b. Muḥammad. Or an amir was put in charge of a succession of maliks. Qasim al-Daula Aq-Sonqur Bursuqī is a case in point. He was originally a mamlūk of Bursuq, who was made šahna of Baghdad by Toğhril Beg in 452/1060–1 and subsequently served Alp-Arslan, Malik-Šāh, and Berk-Yaruq. Aq-Sonqur Bursuqī was made šahna of Baghdad by Muḥammad b. Malik-Šāh in 498/1105. After the death of Maudūd b. Altun-Taq, the muqta' of Mosul, he was assigned Mosul and the Jazīreh in 508/1114–15, appointed atabeg to Masʿūd b. Muḥammad, and ordered to organize a jihād (holy war) against the Franks in Syria. In 509/1115–16 Muḥammad b. Malik-Šāh assigned Mosul to Chaʿush Beg, who also became atabeg to Masʿūd. Bursuqī retired to Raḥba, which he held as an iqṭā'. Muḥammad b. Malik-Šāh died in 511/1117. In the following year Bursuqī was appointed šahna of Baghdad by Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, but Mengū-Bars was appointed to the same office almost immediately afterwards. Masʿūd then assigned Marāqeh to Bursuqī as an iqṭā' in addition to Raḥba. Dubais b. Ṣadaqa the Mazyadid meanwhile urged Chaʿush Beg to rebel against Maḥmūd, to seek the kingdom in the name of Masʿūd, and also to seize Bursuqī. The latter, learning of this plan, joined Maḥmūd. For a brief period the khūṭba was read in Āzarbāijān, the Jazīreh, and Mosul in the name of Maḥmūd. Battle was joined between him and Maḥmūd in 514/1120 and Masʿūd was defeated, after which Maḥmūd sent Bursuqī to Maḥmūd with a pardon. In 515/1121 Bursuqī was assigned Mosul by Maḥmūd and was ordered to undertake a jihād against the Franks. The following year Bursuqī was given Wāṣīt as an additional iqṭā', together with the office of šahna of Baghdad; he was also reappointed atabeg to Maḥmūd and married to Maḥmūd's mother, who had been seized by Mengū-Bars on the death of Muḥammad b. Malik-Šāh in 511/1117 before the expiry of her 'idda (the legal period of retirement assigned to a widow before she may marry again). Seven years later, Bursuqī was dismissed from the office of šahna of Baghdad at the caliph's request. Maḥmūd then made him atabeg to one of his sons, sent him back to Mosul, and ordered him once again to undertake a jihād against the Franks. After taking Aleppo he returned to Mosul, where he was assassinated by a Bāṭīnī in 520/1126.

While the sultan thus hoped to retain the nominal allegiance of the great amirs through the atabegate, they, on the other hand, saw in it a means to establish their virtual independence. In view of the fact that sovereignty was considered inherent in the Saljuq family, it was important for an amir to secure the person of a Saljuq malik in whose name he could act. The atabegate provided him with a ready means of doing so. Further, in view of the jealousies among the amirs, it was easier for them to establish virtually independent kingdoms under the guise of atabegates in the outlying provinces than to dominate the sultanate itself, and there are cases of amirs demanding or taking forcible possession of some malik, with the nominal acquiescence of the sultan, in order to increase their prestige. Thus Mengü-Bars,¹ having made himself master of Fārs in succession to Qaracha al-Sāqi (Saljuq-Shāh b. Muḥammad’s atabeg, whom Sanjar had killed in 526/1132) wrote to Toghril b. Muḥammad and demanded that he send his son Alp-Arslan to him; if his demand was met, he offered to recognize Toghril as sultan. In due course Toghril sent Alp-Arslan to Mengü-Bars.

‘Imad al-Dīn Zangi, who had originally been in the service of Bursuqi, was another case in point. He made himself master of Mosul in 521/1127 on the death of Bursuqi’s son ‘Īzz al-Dīn. Two Saljuq maliks were under his care. One he had captured from Dubais b. Șādaqa the Mazyadīd, to whom the malik had been entrusted.² The other was Alp-Arslan b. Muḥammad, who was known as al-Khafaji. According to Ibn al-Athīr, Zangi pretended to hold the country on behalf of the malik Alp-Arslan, in whose name he sent envoys and answered letters, awaiting the death of Mas‘ūd b. Muḥammad, at which time he, Zangi, would assemble an army and seek the sultanate in the name of al-Khafaji.³ As it happened Zangi died before he could put his plan into action. The fact, however, that an amir of his power and virtual independence should be found pursuing such a policy, is striking evidence of the added prestige which the possession of a Saljuq malik gave to an amir. Once an atabeg had firmly established his power, however, the dependent malik was allowed to fall into obscurity, and the atabeg, acting as a virtually independent ruler,

¹ Not to be confused with Mengü-Bars the shahna of Baghdad, mentioned above, who was killed in 513/1119–20.
transmitted his province to his descendants. The political atabegate thus became a potent factor in the disintegration of the great Saljuq empire. From the reign of Mas'ud b. Muhammad on, Azerbaijan and Fars were the scene of various attempts by atabegs to establish their independence, and eventually in both provinces independent dynasties were set up.

Although after the death of Malik-Shah, if not before, most of the empire was alienated in the form of iqta's from the control of the central government, there were other areas, towns and districts, where a rather different arrangement prevailed, for they were under an official known as the shahna. He was in effect a military governor appointed by the sultan or his governor. One of his main functions was to carry out the decisions of the qadi's court, when coercive force was necessary for this; and similarly to support other officials, such as the 'amil (tax-collector), in the execution of their duties. A muqta had full control of an "administrative" iqta, and he exercised by delegation virtually all the functions of the ruler. But the shahna usually had no power to appoint district officials (apart from those in his own divan), and he was concerned merely with the maintenance of order, so that the collection of taxes and the general administration could be carried on. The position of the shahna of Isfahan, for example, was clearly that of a military governor only. On her deathbed in 487/1094, Terken Khatun ordered the shahna of Isfahan to hold the kingdom for her son Mahmud. Various shahnas of Ray are mentioned in the sources, including 'Abbās the mamlūk of al-Muqarrab Jauhar. Ray, like Isfahan, was at one time the Saljuq capital, and, as stated above, was retained by Sanjar in the possession of his divan. This is not to say, however, that the shahna was to be found only in directly administered areas. Exercising the functions delegated to him by the ruler, the holder of an "administrative" iqta sometimes appointed shahnas; but generally speaking, although there are numerous references to

2 See my article, "The Administration of Sanjar's Empire as illustrated in the 'Atabat al-kataba", in B.S.O.A.S. (1917), pp. 380 ff.
3 Cf. also H. Horst, Die Staatsverwaltung der Grosselguqen und Hora^msdhs, p. 94, n. 2. Preserved in the 'Atabat al-kataba is a document issued by Sanjar's divan for one Saif al-Din Yaran-Qush, for the office of shahna of Juvin; this document contains a somewhat puzzling statement, to the effect that the office of shahna in Juvin belonged to the divan of Sanjar's sister Nūr(? ) Bilge, and was conferred upon Saif al-Din by her divan (by virtue of the document issued by Sanjar).
INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE SALJUQ EMPIRE

 shaḥnas in the north-eastern provinces in the time of Sanjar, references to them in the western provinces are less common. The shaḥna appears to have been paid by local dues levied in accordance with custom.

There are occasional references in the sources to revenue farms (damān). These verged on the “administrative” iqtā’, but whereas the muqṭa’ usually had complete control over the general administration of the district and maintained armed forces which he used, if called upon, in the service of the sultan, the revenue farmer was concerned only with the collection of taxes. Further, the farmer’s contract was for a stipulated period, probably one or three years. The number and size of these farms were relatively small. Most of the references are to the early period of Saljuq rule, and to the area in and around Iraq. Toghril Beg farmed Baṣra and Ahvāz to Hazārasp b. Bāṅkir in 448/1056–7 for 300,000 dinārs and 60,000 dinārs respectively.1 In 451/1059 the farmer was changed, but in 456/1064 Baṣra was again in the hands of Hazārasp, and in 459/1066–7 Alp-Arslan farmed it to him together with Wāṣīt for 300,000 dinārs. In 451/1059 Wāṣīt was farmed by Toghril Beg to a certain Abū ‘Ali b. Faḍlān for 200,000 dinārs; and in 455/1063 to another revenue farmer for the same sum. In 452/1060–1 and 455/1063 Toghril Beg farmed Baghdad for three years, on the first occasion for 400,000 dinārs and on the second (to a different revenue farmer) for 150,000 dinārs. Malik-Shâh farmed Baṣra first to a Jew named Ibn ‘Allān, and then in 472/1079–80 to Khumar-Tegin, who gave him 100,000 dinārs a year and 100 horses. With Gauhar Ā’in, the shaḥna of Baghdad, Khumar-Tegin had apparently plotted the fall of Ibn ‘Allān. The latter took refuge with Niẓām al-Mulk. But Khumar-Tegin and Gauhar Ā’in, since they were personal enemies of Niẓām al-Mulk, slandered Ibn ‘Allān before the sultan and persuaded him to have the man drowned.2 Alp-Arslan also farmed Fārs to Faḍlūya, the Shabānkāra leader.

For the most part the tribal groups in the Saljuq empire were not directly administered by the central government. The Kurds and Arabs, for instance, were left mainly under the local rulers or else came under a muqṭa’. The question of direct administration did not therefore arise. The same is largely true of parts of Ṭabaristān. The Shabānkāra in

1 Ibn al-Athīr, vol. ix, p. 422; Fārs-Nāma, p. 121. Ibn al-Jauzi states that Kunduri farmed these districts to Hazārasp for 300,000 sultān dinārs (vol. viii, pp. 168–9).

Fars were also under their own leaders for much of the period until they were temporarily subdued by Chavli Saqao.

The most important tribal group as regards both numbers and influence was the Türkmen. But because of their numbers and the Saljuqs' early relation with them, their control presented a special problem. Throughout the period they tended to continue moving in a westerly direction. Alp-Arslan's policy was to employ them in raids outside the dār al-Islām, and many of them pushed on into Syria and Asia Minor. Others, however, remained in the provinces over which the sultan maintained control. Some were incorporated into the service of the sultan (see p. 218 above), but the majority continued to follow a nomadic or semi-nomadic existence, moving from winter to summer pastures and migrating in search of new pastures. The main concentrations of Türkmen were to be found in Iraq, the Jazireh, Āzarbāijān, Gurgān, and the neighbourhood of Marv. These concentrations were not necessarily constant throughout the Great Saljuq period. The power of the sultan held the Türkmen more or less in check until the death of Malik-Shāh. The weakening of the empire after his death and the dissolution of the kingdom created by Tutush in Syria restored their freedom, and within two or three years several of them had formed independent principalities. The fact that some of them had been officers of the sultan—Il-Ghāzi b. Artuq, for example, was a shāhna of Baghdad on behalf of Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh in 495/1101-2—helped them to transform themselves quickly into small territorial princes when the sultan’s authority declined.

The Türkmen who remained in Gurgān and the neighbourhood of Marv during the reign of Sanjar came under his central divān. The official charged with their administration was also known as a shāhna. His functions were primarily to maintain order and prevent the tribes encroaching on their neighbours, and to collect from them pasture dues and other taxes due to the government. In a diploma issued by Sanjar’s divān, appointing Inanch Bilge Ulugh Jāndār Beg to the office of shāhna of the Türkmen in Gurgān, it is recognized that they formed a special class. The jāndār beg was, among his other duties, to allot pastures and water to each leader according to the number of his households and followers.

The Ghuzz in the neighbourhood of Marv and on the borders of the

1 See Gibb, Damascus Chronicle, p. 25.
empire apparently regarded themselves as the special subjects of the sultan. They were difficult to control, and relations between them and Sanjar's divān were marked by a standing opposition between the settled and semi-settled population. Extortion was practised in the collection of the annual tribute of sheep, which they paid to the sultan's kitchen, and eventually they were driven to rebellion. Sanjar was then induced by his amirs to march against them, and was defeated and captured by the Ghuzz in 548/1153-4; he remained a prisoner in their hands for three years. Although on this occasion the sultan's officials appear to have been at fault, the problem was by no means a simple one, because the Ghuzz were increasing in numbers and encroaching on the settled areas; and after the death of Sanjar in 552/1157, they overran parts of Khurasān and Kirmān.

In exercising his functions as judge and guardian of public order, and in delegating these functions in the provinces to the muqta's, the sultan acted through the dargāh. A whole range of other functions, including in particular the collection of taxes, was exercised by the sultan through the central divān, the main department of the bureaucracy. In the dargāh, which was militarized and composed largely of Turkish amirs, the sultan was accessible to his subjects for the redress of grievances; in the divān, which was mainly staffed by men who were not Turks and who had inherited the administrative traditions of the preceding dynasties, he came into contact with his subjects in a different way: namely, over the collection of taxes. He delegated his functions in the divān to the vizier, who at the height of his power supervised all aspects of the administration, secular and religious, and was more than just the head of the financial administration. Niẓām al-Mulk envisaged him as the keystone of the empire. “When the vizier is of good conduct and judgement”, he states, “the kingdom flourishes and the army and subjects are contented, quiet and wealthy, and the ruler happy at heart; but when the vizier is of evil conduct, indescribable confusion appears in the kingdom, and the ruler is always distressed and afflicted in mind and the kingdom disturbed.”

The relationship between the dargāh and the central divān was not clearly formulated. The connecting link between them until the decline of the vizierate was the vizier himself. ‘Amid al-Mulk Kundūrī, Toghrīl Beg’s vizier, and Niẓām al-Mulk both had direct access to the sultan; but under the later sultans, as stated above, the amīr ḥājīb

1 Siyāsat-Nāma, pp. 18-19.
appears to have been to some extent interposed between them. So far as the vizier conducted the sultan’s relations with foreign rulers and with the caliphate, he acted in some measure as an official of the dargāh. When the caliph gave an audience to Malik-Shāh and his amirs in 479/1086–7, Nizām al-Mulk presented the amirs to the caliph. On the accession of a new caliph it was often, though not invariably, the vizier who gave the oath of allegiance to him on behalf of the sultan. Negotiations for marriage alliances with the caliph were also usually carried out by the sultan’s vizier. ‘Amid al-Mulk Kunduri acted on behalf of Toghril Beg when he demanded the hand of the caliph’s daughter; and the negotiations for the marriage of Malik-Shāh’s daughter to the caliph in 474/1081–2 were carried out by Nizām al-Mulk. Similarly, Kamāl al-Dīn Abu’l Barakāt al-Darguzīnī, Maṣʿūd b. Muḥammad’s vizier, was his vakil in the marriage of his sister Fāṭima to the caliph in 531/1137; and Diyā’ al-Mulk Aḥmad b. Nizām al-Mulk, who was vizier to Muhammad b. Malik-Shāh from 500/1107 to 504/1110–11, was mutavalli on behalf of the sultan’s sister when she was married to the Caliph al-Mustaẓhir in 502/1109.

When the vizier deputized for the sultan in the maṣzālim court, he was exercising functions that belonged to the dargāh rather than to the dīvān. Similarly, his supervision of the religious institution was delegated to him in his capacity as the sultan’s deputy, and not specifically because he was the head of the bureaucracy, except perhaps so far as the administration of auqāf (religious endowments) was concerned. He had no power to appoint qādis, muhtasibs, khaṭibs or other officials of the religious institutions, though he may have advised the sultan on the matter. The main object of his supervising the religious institutions was probably to prevent any tendency towards heresy, because this was believed to threaten political stability. The early sultans, Toghril Beg, Alp-Arslan, Malik-Shāh, and Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh, were strictly orthodox and Ḥanafis by rite. The vizier in the early period was usually a Ḥanafi or a Shāfi‘i. Kundūrī was a fanatical Ḥanafi, and instituted the commination of Shi‘is (rāfdīs) and Ash‘arīs from the minbars of the mosques. Nizām al-Mulk, who was a Shāfi‘i, abolished this practice. Under the later sultans strict orthodoxy was not insisted upon. Anushirvān b. Khalīd, who became vizier to Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad in 521/1127 and to Maṣʿūd b. Muḥammad in 529/1134–5, was a Shi‘i; and Berk-Yaruq’s mustaufi Majd al-Mulk Abu’l Faḍl Barāvistānī Qummi was, according to Ibn al-Aṭhīr, a secret Shi‘i.
The main function of the vizier as head of the divan was a financial one. It was his duty to regulate the sources of revenue and to increase the revenue without causing injury to agricultural prosperity. He was expected to keep the finances of the state in a healthy condition and to hold sufficient revenue in reserve to meet emergencies.

The revenue of the empire derived from ordinary and extraordinary taxes, and from various other sources. Ordinary taxes comprised (a) canonical taxes: namely, kharāj (land tax), pasture taxes (marā'ī), and jīzā (poll-tax on members of the protected communities, the dhimmis); and (b) uncanonical taxes (mukāṣ), such as those on merchandise, tolls and customs, and a variety of dues (rusūm), including those levied for the payment of officials. Extraordinary taxes consisted of levies made for specific purposes. These were of two kinds: cesses imposed on existing taxes (e.g. for defaulters, arrears, and chipped and broken coins), which in the course of time tended to become assimilated to the original tax; and ad hoc levies, which were often extremely burdensome. Because Nizām al-Mulk thought it necessary to state in the Siyāsat-Nāma that the taxes should not be demanded before harvest time, it may be inferred that they were, in fact, not infrequently demanded in advance—a practice that caused much hardship. Diplomas issued to officials concerned in tax collection, i.e. to provincial governors and others, frequently included instructions that the taxes should be levied only at the fixed rates and at the proper time. Since, however, the assessment was sometimes made in one kind of dinār and paid in currency dinārs, by manipulating the conversion rate of one dinār to another it was possible to raise the amount of the tax without actually raising the nominal rate at which it was levied.

The land tax was assessed in one of three ways, by measurement (misdha), as a proportionate share of the crop (muqāṣama), or at a fixed sum (muqāṭa'a). It was paid in cash and kind. Alp-Arslan is said to have levied kharāj in two annual instalments. The Akhbār al-daulat al-Saljuqīyya records that he was satisfied with the original kharāj (al-kharāj al-asli), i.e. the ordinary or original assessment to which additional taxes had not been added, or which had not been raised by a manipulation of the conversion rates. Pasture taxes were levied on the nomadic or semi-nomadic population in one of two ways: either (1) they were based on the tent or family or on the number of head of stock owned, or (2) the community was assessed at a lump sum. Poll-taxes did not form an important item of revenue in Saljuq times. After Alp-
Arslan took Ani, the Byzantines are alleged to have agreed to pay jizya; and Alp-Arslan appointed the ‘amīd of Khurāsān to collect this. Malik-Shāh is also stated to have received jizya from the Byzantine emperor; but both these payments, in so far as they were made, were in the nature of tribute rather than actual jizya.

The nature, method of assessment, and collection of uncanonical taxes varied widely throughout the empire. The matter of their levy moreover, involved a conflict between religious scruples and financial practice; attempts were made from time to time to revoke them, but never with lasting success. Malik-Shāh remitted additional levies (qismat va taqsīf) from the people of Isfahān; and in 479/1086–7 he ordered the abolition of the mukūs levied on traders who handled all kinds of merchandise in Iraq and Khurāsān. He also abolished all tolls and escort dues (khafarāt) paid by travellers throughout his dominions. Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh, on his arrival in Baghdad in Sha‘bān 501/1108, abolished the mukūs, darā‘īb (? imposts), market taxes, transit dues, and other similar dues which had been levied in Iraq and all his provinces, and tablets to this effect were hung up in the markets. When he went back to Isfahān, the mukūs were again levied on the merchants in Baghdad according to custom; on his return to Baghdad he reaffirmed their repeal. Toghūrîl Beg, on the other hand, reimposed the mukūs and the practice of confiscating inheritances. Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, on the advice of his vizier Kamāl al-Mulk Simīrūmī, also decided to reimpose the mukūs in Iraq in 515/1121–2, but after the assassination of Kamāl al-Mulk in the following year, he revoked the mukūs and abolished the taxes that the vizier had imposed on merchants and dealers. Their abolition was brief, however, because Maṣʿūd b. Muhammad is recorded as having revoked the mukūs in 533/1138–9, and tablets to that effect were put up in the Friday mosques and markets.

Remissions of taxes were occasionally granted on special occasions or because of some natural calamity. Toghūrîl Beg, for example, remitted the taxes of Isfahān for three years when he took the city in 443/1051. Individuals, such as members of the religious classes, were also sometimes given immunity from taxes as a special favour.

A fairly important source of revenue was provided by confiscations

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2 Ibn al-Jauzī makes no mention of this under the year 479, but states that the darā‘īb and mukūs were abolished in Baghdad according to the decree of the Caliph al-Muqtadi in 480 (vol. ix, p. 39).
and fines. Toghril Beg confiscated 100,000 dinârs and 20,000 dinârs from an 'Alid and a Jew respectively in Baṣra in 449/1057–8. Under Alp-Arslan there were said to have been no confiscations, but after the death of Malik-Shâh, the mulcting of officials on their dismissal was common. This was a measure partly of the growing financial stringency, and partly of the increase in dishonesty and corruption among the official classes. Intrigue and insecurity were the normal concomitants of official life. Men of influence and power accumulated wealth to defend their personal interests against any future intrigues by their rivals, or against a loss of the sultan’s favours, and those who were ambitious for office accumulated wealth in order to buy it. Through these corrupt practices many officials amassed, temporarily at least, considerable riches. Abu'l Qâsim Anasâbâdî Darguzini, who eventually became vizier to Toghrîl b. Muḥammad, founded his fortune when vizier to Muḥammad b. Malik-Shâh’s amir ḥâjîb, ‘Alî b. ‘Umar. The latter alleged that on his deathbed the sultan had ordered 200,000 dinârs to be distributed among his enemies and those who had complaints against him; but when this sum was obtained from the treasury most of it was misappropriated by Darguzini. He appears to have been one of the most corrupt of the Saljuq officials, making large sums of money from confiscations and fines. Bundârî states that he fined Qutlug Rashidi, the chamberlain (ustâd al-dâr) of Maḥmûd b. Muḥammad, 110,000 dinârs, also that he extracted from a merchant of Hamadân 30,000 dinârs, and 20,000 and 70,000 dinârs respectively from the ra‘îs of Hamadân and the ra‘îs of Tabrîz, together with 150,000 dinârs from Taj al-Dîn Daulatshâh b. ‘Alâ‘ al-Daula and his mother and vizier. Bundârî’s own family also suffered at the hands of Darguzini. He relates that his uncle ‘Azîz al-Dîn, who was employed in the divân-i istifâ of Maḥmûd b. Muḥammad, was imprisoned by Maḥmûd in return for 300,000 dinârs from Darguzini, who also imprisoned Bundârî’s father and another uncle, Ḍiyâ‘ al-Dîn, and seized their estates.

Corruption became widespread under Muḥammad b. Malik-Shâh, and relatively large sums were involved. Bundârî relates that a number of prominent persons wanted to make their nominee ra‘îs of Hamadân in place of the existing ra‘îs, Abû Ḥâşîm. Accordingly they imposed a fine of 700,000 dinârs upon him, besides what was confiscated from his numerous retainers. Muḥammad b. Malik-Shâh sent Anushîrvân b. Khâlid, who was then his treasurer, to collect the money. After
Anushirvān had paid the money into the sultan’s treasury he told the
sultan of the plot against Abū Ḥāšım. Muḥammad thereupon re­
instated him as ra’īs and sent him magnificent presents and robes of
honour.¹ Rāvandī gives a slightly different version of this incident. He
alleges that Ḍiyāʾ al-Mulk Aḥmad b. Nizām al-Mulk, Muḥammad’s
vizier, determined to attack the ra’īs and gave the sultan 500,000 dinārs
to hand him over, but that Abū Ḥāšım, hearing of this, came to
Iṣfahān and bought himself off for 800,000 dinārs in return for which
Muḥammad handed Ḍiyāʾ al-Mulk over to him.²

Zain al-Mulk Abū Saʿīd b. Hindū, who became mustaufi in 498/
1104–5 during the vizierate of Sa’d al-Mulk Abū’l Mahāsīn Āvājī, was
alleged to have been extremely corrupt, and when Sa’d al-Mulk was
killed in 500/1107, Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh seized and imprisoned
him for two years. He was subsequently reinstated and became
Muḥammad’s vizier. But in 506/1112–13 a number of amirs conspired
against him and offered to give 200,000 dinārs of his wealth to the
sultan’s treasury if they were allowed to seize him. The sultan agreed;
he was handed over to one of the amirs, put to death, and his goods
Nizām al-Mulk, who was his vizier from 500/1106 to 511/1118, the sum
of 1,000,000 dinārs in cash, together with jewels and other possessions,
was found belonging to him.³

Further sources of revenue were the money received from the buying
of offices (though offices were not put up to auction as they had been in
Būyid times), and also presents from those who wished to secure or
regain the sultan’s favours; it is probable that revenue from these
sources, as well as from confiscations and fines, went for the most part
into the sultan’s treasury and not the public treasury. Fakhr al-Mulk b.
Nizām al-Mulk gave Berk-Yaruq many presents, including tents,
weapons, jewelled implements, Arab horses, hunting birds, and an
armourer’s shop (ẓarrād-khānā) when he joined him in 488/1095 and
became vizier. Similarly in 494/1101, after defeating Muḥammad b.
Malik-Shāh, and capturing his vizier Mu’ayyid al-Mulk b. Nizām al-

¹ Pp. 89–90.
² Rāḥat al-sudūr, pp. 162–3. Ibn al-Atḥīr states that Abū Ḥāšım, whose maternal grand­
father was Ibn ‘Abbād, the famous Būyid vizier, was extremely wealthy, and that Muḥammad
b. Malik-Shāh on one occasion mulcted him of 700,000 dinārs. He died, according to Ibn
al-Atḥīr, in 502/1109 (vol. x, pp. 332–3).
³ Muḥammad b. Fakhr al-Mulk had apparently accepted a bribe from Arslan Shāh to
induce Sanjar to abandon his march on Ghazna. Sanjar seized him on his return from Ghazna
(Ibn al-Atḥīr, vol. x, p. 589; Bundārī, p. 244).
Mulk, Berk-Yaruq agreed to accept the latter as his own vizier in return for 100,000 gold dinārs; but the new sultan later regretted his decision and killed the vizier before the transaction was completed.\(^1\) Shams al-Mulk ‘Uthmān b. Nizām al-Mulk is alleged to have given his brother Diya’ al-Mulk Aḥmad, vizier to Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh, 2,000 dinārs to make him ‘ārid al-jaish in place of Anushirvān b. Khālid. The sultan and his ministers probably exacted sums of money and presents in return for the grant of robes of honour and similar favours.

Tribute was paid to the Saljuqs by various local rulers, but this was not a regular source of revenue. In the early period of expansion, in the time of Toghril Beg, the local rulers made sundry payments to the Ghuzz; these were not tribute as they are sometimes represented in the sources, but rather payments to mercenaries which naturally ceased when the Ghuzz left the district. Later as the power of the Saljuqs increased and they began to reduce the local rulers to submission, the terms imposed often included the payment of a sum of money. But in due course most of the local rulers, if they continued to possess some or all of their former territories, were absorbed into the iqṭā’ system. Occasionally in the later period tribute was imposed on a neighbouring ruler. Malik-Shāh, for example, imposed an annual tribute of 40,000 dinārs on the ruler of Shīrvān, but this was not regularly paid;\(^2\) and Sanjar, when he took Ghazna in 510/1116–17, settled an annual tribute of 250,000 dinārs on Bahram Shāh.

Lastly there was the revenue from the private estates that the sultan owned in various parts of the empire, including landed estates, qanāts, and real property (mustaghällāt) in towns. There is no indication of their total extent or income. In Kūfa the private domains of the sultan were farmed in 452/1060 for 40,000 dinārs a year. It is not clear whether the

\(^1\) Ravandi’s account of this incident is as follows: Mu’ayyid al-Mulk raised the money in a week, and it was agreed that the day after he paid it he should become vizier. However, disputes arose between him and the officials of the treasury over the value of what he had produced in cash and kind; and he haggled over this and annoyed them. On the next day when the sultan was having a siesta in his tent, the tasht-dār, thinking the sultan was asleep, said to a group of people, “How lacking in zeal these Saljuqs are! Now he (Berk-Yaruq) is going to make vizier again and trust a man who has given him so much trouble, who once induced a slave of his father [i.e. the amir Unar] to seek the kingdom, and prepared for himself an insignia of royalty, and on another occasion went to Ganja and brought out his (the sultan’s) brother [to seek the kingdom]…”. The sultan heard this, came out of his tent, sent for Mu’ayyid al-Mulk, cut off his head, and turned to the tasht-dār and said, “See the zeal of the Saljuqs”. Whereupon the tasht-dār fled and did not dare look upon the sultan again (Rahdt al-sudur, p. 147).

\(^2\) Bundārī, p. 128. According to the Akhbār al-daulat al-Saljuqīyya, the sum fixed was 70,000 dinārs (p. 73).
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income from the sultan’s private estates was paid into his treasury or the public treasury. So far as the revenue was collected and the estates administered by the tax collectors (‘ummāl) of the divān-i istifā-yi mamālik, it would seem likely that it was paid into the public treasury.

The most important charge upon the revenue was the payment of the standing army and expenditure on military expeditions. Secondly, there was the upkeep of the court, which was only partly met by special levies such as the provision of sheep by the Ghuzz for Sanjar’s kitchen. There were probably various other special levies of a minor kind. Cloth for robes of honour and for the various needs of the court and the army may have been partially secured by levies in kind on craftsmen, or by requiring them to carry out work for the dargāh or divān as part or all of the tax demand upon them. In some cases, however, this appears to have been done against a payment of money. Ibn Balkhī states in the Fārs-Nāma that the weavers of Kāzarūn used to receive from the divān an advance on their woven cloth, the delivery of which would be made by some trusted man, the price being fixed by brokers.¹

Except when they were paid by iqṭā’, officials were largely remunerated by special dues (rusūm, marsūmāt), which were presumably paid directly to them, and in some cases collected by them personally and were not remitted to the divān although they were included in the revenue assessments.

Among incidental but regular expenses there were the pensions and allowances paid to the sayyids and others of the religious classes, as well as alms given by the sultan in Ramadān. For example, Alp-Arslan gave annually 1,000 dinārs in Balkh, Marv, Herāt, and Nishāpūr, and 10,000 dinārs at his court. Malik-Shāh and Sanjar were both liberal in their gifts and alms. The latter on one occasion is alleged to have distributed the greater part of the contents of his treasury, giving away over 700,000 gold dinārs during five consecutive days, while the value of the horses and garments he bestowed was even greater.

The government revenue tended to increase up to the reign of Malik-Shāh, when the empire achieved its greatest size, stability, and prosperity. Subsequently the revenue declined, partly because an increasing area was alienated from the control of the central government, and partly because of the growing instability. The balance between order and disorder was at all times precarious, and rapid fluctuations in local prosperity took place. Thus parts of Fārs, which were reduced to a state

of decay and disorder by the depredations of the Shabānkāra, returned to relative prosperity under Chauli Saqao. Ḥamd Allāh Mustaufi, who was for many years a mustaufi in the service of the Il-Khāns and has left a valuable account of Persia in the latter days of the Il-Khāns, states that the revenue of Fārs in Saljuq times amounted to 2,335,000 currency dinārs, whereas in his own time it had been 2,871,200 currency dinārs.¹ According to Mustaufi, the revenue of Ṭrāq-i Ḵājam had been 25,200,000 odd currency dinārs in Saljuq times,² while in his day it fell to 350,000 currency dinārs.³ He states on the authority of the lost Risālat-i Malik-Shābī that the total revenue of Malik-Shā ḡ was 215,000,000 gold dinārs, which amounted to some 500,000,000 currency dinārs.⁴ In spite of the depreciation in the value of the coinage, this figure appears somewhat improbable, for the entire revenue of the Islamic empire under the early ‘Abbasids was only some 25 million dinārs.⁵

Whatever reserves Malik-Shā ḡ may have accumulated during his reign were rapidly dissipated by his successors. Terken Khatun, when she went to Iṣfahān after her son Maḥmūd was proclaimed sultan distributed all the stores that had accumulated; and when Berk-Yaruq besieged Iṣfahān she emptied the treasury and gave gold without stint to the amirs and the standing army. Berk-Yaruq was frequently in difficulty for money. When Abu’l Maḥāsin Dihistānī was appointed vizier in 493/1099-1100 there was no money in the treasury, and when Berk-Yaruq reached Baghdad in 494/1101 he had no funds and sent to the caliph for help; after negotiations the caliph sent him 50,000 dinārs.

The financial situation improved slightly under Muḥammad b. Malik-Shā ḡ. Bundārī states that he found a balance sheet (taʾṣīl) in the handwriting of his uncle, which stated that Muḥammad’s treasury contained 18,000,000 dinārs apart from gold ornaments, jewels, and garments embroidered with gold and silver thread. The improvement, however, was short lived; at the beginning of the reign of Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad the treasury he inherited from his father was emptied by his followers. Bundārī relates that on one occasion Maḥmūd and his officials lacked funds even to provide the daily allowance of beer for themselves. They accordingly sent to the brewer a number of empty boxes from the treasury so that with the proceeds of their sale he might

² Variant reading 2,568,000.
³ Nuḫbat, p. 48.
⁴ Nuḫbat, p. 27.
obtain what he needed. On another occasion Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad is alleged to have asked his treasurer, who had also served his father, for some perfume. The treasurer asked for a few days’ delay to procure it. He then brought thirty mithqāls (1 mithqāl = 4.3 grammes). Maḥmūd said to him, “Tell the company how much perfume there used to be in my father’s treasury”. He answered, “In the fortress of Isfahān there was nearly 180 rītls (1 rīt = 140 mithqāls) in golden, silver, crystal, and china vessels, and we had in the ‘field’ treasury 30 rītls”.

Mas'ūd b. Maḥmūd’s treasury was also usually empty. Such revenue as arrived from the outlying districts he used to distribute among his audience at once. His vizier Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Husain, attempting to reform abuses in the financial administration, organized the collection and payment of taxes and revived practices which had been neglected. In doing this he exposed the fraudulent practices of officials and others; he also tried to break the power of the amīrs and prevent their corrupt practices. He achieved some measure of success and succeeded in collecting the taxes with greater regularity, but eventually his opposition to the amīrs cost him his life. It appears that he had attempted to bribe ‘Īzz al-Mulk Ṭāhir b. Muḥammad Burūjirdī, then vizier to Qara-Sonqur, to hand over his master for 500,000 dinārs. ‘Īzz al-Mulk refused; Kamāl al-Dīn then made Mas'ūd frightened of Qara-Sonqur, and together they summoned the amīr Boz-Aba from Fārs, hoping to use him to overthrow Qara-Sonqur. The latter, however, reacted strongly; he summoned Saḷjuq-Shāh b. Muḥammad and prepared to set out for Fārs to take it from Boz-Aba and give it to Saḷjuq-Shāh. Dā’ūd and his atabeg Ayāz, who was one of Qara-Sonqur’s followers, also joined them. Setting out with the two Saḷjuq maliks from Āzarbājān with an army of 10,000 men, Qara-Sonqur reached Hamadān, whence he sent ‘Īzz al-Mulk Burūjirdī to Mas'ūd with an ultimatum that Kamāl al-Dīn be killed or handed over to them; Mas'ūd was obliged to give way and Kamāl al-Dīn was executed by them in 533/1139. Establishing ‘Īzz al-Mulk Burūjirdī as Mas'ūd’s vizier, Qara-Sonqur then went to Fārs. Having taken possession of the province, he handed it over to Saḷjuq-Shāh and returned to Āzarbājān. Boz-Aba, however, recaptured Fārs shortly afterwards.

1 Bundārī, pp. 141-2.
2 Qara-Sonqur had been appointed atabeg to Toghrīl b. Muḥammad and Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad in 521/1127. He fled from Mas'ūd in 527/1132-3 and remained in Āzarbājān after defeating Dā’ūd b. Maḥmūd in 530/1135-6.
Of the later sultans Sanjar was the only one who had a relatively well-filled treasury, containing rare and valuable objects, including necklaces, pearls, priceless pendants, and other jewels; purses full of money, and garments. His jewels were kept in sealed drums.

The divān over which the vizier presided, the divān-i aʿlā as it was called, had four main departments: (1) the divān al-inšāʾ waʾl tughrāʾ, sometimes called the divān-i rasāʾil or the divān-i inšāʾ; (2) the divān al-zamān waʾl istīfā (also called the divān-i istīfā-yi mamālik); (3) the divān-i ʿishrāf-i mamālik; and (4) the divān-i ʿard.

The divān-i inšāʾ was primarily concerned with the supervision of incoming and outgoing correspondence, and all diplomas of appointment to the various offices of state, including “administrative” iqṭāʾs, were prepared in and issued from this office. Its head was called the tughrāʾi. According to Bundari, the chief requisite for his office was an ability to execute “curved” handwriting (al-khatt al-qausi). In fact, however, since considerable importance was attached to literary form, the tughrāʾi was probably often a master of literary style, as indeed was Muʿayyid al-Daula Muntajab al-Dīn Bāḍīʿ Atabeg Juvainī, the head of Sanjar’s divān-i inšāʾ. Further, since the office was a stepping-stone to the vizierate, and its holder acted as deputy-vizier in the absence of that official, the attainments expected of the tughrāʾi were clearly more than those of a calligrapher.

The divān-i istīfā-yi mamālik was concerned with the revenue accounts, tax assessments, collection, and expenditure; its head was the mustaufi al-mamālik. There exists no detailed information of the exact procedure followed in this department in Saljuq times, or of its relations to the divān-i ʿishrāf-i mamālik. It was presumably divided into a number of sub-departments, also called divāns: e.g. the divān-i muʿāmilat va qismat appears to have been concerned among other things with tax contracts of the muqāṭaʾa type. The empire, so far as it was not alienated from the direct control of the central divān in the form of “administrative” iqṭāʾs, was divided into tax districts, each presided over by a mustaufi or ʿāmil. The tax statement was prepared in the divān-i istīfā-yi mamālik and sent to the district mustaufi, who allocated the amount demanded within the district, and was responsible

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1 P. 77. The tughrāʾ was originally a calligraphic emblem put on rescripts and farmans. Each ruler had his own tughrāʾ.
2 See, however, H. Horst, Die Staatsverwaltung, pp. 71 ff.
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for the local expenditure of revenue on allowances, pensions, and salaries. Collection was carried out by the local tax-collectors (‘ummāl) and by their subordinates, the muḥāṣṣils and mutaṣṣarrifs. Oppression in the collection of taxes was not uncommon; and a proportion of the total sum levied must have frequently failed to reach the treasury.¹ Tax collection in “administrative” iqtā’s and provincial governments was in general the responsibility of the muqta’ or provincial governor, who had his own divān. In theory the muqta’s and provincial governors had no power to alter taxation, but in practice they exercised a wide discretion in such matters and were not subject to effective control by the divān-i istifa-yi mamālīk.

After the reign of Malik-Shāh an increasing proportion of the empire was alienated from the direct control of the central divān. When Sanjar reinstated Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad as the ruler of the western provinces of Persia in 513/1119-20, no land remained under his divān because Sanjar had made various assignments to Toghril b. Muḥammad and Saljuq-Shāh b. Muḥammad, and various amīrs had taken possession of other districts; the only source of revenue remaining to Maḥmūd’s divān, according to Bundārī, was confiscations.

The divān-i ʿishrāf-i mamālīk was concerned with the auditing of financial transactions. Its head was the mushrif-i mamālīk. Nizām al-Mulk seems to have envisaged the divān-i ʿishrāf as ideally exercising supervision and inspection over the administration in general, and not only its financial matters. In practice, however, the mushrif seems to have been concerned with finances only. There were district or provincial mushrifis in the same way that there were district or provincial mustaufīs. The function of the provincial mushrif was:

To account for (zīr-i qalam-i khwīsh dārad) everything which went on in the (provincial) divān concerning different kinds of financial transactions (muʿāmalāt), the conclusion of agreements (uqūd-i qahālāt), adjustment of accounts (taṣābih), pasture taxes (marāt), alms taxes (ṣadaqāt), the allocation of allowances (ṭalāq-i jāmāgīyyāt va jārāyāt), particulars of accounts (taṣfīl-i muḥāṣibāt), the conduct of monetary affairs (hāl va ‘aqd va khattāt va ṭaf), and the collection and disbursement of revenue; and to certify (maʿlum dārad) all the landed estates (amlāk) and real property (mustaghabāt) of the sultan, the revenue from kharāj and ‘ushr (mal-i kharāj va khāzānāt va gharāt-i ‘ushr va irtīfāt), and salaries (marṣūmāt), and to take cognizance of whatever sums, great or small, relating to the collection and disbursement of revenue were new, and not omit to record them so that the smallest item of revenue in

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cash or kind should not be levied or expended without his knowledge and authorization. He was to take cognizance of everything that went on in the office of the ra’iš in the way of meetings, the allocation and assessment of tax quotas (qism va taqṣīʿāt), and alterations [in these], and to conceal nothing; to keep himself informed of what went on in the mint and concerning seals (muḥr), coins (ṣikka), and the standards used in every forge. No overseers of markets (muqaddimān-i aṣvaq) or headmen of districts (ṣuʿamā-ji naṣāḥāt) were to be appointed without his knowledge, and he was to appoint vigilant and efficient deputies so that he would know what went on and how those in charge of affairs conducted their business and the state of agriculture and the development [or otherwise] of the district. He was to look into the matter of seed, draught animals, means of cultivation, estimates of the value of crops, and measures, and should consider whether they were too high or too low; he should always have available an amended and up-to-date register and a clear and accurate statement of the extent of the tax districts and their conditions, so that if asked about these he could give an answer. He was to investigate the affairs of the taxpayers and peasants (dahdqin va raʿayā) so that the tax collectors (ʿummāl va muṭaṣarifān), scribes, and officials should not make improper demands or impose any extra burden upon them.  

From this document it is clear that the mushrif was concerned with overseeing the collection and disbursement of taxes, and with whatever affected this. Since the prosperity of the empire depended ultimately on the well-being of agriculture, and since, too, over-taxation would lead to the ruin of the countryside and in the last resort to the flight of the peasantry, he was given a general authority over agricultural matters. To what extent and in what way action was taken when a mushrif reported adversely on the action of officials or others in the area under his jurisdiction, is not clear; and there is little reason to suppose that his presence was effective in curtailing corruption and extortion. The divān-i ishrāf and the district mushrifs also exercised general supervision over the administration of auqāf, although these were normally under the immediate charge of the qādī; this supervision followed from the fact that the divān-i auqāf handled the collection and expenditure of funds.

The fourth department of the divān-i aʿlā was the divān-i ʿarḍ, headed by the ʿārḍ al-jaṣṣ (also called the ṣāhib-i divān-i ʿarḍ), or the muster master. The military registers and records of the “military” iqṭā’s were kept in this department, and everything relating to the pay of the standing army and of the amīrs went through it. It was also concerned with recruitment and with assembling and reviewing troops.

before military expeditions. Up to the end of the reign of Malik-Shāh the ‘ārid al-jaиш was a member of the bureaucracy. Later the office was held from time to time by a Turkish amir.

Through the divān-i ‘ārid the vizier exercised, in theory at least, supervision over the fiscal value of “military” iqṭā’s; but he did not in practice control their allocation. It seems unlikely that the “administrative” iqṭā’s went through this department except exceptionally; and unlikely that the vizier, through the ‘ārid al-jaиш, controlled their allocation, though at the height of his power Nizām al-Mulk no doubt exercised considerable influence over these grants. Occasionally other viziers exercised similar control. For example, ‘Īzz al-Mulk Ṭāhir b. Muḥammad al-Burūjirdi, vizier to Masʻūd b. Muḥammad, was alleged to have assigned the provinces independently of Masʻūd; and Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Husain, who made an abortive attempt to reform the financial administration (see p. 256 above), gave iqṭā’s and allowances to the amirs in strict accordance with the numbers of their armies. Nizām al-Mulk recommended that the muqta’s and also the tax collectors (‘ummāl) should be changed every two or three years so that they would not establish themselves in a strong local position. The divān, however, was seldom strong enough to act upon this advice.

Often the heads of the various departments of the divān had deputies, who acted on their behalf in their absence on campaigns or missions for the sultan. Abu’l Qasim Anasābādī Darguzānī, whom Sanjar appointed vizier to Toghril b. Muḥammad in 526/1132, was at the same time made Sanjar’s vizier; he remained in Iraq with Toghril and appointed a deputy to act for him at Sanjar’s court. This was an exceptional case. Plurality of office, however, against which Nizām al-Mulk inveighs in the Siyāṣat-Nāma, was not uncommon. There was also a series of subordinate officials and scribes (kuttāb) in the different departments of the divān. The choice of departmental heads of the divān and of subordinate officials was in practice often in the hands of the vizier, whose fall would frequently entail the dismissal of his supporters and clients also.

After the death of Nizām al-Mulk the prestige and influence of the vizierate declined, and the sultan tended to deal directly with the heads of the different departments. Berk-Yaruq’s mustaufī, Majd al-Mulk Abu’l Faḍl Barāvistānī, dominated the Vizier Fakhr al-Mulk b. Nizām al-Mulk, and became the most powerful official in the bureaucracy (see below, p. 267).

Although the vizier was the head of the bureaucracy and his functions
mainly administrative, he was nevertheless expected to accompany the sultan on military expeditions. Thus Niẓām al-Mulk was present with Alp-Arsalan on most of his campaigns; and in 464/1071-2 Alp-Arsalan sent him at the head of a large force to Fārs, where he defeated Faḍlūya, the Shābānkāra leader. When vizier to Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh, Khaṭīr al-Mulk Abū Mansūr Maibudi was entrusted with the defence of one of the gates of Iṣṭahān during its siege by Berk-Yaruq in 495/1102; but he deserted his post and went to Maibud. On some occasions it appears to have been the vizier and not the sultan who dispatched military expeditions. For example, Niẓām al-Mulk sent an army to besiege Alamūt in 485/1092 after hearing that Ḥasan-i Sabbāḥ had taken it; and Sanjar’s vizier, Mukhtāṣ al-Mulk Abū Naṣr Ṭhmād Kāshi, sent an army against the Ḥsā’īlis of Türshiz and Baihaq in 520/1126.

The vizier was probably paid mainly by iqṭā’īs. Ibn al-Khālīkan alleges that one-tenth of the produce of the soil was usually granted as an iqṭā’ to the viziers in the Great Saljuq period. If so, this type of iqṭā’ was clearly something rather different from the “administrative” or the “military” iqṭā’. When Niẓām al-Mulk was accused by Abūʾl Maḥāsin b. Kamāl al-Daula, deputy-head of the divān-i rasa’il, and by others before Malik-Shāh of misappropriating the revenue, he admitted to taking one-tenth of Malik-Shāh’s wealth, which he alleged to have spent on the standing army, on alms, gifts, and auqāf. This story may be the foundation for Ibn Khallikān’s statement. If, in fact, such an allocation was made to the vizier, it was probably not so much in lieu of salary as to enable him to meet the expenses of his office, such as the giving of alms and presents and the provision of allowances for the religious classes and others. It must also be remembered that the area under the direct administration of the central government was probably never the majority of the empire, and therefore the sum involved was not as large as might appear at first sight.

Most viziers also held assignments of land, but whether this was granted to them as personal estates or in lieu of salary is not always clear. In either case such assignments differed from the “military” and “administrative” assignments, for the holder was not under obligation to furnish the sultan with troops; and, further, he did not live on his iqṭā’. Nevertheless, since the maintenance of private armies by influential people was the general rule, the produce of these assignments was probably largely spent on the upkeep of troops.

1 Vol. iii, p. 297.
INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE SALJUQ EMPIRE

Another source of wealth for the vizier was confiscation and fines. Further, since he was one of the most influential men in the empire, those who desired office, whether at the centre or in the provinces, and those who feared they had incurred the sultan’s displeasure endeavoured to buy the vizier’s support. ‘Amid al-Mulk Kunduri, after his abortive attempt to place Sulaiman b. Chaghri on the throne, and knowing that Nizām al-Mulk’s jealousy had been aroused and that he had schemed for his arrest, sought to make his peace with Nizām al-Mulk. In Muharram 456/December 1063–January 1064, Kunduri went to Nizām al-Mulk and left with him 500 dinārs tied up in a handkerchief. This availed him nothing and he was killed shortly afterwards. When Malik-Shāh seized and blinded Abu’l Mahāsin b. Kamāl al-Daula in 476/1083–4 after his failure to encompass the fall of Nizām al-Mulk, Kamāl al-Daula gave Nizām al-Mulk 200,000 dinārs.¹ This suggests that there had been a significant increase in the amount of money changing hands in this way. When the Bani Jahir, who had been in the caliph’s vizierate, were disgraced in 493/1099–1100, their possessions were sold and the proceeds went to Mu‘ayyid al-Mulk b. Nizām al-Mulk, Muhammad b. Malik-Shāh’s vizier. When the latter was killed by Berk-Yaruq, his possessions were taken by Berk-Yaruq’s vizier, al-‘Izz Abu’l Mahāsin Dihistānī. When the latter was murdered in 495/1101–2 his wealth was shared between his successor in the vizierate, Khaṭir al-Mulk Abū Mansūr Maibudi, and the sultan. One of the most active viziers in respect to confiscation was Kamāl al-Dīn Abū’l Barakat Darguzānī. Shams al-Mulk b. Nizām al-Mulk, who was vizier to Mahmūd b. Malik-Shāh in 516/1122–3, is also alleged to have oppressed and fined the people, and consequently to have been hated by them.

The vizier was himself obliged to spend large sums of money to retain the favour of the sultan, and, if possible, to forestall the intrigues of rivals. On one occasion Nizām al-Mulk sent a certain Ashtar to accompany Alp-Arslan’s envoy on a return mission to Shams al-Mulk, the ruler of Transoxiana, and to report what had transpired. It so happened that Shams al-Mulk’s envoy mentioned that Nizām al-Mulk was a rāfīdī (i.e. a Shi‘i). Ashtar at once informed Nizām al-Mulk. The vizier was much perturbed at this and spent, according to his own account, 30,000 gold dinārs to prevent the report—false though it was—reaching the sultan’s ears.²

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, vol. x, p. 85. According to Bundārī, Kamāl al-Daula gave 300,000 dinārs to the sultan’s treasury (p. 57).
² Siyāsat-Nāma, pp. 88–90.
The expenses of a vizier's establishment were considerable. His court was the refuge of innumerable persons who sought redress, office, or some other favour. When Niẓām al-Mulk came to Baghdad with Malik-Shāh in 480/1087-8 many beggars and others came to his court; and none (to quote Hindu-Shāh, author of the Tajārib al-salaf) went away disappointed. When he left Baghdad he ordered the gifts he had made to be counted: they amounted to 140,000 dinārs. The second time he came to Baghdad he did not at first give any presents, but after a member of the religious classes remonstrated with him, he resumed his former practice. Tāj al-Mulk Abu'l Ghanā'īm—Terken Khatun's vizier, who, with Majd al-Mulk Barāvīstānī, the mustaufī, and with Abu'l Ma'āli Sadid al-Mulk, the ṣāriḍ al-jaish, plotted for the downfall of Niẓām al-Mulk—accused him of spending 300,000 dinārs annually on jurists and Sūfīs. According to al-Ṭūṭurshī, Niẓām al-Mulk spent double that sum annually on madrasas, ribāts (hospices), and pensions for the pious and the poor. Indeed the vizier, like the sultan, was expected to keep an open table and to show generosity to the poor and the religious classes, and since these obligations arose in part from his official position, it is not unlikely that the money spent on pensions and madrasas was derived, partly at least, from the state revenue.

The vizier in some cases had his own "private" army; and that of Niẓām al-Mulk was of considerable size. His mamlūks were known as the Niẓāmiyya mamlūks, and after his death they played an important part in securing the accession of Berk-Yaruq; then, in revenge for the death of their former master, they killed Tāj al-Mulk Abu'l Ghanā'īm, who had been designated to succeed him as vizier to Malik-Shāh but had not formally assumed office before Malik-Shāh died.

It was usual for the vizier to rise to his office through the subordinate ranks of the divān. Many held the office of mustaufi, ṣāriḍ al-jaish, or ṭughrāʾī before becoming vizier. Some entered the divān-i a'la after being employed in the provinces or in the divān of an amīr or a Saljuq princess. Transfer from the divān of one Saljuq malik to another was also not uncommon. Thus viziers and departmental heads of the divān enjoyed a common background and training. There was, however, occasionally recruitment to the bureaucracy from other classes; and an able man, if he was prepared to accept patronage and adopt the various devices which led to success in official life, could rise to the top. Abu'l Qāsim Anasābādī Darguzūnī was the son of a peasant of Anasābād near Hamadān. He came to Isfahān as a child and subsequently entered the
services of Kamāl al-Mulk Simirūmī, acting as vizier to Guhar Khatun, Muḥammad b. Malik-Shāh’s wife. He then became vizier to the amīr ḥājib, ‘Alī b. ‘Umar, at which time he laid the foundations of his fortune (see p. 251 above). He ultimately became vizier to Sanjar and Toghrīl b. Muḥammad, and was executed by the latter in 527/1133. Kamāl al-Mulk Simirūmī himself was the son of a man who farmed Simirum, which belonged to Guhar Khatun’s divān. He entered the service of Guhar Khatun’s divān and in due course her vizier, when he went to Baghdad, made Kamāl al-Mulk his deputy. Kamāl al-Mulk rehabilitated Guhar Khatun’s divān and succeeded in ingratiating himself with her; and on the death of the vizier he became the head of her divān. She recommended him to the sultan, who made him mushrif al-mamālik, and then mustaufi. Finally he became vizier to Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad in 512/1118-19. Muḥammad b. Sulaimān Kāshgārī, who became Sanjar’s vizier, was previously a merchant. He was not a popular or successful vizier. Trade, it seems, was not a suitable training for the bureaucracy. Zākī, whose incompetence, as stated above, had contributed to the replacement of the vakil-i dar by the amīr ḥājib, was a rich Qazvīnī merchant.

The most famous of all the Saljuq viziers was Niẓām al-Mulk. Five of his sons, two of his grandsons, and one great-grandson held the office of vizier to one or other of the sultans or maliks after him, though none of them achieved his eminence. He was the son of a man who had been made the tax-collector and revenue farmer (bundār) of Tūs, by the Ghaznavīd ‘amīd of Khurāsān. At the beginning of the Saljuq expansion the country was in a state of disorder and the taxes were not being collected. The ‘amīd of Khurāsān demanded from Abu’l Ḥasan, Niẓām al-Mulk’s father, the arrears of Tūs, which he was unable to pay in full. In the prevailing confusion the administration began to disintegrate and many of the Ghaznavīd officials dispersed. Abu’l Ḥasan eventually found his way to Ghazna, with his son Niẓām al-Mulk, who was still a child. In due course the latter entered Ghaznavīd service, but after Balkh fell to the Saljuqs in 432/1040-1 he attached himself to the ‘amīd of Balkh, Ibn Shādān. His experiences with Ibn Shādān were not altogether happy. It is related—perhaps apocryphally—that whenever the ‘amīd thought Niẓām al-Mulk had accumulated any wealth, he would say, “O Ḥasan, you have grown fat” and mulct him. When this had happened several times Niẓām al-Mulk fled to Marv.¹ There, by

¹ Muḥammad Mufīd, Jāmi’-i Mufīdī, ed. Iraj Afshār (Tehran, 1342/1963), vol. 1, p. 54.
some means or other, he joined the service of Alp-Arslan. Kunduri, who had been Toghril Beg's vizier, was dismissed by Alp-Arslan shortly after his accession, and Niẓām al-Mulk became vizier, which office he also held under Malik-Shāh. Ghazālī, who was Niẓām al-Mulk's contemporary, compared him to the Barmakids; and he appears to have enjoyed a great reputation among all classes of the population, including the army. Such was his prestige that the caliph allowed him to be seated in his presence. On the occasion of the betrothal of Malik-Shāh's daughter to the caliph in 474/1081–2, when the sultan's retinue went to the caliph's court, Niẓām al-Mulk, at the caliph's command, rode while everyone else walked; and when they reached the caliph's audience Niẓām al-Mulk was seated on a throne (masnad) and given a robe of honour with a border (tarāz) on it, inscribed: “In the name of the just and perfect vizier, Niẓām al-Mulk, raḍī amirī'l mu'mīnīn.”

To what extent Niẓām al-Mulk's reputation for justice was merited is difficult to judge. His lavish expenditure on pensions, allowances to the religious classes, and the building of madrasas contributed to his fame and popularity. In a letter to Fakhr al-Mulk b. Niẓām al-Mulk, Ghazālī tells him of his father's ambition not to be surpassed by anyone in good works. He appears on the whole to have counselled moderation and tolerance, though in his early career, at least, he was not above ridding himself of rivals by intrigue, as he did in the case of 'Amīd al-Mulk Kunduri. He was undoubtedly an able and competent administrator, and not without skill in military affairs—a fact which no doubt was of great help to him in his relations with the amirs, and which enabled him to maintain the prestige of the bureaucracy vis-à-vis the military. He appears to have been a good judge of character, an essential attribute of a vizier when power was personal rather than institutional. Bundārī states that he selected each man for the work for which he was best suited and appointed him to office accordingly. The fact that many of his relatives held office under him increased his power though it also aroused the sultan's jealousy.

The office of vizier was potentially, and under Niẓām al-Mulk actually, one of great power, but it also involved its holder in great risks. He had no security of tenure and could be dismissed at will and without cause by the sultan. The power he exercised was delegated to him entirely as a matter of grace: he was the servant, not of the state, but of the sultan, and consequently it was essential for him to retain the

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1 Ibn al-Khallīkān, vol. 1, p. 413.
2 See Faḍḍ'ī al-anām, p. 30.
satisfaction of the sultan, who, because of the arbitrary nature of power in the medieval Persian state, was inevitably jealous of any influence the vizier obtained. The latter often faced a conflict between his duty towards the people, whether seen in terms of Islam or common justice, and political practice. Ghazâlî indeed took the view that the vizier because of his office inevitably became involved in corruption and disobedience to the laws of God.\(^1\) Another story, also perhaps apocryphal, illustrates this point. Nizâm al-Mulk complained to the Imam al-Ḥaramain of Alp-Arslân’s secret ill-feeling towards him in spite of his almost superhuman efforts in the interests of the state. The Imam al-Ḥaramain replied that since the wealth and property of the sultan were in the hands of Nizâm al-Mulk, inevitably the sultan suspected him of corruption. He also pointed out that some of the demands sultans made upon their viziers were impossible to fulfil.

The vizier was also likely to incur the dissatisfaction of other members of the sultan’s family, who, if their desires were opposed or they were prevented from interfering in affairs, were likely to attribute this to the vizier’s opposition; and the vizier’s rivals, desirous of self-advancement, would encourage them in this. No vizier who made any serious effort to establish an effective administration was immune from the jealousy and intrigues of his fellows. Nizâm al-Mulk, the strongest and most influential of all the Saljuq viziers, was no exception, and many of his contemporaries attributed his murder—generally thought to have been committed by an emissary of Ḥasan-i Sabbâḥ—to Malik-Shah and Tâj al-Mulk Abu’l Ghanâ’im, Terken Khatun’s vizier, who had supported her in her efforts to persuade the sultan to declare her son Mahâmûd as valî ‘ahd.

The bureaucracy had no traditions of integrity and independence: the vizier could not expect loyalty from his colleagues, and consequently self-preservation demanded that he should fill key places as far as possible with his relatives and clients, the former because he could in some measure control them and the latter because their hope of advancement would be at least temporarily bound up with his. But by the nature of the case he fought a losing battle. He had to share with his supporters the benefits and spoils of office; and as they rose from poverty to riches, from weakness to power, and insignificance to fame, they were likely to scheme with others to encompass his destruction.

The prevention of corruption in subordinate officials was an ex-

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\(^1\) Cf. Faḍl al-anâm, p. 61.
tremely difficult problem for the vizier, and one which, however dealt with, made many enemies for him. There was no adequate system of control or supervision. The barid, which in earlier times had been used for the transmission of messages between government agents in the provinces and the capital, and whose officers kept watch over and reported on events taking place in various parts of the empire, had been abolished. Alp-Arslan’s alleged reasons for objecting to it were sound: namely, that those who were loyal would pay no attention to the sahib khabar (the postmaster) and see no need to bribe him, while his enemies would make friends with the sahib khabar and give him money, with the result that he would report favourably on them and unfavourably on those who were loyal. But in the absence of any effective checks and controls in the administrative system, there could be, as Nizām al-Mulk recognized, no security for the ruler against rebellion, injustice, or extortion by his officials. Hence Nizām al-Mulk advocated an efficient system of espionage backed by an armed force strong enough to overpower all opposition. In his view, the sultan should have informers and spies throughout the empire and among all classes of the people, including the qādis. He probably had his own agents in the country, but in spite of his advice, the barid was not re-established.

Perhaps the most delicate problem of all for the vizier was his relationship with the amirs. His official business constantly brought him into contact with them. Friendship with them individually attracted the enmity of those excluded from the friendship and aroused the suspicion of the sultan. Up to the death of Nizām al-Mulk the vizier’s influence was greater than that of the amirs, but after his death they gradually deprived the bureaucracy of all effective power. None after Nizām al-Mulk really succeeded in re-imposing control over the amirs, and those who tried came to an untimely end. The first and most striking case is that of the mustaufī Majd al-Mulk Barāvistānī, who, having succeeded in getting Fakhr al-Mulk b. Nizām al-Mulk appointed to Berk-Yaruq’s vizierate in 488/1095, made his own influence dominant in the divān. He appears to have attempted to keep a tight hold on the amirs, but in 492/1098–9 Öner rebelled and offered Berk-Yaruq his renewed obedience on condition that Majd al-Mulk was surrendered to him. But before any action could occur, Öner was assassinated. The opposition to Majd al-Mulk was not thereby ended, and later in the same year a number of prominent amirs demanded that the sultan

1 Siyāsat-Nāma, p. 65.
should hand Majd al-Mulk over to them. Berk-Yaruq refused to surrender him. The rebellious amirs thereupon entered the sultan’s tent, dragged out the mustaufi, and killed him. This incident is significant of the changing relationships between the vizierate and the amirs; and by the time of Mas‘ūd b. Muḥammad, the amirs began to appoint their own nominees to the office. As stated above, Qara-Sonqur made his own vizier, ‘Izz al-Mulk Ṭahir b. Muḥammad Burūjirdī, the vizier to Mas‘ūd b. Muḥammad in 533/1139. After the death of Qara-Sonqur, a group of amirs led by ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Ṭughrāyarak persuaded Mas‘ūd to seize ‘Izz al-Mulk in 539/1144–5 and in the following year (or in 541/1146–7) Boz-Aba, who had become one of the most powerful amirs in the empire, succeeded in appointing his own vizier, Tāj al-Dīn Abūl Fath b. Darast, to the sultan’s vizierate. He held office for only a few months, however, before returning to Boz-Aba’s service in Fārs. Ibn al-Athīr states that he preferred Boz-Aba’s service to the sultan’s, whereas Bundārī states that Mas‘ūd allowed him to return to Boz-Aba in the hope that he would restrain Boz-Aba from rebellion. Whichever account is nearer to the truth, it is clear that there had been a sharp decline in the power of the sultan’s vizierate, as well as a major change in the relations between vizier and amirs.

The position of the vizier and of government officials in general was extremely insecure. After the death of Nizām al-Mulk, viziers succeeded one another with great rapidity. This was perhaps partly due to the prevailing financial stringency; the dismissal of a vizier and the confiscation of his wealth by the sultan was a means of temporarily relieving this stringency. After the death of Malik-Shāh the number of viziers who escaped being murdered, imprisoned, or having their wealth confiscated is small. The readiness with which the later sultans listened to intrigues against their viziers contrasts strongly with the conduct of Alp-Ārslan, who, on one occasion when he received a letter accusing Nizām al-Mulk of malpractices, is alleged to have given it to him and said, “If they are right in what they have written, repair your nature and mend your ways; and if they lied then forgive them their slip”. But it is also true that since there were no effective controls or checks against corruption within the bureaucratic system itself, then

1 Rāvandī, pp. 145–7. Ibn al-Athīr’s account differs slightly, in that he states that Berk-Yaruq finally agreed to surrender Majd al-Mulk but made the amirs promise to spare his life. When he was handed over by the sultan, some soldiers killed him before he reached the amirs (vol. x, pp. 196–7).

once there was a relaxation in the power of the sultan, intrigue and corruption grew and fed upon each other.

The sultan exercised “administrative” justice in the mazālim court, personally or through his agents. He delegated his function as judge according to the ideal system of the shari’a to the qādi. In the mazālim court the administration of justice was exercised on the basis of custom, equity, and governmental regulations; whereas the qādi in his court applied the shari’a according to certain formal rules of evidence and procedure.¹ This court sat in the mosque, in the qādi’s residence, or some other duly appointed place. It was concerned primarily with the settlement of litigation, the execution of testaments and matters of inheritance, escheat, transfers of property, administration of the affairs of orphans, widows, and of those legally incapacitated, and the appointment of umanā (trustees) for this purpose. The qādi normally applied the shari’a according to the rite to which most people in the area under his jurisdiction belonged. Among the qualifications demanded of the qādi was that he should be a Muslim, free, and versed in the principles of the law (usūl al-fiqh).

In spite of the fact that by Saljuq times the jurisdiction of the mazālim court tended to overlap with and to supersede that of the qādi’s court, the qādi still played an extremely important role in the life of the Saljuq empire. He acted as a link both between the political and the religious institution, and between the sultan and his people; and he maintained and transmitted the traditions of Islamic civilization. From the new relationship between the caliph and the sultan, and from the renewed association of the political and the religious institution, there followed a reappraisal of the position of the religious classes in general and of the qādi in particular. Nizām al-Mulk states the qādis were the deputies (nā’ibān) of the ruler, upon whom their support was incumbent. Full respect and dignity were to be accorded to them because they were the deputies of the caliph (nā’ibān-i khālīfā), upon whom his mantle (shīr) had devolved. At the same time, they were also appointed by the secular ruler and did his work.² Similarly in contemporary documents the ‘ulamā are sometimes referred to as the “heirs of the Prophet” and the qādis as the officers of the shari’a and “the umanā of God in the execution of decrees, the termination of disputes, and in obtaining the rights of the weak”.³ The position of the

² Sījāsat-Namā, pp. 40–1.
³ Cf. Qudic Custodiet, Studia Islamica, fasc. v, p. 132.
qādīs vis-à-vis the sultan was to some extent analogous with that of the caliph vis-à-vis the sultan: the immediate source of their power was the sultan, who exercised constituent authority, but their functional authority was derived from the shari'a and the Prophet—hence the reference to them as the “heirs of the Prophet”. But whereas the caliph under the new arrangement exercised only spiritual authority, the qādīs were incorporated into the political institution.

Once a qādī was appointed, it was theoretically incumbent upon government officials to execute his decrees, which were not subject to review, though in cases of injustice an appeal could in theory be made to the mażālim court. The freedom of action of the qādī was limited in practice, first because he had to rely on the officials of the dargāh (or, in the provinces, on the muqta‘) to execute his decrees; and secondly because he was subject to dismissal by the sultan, or by those to whom the sultan had delegated authority in the provinces.

With their incorporation into the administrative hierarchy, the qādī and other officials of the religious institution, such as the kḥāṭīb and muḥtāsib, received salaries and allowances as other officials did. Nīżām al-Mulk, writing on the position of the qādīs states:

He (the sultan) must know the condition of each one of the qādīs of the kingdom individually. Whoever of them is more learned, more abstemious, more honest (kūṭdh-dasttar), he shall keep in office, but whoever is not he shall be dismissed and replaced by someone more worthy. He shall allocate to each one of them a salary (mushāhira) sufficient for his livelihood so that he will have no need to commit embezzlement. This is an important and delicate affair because the qādīs are empowered over the lives and possessions of the Muslims. If they issue a decree in ignorance, greed, or with deliberate intent, or give a written judgement, it will be incumbent upon other judges (bākimān) to execute that evil decree while making it known to the sultan so that he may dismiss and punish that person. The officials must support the qādī and preserve his prestige. If anyone behaves proudly and does not appear at the [qādī’s] summons, he shall be made to appear by force and compulsion even though he is a man of standing (muḥtashām).

The documents of the day also recognize that the office of qādī was intimately connected with the well-being and interests of the population. He was in fact often their spokesman, and in times of disorder it was not unknown for him to organize the administration and defence of a city. Usually, moreover, he was a local man, and there was a strong hereditary tendency in the office. The chief qādī of a town or

1 Siyāsat-Nāma, p. 38.
district, who was called the qādi al-qudāt, was appointed by the sultan, unless he lived in an area alienated from the ruler's direct control, in which case he was probably appointed by the provincial governor or the muqta. He usually had power to appoint deputies in the area under him. In his deed of appointment he was designated as the qādi of such and such a place. This was also the case with diplomas issued for mustaufis, mushrīfs, āmīls, and other officials, who were appointed over specified areas; but whereas they were simply the representatives of the divān-i aʿlā in the area, the qādis, although appointed by the sultan, exercised their authority both as the "heirs of the Prophet", and as the qādis of a particular area, which gave them a certain independence vis-à-vis the central government.

The main duty of the qādi under the Saljuqs was probably to watch over the religious institution on behalf of the sultan, especially with a view to preventing unorthodox opinions. Usually, though not invariably, the qādi was also entrusted with the supervision of mosques and of the officials of the religious institution, notably the muhtasib, in the area to which he was appointed. His oversight of the mosques sometimes included power to nominate the imāms, who led the prayers, and the khatīb, who read the khutba in the Friday mosque. In the chief cities of the empire, however, the latter was frequently nominated by the sultan; and in Marv the office was held by a Shāfiʿī. It was not uncommon for the office of khatīb to be held by a qādi.

With regard to the administration and supervision of auqāf there was considerable variety of practice. If no mutavalli (administrator) had been appointed by the founder, the qādi administered the vaqf directly; if, however, there was a mutavalli, then the qādi merely exercised general supervision over its administration. The qādi frequently taught in the local madrasa, and in some cases held the office of mudarris. Often, too, he was a mufti and issued fatwas (decrees) on theological and juridical matters. Sometimes he also presided over the maẓālim court, as stated above. Lastly the qādis were often used by the sultan as envoys. This was perhaps partly because of the respect in which they were held by the local population; and partly because it was the policy of the Saljuqs to incorporate the religious hierarchy into the administrative hierarchy.

Alp-Arslan appears to have had a chief qādi of the empire: qādi-yi jumla-yi mamālik. According to the document for his appointment, dated Muḥarram 457/December 1064–January 1065, this official was

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1 'Atabat al-Kataba, p. 87.

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entrusted with the care of mosques and auqāf, and was instructed to hear sharʿi cases and to take good care of the documents (wills, contracts, etc.) deposited with him. The great men of the kingdom, the tax collectors, ruʿasā, and all the subjects were enjoined to consider him the foremost qāḍī of the empire (aqdāʾ-i-quḍāt dar kull-i vilâyāt). With the increased centralization of the administration in the hands of the vizier during the reign of Malik-Shāh, it is not unlikely that the office of chief qāḍī of the empire fell into disuse. The vizier as head of the financial administration exercised general supervision over auqāf, as stated above; but his precise relationship to the chief qāḍī, and to the provincial qāḍīs—in respect to the supervision of auqāf, as well as to the extent and nature of control held by the divān-i auqāf-i mamālik over provincial auqāf—is not clear. In some cases the auqāf of a particular district were expressly placed outside the control of this divān. It is possible that under Sanjar the qāḍī-ji lashkar may have, to some extent, taken the place of the chief qāḍī of the empire. In a diploma for the qāḍī-ji lashkar issued by Sanjar’s divān for the qāḍī al-quḍāt, Majd al-Din, he was entrusted with the supervision of auqāf; and the amirs, army leaders, and the sultan’s entourage, Turk and non-Turk, were all instructed to refer their sharʿi cases to him. He was also enjoined to administer the Ḥanafī rite.

While the renewed association between the religious and the political institution did in some ways strengthen the position of the qāḍīs, it also to some extent jeopardized their independence. Niẓām al-Mulk, in fact, proposed that the sultan should appoint a god-fearing man in every town to watch over and give information about the condition of the ‘āmil, the qāḍī, the muḥtasib, and the subjects in general.

The muḥtasib, who was under the general supervision of the qāḍī was, like him, normally a member of the religious classes; and through him the sultan came into contact with his subjects in yet another way: by exercising control over the moral welfare of the townspeople. In general the people in the towns were grouped according to their religious, ethnical, and above all professional affinities, because only by grouping themselves into corporations were they able to protect their lives and goods, and to buy intercessions and favours to relieve their lot. The corporate organization of society, which was a marked feature of Islamic society in Persia until modern times, was characteristic also of

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1 See Horst, op. cit. pp. 147–8.
2 ‘Atabat al-Kataba, p. 33.
3 Ibid. p. 59.
4 Siyāsāt-Nāma, p. 43.
the Saljuq period. There is evidence of a spirit of corporate feeling among the inhabitants of various cities, which sometimes manifested itself in rivalry between different towns and also in the ability of a town to make a settlement with individual leaders without reference to the central government or its officials. Thus when disorders were committed by the ‘ayyar in Baihaq after the death of Malik-Shah in 485/1092, a sayyid from a neighbouring village patrolled the city at night with mounted men and footmen so that “no disorderly person or wrong-doer should encroach upon the possessions of the Muslims or their women”.¹

Bodies of ‘ayyar were to be found in various cities, notably Baghdad and Nishāpūr. These groups may have originated as an offshoot of the futuwwa organizations. In the Qāhūs-Nāma, where he discusses the fifth/eleventh-century Persian conception of javānmardi or futuwwa (chivalry), Kai Kā’ūs ranks soldiers (sipāhiyān), ‘ayyarān, and the people of the bazaar as the fourth and last group of those possessing this quality. The other three were first Šūfis, secondly wise men, prophets, and saints, and lastly “spiritual” men and apostles.² From his description it seems possible that the futuwwa organizations were dividing along two lines, those who fulfilled their self-imposed duties in an active sphere, and those who interpreted jihad as applying to the inward and spiritual struggle against the temptations of the world. Kai Kā’ūs states: “The most perfect soldier is like the most perfect ‘ayyar, but generosity, hospitality, liberality, gratitude, and probity should be greater in a soldier, and he should be more heavily armed; and while [to prefer] his own loss and the benefit of a friend, obedience, and humility are a virtue in a soldier, they are a fault in an ‘ayyar.”³

Ibn al-Jauzi (d. 597/1200–1), writing rather later, also identifies the ‘ayyar with those who belong to the futuwwa organization. He states:

Amongst those persons who have been made captive by the misrepresentations of Satan are the ‘ayyar; and this body, who are called fityān, take the people’s goods, and say “a fatā, is one who does not commit fornication nor lie, and strives to preserve the honour and reputation of women, and does not violate their privacy. In spite of this, they do not restrain themselves from seizing people’s property, not remembering that by their action they oppress the people. They call their organisation (tarīqa) ‘futuwwa’.” It often happens that one of them takes an oath, binding himself to the obligations

² Ed. R. Levy, Gibb Memorial Series, p. 141.
³ Qāhūs-Nāma, p. 143, taking the variant ziyān-i ḥund va sūd-i dīst.
of futuwwa, and abstains from food and drink. Their garments are trousers (sarāwīl) with which they invest everyone who enters their organisation, in the same way as the Şūfis clothe the murid in a patched garment (muragga‘a).1

The general tendency was for the ‘ayyar to degenerate into bands of robbers. Already before Saljuq times they had been a frequent source of trouble to the Sāmānid administration in Khurasan; and Yaʻqūb b. Laith, the founder of the Šaffārid dynasty, was himself an ‘ayyar. By Saljuq times the ‘ayyar were mostly undisciplined mobs who took up arms, robbed and murdered the population, and spread terror among them when opportunity offered.2

The city was usually enclosed by a fortified wall, within which there was frequently a citadel: the last refuge of the city’s defenders in case of siege, and of government officials in case of revolt. The city was divided into quarters, and in the large cities each quarter was self-contained and sometimes enclosed within its own walls, having its own mosque, bazaar for primary necessities, and public bath. Nasir-i Khusrāw mentions that all the streets and quarters of Isfahān had strong bars and gates in 444/1052.3 Sometimes the quarters were separated from one another by an occupational grouping. Factional and sectarian strife and rivalry among different quarters were not uncommon, especially in Baghdad. Nishāpūr was also notorious for factional strife. In 489/1096 riots took place there between the Karāmiyya and other sections of the people; many were killed, and the Šāfī‘īs and Ḥanafis prevailed in the end;4 and after the Ghuzz captured Sanjar in 548/1153, it is alleged that there were riots in Nishāpūr every night in one quarter or another, because of religious differences and ancient hatreds.5 Tus appears to have been another town where lack of unity prevailed. Ghazālī, too, complains of intrigues and envy among its inhabitants.6

The dhimmis or members of the “protected” communities, i.e. Christians, Jews, Sabeanb, and Zoroastrians (only the first two were found in any number), were segregated in their own quarters. They each had their own organizations and took little part in the life of the Muslim community. They enjoyed freedom of religion and appointed

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1 Naqī al-‘ilm wa-l-ulamā‘ yā talbīs Iblīs (Cairo, A.H. 1340), p. 421. This has been translated by D. S. Margoliouth, under the title “The Devil’s Delusion”, in Islamic Culture (1938).
3 Safar-Nama, p. 92.
5 Rāvandi, p. 182.
6 Faḍā’il al-anām, p. 53.
their own religious officials, subject probably to the confirmation of the sultan or his officials. They were subject to the payment of jizya (poll-tax) and to certain other limitations such as the wearing of distinguishing marks on their clothing; and they were debarred from bearing arms. The Jews were probably largely occupied in trade and commerce. There were Jewish and Christian communities in many of the large cities of the empire, notably Baghdad and Nishapûr. Benjamin of Tudela, who travelled some years after the death of Sanjar, mentions Jewish communities in, among other places, Hamadân, Iṣfahān, Nihâvand, and Shîrāz.

On the whole there appears to have been little discrimination against the dhimmis, though from time to time there were outbreaks of feeling against them. Ibn al-Athîr relates an incident concerning a Jew called Abû Sa’d b. Samhâ, who lived in Baghdad in 484/1091 and was an agent (vakîl) for Malik-Shâh and Nîzîm al-Mulk. After being struck by a huckster in the street, he went with the šâhna, Gauhar Ā’in, to the sultan’s camp, which was then in the neighbourhood, to complain of the caliph’s vizier, Abû Shujâ’—presumably because he was considered responsible for public order so far as it concerned the dhimmis in Baghdad. Meanwhile, a decree was issued by the caliph forcing the dhimmis to wear distinguishing marks on their clothing, and they began to flee from Baghdad. But when Abû Sa’d and Gauhar Ā’in reached the sultan’s camp their demand for Abû Shujâ’ s dismissal from the caliph’s vizierate was accepted, and the caliph was forced to comply. It is clear from the fact that new orders for the dhimmis to wear special clothing were from time to time issued that these orders were not permanently enforced. A new order making it obligatory on the dhimmis in Baghdad to wear distinguishing marks on their clothes was issued by Mahmûd b. Muḥammad in 515/1121-2.

The most influential and respected section of the local population was that composed of the religious classes, many of whom had a large following among the people. It was perhaps for this reason that they were frequently employed as envoys. Al-Muqtâdî sent Abû Ishâq Shirâzi on an embassy to Malik-Shâh in 475/1083. In every town through which he passed the people came out with their women and children to welcome him, and sought to touch his stirrups and collect the dust from his mule as a blessing; and in Sâveh various guilds, such as the bakers’, fruiters’, confectioners’, and others came out to present

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1 Vol. x, pp. 123-4.
offerings of their respective trades and crafts. A va‘īz (preacher) named ‘Abbādī, whom Sanjar sent to the caliph in 541/1166–7, found great acceptance in Baghdad. Mas‘ūd b. Muḥammad and others came to hear him preach, and “as for the common people, they abandoned their occupations to be present at his assembly”.

The religious classes were organized into corporations; in the large towns the Shāfī‘īs and Ḥanafīs (and any other rites that existed) each had their own ra‘īs or head, who sometimes received a diploma of appointment from the sultan. Abū Sa‘d ‘Abd al-Karím b. Muḥammad b. Manṣūr al-Sam‘ānī, who received a diploma from Sanjar’s divān for the office of ra‘īs of the Shāfī‘īs of Marv and its environs, was also appointed khāṭīb of the Friday mosque and mutavalli of its auqāf, and he was authorized to teach in the madrasas, including the Niẓāmīyya madrasa, shrines (maṣḥābīd-i khāir), and Friday mosque. The khāṭībs of the neighbourhood and the mutavallīs of the auqāf were instructed to refer their affairs to him. The ‘Alids also formed an important corporation under their own naqīb, who in some cases received a diploma of appointment from the sultan; and they were in some measure removed from the authority of other officials. In a diploma issued by Sanjar’s divān for Murtadā Jamāl al-Dīn Abūl Ḥasan ‘Alavi, for the office of naqīb of the sayyids of Gurgān, Dihistān, Astarābād, and the neighbourhood, which office he held by hereditary right, he was enjoined to treat the sayyids with respect according to the degree of their learning (‘ilm) and piety (‘afāf), and to transmit to them their livelihood from the customary sources. He was to strengthen the righteous and punish the wicked, to investigate carefully their genealogies, and to expel anyone who falsely claimed to be a sayyid. All the sayyids of Gurgān and Dihistān were to recognize him as their naqīb, to obey him, and refer their affairs to him. The divān officials and local officials were to respect him and to entrust to him the affairs of the sayyids without interfering therein.

It was not only the ‘ulamā of the religious institution who were held in respect. The Sufis also enjoyed honour among all classes of the people and were organized in recognized orders and corporations. Some, like Abū Sa‘d b. Abi ‘l Khair, who was visited on several occasions by various members of the Saljuq family, passed lives of religious devotion; others used the garb of a Sufi to make a livelihood. Among such were

1 Ibn al-Athīr, vol. xi, p. 78.
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the guilds of story-tellers against whom Ibn al-Jauzî warned in The Devil’s Delusion:

In our time the story-tellers act in a way which has no connection with delusion, since it is an evident way of making the stories a source of livelihood and of getting gifts from tyrannical princes and obtaining the like from the gatherers of unlawful imposts and earning money by [their stories] in the provinces. Some of them go to the cemeteries where they dilate upon affection and parting with friends drawing tears from the women, but not exhorting them to take warning.¹

The more prominent merchants ranked among the “notables” of the city, while the smaller merchants ranked with the craft guilds in the bazaars. The merchant community with the šarrâfs (brokers) played an important part in financing the operations of the state. Travelling, exporting, and wholesale merchants usually conducted their business in caravanserais, which were situated on the outskirts of the town or in the bazaar itself. According to Nāṣîr-i Khusrau, there were fifty good caravanserais in Isfahān in his day where the merchants congregated and had rooms.² Monetary dealings were handled largely through the šarrâfs. Nāṣîr-i Khusrau reports that there were 200 šarrâfs in one of the bazaars of Isfahān in 444/1052, which indicates the commercial importance of Isfahān at that time.

The bazaar was usually divided into a number of suqs, belonging to the different craft guilds, most of which had their own separate quarters. However, the craftsmen did not live in the bazaars; these were locked and barred at night, as were the premises of the craftsmen within them. Some guilds, such as the brickmakers’ and plasterers’, were usually to be found on the outskirts of the city. Trade was carried on daily except on Fridays and religious holidays. Ghazâlî has a curious passage in the Kimiyā al-saadâz on forbidden things (munkirât) in a bazaar, which gives a glimpse of the life of the people. Among the items which should not be sold he mentions effigies of animals for children at the holiday (‘id), swords and wooden shields for the Nau-Rūz (the festival of the vernal equinox), and clay pipes for Sada (the festival of the autumnal equinox). These things were not in themselves forbidden but they were a manifestation of Zoroastrian customs, which were contrary to the sharî’a and for this reason unseemly. Further, excessive decoration of the bazaars, making much confectionery and extravagance on the occasion of the Nau-Rūz were not fitting: Nau-Rūz and Sada should be forgotten.

¹ P. 133. The translation is Margoliouth’s, in Islamic Culture (1938), p. 36.
² Safar-Nâma, p. 92.
³ Tehran, 1333/1964, p. 407.
The guilds had their own leaders. They were probably responsible, not only for the maintenance of professional standards, but also for allocating among the members and then collecting the taxes and levies that were assessed on the guild in a lump sum. The sources tell us little of the actual membership of the guilds and their methods of work. Ghazālī mentions three types of association which were customary but in his view wrong. The first was the association of porters (hammālān) and artisans (pīshāvarān), who made the pooling of their individual earnings a condition of their association. The other two did not specifically concern the guilds but were, rather, trading associations. The first consisted of persons who pooled their capital and shared the subsequent loss or gain; and the second was a partnership between two parties, one of whom had standing, while the other put up the money and traded in his partner's name, the profits being shared between them. As in later times, the bazaar was sometimes closed by way of protest against injustice. Thus in 512/1118–19, when one of the soldiers of Mengū-Bars, the shāhna of Baghdad, broke into the house of a newly married couple, wounded the bridegroom, and raped his wife, the bazaars all closed in protest.

Public morals and the due performance by Muslims of their religious duties were under the general care of the muḥtasib. He had to prevent, for example, prayer that was contrary to the legal rites, the breaking of the fast of Ramaḍān, wine-drinking in public, the playing of illegal musical instruments, and unseemly behaviour in public. He was also charged with overseeing what might be called public amenities. Thus it was his duty to see that no house was raised above another belonging to a Muslim so as to overlook the women's quarters; that no house had projecting rain-spouts or open drainpipes to drench or befoul wayfarers in the street; and that free passage in the streets was not impeded. He was not to allow slaves to be ill-treated, or animals overburdened. He was also to see that the dhimmis complied with the regulations imposed upon them to distinguish them from Muslims. The muḥtasib's main task, however, was to oversee the markets and to prevent dishonest dealing by merchants and artisans, as well as to supervise the guilds and corporations. He was empowered to inflict summary punishment on offenders. Nizām al-Mulk states that a muḥtasib should be appointed in every city

1 Kimiyā al-sa'da, p. 272.
to oversee weights and prices, to watch over commercial transactions, prevent fraud and the adulteration of goods, and “to enjoin what is good and forbid what is evil”. If the sultan and his officials did not support the muhtasib, “the poor would be in trouble and the people of the bazaar would buy and sell as they liked, middle-men (jadla-khur) would become dominant, corruption would become open and the shari‘a without prestige”.¹

In a diploma issued from Sanjar’s divān for the muhtasib of Māzandarān, Auhad al-Din, he is commanded to enjoin what is good and forbid what is evil; to exert himself in the equalization and control of weights and measures (tasviyat va ta‘dil-i mavāzin va makā’il) so that no fraud would be committed in buying and selling and the Muslims would not be cheated or suffer loss; to ensure that the requirements of the shari‘a would be duly carried out in mosques and places of worship, and that the mu‘ādhhdins and other officials would perform their duties in the proper way and at the stated times; to strive to suppress corrupt persons and to prevent notorious conduct by them in public, the open commission of vice, and any dealing in intoxicating drink in the neighbourhood of mosques, burial places, and tombs. Further, the muhtasib must see that the dhimmis wear distinguishing clothing to mark their inferiority among the Muslims; and he must prevent women mixing in assemblies of the ‘ulamā (majlis-i ‘ilm) and listening to homilies (mavā‘ız).²

Saljuq documents not infrequently compare the sultan to a shepherd and state that the subjects were placed in his care as a trust from God. In some measure his function as “the shepherd of his people” was delegated to the qādi. In part, however, it was delegated to a local official known as the ra‘is. This term, like various others, is used in a variety of senses and not always with precision. In some instances, as stated above, it is broadly synonymous with a provincial governor; it is also used to designate the head of a religious corporation. But in its most common use the term ra‘is designated a local official representing the local people vis-à-vis the government in general and the tax administration in particular. In the larger towns he was appointed by the sultan or the muqta‘. But he was not an official of the central or the provincial government, as were the ‘āmil, mustaufi, and mushrif, even though they, too, were sometimes local men; normally he was one of the leaders of local society, for only a man of local influence and standing could carry out his duties. Not only did he stand up for the interests of

¹ Siyāsat-Nāma, p. 41.  
² ‘Atabat al-kataba, pp. 82–3.
the local population against the officials of the bureaucracy and the military classes—those living in the area and passing through it—but he also ensured that the local population paid their taxes in full to the government. There are instances of a ra’is being sent from one city to another, though this was probably exceptional. Ibn Funduq states that Ḥamza b. Muḥammad, in whose family the office of ra’is of Baihaq was hereditary, became ra’is of Baihaq for a time, and then was sent as ra’is to Tabriz and Marāḡeh.¹ As with the qāḍī, there was probably a hereditary tendency in this office.

Rāvandi relates an incident that shows the importance of the ra’is as the representative of the local people: when the Nizāmiyya mamlūks took Berk-Yaruq from Iṣfahān to Ray and seated him on the throne, the ra’is of Ray, Abū Muslim, the son-in-law of Nizām al-Mulk, suspended a jewelled crown above his head.² In some instances the ra’is of a town was a man of considerable substance, as was Abū Hāshim, the ra’is of Hamadān (see above, p. 251).

Since the relations between the government and people were principally in the field of taxation, it follows that the functions of the ra’is were mainly connected with financial affairs. It was his special duty to safeguard the well-being of the people and to see that their burdens were lightened, and at the same time to ensure the due collection of divān taxes, to prevent both tyranny and oppression by the tax-collectors and evasion by the tax-payers. Through him the sultan exercised control over the officials of the divān. It was his duty to prevent anything being levied without due authorization from the divān, or without some overriding emergency; and when a levy was made on the order of the divān, he had to see that it was equitably distributed among all classes of tax-payers. He also supervised all transactions concerned with the revenue; and the ‘āmil, shahna, and other officials were to keep him fully informed of their activities and not to act without his agreement and approval. In a diploma issued by Sanjar’s divān for the ra’is of Sarakhs, he is instructed inter alia not to allow demands to be made upon the people on behalf of leading members of the sultan’s retinue or by others passing through the district, by the military (mutajannida), or by those having drafts for the collection of dues (‘awārid) or fodder (‘alaf).³ Clearly in the absence of coercive force provided by the government, only a man of local standing could hope to carry out such instructions.

¹ P. 94. ² Pp. 140-1. ³ ‘Atabat al-kataba, p. 41.
The ra'is had a divân or office, and in some cases had the power to appoint deputies to act for him. He was paid by dues (rusūm) levied locally. He seems to have had some responsibility for the general conduct of affairs inside the city, and appears on occasion to have had powers of arrest and imprisonment. After Ghazālī had been appointed mudarris of the Nizāmiyya in Nishāpūr a group of persons were alleged to have intrigued against him, imputing to him unorthodox views; and one man changed some words in the text of a copy of the Mishkāt al-anwār and the Munqidh min al-dalāl with the intention of incriminating Ghazālī. Before signing the copy as correct, however, the author discovered the falsification. When the ra'is of Khurasan (= ? Nishāpūr) learned of this he arrested the man and debarred him from residence in Nishāpūr. He accordingly left that town and went to the royal camp where he continued his intrigues until finally Sanjar summoned Ghazālī to speak for himself. Ghazālī duly came to court about the year 503/1109-10 and put his opponents to shame.¹

In this brief examination of the internal structure of the Saljuq empire I have attempted to show that nothing, religious or temporal, lay outside the care and concern of the sultan. Ghazālī's new definition of the relationship between the sultanate and the caliphate was an attempt to authorize the sultan's government (see above, pp. 207 ff.). This went far towards assuring the acceptance of his government as the effective organ through which Islamic government was expressed, or at least as the means for securing conditions in which the Islamic community could carry on its lawful purposes. And the attempt was to this extent successful, that after the caliphate was overthrown by the Mongols, although there was a temporary break with tradition, yet when the Mongol Il-Khāns were converted to Islam their government was accepted—except by the more legalistically minded—as the government of Islam. On the other hand, the fundamental disharmony in the organization of the state was perpetuated by Nizām al-Mulk's restatement of "the old Persian tradition of monarchy, with its independent ethical standards based on force and opportunism".²

The Saljuqs, who had started out as the leaders of a tribal migration, were gradually transformed, partly under the influence of Ghazālī and

¹ Fadā'īl al-omām, pp. 11-12.
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Nizām al-Mulk, into the rulers of a centralized state. The formulation of its institutions was largely the achievement of Nizām al-Mulk, who modified and developed existing forms. The main features of the new organization of state—notably the structure of the divān, the iqṭāʾ system, and the close connexion between the assessment of taxes and the levy of troops—are also to be found (with changes in terminology) in the Šafāvid and Qājār periods. The main institutions of the Saljuq state were essentially bureaucratic, though the fact that many offices of the state were held by the military tends to obscure this fact. The measures taken to solve the two crucial problems of the state, namely the payment of its civil and military officials and the provision of armed forces for the preservation of order and the maintenance of defence, were bureaucratic devices; and though their abuse led to decentralization and ultimately to the disintegration of the state, they did not of themselves involve decentralization.

Through the officials of the divān, the muqtaʾs and provincial governors, the officials of the religious institution, and local officials, the sultan came into contact with all aspects of the life of his people. But in the absence of any effective system of control over them, the officials of the central government showed a recurrent tendency to act unjustly, while local officials became petty despots, and the people in general tended to encroach upon one another’s rights. Thus the population felt no real identification with the sultan or his government, which is perhaps why ethics and not politics provided the social ideal, and why the emphasis in the political literature of the time is on justice seen, not in terms of legal justice or anything expressed in specific and practical terms, but as the harmonious relationship between society in a divinely appointed system, the component parts of which were in a perfect equilibrium.
CHAPTER 3

RELIGION IN THE SALJUQ PERIOD

In the religious history of Iran the Saljuq period is particularly interesting, for it is the period of the Isma'ili. As the Isma'ili movement is treated in another part of the book, this chapter will be chiefly devoted to the three main aspects of religious life in Iran during this period: the development of Sunnism, the ferment of Shi'i ideas, and Sufism. Chronologically the Saljuq epoch in Iran extends roughly from the tenth to the twelfth centuries; obviously in this chapter we cannot always keep exactly within these limits.

If we realize that in the years from the death of Ash'ari (935) to that of Ghazali (1111) the entire theological system of Islam found its final systematization; that it was also the period of Nizam al-Mulk’s Siyāsāt-Nāma and of extremely interesting Shi’i–Sunni polemics; and finally that in the twelfth century the oldest Sūfī ṭarīqāt (fraternities) were organized, some of the first great Muslim theological universities were founded, and the poet Nizāmi lived (1141–1209/13): realizing these facts, we can easily see the importance of the Saljuq era. Though not one of the most original, it is certainly one of the most formative epochs in the cultural history of Iran.

(1) SUNNISM

The stronghold of Sunnism was mostly eastern Iran, whereas Shi'i centres were typical of Persian ‘Iraq and ʿTabaristān (especially Qum, Ray and Āveh). Iranian Sunnism was chiefly Ḥanafī and Ṣāḥīḥ, and these two schools were not often on good terms. In the Kitāb al-naqḍ, a Shi’i polemic work of the first half of the twelfth century by Naṣr al-Dīn Abū’l-Rashīd al-Qazvīnī, an attempt is made at a sort of sectarian geography of Iran. The author observes that Khurāsān and Transoxiana and part of ‘Iraq were Ḥanafī and Muʿtazila in theology; Azarbājān up to the borders of Anatolia, and Hamadān, Sīfāshān, Sāveh, and Qazvīn were Ṣāḥīḥ, while their theology represented various schools (Ash’ārī, Ḥanbali, etc.); the areas of Luristān, Khūzistān, Karaj, Gulpāīgān, Burūjird, Nīḥāvand were full of “anthropomorphists” (Muḥabbīha, Muḥāṣṣima); and in Māzandarān, Qum, Kāshān and Āveh there were Shi’is.
A later work, also by a Shi‘i author, the *Tabṣirat al-awāmm* (beginning of the thirteenth century), shows us the religious pattern of Saljuq Iran in more detail. The author distinguishes seven Sunni "sects", distributed more or less as follows:

1. *Dā‘ūdī*, "now no more in existence".
2. *Hanafi*, theologically divided into *Mu‘tazila*, *Najjāriyya*, *Karāmiyya*, *Murji‘a*, and *Jabriyya*. The people of Khwārazm are Hanafi–Mu‘tazili, the people of Bukhārā and the "peasants" (*rusta‘i*) of Kāshān are Hanafi–Najjāri; in Ghūr and Sind there are Karāmis, whereas the Ḥanafis of Kūfah and Baghdād are Murji‘a, and the Ḥanafis of Khurāsān, Transoxiana, and Farghāna are Jabrī, as are the Turks.
4. *Ṣaḥīḥ*, theologically divided into six groups: *Mushabbiha* or "anthropomorphists" (Ḥamadān, Qara, Burūjird, Iṣfahān, Yazd, Herāt, Salmās, Shīrāz, etc.); *Salafī*, i.e. more moderate *Mushabbiha*; *Khārijī* led by Ḥusain Karābīsī (according to this author all the Khārijis of Baṣra, Oman, and Ḥisārā‘in are Ṣaḥīḥ–Karābīsī); *Mu‘tazila*, having as their imām Māwārdī and Ṛaghib Iṣfahānī (the inhabitants of Mufrādat, a town in Khūzistān between Baṣra and ‘Askar-i-Mukarram, are Ṣaḥīḥ–Mu‘tazila, who "in older times" were numerous in Fāsā, and even "now" in Shīrāz there is a half-ruined caravanserai, an old *vaqf* of the Ṣaḥīḥ–Mu‘tazila of Fāsā); *Aš‘arī*; and *Yazidi*, who are spread from Zūr to Syria (of Mushabbiha and Khārijite [sic] tendencies, they consider Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthmān, Mu‘āwiya and Yazīd to be "God-guided caliphs", but they often use *taqiyya* and include ‘Alī also in the list of God-guided caliphs).

This rather confused list is interesting for its information on the geographical distribution of religious centres in Saljuq Persia. Of particular interest is the continuation of centres with Khārijite tendencies. Yāqūt too (1179–1229) informs us that in this period there were many Khārijites in Sīstān: they were not afraid of declaring openly their Khārijism, and they wore a special garb.

As always happens in formative ages, religious debates and quarrels, often ending in massacres, were frequent. Even in moments of grave dangers religious antagonism was strong and active; according to
Ravandi's *Rāḥat al-sudūr*, in Nishāpūr after the terrible onslaught of the Ghuzz (1154) every night one sect would assault a quarter of the town inhabited by members of an enemy sect, and there they would kill and burn. Similar things happened in Shīrāz between Ḥanafīs and Shāfī‘īs, in Ray between both of them and the Shī‘is, and between all of them and the Isma‘īlis. To isolate a single racial or national element in Shī‘i–Sunni disputes of this age is totally impossible. A verse like the following, composed in Arabic by an unknown poet of Ray and mentioned in the Shī‘i work *Kitāb al-naqd*, is typical:

Truly man is distinguished only by religion, and piety (*taqwā*) cannot be abandoned on account of racial reasons (*‘alā‘l-nasab*). Islam exalted the Persian Salmān, polytheism humiliated the noble Abu Lahab!

The same important text speaks of persecutions of Mushabbiha in Iṣfahān at the time of the Saljuq princes Mahmūd and Mas‘ūd, while in Ray Ḥanafīs of Mu‘tazīli tendencies were compelled by force to declare that the Qur‘ān was increate. The Saljuq Mas‘ūd b. Muhammad, influenced by Mu‘tazīli suggestions, persecuted followers of Mushabbiha, Jābriyya, and Ash‘āri tendencies in Qazvin, Ray, Iṣfahān, Baghdad and other places.

The *Kitāb al-naqd*, particularly significant as it is a Shī‘i work, shows clearly that the great majority of Iranians were at that time Sunni with Ash‘āri and even Mushabbiha tendencies; and the city of Iṣfahān is mentioned as a “capital city of Sunnism”. As often happens in fiery polemics, all parties abundantly used an insulting and abusing language, misrepresented facts, and so on. Poets also took part in the disputes: e.g. the famous Zahir-i Faryābī (d. 1201) jeered at Mu‘tazīlas, and Khāqānī (d. 1199) attacked *falāsīfa* (philosophers), Mu‘āṭṭīla, and Mu‘tazīla. Shī‘īs were fond of accusing all Sunnis of anthropomorphism and even of Ismā‘īlim, “because they apply *ta‘lim* and *taqlīd* as the Ismā‘īlis!” An ex-Shī‘i convert to Sunnism wrote, soon before 1161, an anti-Shī‘i book with the significant title “Some of the ignominies of the Shī‘īs” (*Ba‘du faḍā‘īb al-rawāfīd*), which contained a list of sixty-seven of these “ignominies”. Qazvini’s *Kitābu ‘l-naqd*, written as an answer to that book, bears the complete title: “Some vices of the Sunnis: a destruction of the ignominies of the Shī‘īs” (*Ba‘du matbā‘īb al-nawāsīb fī naqd ba‘d faḍā‘īb al-rawāfīd*). His book emphasizes especially the Mushabbiha aspects of Sunnism, and accuses the Sunnis of being blind

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1 *Kitāb al-naqd*, p. 489.

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Followers of the tradition, believers in predestination and enemies of the family of the Prophet. The Sunnis, for their part, tended to assimilate all forms of Shi'ism to Isma'ilism (at that time the supreme public danger). The book *Fadā'ih al rawāfiḍ* says: "Shi'ism is the corridor leading to heresy" (*rafiḍi dihlīz-i mulhidist*). And when the same book says that the Shi'is are Zoroastrians under Muslim garb, it is repeating an older accusation (its initiator may have been Ibn Ḥazm, d. 1064), which is at the root of some unfounded modern assertions of a special similarity between Shi'ism and Zoroastrianism. An interesting anti-Shi'i accusation in this book is the statement that the Shi'is propagandize especially in the lower classes and amongst ignorant artisans and that they are *dabriyya* (materialists).

It is practically impossible to delineate here a history of the development of Sunni ideas solely within Iran, regarded as a racial or national unit. The fact that Ghazālī was Iranian is not of great importance, as he wrote in Arabic and his works were studied even as far away as Spain; whereas in Iran Sunnis, and also Shi'is, studied the religious works of their fellow believers spread throughout that vast unit which was the Islamic world. A chapter on Ghazālī and his significance in the history of Muslim philosophy and theology can be found in any work on the history of Islam and has no place here. We will simply remark that he is one of the best representatives of that solid, clear, Khurasanian Sunnism that has been for centuries the religious milieu in which the greatest Iranian geniuses, literary and otherwise, have been bred. Of this Sunnism Ghazālī is, in a way, the résumé and the practical end: after him Sunnism did not produce much that is significant in the theological field. On the other hand, Ghazālī’s radical mistrust of human reason and his consequent condemnation of philosophy; his intellectual aristokratism (he discouraged the common people from studying theology, saying they must only believe); his so often unjustly praised introduction of a moderate mysticism into orthodoxy, which killed all the most enthusiastic and progressive aspects of mysticism; his wish to make jurisprudence mystical and mysticism juridical—all of these achievements represent an end rather than a beginning, and their enormous influence has been quite detrimental for later Muslim culture.

But the Saljuq period in Iran is not only the period of Ghazālī. It is, as we said before, a formative age in which, side by side with the great synthesis of Ghazālī, there existed other tendencies that are still alive and influential. It is the period in which the Mu'tazila school was
being finally vanquished by the Ash'arites, except for some nuclei of resistance in 'Iraq, Khwārazm, and Transoxiana. Four of the most famous figures here were:

Juvainī (d. 1085), the master of Ghazālī, known as Imām al-Ḥaramain; in his epoch the greatest Shāfi‘ī-Ash'arī theologian of Khūrāsān, and author of the important treatises Iṣḥād, Ṣhamīl, Ghīyāthhu 'l-Umam, Muḥaqiq 'l-Ḥaqq. He had many pupils besides Ghazālī. One of them was 'Īmād al-Dīn Kiyā Ḥarāsī (d. 1110) of Ṭabaristān.

Another Shāfi‘ī-Ash'arī scholar of Saljuq Iran was al-Shahrastānī (d. 1153), who served Sultān Sanjār and is chiefly famous as the author of the great heresiographical manual, al-Mīlal wa'l-nihāl. He lived in Khūrāsān (Shahrīstān is a town there, near Nasā) and in Khwārazm. Amongst other works he wrote a commentary on the Qur'ān. His Muṣārī‘a is a polemical work against Avicenna, who is a favourite target of Ash'arī attacks.

Ibn al-Jauzī (d. 1201) the author of the celebrated Talbīs Iblīs, "The Tricks of Satan", another heretical treatise; he lived in Baghdad and was so much venerated by all religious parties that sometimes disputes between Shi‘is and Sunnis were brought to him to be arbitrated.

Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzi (d. 1210), the author of the famous Tafsīr of the Qur'ān, a real encyclopaedia, of which somebody has said, Fīhi kullu shai‘ illā‘l-tafsīr ("In it there is everything save a commentary on the Qur'ān!"). He also wrote the Muḥassil afkār al-mutaqaddimin (a rich historical summary of the ideas of Muslim theologians); one risāla (treatise) on the Prophet's Ascension, and other similar tracts. The famous al-Kāshshāf, a Mu'tazila commentary on the Qur'ān by al-Zamakhshārī (d. 1144), is also a fruit of the Persian religious genius of the Saljuq epoch.

The growing influence of the orthodox Ash'arite school brought with it, of course, a decline in the speculative sciences. Ghazālī's Tabāṣfut al-Falāṣifa ("Destructio philosophorum") is only the most authoritative example of many similar attacks on philosophy, i.e. on purely speculative, Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic philosophy. A typical specimen of the orthodox Ash'arite attitude of this time towards science is this sentence in the theological treatise Majmū‘a al-rasā‘il al-kubrā: "Only the science transmitted to posterity through the Holy Prophet is worthy of the name of science ('ilm). Other sciences are either sciences but not useful (nāfī‘), or they are not sciences and not useful, or they are not sciences, but only called such, and not useful. If they are sciences
and useful they are certainly contained in the Prophet's heritage." According to Ghazâli the three chief errors of the "philosophers" are the following: "They admit in God only the science of the Universals and not of particular things; they do not believe in the resurrection of the body and in the reality of eschatological facts; they regard the world as being uncreated."

Although an uninterrupted chain of masters and pupils connected him with the great Master Avicenna, the philosopher—Farîd Ghilânî of Balkh (twelfth century) nevertheless wrote a treatise (Risâla hudûth al-‘âlamû) in confutation of Avicenna, and especially of his theory of the uncreatedness of the world. As Avicenna had long been regarded as the philosopher par excellence, many of these attacks simply took the form of attacks on him personally. He was criticized from two sides: from the left, by such rationalist philosophers as Averroes (d. 1199), who thought his Aristotelian tendencies were impure; and from the right by such theologians as Shahrastânî, Farîd Ghilânî, and Fâkhîr al-Dîn Râzî, and even by poets influenced by the general Ashrîte atmosphere (e.g. Sânî, d. 1141, and Khâqânî, d. 1199).

Amongst the most important religious philosophers of the Saljuq epoch we may mention several in particular.

Abû’l-‘Abbâs Faḍl b. Muḥammad al-Lûkârî of Marv, a pupil of Avicenna's pupil Bahmanyâr, was the author of the Bayân al-ḥaq bi-qîman as-siddiq and other works. The Bayân al-ḥaq, still unpublished, utilizes parts of previous works by Fârâbî, Avicenna, and others, and is divided into five parts: logic, natural history, theology, metaphysics, ethics. Lûkârî exercised a great influence on the Persian philosophers of this age for he had numerous pupils, though not all of them remained faithful to Avicennism, as we saw. Amongst his pupils were Abî Tâhir Tabasi of Marv (d. 1145) with his pupil Abû Sa‘îd Funduwarji, and also the qâdi ‘Abd al-Razzâq Turki, al-Īlâqi, the aforementioned Farîd Ghilânî, the physician Hasan Qâttân of Marv, and As‘ad al-Maîhani (d. 1133).

Lûkârî was a contemporary of the great astronomer and poet ‘Umar Khayyâm, who, though not strictly a philosopher or a theologian, must be mentioned here if only because he symbolizes a different direction of Persian thought in this age. The orthodox opinion on him is well expressed in the mystical work Mirsâd al-‘ibâd by Dâya (1223), in which Khayyâm, though praised as "famous for his talents, his wisdom,
intelligence and doctrine”, is associated with “those unfortunate philosophers and materialists, who, detached from divine blessings, wander in stupefaction and error”. In one of his quatrains (129 of Furūghī’s edition) Khayyām himself refuses the title of falsafī (“philosopher”), in the sense of an Aristotelian one, saying he desires simply “to know who I am”. An anecdote reported in the Tatimma šiwan al-bikma connects the name of ‘Umar Khayyām with that of another philosopher and physician of this age, Abū’l-Barakāt Hibat Allāh al-Baladī or al-Baghdādī (d. 1152), a Jew who served under the ‘Abbāsid Caliph al-Mustarshid Bi’llāh, and, taken prisoner by the Saljuq prince Mas’ūd, accepted Islam. Abū’l-Barakāt is the author of famous books such as al-Mu’tabar, Kitāb an-nafs, and a commentary on Aristotle’s psychology. He strongly criticized Avicenna, and according to the anecdote mentioned above, ‘Umar Khayyām, requested by the Kāktūyid prince ‘Alā’ al-Daula of Yazd to express his opinion on the dissension between the two philosophers, is said to have remarked: “Abū’l-Barakāt does not even understand the sense of the words of Avicenna, how can he oppose what he does not know?”

The names of other philosophers of this age—such as Abū Sa‘īd al-Ghānīmi, author of Qurādat at-tabī‘īyāt; Zain al-Dīn al-Sāwī, a contemporary of Sulṭān Sanjar, a pupil of Ilāqī and author of treatises on logic, and so on—would mean little to the non-specialist reader. The importance of the Saljuq period lies especially in the fact that religious learning was organized in great teaching institutions, which might be considered to be amongst the first universities of the civilized world. For in this way the bases were laid for almost all the organized institutions of Muslim religious culture. In this work the great vizier Nizām al-Mulk was most active; the institutions he founded took the name of Niẓāmiyya, and they were like colleges, with scholarships, good salaries for the professors, and a traditional and well-organized course of studies. Especially famous were the Niẓāmiyyas of Baghdad (founded in 1065–7) and Nishāpūr, though others were present in all the chief towns of the Saljuq sultanate. The professors in Baghdad and Nishāpūr were appointed by Nizām al-Mulk and, after his death, by his heirs. All the other colleges were imitations of the Niẓāmiyya: one of the most important of this period is the Mustansiriyya of Baghdad, founded in the years 1228–34 by the ‘Abbāsid Caliph al-Mustansir Bi’llāh. The teaching in all these universities (madrasas) was done by the mudarrises (professors) and their mu’īds (assistants). The professor used to teach
seated on a kursi (a sort of chair), and he wore a special gown called a tarha and a turban; two mu’īds were seated at his side, repeating his words to the students and explaining difficult points. The curriculum studiorum consisted of fīqh (Muslim law) ḥadīth (traditions of the Prophet), tafsīr (exegesis of the Qur’ān), literary theory, mathematics, and medicine. Every student had his own hujra (a small room) and a monthly stipend. In these madrasas, and also elsewhere, there were rich libraries. To take only an example given by Yāqūt in his Mu’jam: in Marv there were ten vaqf libraries, some of them containing 12,000 volumes. Books could be borrowed without any restrictions (Yāqūt himself had two hundred in his house at one time!).

(2) SHI’ISM

Before the sixteenth century, when it succeeded in becoming the official religion of an organized political unit, Ṣafavid Iran, Shi‘ism consisted chiefly of widespread “centres of resistance”, a sort of fermentation of ideas to which it is very difficult to assign a well-defined geographical area. Such centres were by no means limited to Iran, which in Saljuq times was perhaps a more Sunni country than was Anatolia or Syria; but since Persia was to become—and not always by peaceful means—a Shi‘i country four centuries later, it is of special interest to study the position of Shi‘ism in the Saljuq era, in order to try to discover some elements of historical continuity. The chief sources for our study are the two controversial works mentioned above, the Kitāb al-naqd of Qazvini, and the Fadā’ih ar-rawḍīd, together with the “History of Religions”, Tabsiratu ‘l-awāmm, by Sayyid Murtada Ṣāzī.

Of the numerous Shi‘i sects only four retain importance in this period in Iran: (1) the Naṣiri, a name given in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries to those extremists who attributed to ‘Āli divine or quasi-divine powers (all other Shi‘is, including Ismā‘īlīs, considered these heretical and kāfir (unbeliever)); (2) the Zaidis; (3) the Ismā‘īlīs; and (4) the Imāmis (Twelvers).

The Zaidis in the Saljuq period were subdivided into four communities: the Jārūdiyya/Sarḥūbiyya were followers of Abu’l-Jārūd, a contemporary of the imām al-Bāqir, who, as a reproach for his “hypocrisy” (nifāq), had called him Sarḥūb, one of the names of Satan; then there were the Jarīriyya/Sulāmāniyya; the Batriyya, followers of Kuthaīyyir an-Nawwā’ al-Abtar; and the Ya’qūbiyya.

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The Jārūdiyya considered the leaders of the Islamic community before 'Alī to be usurpers and kāfir (unbelievers). Some of them believed that their Mahdi was the lord of Tāliqān (in Badakhshān), Muhammad b. 'Alī b. ‘Umar b. Husain b. ‘Alī, imprisoned by the Caliph al-Mu'tasim (833-42). Others proclaimed as Mahdi the prince of Kūfa, Yahyā b. ‘Umar b. Yahyā b. Husain b. Zaid b. ‘Alī, eventually killed during the caliphate of al-Musta'in (862-6).

The Jaririyya/Sulaimāniyya held different views from the Jārūdiyya, especially with respect to the transmission of the imamate. For the Jārūdiyya, as for the Twelvers, it was transmitted by nass (explicit designation by the former imām), whereas the Jaririyya/Sulaimāniyya adopted the Sunni idea of the transmission of the imamate by shūrā (consultation). For them Abū Bakr and 'Umar were sinners but not kāfir. Not so 'Uthmān, who, having introduced (according to them) anti-Islamic bid'as (innovations, heresies) was truly a kāfir.

The Batriyya were even more moderate than the Jaririyya, holding the idea that, though 'Alī was after the Prophet the noblest of creatures, the caliphates of Abū Bakr and 'Umar were still legitimate, because 'Alī himself had abandoned his pretensions to the imāmate; similar ideas were defended also by the Ya'qubiyya.

Theologically the Zaidis were Mu'tazila, and in jurisprudence they were practically identical with the Sunnis inasmuch as they considered qiyās, ra'y, ijtihād, and istihsān to be good sharī sources of law. They regarded as invalid all imāms after 'Alī son of Husain, and as kāfir all those who did not accept, after him, the imāmate of Zaid and the holy war.

In the Saljuq period Zaidis were still comparatively strong in those regions that had been their stronghold in the ninth and tenth centuries, i.e. Dailam, Gilān, Ṭabaristān, and Gurgān. In some of these areas during the lifetime of the author of the Kitāb al-naqd, the Zaidis still read the khutba in the name of their imāms, and struck coins in their name.

Apart from the Ismā'īlīs (treated in another chapter of this volume) the strongest Shi'i sect of the Saljuq epoch were the Imāmiyya, or Twelvers, as Western orientalists call them. The Saljuqs affirmed their power in Iran just at the moment when Shi'i elements—comparatively strong in Dailam, Ṭabaristān, Persian and Arab 'Irāq, Khūzistān, and Kirmān—together with the powerful Ismā'īlī movement were preparing the way for the destruction of the 'Abbāsid caliphate. Based on the strong Sunnī centres of eastern Iran, and finding its best and most honest representative in the great personality of Nizām al-Mulk,
the vizier of Malik-Shâh, the inflexible Sunnism of the Saljuqs gave new
life to the moribund Sunni caliphate of Baghdad. This passage from the
famous Siyâsat-Nâma of Niżâm al-Mulk is illuminating:

In the days of Mahmud, Mas'ud, Tughril, and Alp-Arslan (may Allah have
mercy on them) no Zoroastrian or Jew or Rafidi would have had the audacity
to appear in a public place or to present himself before a great man. Those
who administered the affairs of the Turks were all professional civil servants
and secretaries from Khurasan, who belonged to the orthodox Hanafi or
Shafi'i sects. The heretics of Iraq were never admitted as secretaries and tax
collectors; in fact the Turks never used to employ them at all; they said,
"These men are of the same religion as the Dailamites and their supporters;
if they get a firm footing they will injure the interests of the Turks and cause
distress to the Muslims. It is better that enemies should not be in our midst."
Consequently they lived free from disaster.¹

This passage shows how one of the racially purest Iranian zones,
Khurâsân, was strongly Sunni, whereas Shi'ism seemed identified with
'İraqî, western Iranian, and even Arabic tendencies: further proof, if
necessary, that the present Shi'ism of Iran has nothing to do with race.

The Siyâsat-Nâma is full of episodes and anecdotes showing the
strong anti-Shi'i tendencies of the influential author, who, for propa­
gandist reasons, often lumped all Shi'is together with the much-feared
İsmâ'iîs; indeed Shi'i resentment was one of the causes of Niżâm al-
Mulk's eventual dismissal, after which Shi'i influence began to grow.
Nevertheless, in spite of the Saljuqs' anti-Shi'i policy, Shi'i centres were
flourishing in Iran, as elsewhere, during this period. Shi'is had their own
madrasas, mosques, and libraries, and, as the protests expressed in the
above passage show, they even succeeded in penetrating into court life:
thus Hibat Allâh Muḥammad b. 'Ali (known as Ibn al-Muṭṭalîb) was a
minister of the Caliph al-Mustaẓhîr; Sa'd al-Mulk Āvâjî was vizier to
Khâlîd Kâşhânî was vizier to both the Caliph al-Mustarshîd and
Sultân Muḥîmîd b. Malik-Shâh. That orthodox Sunnis were preoccupied
with the slow penetration of Shi'i elements into official posts is also clear
from the Faddâ'îh al-ravûfid, which expresses the fear of an alliance
between "Turks" (i.e. the Saljuq ruling class) and Shi'ism: "Now
[c. 1165] there is no sarâtî of Turks that has not at least ten or fifteen ravûfid,
and many of them are employed as dabîrîs in the divâns."² The Shi'i
author of the Kitâb al-naqîd even has words in praise of the "Turks"
who sometimes used to protect the Shi'is in the period following

¹ Darke tr., pp. 164-5
² Pp. 53-4.
the death of Nizām al-Mulk and Malik-Shāh. Shi‘ī influences were particularly strong in Khwārazm, perhaps because this region was a traditional stronghold of Mu‘tazilism: it is known that at the beginning of the thirteenth century the Khwārazm-Shāh Muḥammad went so far as to propose the ‘Alid ‘Ala‘ al-Mulk as caliph, and to invite the ‘ulamā‘ of his country to declare the ‘Abbāsids unworthy of the caliphate, which should have belonged to the Ḥusainīs.1

Amongst the propaganda techniques used by the Shi‘īs to spread their beliefs and influence was that of the manāqibīs or manāqib-khwāns. Manāqib means “virtues” and manāqib-khwān is a singer who extols the virtues of ‘All and his descendants in streets and bazaars. The manāqibīs had existed in Iraq since the Būyid period, and their activity had continued more or less secretly into the period of the early Saljuqs in ‘Irāq and Ṭabaristān; in order to avoid persecutions they often migrated from place to place. The Kitāb al-naqd, speaking of the situation after the death of Malik-Shāh, says that the manāqib-khwāns used to sing qaṣidas in praise of the Shi‘ī imām because he had attacked the Sunnī “usurpers”. These qaṣidas also contained doctrinal and theological elements, such as the concept of tanzīh (the absolute transcendence of God, as opposed to anthropomorphism); that of ‘adl (the justice of God, as opposed to the Ash‘arī idea of His arbitrary power); that of the imāms’ ‘isma (infallibility and impeccability), of their miracles, and so on. Moreover in their fantastic tales of the military exploits of ‘All and his paladins, the poems were like “religious epical songs”. Unfortunately these older poems are almost completely lost, but we have good specimens of this kind of folk-religious Shi‘ī epic in the Šafavīd period. The Kitāb al-naqd gives us also the names of some Shi‘ī poets (to be distinguished from the manāqibīs, who were mere singers), of whom the most famous in the twelfth century was Qīvāmī of Ray.

To counterbalance the manāqib-khwāns’ influence the Sunnīs employed faḍā‘īl-khwāns (also meaning “singers of virtues”), who extolled the superior virtues of Abū Bakr and ‘Umar and insulted the Shi‘īs. The Kitāb al-naqd, in a very interesting passage, tells us that their poems were imitations of those of the Shi‘īs (and this is probably correct), that in them they taught the dogmas of jabr (predestination) and tashbīh (anthropomorphism), and instead of singing of the “true” holy wars of ‘All and his companions, “they invented false wars and unfounded stories concerning Rustam, Suhrāb, Isfandiyār, Kā‘ūs, Zāl, etc., and

sent their singers to spread these idle tales (turrahdt) in all the bazaars of the country, as a confutation (radd) of the bravery and virtue of the Prince of the Believers (‘All). This heretical practice (bid’at) is still observed now, and it is truly a heresy and an aberration to sing the praises of Zoroastrians (gabrakân) in the holy Nation of Muḥammad (blessings on him!)".\(^1\) Imāmite Shi‘ism appears here, in its true light, as an essentially Islamic movement, which, in Iran, not only had nothing to do with pre-Islamic ideas, but condemned them more strongly than it did the traditional Iranian Sunnism.

According to some texts it is also in this epoch that the ta’zıyas (not in the modern sense theatrical plays) experience a sort of revival. These mourning ceremonies in commemoration of the martyrdom of Ḥusain at Karbalā seem to have been started or developed first under the Büyids, and under the Saljuqs they were sometimes practised by the Sunnis too (Ḥanafī and Shāfī‘ī), and “even in strong Sunnī towns, like Hamadān”.

Where in Iran were the Shi‘is most numerous at this period? The list of such places has become almost a topos in various religious books of this epoch, leading one to suspect that it is a formula inherited from older heretical treatises rather than a result of actual observations of facts. The places most commonly mentioned in connexion with the Shi‘is are Qum, Ray, and Āveh (this last being Āveh of Sāveh, mentioned also by Yāqūt as a fervent Shi‘i centre). Summing up the information given in the Tabsiratu ‘I‘wāmm, the Kitāb al-naqd, and the Rāḥat al-sudūr, we see that, besides Baghdad and its famous Shi‘i quarter of Karkh, the “Shi‘i centres” in Saljuq Iran were chiefly considered to be Kāshān, Tafrīsh, Āveh, Qum, Ray, Qazvīn, Sāri, Iran, and zones in Māzandarān; in Khurāsān there were some Shi‘is in Nīshāpūr and Sabzavār. But rather than denoting organized Shi‘i communities, some of these names hint at the presence of generically Shi‘i ferment, sometimes in the sense of Ismā‘īlī or Bāṭinī ferment. I wonder whether verses like those of Shams al-Dīn Lāgharī, quoted in the Rāḥat al-sudūr, may be taken as real proofs of the presence of organized Twelver Shi‘i communities in the localities mentioned:

Sire, the place of Bāṭinīs are Qum, Kāshān, Āba, and Tabrīsh; Vindicate, therefore, the honour of the Four Companions [the “orthodox” caliphs of the Sunnīs], and throw fire into these four places, Then burn Farāhan and Muṣlihgāh, so that the recompense of thy meritorious works may be multiplied!

\(^1\) Pp. 34-5.
More reliable information is that given by the Kitāb al-naqd, which mentions the following Shi'i madrasas of this epoch (second half of the twelfth century): in Ray, a traditional centre of Shi'ism, the madrasa founded by Sayyid Tāj al-Dīn Muhammad Gilaki, a contemporary of Toghril Beg, and the madrasas of Shams al-Islām Ḥaskā Bābūya and many others, some containing from 200 to 400 pupils; in Qum the madrasa of Aṭḥīr al-Mulk, of Sayyid ‘Īzz al-Dīn Murtaḍā, and so on (altogether eight are mentioned for Qum); and in Kāshān the madrasas called Ṣafawīyya, the Najdiyya, the Sharaṣīyya, etc., with learned masters like Imām Ziyā‘ al-Dīn Abu’l-Riḍā Faḍl Allāh b. ‘Ali al-Ḥusainī. In Āveh the madrasas ‘Īzz al-Mulkī, ‘Arabṣhāḥī, and others are mentioned; in Varamīn the Riḍawīyya and Fathiyya, and in Sabzavār there were “good madrasas and teachers, which from generation to generation taught the Law of Islam”.\(^1\)

Shi'i culture in this epoch produced remarkable religious works. More or less at the beginning of the period the important Qur'ānic commentary of the Shi'i doctor Abū Ja'far Tūsī (d. 1068) was composed, and a summary of it by Ibn Idrīs al-Ḥillī belongs to the twelfth century (Hillī died in 1182). In the first half of this century the Shi'is produced a Qur'ānic commentary in Persian, that of Jamāl al-Dīn Rāzī; and another venerated Shi'i scholar, Shaikh Ṭabarṣī (d. 1153), composed three Qur'ānic commentaries, the most important of which is the Majma‘ al-bayān in Arabic (translated into Persian in the nineteenth century). The majority of Shi'i theologians of this period were polemists, but they laid the bases of that methodical Shi'i theology which flourished especially in the next century in the personality of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī—sometimes considered the greatest of all Shi'i theologians. Amongst the Shi'i polemical works we may mention Shaikh Ṭūsī's Ithbāt al-wajib and Talkhis asb-shafī‘; a summary of a work by Sayyid Murtaḍā (d. 1045); written against al-Mughnī fi 'l-imāma by the Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbar Mu’tazili of Hamadān (d. 1023), and concerned with such problems as the legitimacy of the imāmate. Another polemical writer was Abū’l-Qāsim Ḥusain b. Muḥammad of Isfahān, known as Rāghīb (d. 1108), who wrote al-Dhāri‘a ila makārim al-sharī‘a. Qazvīnī's Kitāb al-naqd, composed around 1165, has already been mentioned. This epoch produced a remarkable number of those compositions, partly heresiographic and polemical, partly theological and historical, which could be defined as forerunners of our modern

\(^1\) Qazvīnī, p. 174.
handbooks of comparative religion. The oldest one in Persian was written in 1092 by a Shi'i, Abu'l-Ma'ali Muḥammad 'Ubaid Allāh, and bore the title Bayān al-adīn ("An Explanation of Religions"). To the later Saljuq period belongs the Tabsirat al-ażwāmm of Sayyid Murtadā Dāʾī Ḥāṣānī of Ray, also a sort of encyclopaedia of religions containing useful data.

(3) ȘŪFISM

The second half of the eleventh century, all of the twelfth, and the beginnings of the thirteenth may be considered one of the most important periods in the history of Șūfism, not only in Iran but everywhere. In the second half of the eleventh century in Transoxiana, Khurāsān, and Iraq, great Șūfī saints lived, each one in small convents (khāngāḥ), praying, meditating, and teaching new pupils. As we said in relation to Ghazālī, it is in the Saljuq period that Șūfism, after years of distrust and even persecution by members of the orthodoxy, found its way in a modified form into Sunni orthodoxy itself. Qushāirī and then Ghazālī, both Ašʿārī (at first sight a rather anti-mystical position!), gave to Șūfism full rights of citizenship in Sunnism; whereas Shi'īsm (seemingly a more favourable ground for mystical ideas) generally, at least in older periods, opposed Șūfism, sometimes in a very violent manner.

It is in the twelfth century that the oldest organized tariqats of Șūfism were founded, and some important parts of the tariqat ritual were introduced. Massignon and Kahle are of the opinion that the initiation ritual of the Şāfī brotherhoods was first created in this century, imitating the Qarmati (Isma'īli) ritual.

Further, the document of initiation (ijāza) with its silsila, a sort of spiritual chain of the names of all the Masters of the brotherhood, seems to have been used for the first time towards the end of the Saljuq period, in 1227.1 It is also in this century that the coenobitic life of ikhwān (brothers) in a cloister (khāngāḥ) found its first developments, though we may find traces of a communal life of mystics in earlier texts.2 The first organized Şāfī brotherhood in Iran were the Kāzarūniyya (Şīrāz, 1034), in its beginnings a mystical school rather than a real "order"; but most important were the three branches of an originally common school (Junaidiya): i.e. the Khwājagān (founded by Yusuf Hamadānī, d. 1140), which spread, especially in Turkestan, through its branch

1 See Massignon’s article “Tariqa”, in Encyclopaedia of Islam.
2 Another word for ikhwān, mostly in Anatolia, was akbī.
the Yasaviyya; secondly, the Kubrawiyya (founded in Khurâsân by Najma 'l-Dîn Kubrâ, d. 1221); and thirdly, the famous Qâdiriyya, organized in Baghdad some decades after the death of its spiritual originator, the famous saint 'Abd al-Qâdir Gilânî, d. 1166). To these first tariqats we may add the Rifaiyya, with its centre in Basra (founded by al-Rifai', d. 1183), the Suhravardiyya of Baghdad, founded by 'Abd al-Qâhir Suhravardi (d. 1167) and 'Umar Suhravardi (d. 1234), and later the Chishtiyya, which spread through the eastern zones of Iran, Afghanistan, and India in the thirteenth century; its centre was Ajmir, India, where the tomb of its founder Mu'in al-Dîn Chishti (d. 1236) is situated.

At the beginning of the Saljuq era some of the great Şûfis of the older pre-tariqat period of Şûfism were still living in Iran. Abû Sa'id b. Abîl-Khair, the first mystical poet of Iran (d. 1048–9), and the equally famous Şûfi theoretician Qushairi (d. 1073) were both active in Khurâsân, where they left many disciples. Soon after them come such men as Hujviri, Khwâja Ahmad Sarâkhsî, and Abû 'Abdallâh Bâkû; the Chishtis, spiritual offspring of Khwâja Ahmad Chishti, d. 966 (Chisht is a town in Khurâsân), included Muhammamd b. Abî Ahmâd, Yûsuf b. Muhammamd b. Sam'ân (d. 1067), and Qutb al-Dîn b. Maudûd Chishti (d. 1133), all very well known at the time of the Greater Saljuqs. It was in the same region, Khurâsân, that the fame of Khwâja 'Abdallâh Anşârî (d. 1089), the great writer and saint buried in Herât, began to spread in this period. Some time earlier, Khwâja Yahyâ b. 'Amîr al-Shaibâni, disciple of the Shirâzi saint Ibn Khafîf, had gone to Herât and was active there in spreading Şûfi teachings. One of the greatest Şûfis of Khurâsân was the Shaikh al-Shuyûkh Abû 'Ali Fârmâdi, who lived in the second half of the eleventh century. He was a spiritual disciple of Abu al-Hasan Kharrqaqînî, Abû Sa'id b. Abîl-Khair, Abûl-Qâsim Gurgânî, and of Qushairi, and in his turn became master of the Sunni theologian al-Ǧâzâlî, whose brother Abîmâd Ghaṣâlî, author of the mystical work Sawāniḥ, is also a very famous Şûfi of this epoch (d. 1123). Fârmâdi was also the master of Shaikh Abû Bakr b. 'Abdallâh Nassaj of Tûs, who in his turn had numerous pupils at the end of the twelfth century. Pupils of Abîmâd Ghaṣâlî included the famous author of the Maqâmat, Bâdi 'al-Zâmîn Hamadânî (killed as a heretic in 1131), Shaikh Abûl-Fâdîl Baghdâdî (1135)—the first link in the spiritual chain of Ni'mâtallah Wâlî (d. 1430), a later founder of the mystic order of the Ni'mâtallâhi—and Diyyâ' al-Dîn Suhravardi.
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In Transoxiana the above-mentioned Khwaja Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf Hamadānī, of the school of Fārābī and founder of the Yasaviyya/Khwajagān brotherhood, had many pupils, among whom 'Abd al-Khāliq Ghijduwānī, 'Abdallāh Barqī, Ḥasan Andaqī, and ʿAḥmad Basāvī are particularly famous.

In Khwārazm the greatest Sūfī of this epoch was Ābuʿl-Janāb Najm al-Dīn al-Khiwaqī, known as Kubrā, who was killed in 1221 during the invasion of his native country by the Mongols. He is also known as Shaikh-i Vall-Tardsh ("the Creator of Saints"), because of the great number of Sūfī disciples who followed his teachings, and he founded the Sūfī brotherhood of the Kubrawiyya. He was, like all the great Sūfīs of Iran in this time, a Sunni (Shāfī'ī): "We think", he wrote, "that the best creatures are Muḥammad, the Prophet of God, then Abū Bakr, then 'Umar, then 'Uṯmān, then 'Abbās; and we love the people of His house, the Good, the Pure ones, from whom God took away any trace of impurity and whom He made pure and near to Him." That he showed a particular veneration for 'Abbās and his descendants (in Mongol times this respect was to become accentuated in some of his disciples) is a common quality of Sūfism and not peculiar to him. Amongst his first disciples were Ābu ʿSaʿīd Majd al-Dīn Sharaf b. Muʿayyād Baghūdādī (d. 1211 or 1219, a native of Baghdad in Khwārazm, not to be confused with Baghdad), and Saʿd al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muʿayyād Ḥanūmīya (d. 1252), author of difficult and still not sufficiently studied esoteric and cabbalistic works such as the Kitāb sajanjal al-arwāḥ, in which, according to some, he expressed Shiʿī tendencies: e.g. after Muhammad, he said, there was a chain of twelve auliya, saints, not īmāms. Saif al-Dīn Bākhārāzī (d. 1260) was another disciple, active in Bukhārā and author of famous quatrains; other Sūfīs were Jamāl al-Dīn Jīlī, Bābā Kamāl Jundī, Najm al-Dīn Rāzī, called Dāya, author of the famous mystical work Mīrṣād al-ʿibād (1223); and Bahāʾ Valād (d. 1230), father of the greatest Sūfī of Iran, Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī.

As is clear from all these data, the development of Sūfism in this epoch took place especially in the eastern, more strictly Sunni, zones of the Iranian cultural world. In the western part of this world, with its spiritual centre in Baghdad, Sūfism was spread above all by the Subhravardiyya brotherhood, founded, as we saw, by Abū Ḥāfīṣ ʿUmar Suhravardi, the real founder of the tariqat of this name, though its silsila goes back to his uncle Abū-al-Qāhir, a pupil of ʿAḥmad Ghazālī. Abū Ḥāfīṣ ʿUmar is the author of many books (Kitāb al-ʿawārif, Kashf
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an-naṣāʾīḥ, Iḥām al-taqā, Iḥām al-hudā, etc.) and had very famous students, including the great poet Saʿdī, the poet Aḥmad al-Dīn Kirmānī, and Aḥmad Basavi.

As we said before, most Shiʿīs in this epoch were much more anti-Sūfī than the Sunnis were; the pro-Sūfī attitude of many Shiʿī communities of later ages, and especially of modern Iran, is an interesting phenomenon in the religious history of the country, which cannot, however, justify the anachronistic attitude of those modern Iranian scholars who try to attribute Shiʿī tendencies to Sūfīs of earlier epochs. The Shiʿī attitude towards Sūfism in the Saljuq period is clearly exemplified by the Shiʿī “History of Religions”, the Tabsirat al-ʿawāmm by Sayyid Murtada Rāzi, who distinguishes the Sūfīs of his epoch into six sects: (1) The pantheists, followers of the ideas of al-Ḥallāj (d. 922), who affirm the īṭtiḥād (the complete unification, or fusion, of the soul of the mystic with God); (2) the ʿUṣhshāq (lovers), who preach detachment and love of God as propaedeutic to the acquisition of occult doctrines; (3) the Nārijya (from nūr = “light”), who affirm the existence of two kinds of veils between man and God, a veil of light and a veil of fire (nūr and nār); (4) the Vāsiliyya, who say that the practices of the shariʿa are a useful preparation for approaching God, but are no longer needed by those who have reached (vāsīl) God. (And, our Shiʿī author adds deprecatingly, all the Sūfīs of the period are vāsīl); (5) those who deny the utility of science and logic, saying that arguments based on them are vain, since the only true science lies in humble obedience to the Master; they say also that faith is not a created thing or attitude, but a divine act, and all divine acts are uncreated; and finally (6) those immoral and despicable Sūfīs who assume the garb of wandering beggars.

The same author affirms that “all the Sūfīs are Sunnis”, which is for him a very strong argument for their condemnation; indeed the greatest figures in the history of Sūfism (Ḥallāj, Bāyāzid Bistāmī, Shiblī, and so on) are stamped with the worst maledictions and treated as pantheists, sorcerers, zindigs (dualists), and, generally speaking, as antinomians.

In spite of the Sūfīs’ deep penetration into orthodox Sunni circles—accomplished, as we saw, precisely in this epoch—an anti-Sūfī attitude is of course still present in some orthodox Sunni writers. Talbis Iblis, by the Aṣḥārī theologian Ibn al-Jauzī, contains strong attacks on the Sūfīs, though the author makes a clear distinction between an older, purer Sūfism, and the “modern” one, for which he shows distrust. Ibn al-Jauzī gives us in his book precious information on the Sūfī life
of his age. He says that the Şūfis of the twelfth century owned many ribâts in which they led a merry life, whereas for the older mystics the ribâts were places of asceticism. Some of the convents had been erected by unjust princes with stolen money, which they wanted to “purify” through these holy foundations (vaqf), and those who frequented them were quite different from the Bishrs and Junaids of the past. Imitating the old companions of the Prophet, early Şūfis used as their garment the austere khirqa (a robe made of shreds and patches of various colours), but some wore a woollen vest under it. They used to eat but little, and before the ceremony of initiation they fasted for two months. Some Şūfis organized for their sâliks (disciples) periods of forty days of half-fasting called arba’inîyya (arba’in = “forty” in Arabic) during which they ate only fruit; and some of them grew so accustomed to fasting that they had temptations and visions and sometimes fell into immoral habits. Now, however (he adds), there are Şūfis who exaggerate in the opposite direction and eat abundantly. The habits Ibn al-Jauzi most energetically disapproves of in Şūfis are laziness and mendicity, both forbidden by the canonical law of Islam. Nor does samâ‘ (singing and dancing) meet with his sympathy, though it was prudently accepted by Ghazâli, who devoted an interesting book of his Ihyâ‘ to the problem of the canonical legality of samâ‘. Both Ghazâli and Ibn al-Jauzi mention the habit, current amongst Şūfis in their time, of tearing away garments in the paroxysm of ecstatical dances, and of distributing their pieces (considered to be full of baraka, or mystical force) to those present. Ghazâli gives a canonical reinterpretation of this, accepting it as a sort of surrogate alms, when the pieces torn away are sufficient to patch garments of poor people. Ibn al-Jauzi also speaks critically of the dangerous practice of the intercourse of Şūfis with the shđhîds (beautiful youths, symbols of the beauty of the Creator). Şūfis of his time, however, had a strong predilection for celibacy and loved to travel without any provisions, relying only on God (tavakkul). Their contempt for the sciences, their calling the canonical law of Islam ‘ilm-i ğâbir (purely exoteric science) and their own doctrines ‘ilm-i bâtin (esoteric science), their disdain for logic and law once they had realised their “truths”—none of this met with the approval of the author.

In spite of all such opposition, Şūfis in this epoch were fairly free to teach their doctrines and carry out their practices. They easily found protectors in princes and powerful personalities. One of the greatest of

1 Ihyâ‘, vol. ii, pp. 209, 22 ff.
their protectors in the Saljuq era was the great vizier Niẓām al-Mulk himself. According to Muḥammad b. Munawwar in his *Asrār al-tauhīd*, composed in the second half of the twelfth century, he had been in his youth a pupil of the famous Abū Saʿīd b. Abī Ḥaṣan ‘Alī Khair, and had witnessed miracles performed by that saint. He is said to have remarked: “All that I have, I owe to Shaikh Abū Saʿīd.” He founded many khānqāhs, and gave much money to the embryonic Ṣūfī organisms of his age. Not one of the least of the Ṣūfīs’ contributions to Iranian culture lay in their ample use of poetry to teach their doctrines: the first great mystic poet, Sanaʿī of Ghazna lived in this epoch.

Though not strictly speaking a Ṣūfī, and active outside as well as inside Iran, Shihāb al-Dīn Suhravardi “Maqtūl” (1153–91)—not to be confounded with the other Suhravardīs mentioned above—is one of the most original thinkers of the eastern Islamic world in this epoch. This “Master of the doctrine of ḥiqq” (*Shaikh al-ḥiqq*) was born in Suhravard, in north-western Iran, and his early education was also in Iranian territory, at Maragheh and Isfahan. He was chiefly active in Syria, where he was killed—allegedly for religious motives, but probably also for political reasons—by order of the great Ayyūbid Sūltān Shalāḥ al-Dīn, the “Saladin” of Western histories and legends. He can be classified neither as a Ṣūfī nor as a philosopher, neither as Sunni nor as Shiʿī, and in this isolated originality lies his greatness. He could be called perhaps a theosophist, apart from the modern implications of this word, or a gnostic; but many of his ideas (the development of a sort of mystical Neo-Platonism with clear Ismāʿīlī influences) and also a great part of his terminology are original and do not follow the accepted patterns. This, and his openly expressed contempt both for the traditional Aristotelian philosophy of the schools and for the orthodox legalism of the theologians, even accentuated his “heterodoxy”. Moreover in his works he consciously attempted to revive the older Hermetic/Pythagorean/Iranian tradition. For instance, in his *Talwīḥāt* he says: “...Know thou that the Exalted Wise Men (al-ḥukamā al-kibār) of old, since the times in which Wisdom was orally transmitted, such as the Father of the Wise, the Father of Fathers, Hermes, and before him Agathodaimon and Pythagoras and Empedocles and the Prince of the Wise, Plato, were of much greater dignity and of much higher spiritual stature than all those subtle ṭūrī we know amongst the Muslims...”.1 And in his *Mashārī wa mutʿarahāt* he again sets up a sort

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1 Corbin ed., vol. 1, p. 111.
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of spiritual *silsila* in which old Iranian names occur alongside those of Greeks, Egyptians, and Muslims:

The last one amongst the Greeks who had an exact notice of that Annihilating Light that leads to the Lesser Death was Plato, the sublime Wise one. And amongst the Great ones, the one who consolidated his knowledge, and whose name remains eternal in the histories, was Hermes. Amongst the “Pahlavis” [“old Iranian traditions”, *faḫlavīyān*] it was the first man [*mālik al-fīn*, “the possessor of the clay”] called Gayūmart, and in his school (*ṣūlā*) Farīdūn and Kai-Khusrau. For what concerns the lights of the mystical path [*ṣūlāk*] in these times nearer to us the leaven of the Pythagorians fell into Akhī Akhmīm [the famous Egyptian Muslim mystic *Dhū l-Nūn*, d. 860] and from him it descended into the Contemplative Wanderer (*ṣayjār*) of Tustar [Abū Sahl al-Tustarī of the ninth century] and into his school; whereas the leaven of the Khusravānids, in the Mystical Path, descended into the Contemplative Wanderer of Bīstām [Bāyazīd Bīstāmī, d. 874] and after him into the Divine Knight (*fāṭā*) of Baidā [Mansūr al-Ḥallāj, the mystical martyr, killed in 922] and afterwards into the Divine Wanderer of Āmul and Kharraqān [Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Kharraqānī]...¹

These doctrines were therefore, for him, the common patrimony from an ancient tradition of which Iran was a part, a tradition that originated in the Hellenistic syncretism of the first centuries of the Christian era. This allegedly “old” doctrine, actually perfected and developed by Suhravardi’s undeniable theosophical genius, cannot be outlined here. It is sufficient to say that Suhravardi did not remain an isolated thinker; after he died his *ishrāqi* ideas, more or less openly professed, found their way first into Iranian *Ṣūfism* and *Shīʿism*, and later, sometimes through dim and secret historical channels, even into modern Iranian culture, after their interesting revival in the seventeenth century in the School of Ḥisfahān. It is another important seed of thought that first developed in the Saljuq epoch.

To conclude, the importance of the Saljuq period in the religious history of Iran lies in its formative richness, expressed in various directions of thought: first, Ashʿarī Sunnism reached its final systematization in the great synthesis of Ghazālī. Secondly, Ṣūfism was first organized into great brotherhoods, and important schools were created. Thirdly, the philosophy of Suhravardi Maqtūl opened up new paths to Iranian theosophical speculation. And fourthly, Shiʿī ferment pullulated in Iran in the double aspect of Ismāʿīlism, with its highly interesting esoteric theology, and Twelver Imāmism, which, though now comparatively weak, created a wide network of propaganda centres, during the Saljuq period.

CHAPTER 4

DYNASTIC AND POLITICAL HISTORY
OF THE IL-KHĀNS

THE MONGOL INVASION

The chronology of Sulṭān Muḥammad’s first contacts with the Mongols is extremely confusing, and it is difficult and sometimes impossible to reconcile the accounts of the various authorities. According to Jūzjānī relations had been established as early as 1215. Himself attracted by the riches of China and therefore disturbed by reports of Chingiz-Khān’s operations in that region Muḥammad decided to send an embassy to this new rival with instructions to ascertain his military strength and the extent of his successes. The embassy was headed by one Bahā’ al-Dīn Rāzī, and Jūzjānī professes to give his somewhat lurid account of the mission in the envoy’s actual words. As the party journeyed through the North China plain they descried in the far distance a great white mound, which they took to be a snow-covered mountain but which, as they were informed by their guides, was in fact a huge pyramid of human bones. As they proceeded farther the very ground beneath their feet became dark and greasy from the fat of rotting corpses; and for three full stages they had to make their way through this grisly morass. When they finally arrived before Peking they perceived, beneath a bastion of the citadel, the bones of 60,000 young women who, when the city was captured, had flung themselves from the walls rather than fall into the hands of the Mongols. During the envoys’ first interview with Chingiz-Khān the Chin Emperor’s son and prime minister were brought in bound in chains, no doubt with an eye to the effect of this spectacle upon the ambassadors. The latter were, however, favourably received, and in a second interview Chingiz-Khān charged them to inform the sultan that he regarded him as the ruler of the West, as he himself was ruler of the East. There should be a treaty of peace and friendship between them, and merchants should be free to travel to and fro between their territories. Among the gifts which he sent with them for presentation to their master was a nugget of gold from the mountains of China

so large that it had to be transported in a waggon. He dispatched with them also a group of his own merchants with a caravan of five hundred camels laden with gold, silver, silks and furs. And here Juzjani casts some doubt upon the story by stating, still apparently in the words of Bahâ’ al-Din, that these were the same merchants whose detention and execution at Uțrăr gave rise to the outbreak of hostilities between Chingiz-Khân and the sultan.

The mission to Peking is mentioned by none of the other sources. However, Nasawi’s account of an embassy in the opposite direction may well be the description of the same event, viz. the first diplomatic encounter between the Mongols and the Khwârizm-Shâh, wherever and whenever this may have actually taken place. The embassy described by Nasawi reached the sultan somewhere in Transoxiana (probably Bukhâra) early in 1218 bearing presents similar to those enumerated by Juzjani, including a precious silk fabric called torqu. The message they brought was likewise similar to that recorded by Juzjani. Chingiz-Khân had heard of the sultan’s victories and wished to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship with him; he wished also for the free and unhindered movement of merchants between their territories. In expressing these wishes, however, he referred to Muḥhammad as being “on a level with the dearest of my sons”, a phrase which gave deep offence to the sultan. Sending for one of the envoys, a Khwârizmi called Maḥmûd, probably the same Maḥmûd Yalavach who afterwards held high office in the Mongol empire, he questioned him in private about Chingiz-Khân, asking whether it was true that he had conquered the Chinese and captured their capital. Maḥmûd replied that it was indeed so. Even such conquests, the sultan went on, did not give an infidel the right to address him, the ruler of a great empire, as his son, i.e. as a vassal. Perceiving the sultan’s anger Maḥmûd added that the Mongols’ army could bear no comparison with the Khwârizm-Shâh’s forces, and Muḥammad was mollified and agreed to the conclusion of a treaty.

Whatever the truth about the initial embassy to or from Chingiz-Khân, the sources are all in broad agreement about the massacre at Uțrăr. In that town, on Muḥammad’s eastern frontier, there arrived at some time in 1218 a caravan of merchants, four hundred and fifty in number according to Juvainî, a figure which tallies with the five hundred camels which, in Juzjani’s account, were required for the transport of

1 Transl. Houdas, pp. 57–9.  
2 Transl. Boyle, vol. 1, p. 79.
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their wares. The sight of all these riches excited the cupidity of the governor, a relation of the sultan called Inalchuq, who had been accorded the title of Qayir-Khān. He placed the whole party under arrest and dispatched a messenger to Muhammad, who according to Juvaini was still in Western Persia, to seek his instructions, alleging that the merchants were really spies in the service of the Mongols. Whether the sultan believed this allegation or whether, like Inalchuq, he was activated solely by motives of greed, he authorized or at any rate connived at the execution of several hundred fellow-Muslims, many of whom must have been his own subjects. News of this bloodbath was brought to Chingiz-Khān by a member of the party who had contrived to make his escape. Controlling his anger the Mongol conqueror made a last attempt to obtain satisfaction by diplomatic means. A Muslim, formerly in the service of Sultan Tekish, was dispatched with two Mongols as companions to protest against Inalchuq’s action and demand the surrender of his person. Far from acceding to this request the sultan ordered all three envoys to be put to death, a wanton breach of international law which rendered the Mongols’ invasion of his territories inevitable.

However, before Chingiz-Khān could attack the sultan it was necessary to deal with two enemies nearer home. Of these the more formidable was the Naiman Küchlüg, who as the sultan’s ally had seized the lion’s share of the Qara-Khitai empire. An army under the command of the famous Jebe chased him from Kashghar over the Pamirs into Badakhshān, where, with the co-operation of the local population, he was captured and put to death. In the meantime the remnants of the Merkit had been defeated and annihilated by an army jointly commanded by the great general Sübedei and by Chingiz-Khān’s eldest son Jochi. Defeated with Küchlüg on the Irtish in 1206 the Merkit had at first made common cause with the Naiman prince but had then quarrelled with him and withdrawn into the region of the Upper Yenisei. Pursued from thence by the Mongols, they had fled to the territory of the Qipchaq to the north-east of the Aral Sea; and here, in what is today the Kustanai region of Northern Kazakhstan, they were now overtaken and destroyed.

Sultan Muhammad was in Samarqand when he learnt of the Merkit’s approach to the Qipchaq country. He at once set out to attack them, but upon reaching Jand received the news that the Mongols were close at their heels. Returning to Samarqand for reinforcements he advanced
northwards for the second time, hoping, in the words of Juvaini,¹ “to kill two birds with one stone”. Between two rivers, apparently the Irgiz and the Turgai, he came upon the scene of the battle. From a wounded man, discovered amongst the piles of dead, it was learnt that it had been fought that very day. Hurrying after the retiring Mongols the sultan caught up with them the next morning. They sought to avoid a conflict insisting that their quarrel was only with the Merkit and that they had no authority to attack the sultan. The latter, however, forced them into a stubborn but indecisive engagement, which continued till nightfall. The Mongols then withdrew under cover of darkness after first kindling fires to conceal their intention; and the sultan entered their camp the next morning only to find it deserted. He returned to Samarqand in a state of panic, the effect of this first encounter with the Mongols being such that he never again ventured to meet them in the open field.

It was probably at Samarqand that Muhammad first learnt of the approach of Chingiz-Khān’s main army. He held the first of several councils of war, in which his son Jalāl al-Din,² according to Juvaini, or Shihāb al-Dīn Khīvaqī, according to Ibn al-Athir,³ advocated the more courageous, if less practical, course of advancing with united forces to meet the enemy at the frontier. The majority were in favour of abandoning Transoxiana to its fate, some advising the sultan to withdraw into Khorāsān and defend the crossings of the Oxus, while others suggested that he should make a stand in the Ghazna region of Afghanistan and, if necessary, fall back on India. He decided to follow this latter advice and having placed considerable garrisons in the various towns of Transoxiana made his way to Balkh en route for Ghazna. At Balkh, however, he was met by an emissary of his son Rukn al-Dīn, the governor of ‘Irāq-i ‘Ajam, who persuaded him to change his plans and proceed instead to Central Persia. Upon leaving Balkh he sent a patrol to Panjāb or Mēla, the well-known crossing of the Oxus near the mouth of the Vakhs, to ascertain the course of events. At Tīrmidh the patrol came up with the news that Bukhārā had already fallen, soon followed by a report of the capture of Samarqand. Continuing his westward flight the sultan passed by the great natural fortress known later as Kalāt-i Nādirī, and it was suggested to him that he should concentrate troops and supplies in this well-nigh impregnable stronghold. He was

² Vol. xii, p. 237.
unable to reach a decision and pressed onwards towards Nishāpur, where he arrived on 18 April 1220. Still in a state of panic he urged the inhabitants to disperse throughout the countryside rather than attempt to withstand the irresistible Mongols. Finding them unwilling to quit their homes he bade them repair the fortifications for whose destruction he had himself been responsible. Then gradually recovering his peace of mind and thinking that the Oxus might prove at least a temporary barrier to the Mongols’ advance, he gave himself up to pleasure and for a time refused to listen to any serious business. His fears were now so much allayed that he decided to send Jalāl al-Dīn back to Balkh. He had travelled only a single stage of the journey when he learnt that Sübedei and Jebe had already crossed the Oxus and were close at hand. He returned to Nishāpur with the news, and the sultan left the town on 15 May just in time to escape the vanguard of the Mongol army, which arrived before the gates on the very next day and at once continued in his pursuit.

The conquest of Transoxiana had been accomplished with incredible speed. After passing the summer of 1219 on the banks of the Irtish Chingiz-Khān had advanced westwards in the autumn through what is now the Soviet Socialist Republic of Kazakhstan. At Qayaliq in the present-day Taldy Kurgan region he was joined by the local Qarluq tribesmen as also by the Qarluq of Almaliq and a contingent of Uighur led by their ruler, the idīng-gut. The Mongol army, which in Barthold’s estimation numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 men, arrived at some time in the late autumn before the frontier town of Utrār. Here Chingiz-Khān divided his forces, advancing himself on Bukhārā with the main body, whilst sending his eldest son Joči on an expedition down the Syr Darya and leaving his younger sons Chağatai and Ögedei to lay siege to Utrār. Having crossed the Syr Darya the Mongols approached the small fortified town of Zurnūq, which was persuaded to surrender without a fight. Instead, however, of following the normal route towards Samarkand the Mongols were led by Türkmen guides across the Qizil Qum desert to Nūr (now Nurata); and from Nūr, which likewise offered no resistance, Chingiz-Khān arrived before Bukhārā early in February 1220. The garrison, after a siege of only three days, decided to abandon the town and endeavoured to cut their way through the besiegers; but only a few of their number made good their escape. The townspeople were left with no choice but capitu-

1 Turkestan, p. 404.

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lation, and the next day they opened their gates to the Mongols. The citadel, however, was still held by a small body of the sultan's troops who continued to offer resistance. This act of defiance was countered by the Mongols' destroying the town by fire and then launching an assault on the fortifications driving the inhabitants in front of them as a kind of cannon fodder. After some twelve days' fighting the citadel was stormed and its defenders massacred to a man. The walls of the town were then razed to the ground, and the Mongols, accompanied by a levy of the able-bodied men of Bukhārā forced into their service to fight in the front ranks against their fellow Muslims, set out for Samarqand. The fortifications of Samarqand had been greatly strengthened and very considerable forces concentrated there, circumstances of which Chingiz-Khān had been informed at Utrăr and which account for his having first attacked the more westerly Bukhārā. Arriving before the town he passed the first two days in inspecting the walls and outworks, his forces now augmented by the troops of Chaghaltai and Ögedei, the victors of Utrăr. It was at this juncture that, having learnt of Muḥammad's flight, he dispatched Sübedei and Jebe in his pursuit. On the third and fourth days of the siege the defenders made sorties from the town but with such disastrous effect that on the fifth day they decided to surrender. Having first demolished the walls the Mongols drove the inhabitants out into the open country the better to subject the town to pillage. Here too, as in Bukhārā, the citadel garrison fought on after the surrender, but they were soon overpowered and destroyed. As for the civil population they were now divided up, the craftsmen for ultimate transportation to Mongolia as slaves of the Mongol princes and the young men for service in the levy; and the conquest of Transoxiana virtually completed, Chingiz-Khān withdrew into the mountains to the south of the town to remain inactive, resting his men and animals, until the autumn.

In the meanwhile Jebe and Sübedei were sweeping across Persia in pursuit of the sultan. So well, however, had he concealed his tracks that only on one occasion did the Mongols come to close quarters with him and even then he was quickly able to shake them off. It will be convenient, therefore, to consider Muḥammad's movements separately from those of his pursuers. Upon leaving Nishāpūr he had made off in a north-westerly direction to Isfarā'īn and then followed the great trunk road to Ray. At Ray a patrol came up with the news that the enemy was close at hand and he hurried south-westwards to the castle

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of Farrazin near the modern Arāk (Sultānābād) on the Hamadān–Iṣfahān road, where his son Rukn al-Dīn was encamped with an army of 30,000 men. Upon the very day of his arrival he sent his mother along with his son Ghiyāth al-Dīn to the castle of Qārūn, apparently a mountain stronghold in the neighbourhood of Hamadān, and at the same time dispatched a messenger to summon the atabeg of Great Lur, Nuṣrat al-Dīn Hazār-Asp. In the meantime the sultan consulted the amirs of Trāq-i ‘Ajam as to the best means of repelling the invaders. They advised that a stand should be made in the bastion provided by the Kūh-i Ušturān, a lofty mountain chain in the High Zagros. He went to inspect these mountains at close range and then dashed his troops’ spirits by rejecting out of hand the possibility of their defending themselves in such a terrain. No sooner had he descended from the mountains than the atabeg Nuṣrat al-Dīn appeared in answer to his summons. He too offered a natural stronghold as a base of operations: a mountain valley on the border of Luristān and Fārs, probably the Shi‘b-i Bāvvān, famed as one of the four Earthly Paradises. Here, the atabeg said, 100,000 foot could be gathered together from Luristān and Fārs to repel the enemy upon his arrival. But the sultan opposed himself to this plan also, suspecting or affecting to suspect that Nuṣrat al-Dīn wished to involve him in his own quarrel with the atabeg of Fārs. He decided to remain in Farrazin but had no sooner reached this decision than he received news of the Mongols’ attack upon Ray; and at the heels of the patrol which brought this news came the Mongols themselves. They overtook the sultan en route to Qārūn and discharged arrows at him without realizing his identity. Escaping on his wounded horse he made his way to the castle, where he remained for only one day before taking guides and stealing off in the direction of Baghdad. The Mongols arrived immediately and launched an assault on the castle thinking the sultan to be still inside it; then realizing their mistake they set off in his pursuit. He shook them off by turning back from the Baghdad road and striking northwards towards the strong castle of Sarchahān in the mountains between Sā‘īn-Qal‘a and Sultāniyeh. He remained here for seven days before crossing the Alburz into Gīlān; he then turned eastwards along the coast of the Caspian, the Mongols being now once again in close pursuit. Arriving at Dabū in the Āmul area he was advised by the local amirs to seek refuge in one of the offshore islands, apparently the present-day Āshūrādēh at the entrance to Astarābād bay.

It was here that he died in December 1220, or January 1221, either, as Juvaini\(^1\) would have us believe, from grief at the fate of his womenfolk, who had been captured by the Mongols in a castle on the neighbouring mainland, or, according to Nasawi's\(^2\) more prosaic account, from an acute inflammation of the lungs. Such was the wretched end of a monarch who for a brief interval had ruled over the whole eastern half of the Saljuq empire but whose very conquests had facilitated the Mongol invasion, just as his conduct at Utrar had provoked it.

As for the sultan's pursuers, they had followed the normal practice of Mongol advance parties, avoiding combat as much as possible and attacking only when provoked. Thus at Balkh, where the notables of the town had sent a deputation to them with offerings of food (tuğbu), they had contented themselves with setting a shahna or resident over the people and had done them no harm. Even at Zâveh (the modern Turbat-i-Haidari), where the townspeople had closed their gates and refused their demand for provisions, it was at first their intention to ride on; but angered by jeers shouted at them from the walls they had turned back to storm the town and massacre the population. At Nishâpûr itself the authorities saw fit to go through the forms of submission and to supply the Mongols' needs. A deputation was received by Jebe, who urged them to destroy their walls and to give provisions to any bodies of troops that passed by. The two generals then parted company, evidently quite uncertain as to the direction of the sultan's flight. Sübedei turned back south-eastwards to Jâm and then circled round to the north-west through Tûs, Râdkân and Qûchân to Isfara'în. Here he may have picked up the sultan's trail, for he followed in his tracks along the great Khurâsân trunk road as far as Ray. Meanwhile Jebe, who had made for the district of Juvain to the north-west of Nishâpûr, had proceeded from thence into Mazandarân, where he carried out great massacres, especially in the Amul region, before crossing the mountains to link up with Jebe at Ray. What happened at Ray is by no means clear. According to Juvaini,\(^3\) the qâdi and other dignitaries tendered submission to the Mongols, but Ibn al-Athîr speaks of their sacking the town, perhaps as the consequence of a later rebellion.\(^4\) At Ray the Mongols learnt of the sultan's recent departure in the direction of Hamadân, and Jebe set out in his pursuit. Entering Hamadân he received the submission of the governor and set a shâhna over the town,

\(^2\) Transl. Houdas, p. 79.
\(^3\) Transl. Boyle, vol. i, p. 147.
\(^4\) Vol. xi, p. 244.
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to which he returned again after the clash with the sultan at Qārūn. From Hamadān he made his way to Sujās to defeat and destroy a large concentration of the sultan’s troops under two of his generals. The greater part of ʿIrāq-i ʿAjām was then subjected to slaughter and rapine until, with the approach of winter, the Mongols withdrew northwards to the Mughān Steppe. That troops were sent from these winter quarters in search of the sultan is possible but unlikely; the forces which chased him along the Caspian littoral and which captured the castles in which his harem had sought refuge were probably those left behind by Jebe in the previous summer. In any case, the generals’ main attention must have been attracted in another direction, for it was from this base that they launched their first attack on the Georgians, on whom they inflicted a crushing defeat in February 1221. In the spring they returned to Hamadān to put down a revolt and then left ʿIrāq for Āzarbāijān, where they pillaged and slaughtered until the atabeg made his submission. It was about this time, according to Rashīd al-Dīn,1 that they dispatched a message to Chingiz-Khān to the effect that the sultan being now dead they would, in accordance with the khan’s yardīgh, continue their conquests for a year or two before returning to Mongolia by way of the Caucasus. It would seem, indeed, that the pursuit of the sultan had been only the first part of their mission. From Āzarbāijān the generals now invaded Georgia for the second time, then passing into Shīrvān forced their way through Darband to descend into the plains of what is now southern Russia. Here they dispersed a coalition of Caucasians and Qipchaq before advancing westwards into the Crimea to sack the Genoese entrepôt of Soldaia and defeat a Russian army on the Kalka. Then they turned back, crossing the Volga near the present-day Volgograd and finally joining their master somewhere along the route of his homeward journey after carrying out a reconnaissance raid without parallel in history, “an expedition”, in the words of Gibbon,2 “which had never been attempted and has never been repeated”.

In the summer of 1220, whilst Jebe and Sübedei were chasing Sultan Muhammad to and fro across Persia, Chingiz-Khān was resting his men and animals in the mountains to the south of Samarqand. It was not until the autumn that he moved southwards against Tīrmīdīh on the northern bank of the Oxus, where today it forms the frontier between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. The people of Tīrmīdīh, emboldened by the strength of their fortifications, rejected his call to surrender, and

1 Transl. Smirnova, p. 226.
2 vii, 10.
paid for their defiance the terrible price that was soon to be exacted from the great cities of Khurāsān. When after eleven days’ fighting the town was taken by storm, the whole population, men and women, were driven out on to the plain, and divided amongst the soldiers, by whom they were then put to death, each soldier being responsible for the execution of a fixed number of persons. The story is told that when the Mongols had finished this butchery they caught a woman who had escaped their attention. In exchange for her life she offered them a large pearl but, when they asked to see it, said that she had swallowed it. They at once disembowelled her and found several pearls in her stomach, whereupon Chingiz-Khān ordered all the bodies to be eviscerated. From Tirmidh he now withdrew into the upper reaches of the Vakhsh, i.e. the region of the present-day Tajikistan, where he passed the winter of 1220-1 in operations against the local population. Then, with the approach of spring, he prepared to cross the Oxus and attack Balkh.

On what happened at Balkh the authorities disagree. Ibn al-Athīr¹ says that the town surrendered voluntarily and that in consequence the lives of the inhabitants were spared. On the other hand, according to Juvainī,² the population, despite their professions of submission, was subjected to the same wholesale slaughter as the people of Tirmidh. It is probable that, as appears to have been the case at Ray and as we know to have been the case at Herāt, the massacre followed, not upon the original surrender of the town, but upon a subsequent revolt. Whatever the details, the capitulation of Balkh was speedily achieved, and Chingiz-Khān turned westwards to lay siege to Tāliqān, a town in the mountains of Jūzjān, probably to be identified with the present-day Chachaktu. The town with its castle (which is given various names, all meaning something like “Hill of Victory”) occupied a strategic position in the path of bodies of Mongol troops on their way to Khurāsān, Ghūr and southern Afghanistan; and whenever such parties passed beneath the castle the garrison would make a sortie and attack them, carrying off their prisoners and cattle. So seriously did this harassment affect the Mongols’ movements that, some months before Chingiz-Khān’s arrival a large force from the main army had been beleaguering the town. Their failure to capture Tāliqān accounts for Chingiz-Khān’s decision to intervene in person. The subjugation of Khurāsān he deputed to his youngest son Tolui, who carried out the task with a thoroughness from which that region has never recovered.

¹ Vol. xii, p. 255.  
From Balkh, Tolui proceeded in a westerly direction as far as Marūchaq in what is now the north-western corner of Afghanistan. Then crossing the Murghāb and its left-bank affluent the Kushk he turned northwards along the river bank, following what, six centuries later, were to be the tracks of the Transcaspian Railway. Marv, at the time of his approach, was in a state of great confusion, the governor being at loggerheads with a great host of Türkmen who had sought refuge in that neighbourhood and whom he had only recently succeeded in dislodging from the town, which they still continued to attack. Having spied out the position of the Türkmen’s encampment on the river bank, the Mongols launched a night attack. Surprised in the darkness the Türkmen, despite their numbers, were utterly routed, and such as were not drowned in the river fled in panic. The way now lay open and on the next day, 25 February 1221, the Mongols arrived before the gates of Marv. Tolui in person, with an escort of five hundred horsemen, rode the whole distance around the walls, and for six days the Mongols continued to inspect the defences, reaching the conclusion that they were in good repair and would withstand a lengthy siege. On the seventh day the Mongols launched a general assault. The townsmen made two sallies from different gates, being in both cases at once driven back by the Mongol forces. They seem then to have lost all will to resist. The next day the governor surrendered the town, having been reassured by promises that were not in fact to be kept. The whole population was now driven out into the open country, and for four days and nights the people continued to pour out of the town. Four hundred artisans and a number of children were selected to be carried off as slaves, and it was commanded that the whole of the remaining population, men, women, children, should be put to the sword. They were distributed, for this purpose, amongst the troops, and to each individual soldier was allotted the execution of three to four hundred persons. These troops included levies from the captured towns, and Juvaini records that the people of Sarakhs, who had a feud with the people of Marv, exceeded the ferocity of the heathen Mongols in the slaughter of their fellow-Muslims.

Even now the ordeal of Marv was not yet over. When the Mongols withdrew those who had escaped death by concealing themselves in holes and cavities emerged from their hiding places. They amounted in all to some five thousand people. A detachment of Mongols, part of the rearguard, now arrived before the town. Wishing to have their share
of the slaughter they called upon these unfortunate wretches to come out into the open country, each carrying a skirtful of grain. And having them thus at their mercy they massacred these last feeble remnants of one of the greatest cities of Islam.

The sober and careful Ibn al-Athir, a contemporary of these events, puts the number of the slain at the enormous figure of 700,000. Juvaini gives an even higher figure. He tells how the sayyid ‘Izz al-Dīn Nassāba “together with some other persons passed thirteen days and nights in counting the people slain within the town. Taking into account only those that were plain to see and leaving aside those that had been killed in holes and cavities and in the villages and deserts, they arrived at a figure of more than one million, three hundred thousand.”

From this great shambles Tolui now proceeded south-westwards to Nishāpūr. After their desertion by Sūltān Muhammad the people of Nishāpūr had at first adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Mongols, but with the passage of time and the rumours of victories gained by the sultan in Central Persia they had become openly hostile to the invaders. In November 1220 an army of 10,000 men under one Toghachar, a son-in-law of Chingiz-Khān, had appeared before the town. The fierce resistance of the townsfolk caused the Mongols to withdraw but not before Toghachar had been killed in battle. The people of Nishāpūr were elated with the news of his death, which was, however, soon to prove their own death-warrant. Tolui now approached the town with such vast forces and such abundance of siege instruments that the people at once lost heart and sought to negotiate terms of surrender. Their overtures were rejected, and the assault began on Wednesday, 7 April 1221: the walls were breached on the Friday, and on the Saturday the town was taken by storm. As in Marv, the people were driven out into the open country, and in order to avenge the death of Toghachar it was ordered “that the town should be laid waste that the site could be ploughed upon; and that in the exaction of vengeance not even cats and dogs should be left alive”.

Toghachar’s widow, the daughter of Chingiz-Khān, rode into the town with her escort and took her share in the killing of the survivors. Four hundred craftsmen were spared for transportation to Mongolia; otherwise the

1 Vol. xii, p. 256.
2 Transl. Boyle, vol. i, pp. 163–4. On these figures see below p. 484, n. 4.

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whole population was put to death. The heads of the slain were severed from their bodies and piled in heaps, those of the men being separate from those of the women and children.

"The last of all to suffer", says Juvaini, \( ^1 \) "was Herāt, and when he [i.e. Tolui] had joined her to her sisters, he returned to wait upon his father." The Persian historian has unfortunately left no detailed account of the capture of the town. Barthold, \( ^2 \) on the authority of d'Ohsson, whose authority in turn was a fifteenth-century local history of Herāt, says that none of the inhabitants were killed, with the exception of the sultan's troops and that Herāt, in consequence, "suffered least of all". On the other hand, Jūzjānī, a contemporary of the event who had himself taken part in the defence of a mountain fortress at no great distance from Herāt, speaks of its capture after siege of eight months' duration and the subsequent massacre of the entire population. There were in fact two sieges of Herāt, both of which are recorded in detail in a work which was re-discovered only during the present century and was published, on the basis of a unique manuscript, as recently as 1944. This is the Ta'rikh-Nāma-yi-Harāt or "History of Herāt" of Saif b. Muhammad b. Ya‘qūb known as Šaīfī. A native of Herāt, Šaīfī was born in that city in 1282 and wrote his history at some time between 1318 and 1322. It contains a great deal of information, not recorded elsewhere, about conditions not only in Herāt itself but in the whole of Khurāsān in the period during and immediately following the Mongol invasion.

According to Šaīfī's \( ^3 \) account Tolui, upon his arrival before Herāt, encamped in the meadows near the town and sent an envoy to invite the people to surrender. The envoy was at once put to death on the orders of the malik or governor representing Sulṭān Jalāl al-Dīn. Tolui, in anger, ordered a general assault, which continued for eight days, at the end of which the malik was killed in the fighting. Tolui now intervened in person, riding up to the edge of the moat and making a proclamation, in which he promised to spare the lives of the inhabitants if they surrendered immediately. To this the townspeople agreed and the Mongols kept their word except with regard to the troops of Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn numbering 12,000 men. Tolui set a malik over the town, a Muslim called Abū Bakr of Marūchaq, and also a Mongol šahna, a man called Mengetei, a member of Tolui's immediate entourage. Eight days later Tolui left the region to join his father.

But this was by no means the end of the story. For a time all went well, the people living peaceably under the protection of the Muslim malik and the Mongol shahna. And then, all of a sudden, they rose in rebellion and killed both of these officials. Šaifī gives two versions of this rising. It was either a spontaneous movement on the part of the Herātis or else it was engineered by the people of the mountain stronghold of Kālyūn to the north-east of Herāt, who were still holding out against the Mongols, and hoped in this way to enlist the Herātis as their allies. According to this latter version, the assassinations were carried out by men from Kālyūn who entered the town disguised as merchants with weapons concealed about their persons. Whatever the truth of the matter, the damage was now done. When the news reached Chingiz-Khān he was filled with anger and dispatched the general Eljigidei at the head of 80,000 men to mete out retribution. Šaifī records his instructions: “The dead have come to life again. This time you must cut the people’s heads off: you must execute the whole population of Herāt.”

Eljigidei set out in November 1221. In due course he arrived on the Hari Rūd, and busied himself for the next month with warlike preparations: from the surrounding regions he gathered reinforcements to the strength of 50,000 men. With this great army Eljigidei now laid siege to Herāt. This time the resistance was long and heroic. It was not until June of the following year that the Mongols finally captured the town. Eljigidei carried out his instructions to the letter: the entire population was put to death, “and no head was left on a body, nor body with a head”. Šaifī assesses the number of those thus massacred at a figure of 1,600,000. (The contemporary Jūzjānī records that in a single quarter there were counted 600,000 dead and on this basis estimates the total number in the whole town at 2,400,000!) For seven days the Mongols were busy with this slaughter and with demolishing the houses, filling in the moats and destroying the fortifications. On the eighth day they set off in the direction of Kālyūn. When they had reached Auba (Obeh) on the Hari Rūd, Eljigidei sent back 2,000 horsemen with instructions to kill any persons they might find who had escaped the massacre by going into hiding. They stayed two days in the town, where they discovered nearly their own number of such wretches; they put them all to death and then returned to the main body.

THE MONGOL INVASION

The siege of Ţăliqăn, to which we now return, lasted, according to Ibn al-Aţhir,¹ ten months (six months before, and four months after the personal intervention of Chingiz-Khân), according to Rashīd al-Dīn,² seven months; the town was taken only after the arrival of Toluţi’s forces fresh from the conquest of Khurāsān, i.e. at some time in the early summer of 1221. On Chingiz-Khân’s movements following on the capture of Ţăliqăn the sources are vague and contradictory. He probably remained in the mountains of Jūzjān in the immediate vicinity of Ţăliqăn until he received the news of Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn’s victory at Parvān.

Jalāl al-Dīn had accompanied his father in his flight across Persia and had been present at his deathbed on the island in the Caspian. Together with his brothers Uzlaq-Sulṭān, the heir-presumptive of Sultan Muḥammad (though, according to Nasawi, the sultan, shortly before his death, had altered his will in favour of Jalāl al-Dīn) and Aq-Sulṭān he then left the island and landing on the Manqishlaq Peninsula made for Gurgānj, his father’s capital, which he reached some little time before its investment by the Mongols. The discovery of a plot against his life (in which his brother Uzlaq-Sulṭān seems to have been involved) prompted him to quit the capital almost immediately and make for the territories formerly allotted to him by his father and corresponding more or less to the modern Afghanistan. Crossing the Ḍara Qum desert accompanied by only three hundred horse he broke through the cordon established by the Mongols along the northern frontiers of Khurāsān and succeeded in reaching Nišhāpur. His brothers, Uzlaq-Sulṭān and Aq-Sulṭān, who followed the same route shortly afterwards, were less fortunate. They were killed in battle or captured in flight and their severed heads were paraded on the end of lances to strike terror into the population—an indignity afterwards inflicted upon Duke Henry of Silesia.³ As for Jalāl al-Dīn, he remained in Nišhāpur only for a day or two before departing, on 10 February 1221, en route for Ghazna. His departure nearly coincided with the arrival of the Mongols in his pursuit. They at once took up the chase, but he shook them off and travelling, according to Juvainī,⁴ 150 miles in a single day arrived before the walls of Zūzan in Kūhistān. Refused asylum by the people of Zūzan he found shelter in a neighbouring town, which he left at

midnight, only a few hours before the arrival of the Mongols: he had reached the region of Herât before they finally abandoned their pursuit. The sultan continued on his way to Ghazna, which, at the time of his arrival, was in the hands either of his cousin Amin Malik, a Qanqlî Turk, who had been malik of Herât, or of the Ghûrî A'zam Malik, the son of Imâd al-Din of Balkh, more probably the latter. Amin Malik, if not already present, hastened to join the sultan and with his Qanqlî forces, the Ghûrî troops of A'zam Malik and a great host of Khalaj and Türkmen tribesmen which had gathered together at Peshawar under Saif al-Din Ighraq, Jalâl al-Din now found himself at the head of a well-equipped, if ill-assorted, army of some 60,000 men.

The sultan passed the remainder of the winter in Ghazna and in the first days of spring led his forces northwards to Parvân, a town at the confluence of the Ghôrband and the Panjshîr in a position where many roads met and where he hoped to obtain some information about the course of events. Learning that a Mongol army under the two generals Tekechûk and Molghor was laying siege to a castle in the Wâllân Kôtal (to the north-west of Chârikâr) he led an attack against them and had killed a thousand men of the Mongol vanguard before they withdrew across the river (apparently the Ghôrband) and destroyed the bridge. The two armies then discharged arrows at each other across the water until nightfall, when the Mongols retreated and the sultan returned to his base at Parvân. News of this encounter being brought to Chingiz-Khân, presumably by the defeated commanders, he at once dispatched one of his most distinguished commanders, the Tatar Shigi-Qutuqu, at the head of an army of 30,000 men. The Mongols reached Parvân, according to Juvaini, only a week after the sultan’s own arrival. Jalâl al-Din at once rode out to meet the enemy. Three miles from the town he drew up his forces in battle order, assigning the right wing to Amin Malik and the left to Ighraq, while he himself commanded in the centre. He then instructed the whole army to dismount and fight on foot holding on to the reins of their horses. The Mongols concentrated their attack on the right wing under Amin Malik, which they drove back until repeated reinforcements from the centre and the right turned the tide and they were forced back in turn.

The battle raged to and fro until nightfall when both sides withdrew to their bases. Under cover of darkness the Mongols had recourse to a ruse which, according to Carpini, was part of their normal tactics. They

2 Transl. Becquet and Hambia, p. 80.
set up dummy warriors on their spare horses, and the next morning the sultan's army were dismayed to descry what appeared to be a line of reinforcements drawn up at the rear of the enemy lines. In their alarm they considered the possibility of flight but, rallied by the sultan, joined battle with the Mongols for the second time. Again they fought on foot and this time the enemy launched their attack on the left wing under Ighraq. Ighraq's men stood firm and the Mongols turned and began to make for their base, whereupon, at the sultan's command, the whole army mounted horse and moved forward at the charge. The Mongols fled before them, then turned in a final desperate attack before, with the sultan's personal intervention, they were utterly routed, Shigi-Qutuqu escaping with the remnants of his army to carry the news to Chingiz-Khan.

Few victories have been more short-lived than this, the only serious defeat to be inflicted upon the Mongols during the whole campaign. Jalâl al-Dîn's forces were dispersed upon the very battle-field. In a quarrel over the booty Amin Malik struck Ighraq over the head with a whip. Jalâl al-Dîn, fearing the reaction of Amin Malik's undisciplined followers, saw fit to ignore the incident, and Ighraq, waiting only till nightfall, withdrew in dudgeon with all his forces as also those of A'zam Malik, who had taken his side in the dispute with the Qanqli. Disheartened by their defection, Jalâl al-Dîn returned to Ghazna, there to make preparations for seeking safety beyond the Indus: the victor of Parvân was soon to become a fugitive before the main army of Chingiz-Khan.

At Taliqân Chingiz-Khan had been joined not only by Tolui but also by his elder sons Chaghatai and Ögedei, who together with his eldest son Jochi had captured the Khwarazmi capital Gurganj after a siege of seven months. It was thus at the head of vastly augmented forces that he now advanced against Jalâl al-Dîn, apparently setting out from the Tâliqân area immediately upon receiving the news of the defeat inflicted upon Tekechük and Molghor. His route lay through the present-day district of Durzâb and Gurziwan, where the resistance of a stronghold (probably the castle of Rang mentioned by Jûzjâni)1 delayed the army, according to Juvainî,2 for a full month. The advance was held up at Bâmiyân also, where one of Chaghatai's sons, the favourite grandchild of Chingiz-Khan, was killed and where, in vengeance for his death, it was ordered "that every living creature, from mankind down to the

1 Transl. Raverty, p. 1003.  
HISTORY OF THE ĪL-KHĀNS

brute beasts, should be killed; that no prisoner should be taken; that not even the child in its mother’s womb should be spared; and that henceforth no living creature should live therein”.¹ The report of Shigi-Qutuq’s defeat at Parvān seems to have reached Chingiz-Khān after this butchery had been completed, for we are told by Juvaini that upon receiving the news he hurried forward by day and night without intermission so that no time was left for the cooking of food. At Parvān he halted long enough to inspect the battlefield and to criticize both his own commanders and the sultan for their choice of positions. In Ghazna, which he entered without opposition, he learnt that Jalāl al-Dīn had left for the Indus only a fortnight before and at once continued in his pursuit. He overtook the sultan on the very banks of the river, probably at Dinkot, near the modern Kālābāgh, whilst the boats were still being assembled for the crossing. Despite his desperate position, hemmed in by the oncoming Mongols in front and with the waters of the Indus in his rear, Jalāl al-Dīn drew up his forces and offered battle. The Mongols first attacked the right wing commanded by Amin Malik; it was driven back and destroyed, Amin Malik himself being killed whilst fleeing in the direction of Peshawar. The left wing was likewise driven back: only the centre, where the sultan in person commanded a body of 700 men, continued to stand firm. In charge after charge he attacked different sectors of the semi-circle of troops in front of him, but as more and more detachments arrived he was left with less and less space to manoeuvre until by mid-day it was clear that the situation was hopeless. He mounted a fresh horse, made a final charge to force back the men closing in on him, then turning in the space thus gained he threw off his cuirass and drove his horse over the bank into the water, thirty feet below. His pursuers were about to plunge in after him but were prevented by Chingiz-Khān, who had ridden down to the water’s edge to watch the sultan’s progress towardst he opposite bank. As he climbed ashore safe and sound, still grasping his sword, lance and shield, the Conqueror pointed him out to his sons with expressions of amaze­ment and admiration. Jalāl al-Dīn’s men were less fortunate than their leader: of those that followed him into the Indus the vast majority were killed by Mongol arrows, and Juvaini² tells us, on the authority of eye­witnesses, that the whole river, within the range of the bowmen, was red with the blood of the slain.

The Battle of the Indus marks the virtual end of the Campaign in the

¹ Transl. Boyle, vol. i, p. 133.
² Ibid. vol. ii, p. 411.
THE MONGOL INVASION

West. It took place, according to Juvaini, in Rajab of the year 618, i.e. at some time between 21 August and 19 September 1221. Nasawi gives a later and more precise date, viz. the 8th Shawwal (25 November), which is, however, difficult to reconcile with Juvaini's more detailed account of events leading up to the battle. After gaining this victory Chingiz-Khan followed the Indus some distance upstream, apparently seeking a crossing-place and then turned off into the valley of the Upper Kurram. Here he learnt that Jalāl al-Dīn had recrossed the river to bury his dead. He dispatched Chaghatai in his pursuit whilst proceeding himself with the main army to winter-quarters in a region probably to be identified with the Swat valley. He now conceived the idea of returning to Mongolia by way of Bengal and Assam, but the difficulties of the route were such that he was forced to turn back after travelling only two or three stages and slowly retraced his steps through Afghanistan. The summer of 1222 he spent in pasture lands high in the Hindu Kush, apparently in the region of Parvān. Here he received the first visit of the Taoist monk Ch'ang-ch'ün, whom he had summoned from China hoping to receive from him the "medicine of immortality". A second interview was postponed till the autumn because of news of an insurrection by the "native mountain bandits" with which Chingiz-Khan wished to deal in person. This is perhaps a reference to the continued resistance of Herāt or, conceivably, to the situation at Balkh, where, as Juvaini tells us, the Mongols on their return journey killed the survivors of the earlier massacre and demolished any walls that were still left standing. Ch'ang-ch'ün passed close to Balkh on his way to the second interview with Chingiz-Khan, and we are told in the account of his travels that the population "had recently rebelled against the Khan and had been removed; but we could still hear dogs barking in the streets". Chingiz-Khan received this visit somewhere to the east of Balkh, perhaps in the Baghla area; he broke camp on 3 October and crossed the Oxus on a bridge of boats on the 6th. Chaghatai had by now returned from his fruitless search for Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn, and a general called Dorbei Doqshin was sent back on the same errand. He was equally unsuccessful although he penetrated as far as Multan and Lahore before the summer heat forced him to withdraw northwards to join his master. Meanwhile Chingiz-Khan had reached the Samarqand area

2 *The Travels of an Alchemist*, p. 102.
3 *Transl.* Houdas, p. 139.
early in November and encamped some six or seven miles to the east of the town. Juvaini is wrong in stating that he passed the whole winter here, for Ch'ang-ch'ün, who left Samarqand on 29 December, caught up with the Mongols a month later on the eastern banks of the Syr Darya. The spring and summer of 1223 were spent in the region of Qulan-Bashi, the pass between the Aris and Talas basins on the way from Chimkent to Jambul. Here Ch'ang-ch'ün took his leave of Chingiz-Khān and we have no precise details regarding the rest of his itinerary: he was on the Black Irtish in the summer of 1224, and it was not till the spring of 1225 that he finally reached his headquarters in Mongolia. In the autumn of the following year he was at war with the Tangut, whose rebellion is said to have been one of the reasons for his return from the West. He died, while the campaign was still in progress, on 25 August 1227.1

SULTĀN JALĀL AL-DĪN

Sultān Jalāl al-Dīn remained in India for nearly three years. He was joined, on the very banks of the Indus, by a number of stragglers from his defeated army and after several successful encounters with bodies of Indian troops in the Salt Range found himself at the head of some three to four thousand men. News of the approach of a Mongol army now caused him to withdraw in the direction of Delhi. Somewhere in the Rawalpindi area the Mongols gave up the chase and the sultan, having arrived within two or three days’ journey from Delhi, dispatched an envoy to Sultān Shams al-Dīn El-Tutmish to seek an alliance and ask for temporary asylum. Alarmed at the possibility of involvement in the sultan’s fortunes El-Tutmish replied with a polite refusal, and Jalāl al-Dīn turned back to the Lahore region, where more fugitives gathered around him and his forces were increased to a total of 10,000 men. Another expedition against the tribes of the Salt Range led to an alliance with the Khokars against Nāṣir al-Dīn Qubacha, the ruler of Sind, who was driven out of Uch and forced to flee upstream to Multān. The summer (apparently of 1222) Jalāl al-Dīn passed in the Salt Range or in the mountains near Lahore and then, with news of the Mongols again in his pursuit, he made his way into Lower Sind, clashing briefly with Qubacha as he passed by Multān, setting fire to Uch, which had risen in revolt, and capturing Sādūsān (the modern Sehwan) before arriving at the seaport of Debul at the mouth of the

1 For the best account of his career see Grousset, Le Conquérant du monde.
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Indus. At Debul he received the news that his brother Ghiyāth al-Dīn had made himself master of 'Irāq, where, however, the greater part of the military favoured Jalāl al-Dīn and were demanding his presence there. This news and reports of the Mongols’ continuing approach decided the sultan to re-enter Persia by way of Balūchistān and Makrān.

The sultan emerged from these waterless wastes with greatly depleted forces: his army, according to Nasawi, had been reduced to 4,000 men mounted on donkeys and oxen. He was welcomed on the borders of Kirmān by a former official of his father. This was Baraq Ḥājib, a Qara-Khitayan by origin, who had risen to the rank of ḥājib or chamberlain in the service of Sultān Muḥammad and had then attached himself to Ghiyāth al-Dīn. Appointed governor of ʿIsfahān he had quarrelled with Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s vizier and was on his way to India to join Jalāl al-Dīn when his party was attacked by the governor of the castle of Guvāshīr (as the town, as distinct from the province, of Kirmān was then known). Baraq turned the tables on his attacker, whom he captured and put to death: the governor’s son, driven from the castle, entrenched himself in the inner town, to which Baraq was laying siege when he received the news of the sultan’s approach. In addition to other tokens of his loyalty he offered Jalāl al-Dīn the hand of his daughter in marriage. The sultan, as we shall see, was much addicted to such political and, for the most part, temporary alliances: in Ghazna he had married a daughter of the ill-fated Amin Malīk and in India a Khokar princess. The marriage with Baraq’s daughter having been duly solemnized the sultan appeared before the gates of Guvāshīr, which at once surrendered to him and in which he now installed himself with his bride and his father-in-law. Some days later he set out on a hunting expedition, from which Baraq excused himself on the grounds of some bodily infirmity. Suspecting his motives Jalāl al-Dīn sent back an officer to summon him to his presence, making out that he was leaving immediately for ’Irāq and wished to consult Baraq on conditions in that province. Baraq’s reply, though expressed in courtly language, made it quite plain that he intended to keep Kirmān for himself, an intention made even plainer by his ejecting such of the sultan’s followers as still remained in Guvāshīr. Jalāl al-Dīn had no alternative but to swallow his discomfort and continue on his way, leaving Baraq to consolidate his position and found the local dynasty of the Qutlugh-Khāns (1224–1303). In Fārs the sultan fared better. Pleased with the advent of a rival

to Ghiyāth al-Din, who had twice invaded his territory, the Atabeg Sa’d showered presents upon Jalāl al-Dīn, gave him his daughter in marriage and even agreed to the sultan’s request for the release from imprisonment of his rebellious son Abū Bakr, afterwards his successor and the patron of the poet Sa’dī. Jalāl al-Dīn remained in Shīrāz only for a month or two after the marriage (perhaps the most permanent of these alliances, for we know that the Salghurid princess accompanied Jalāl al-Dīn in the final flight before the Mongols that culminated in his death at the hands of a Kurdish assassin), and then made his way to Iṣfahān. Here he learnt of Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s presence at Ray, whither he proceeded at such speed as to catch his brother and his followers completely unawares. Most of the officers and officials at once declared themselves for Jalāl al-Dīn, and those who, with Ghiyāth al-Dīn at their head, had fled in panic, were soon persuaded to return and tender their submission. Thus, after three years of wandering, the sultan found himself in undisputed possession of part at least of his father’s empire.

With the military resources now at his command Jalāl al-Dīn, in the winter of 1224–5, moved southwards into Khūzistān with the object, apparently, of resuming his father’s feud with the caliph. Nasawī and Juvainī are, as one would expect, somewhat reticent on this delicate subject and it is only Ibn al-Athīr who gives a detailed account of the campaign. In Muharram 622/January–February 1225 the sultan invested Shustar, which was defended with considerable vigour by the caliphal governor of Khūzistān, Muṣṭafar al-Dīn Wajh al-Sabū’. As the siege dragged on detachments of the sultan’s army infiltrated westwards plundering the country as they went; they reached the districts of Bādūrāyā and Bākusāyā on the eastern borders of Arab ʿIrāq, and one party turned southwards to clash with the governor (ṣabīna) of Baṣra. Meanwhile the siege of Shustar, which had continued for two months, was suddenly abandoned, and the sultan set out in the direction of Baghdad. His advance was opposed by an army of 20,000 men under the command of the mamlūk Jamāl al-Dīn Qush-Temūr. Defeated by a ruse, despite their superior numbers, the caliph’s troops were driven back to the outskirts of Baghdad, which, however, the sultan did not closely approach, perhaps because of the formidable preparations that had been made for his reception, making instead for the small town of

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3 Vol. xii, pp. 276–8.
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Ba‘qūbā some twenty-seven miles to the north of Baghdad. From here the Khwārazmis proceeded to Daquqā (the modern Tauk), still pillaging the countryside as they passed by and in particular seizing all the horses and mules on which they could lay their hands; for they had arrived in Khūzistān, according to Ibn al-Athīr, with a great shortage of mounts, such animals as they had being so weak as to be practically useless. Daquqā was taken by storm and the sultan, angered by the inhabitants’ resistance, ordered or countenanced a general massacre. Alarmed by the fate of Daquqā the people of Baqā‘ij on the Lower Zāb asked the sultan for a shāhna to protect them from his soldiers; he sent them, so it was said, a son of Chingiz-Khān whom he had captured in one of his battles with the Mongols. The sultan himself remained in Daquqā till the end of Rabi‘ I (the beginning of May 1225), exchanging messages with Muzaffar al-Dīn Kök-Böri, the last (1190–1232) of the Begtginids of Irbil, with whom he finally concluded a treaty of peace. According to Juvainī, these negotiations followed upon the capture of Muzaffar al-Dīn in battle as he passed by Daquqā at the head of reinforcements for the caliph’s army. Satisfied with this diplomatic victory or perhaps realizing that his resources were still inadequate for a full-scale assault on Baghdad, the sultan now decided to turn his arms against a far less formidable opponent, Muzaffar al-Dīn Öz-Beg, the atabeg of Āzarbāījān.

At Marāgheh, which he found still in ruins as the result of the Mongol invasion, Jalāl al-Dīn received the news that Yaghān Taisī, the maternal uncle and atabeg of his brother Ghiyāth al-Dīn, had set out from Āzarbāījān with the intention of seizing the town and region of Hamadān. After his nephew’s discomfiture at Ray, Yaghān Taisī had entered Öz-Beg’s territory either as his ally against the sultan, as Nasawi would have us believe, or more probably, as Ibn al-Athīr’s more detailed account implies, as a freebooter pure and simple. After ravaging a great area of Āzarbāījān he passed the winter of 1224–5 on the seacoast of Arrān, presumably in the Mughān Steppe, so favoured in later times by the Il-Khāns. Recrossing Āzarbāījān en route for Hamadān he had pillaged the unhappy country for a second time. His advance on Hamadān was due to the instigation of the caliph, who had offered him the town and region as an iqtā’, presumably as an act of reprisal for the sultan’s invasion of his own territory. Travelling light and with the

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speed that was to become proverbial Jalāl al-Dīn came upon Yaghan Taisī by night, his encampment surrounded with the horses, mules, donkeys, oxen and sheep which he had carried off from Arrān and Āzarbāijān. The plunderer awoke in the morning to find his forces encircled by an army whose commander he recognized, by the parasol held over his head, as Sultān Jalāl al-Dīn. Completely taken aback by the sudden appearance of the sultan, whom he had believed to be still in Daqūqā, he sent his wife, who was Jalāl al-Dīn’s sister, to intercede on his behalf. She obtained his pardon, and the sultan, his forces swollen by Yaghan Taisī’s army to some 50,000 horse, returned to Marāgheh to prepare for the attack on Tabrīz.

With the approach of the sultan the atabeg had at once deserted his capital for Ganja (the present-day Kirovabad) in Arrān; and, perhaps because of his enemy’s departure, Jalāl al-Dīn’s first moves were peaceful and conciliatory enough. He sought and obtained permission for his troops to visit the town and purchase provisions; then when complaints were made about their behaviour, he sent in a shāhna to keep order and protect the populace; only when complaints were lodged against the shāhna did he finally lay siege to the town. After five days of violent fighting the two sides came to terms, and Tabrīz was surrendered to the sultan on the understanding that Öz-Beg’s wife, who had remained in the town, should be granted safe-conduct to her possessions in Khūy and Nakhchivān. This lady, a daughter of Togrul II, the last of the Saljuqs of ‘Irāq, had, according to Juvainī, been in secret correspondence with Jalāl al-Dīn. Estranged from her cowardly and pleasure-loving husband, she had promised to secure the capitulation of the town if the sultan would agree to marry her. Such a marriage was possible because of an oath which Öz-Beg had taken that he would divorce her if he executed a slave, whom he now had in fact executed. Jalāl al-Dīn accepted her proposal; she for her part persuaded the notables of Tabrīz to negotiate the terms of surrender, and the sultan made his triumphal entry on 17 Rajab 622/ 25 July 1225. Ibn al-Athīr has recorded two episodes of his short stay in the town. When Friday came around he attended the service at the mosque, but when the preacher began to pray for the caliph he stood up and remained standing until the prayer was over. Öz-Beg had built at vast expense a beautiful pavilion looking down upon gardens. Having entered and inspected it the sultan declared that it was a place fit only

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2 Vol. xii, p. 282.
SULTAN JALĀL AL-DĪN

for the slothful and of no use to him. Sloth was certainly not one of Jalāl al-Dīn’s failings. Within days, it would seem, of his occupation of Tabrīz he had already embarked upon his first campaign against the Georgians.

For some years previous to the sultan’s arrival the Georgians had been engaged in aggressive warfare against the Muslim states on the southern fringes of the Caucasus; and Āzarbāījān, whose ruler had neither the power nor the will to oppose them, had borne the brunt of their attack. Jalāl al-Dīn was accordingly seen in the light of a heaven-sent deliverer, a role which he was only too willing to assume. With such forces as he had at hand he at once advanced into enemy territory, encountering a Georgian army of some 70,000 men on the river Garnī in Armenia. The battle, which took place at some time in Sha‘bān, 622/August–September 1225, resulted in a crushing defeat for the Georgians; and advancing from the battlefield the sultan captured the old Armenian capital of Dvin, then in Georgian hands. From Dvin he returned to Tabrīz, where the leading men were reported—falsely, according to Nasawi— to be plotting against him, leaving his brother Ghiyāth al-Dīn to carry the war into the borderlands of Eastern Georgia. The conspirators, if such they were, having been duly punished, the sultan left Tabrīz for Khūy, where he fulfilled his promise of marrying Öz-Beg’s wife. According to Nasawi and Juvaini, the news was brought to her husband in the castle of Alinja near Julfā, at no great distance from Khūy, and his feelings of shame and mortification were so violent as to bring about his death. It is probable, however, and more in keeping with what is recorded of Öz-Beg’s character, that he survived this blow to his personal honour. At any rate we are told by Ibn Al-Athīr that he was still in Ganja some time after the ceremony when the town was occupied by Jalāl al-Dīn’s troops. He withdrew into the castle, from which he sent a message to the sultan protesting against, not the violation of his marriage, but the marauding activities of Jalāl al-Dīn’s soldiers; and the sultan dispatched a body of troops to protect him from further annoyance.

The war against the Georgians was resumed, according to Nasawi, immediately after the ‘īd al-fitr, i.e. at the beginning of October 1225, but it is difficult to believe that all that had happened since the capture

1 Transl. Houdas, pp. 192 ff.
5 Vol. xii, pp. 284–5.
of Tabriz (at the end of July) could have been crowded into so brief a space of time; and it was probably well into winter (Dhu’l-Hijja, 622 = 4 December 1225–1 January 1226, according to Ibn al-Athir) before the sultan re-entered Georgian territory, his objective being now the capital, Tiflis. Advancing directly northwards from Dvin he crossed the Pambak mountains to encounter the enemy in the Lori steppe in what is now northern Soviet Armenia. The Georgian army, according to Ibn al-Athir, had been augmented with contingents of Alans (Ossetes), Lezghians and Qipchaq Turks; but this is probably an anachronistic reference to the confederacy that was formed against the sultan in 1228. Whatever their composition, these forces were defeated, and the sultan advanced into Georgia proper. His progress was slow, whether because of Georgian resistance or because of the rigours of a Caucasian winter, and it was not until the beginning of March 1226 that he finally arrived before Tiflis. Having inspected the fortifications and convinced himself that an open assault would be fruitless Jalal al-Din had recourse to a stratagem. Concealing the greater part of his forces in ambush he approached the town at the head of some 3,000 horse; and the defenders, deceived by appearances, were tempted to make a sortie. The sultan turned in simulated flight and led the Georgians on until they fell into the trap he had set, and the whole Khwarazmi army sprang up from their hiding places, drove the enemy back through the gates and, with the collaboration of the Muslim inhabitants, possessed themselves of the town. The citadel, which lay on the far side of the Kur, seemed secure from attack; but a single day sufficed for the sultan to transport his troops across the river and blockade it from every side. The garrison negotiated favourable terms of surrender and were allowed to withdraw unmolested into western Georgia. It was otherwise with the townspeople. The Christian population, except such as saved their lives by apostasy, were subjected to a general massacre; and all of their churches were razed to the ground.

Jalal al-Din’s prestige was now perhaps at its zenith. Tiflis had been in Georgian hands for more than a century and in recovering the city for Islam the sultan had succeeded with apparent ease where the Saljuqs, while still at the height of their power, had repeatedly failed. It was this success no doubt which induced his admirer Mu’azzam, the Ayyubid ruler of Damascus, to suggest to Jalal al-Din an attack on the Armenian town of Akhlat as a diversionary movement in a campaign against his

1 Vol. xii, p. 293.

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brother Ashraf, the ruler of Harran and Mayyafiqin, who held the town as the most easterly of his various fiefs. Jalal al-Din was already en route for Akhlat when news reached him of suspicious behaviour on the part of Baraq Hajib, and he abandoned this new adventure in order to deal with his rebellious vassal. Accompanied by less than 300 horse he rode from the Tiflis region to the borders of Kirmān in the amazingly short space of seventeen days. As on a previous occasion Baraq adopted an attitude of courteous defiance; and, realizing the strength of his position, the sultan had no option but to turn back. He halted at Iṣfahān to rest his horses; and the Iṣfahānī poet Kamāl al-Dīn Ismā‘īl composed a fine qaṣida\(^1\) upon his spectacular dash from the Caucasus mountains to the Dasht-i-Lūt. Here he received a report from his vizier Sharaf al-Mulk, who during his absence had led a raid into the Erzerum region to replenish the garrison’s dwindling provisions; whilst returning through the territories of Akhlat he had been attacked by Ashraf’s representative, the ḥājib Husam al-Dīn ‘Ali of Mosul, who was able to recover the whole of the booty. Despite this provocation Jalāl al-Dīn did not, upon his return to Tiflis in the early autumn, immediately resume his attack upon Akhlat. Instead he laid siege to the Armenian towns of Ani and Kars, both held by the Georgians, which he continued to invest until the beginning of October, when he returned to Tiflis and from Tiflis made a ten-day foray into western Georgia. All of these movements were designed to mask his real intentions and to lull Husam al-Dīn into false security. In this he was not entirely successful, for when he appeared before Akhlat on 7 November the ḥājib had had two days’ notice of his approach. In their second assault the sultan’s men forced their way into the town, where, however, they committed such atrocities that the population, filled with the courage of despair, were not only able to eject them but also to beat off a further attack launched a few days later. Meanwhile, there had been a heavy snowfall in Armenia and reports had reached the sultan that the Īve Türkmen, thinking he was stuck fast before Akhlat, had occupied Ushnuyeh and Urmiyeh and extended their marauding activities to the very walls of Tabrīz. On 15 December he raised the siege of Akhlat and hastened back to Āzarbāijān.

The Türkmen were soon dealt with, but other preoccupations prevented Jalāl al-Dīn from resuming the assault on Akhlat. In February or March 1227 the Georgians attacked and burnt Tiflis and

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HISTORY OF THE ĮL-KHĀNS

had dispersed before the sultan could overtake them. Then Orkhan, one of his oldest and most trusted commanders, was murdered in Ganja by Ismā'īlī assassins, and to avenge his death the sultan carried fire and sword into all the Ismā'īlī territories from Alamūt to Gird-Kūh. Next came news of a Mongol army advancing westwards and already at Dāmghān on the borders of his territory. The sultan attacked these invaders, put them to flight and followed them in close pursuit for a number of days; he then halted near Ray in case they might rally and return to the attack and receiving a report that large forces were in fact approaching he decided to stay and await their arrival.

Such, according to Ibn al-Athir,1 was the sequence of events in 1227. Neither Nasawi nor Juvaini mentions the campaign against the Ismā'īlīs or, what is stranger still, the defeat of the Mongols in the Dāmghān region. All authorities are at any rate agreed that the major encounter with the Mongols occurred in the following year. In 1228, so Ibn al-Athir2 tells us, Jalāl al-Dīn fought many battles with the Mongols: his informants differed as to the actual number, but most of them went against him, only in the last was he victorious. This was the Battle of Isfahān, fought according to Nasawi,3 on 22 Ramaḍān 625/25 August 1228, which seems in point of fact to have been a Pyrrhic victory for the Mongols. Nasawi's4 account of the battle is in broad agreement with Juvaini's5 less-detailed version. Proceeding direct from Tabrīz to Isfahān (and not withdrawing in that direction from Ray as in Ibn al-Athir's6 account) the sultan gathered together his forces and calmly awaited the enemy's approach. When the Mongols encamped a day's journey to the east of the town, he did not immediately give battle having been advised by his astrologers not to engage the enemy until the fourth day. The Mongols interpreted his inaction as unwillingness to fight and thinking it might be necessary to lay siege to the town, dispatched a foraging party of 2,000 horse into the Luristān mountains to procure provisions. Jalāl al-Dīn caused them to be followed by a detachment of 3,000 men who, having seized the passes and cut off their retreat, returned to Isfahān with 400 prisoners. Of these wretches some were handed over to the qādi and ra'iṣ to be massacred in the streets of the town for the delectation and encouragement of the populace; the rest he decapitated personally in the court-

1 Vol. xii, pp. 306–7
3 Transl. Houdas, p. 231.
6 Loc. cit.
yard of his palace, the bodies being dragged out into the open country
to be devoured by dogs and vultures. On the day approved by the
astrologers the sultan was drawing up his army in battle-order when
Ghiyāth al-Dīn, who had been nursing a grudge against his brother,
suddenly withdrew along with all the forces under his command. Un-
disturbed by this defection the sultan, perceiving the enemy’s numbers
to be inferior to his own, ordered the local infantry to return to the
town, as a gesture at once of self-confidence and of contempt for his
opponents. Towards evening the right wing of his army charged the
Mongols’ left, broke through and pursued the fleeing enemy as far as
Kāshān. Satisfied with this success Jalāl al-Dīn was resting on the side
of a ravine when he was approached by one of his chief officers, who
urged him not to let the enemy escape under cover of darkness but to
avail himself of the opportunity to destroy them utterly. The sultan at
once mounted horse but had hardly reached the end of the ravine before
a Mongol force, which had been lying in ambush, charged down upon
the left wing driving them back against the centre. The sultan’s
commanders in the left wing were killed almost to a man, and the
centre, where he himself was stationed, was in utter confusion, sur-
rounded on every side by the enemy. His very standard-bearer turned
in flight, and Jalāl al-Dīn struck him down with his own hand before
cutting his way through the Mongol ranks and making good his
escape. What was left of the centre and left wing fled in various direc-
tions: some to Fārs, some to Kirmān and some to Āzarbājān, while
those who had lost their horses made their way back to Isfahān. Two
days later the right wing returned from Kāshān expecting to find the
rest of the army equally victorious; learning of their defeat and dispersal
they too disbanded, leaving Isfahān at the mercy of the invaders. The
Mongols, however, who had suffered even greater losses than their
opponents, were content to show themselves before the walls of the
town; they then retreated northward with such speed that they reached
Ray in three days; they continued eastwards to Nīshāpūr and were soon
beyond the Oxus. As for the sultan a whole week passed without news
of his whereabouts; he was believed dead and there was talk of
appointing Yaghān Taisī as his successor. The qāḍī persuaded the
citizens to postpone any decision until the ‘Īd al-fītr; and Jalāl al-Dīn,
who had been hiding in the Luristān mountains, appeared just in time
to preside over the celebrations. Entering the town amidst universal
rejoicings he honoured and promoted those of his commanders and
soldiers who had distinguished themselves in the battle whilst punishing others for their absence or inactivity. He remained only a day or two in Isfahān before proceeding northwards in the wake of the retreating Mongols; from Ray he dispatched bodies of horsemen even into the desolate wastes of Khūrāsān.

Upon returning to Tabriz the sultan received disturbing news about his brother Ghiyāth al-Dīn. After his defection at the Battle of Isfahān Ghiyāth al-Dīn had taken refuge in Khūzistān, where he stood under the direct protection of the caliph; he was now said to be heading northwards towards Isfahān. When this report reached the sultan he was playing polo in the great square. With typical impetuosity he flung down his mallet and at once took to the road only to learn en route that his brother had sought and obtained asylum with ‘Alā’ al-Dīn of Alamūt. The Ismā‘īlī ruler refused to hand over the fugitive but guaranteed his good behaviour, and, apparently satisfied with his undertaking, the sultan returned to Āzarbājījān. As for Ghiyāth al-Dīn, his confinement in Alamūt soon became irksome and he was lured by Bārāq Ḥājib to Kirmān, where both he and his mother (whom Bārāq had compelled to marry him) were treacherously put to death.

Late in 1228 Jalāl al-Dīn approached Akhlāt for the second time. He now had another score to settle with the ḥājīb Ḥusām al-Dīn. The Saljuq princess, Öz-Beg’s former wife, was soon completely disenchanted with her new husband and, angered by the discourteous behaviour of his lieutenant the vizier Shāraf al-Dīn during the sultan’s absence in Central Persia, had not only invited the ḥājīb to invade Āzarbājījān but had accompanied him back to Akhlāt. The sultan’s troops do not appear on this occasion to have closely invested the town. Instead they pillaged and massacred through the length and breadth of Armenia penetrating to the Plain of Mūsh on the border of Jazireh or Upper Mesopotamia, and the people of Ḥarrān and Sarūj, thinking the Khwārazmīs intended to winter in that more temperate region, began a general exodus into Syria. Their fears, however, were groundless, for the sultan, when an unprecedented snowfall rendered further operations impossible, withdrew his forces into Āzarbājījān.

A renewal of the campaign in the spring of 1229, was prevented by a threat to the sultan’s northern flank. The Georgians, now fully recovered from their earlier defeat, had formed a confederation of the various Caucasian peoples and were advancing southwards with a multi-national army that included a contingent of 20,000 Qipchaq Turks. The
two sides came into view of each other at a place with the Georgian name of Mindor near the town of Lori, and it was at once evident that the enemy's forces vastly outnumbered the sultan's. Disdaining his vizier's advice to entrench himself and await reinforcements, the sultan drew up his men in preparation for battle. He then ascended a hill in order to observe the enemy more closely and, descrying the banners of the Qipchaq on the right wing, dispatched a messenger to remind them of the favours he had rendered them during his father's lifetime. The appeal was successful and the Qipchaq withdrew from the battlefield. Next, turning to the Georgians drawn up in front of him the sultan proposed a one-day truce, during which the young men of either side might engage in single combat. The proposal was readily accepted, and five champions rode forward in succession from the Georgian ranks, each to be felled by the sultan in person. Then, wearying of the sport and forgetful of the truce, he gave a sign with his whip, and his troops advanced at the charge to drive the enemy before them in headlong flight.

Fresh from this and other victories in the Caucasus area the sultan, at the end of August 1229, sat down before the walls of Akhlat. This time he did not raise the siege with the advent of winter, although the bitter cold and heavy snowfalls obliged the besiegers for a while to forsake their posts and seek shelter in neighbouring villages. Meanwhile food supplies inside the town dwindled and deteriorated, and the besieged, who had begun by eating their sheep and oxen, were reduced to a diet of cats and dogs, and even rats and mice. Akhlat was finally taken on 14 April 1230, and was subjected, apparently against the sultan's better judgment, to three days of looting. Ḫusām al-Dīn, his old adversary, was now dead, having been executed by the mamlūk who had succeeded him as governor, and the sources are silent about the Saljuq princess whom he had abducted. Jalāl al-Dīn indemnified himself for her loss and avenged the slight to his honour by laying hands on a Georgian lady, the wife of Malik al-Āshraf, who had been left behind in the town. It was probably this act which decided Ashraf to join with Kai-Qubād, the Saljuq sultan of Rūm, in taking up arms against Sultān Jalāl al-Dīn.

Kai-Qubād had been greatly alarmed, not to say panic-stricken, by the capture of Akhlat, which he saw as an immediate threat to the eastern flank of his territories; and he had dispatched envoy after envoy to the Ayyūbids with frantic appeals for an alliance against the sultan. With
the approval of the senior Ayyūbid, Malik al-Kāmil of Egypt, Ashraf mustered his forces—5,000 seasoned troops—at Harrān and moved northwards to link up, at Kai-Qubād’s headquarters in Sivās, with an army of 20,000 Rūmīs. The allies then proceeded eastwards along the highway to Persia and halted in Arzinjān in the valley of the western Euphrates. The sultan, meanwhile, was following the same route in a westerly direction. He had left Akhlāt to attack the town of Malāzgird, when the ruler of Erzerum, a cousin of Kai-Qubād, who had supplied him with provisions and forage during the siege, came to inform him of the alliance concluded between his cousin and the Ayyūbids; he advised the sultan to advance to the attack before their forces could combine. Jalāl al-Dīn accepted his advice and had pushed forward as far as Khartabirt, where he fell ill; by the time he had recovered sufficiently to continue the march the allies had already linked up. The first clash with the enemy occurred in the village of Yasi-Chaman, somewhat to the east of Arzinjān, on 7 August, when a detachment of Rūmī troops were surrounded and cut to pieces. Two days later the main armies were in contact and there was some skirmishing; but they did not join battle in earnest until the 10th. The Khwārazmīs were decisively defeated, whether because they lost their bearings in the mist, or because of a sand storm that blew in their faces, or simply because of the weight of the enemy’s numbers; and Jalāl al-Dīn fled to Khūy, pausing en route at Akhlāt only long enough to collect such stores and valuables as could be readily transported.1

From Akhlāt, which he now reoccupied, Ashraf entered into negotiations with the sultan; and peace was concluded on condition that Jalāl al-Dīn should henceforth respect the territories of both the Ayyūbids and the Saljuqs. With respect to Kai-Qubād the sultan gave this undertaking with great unwillingness and only upon receiving reports that large forces of Mongols had arrived in Central Persia. This was the army, 30,000 strong, under the command of the noyan Chormaghun, dispatched by Ögedei, the son and first successor (1229-41) of Chingiz-Khān, to complete the conquest of Persia and make an end of the sultan. It seemed at first as though the Mongols might winter in ‘Irāq-i ‘Ajam, thus affording Jalāl al-Dīn time to reassemble his forces; but then came news of an army at Sarāb, only sixty miles east of Tabriz. The sultan set out at great speed for Ahar, where he passed the night; the roof of the palace in which he lodged caved in and he took this for

1 For a detailed account of this campaign see Gottschalk, Al-Malik al-Kāmil, pp. 188 ff.
SULTĀN JALĀL AL-DĪN

an evil omen. He made his way to the Mughān Steppe, where the Mongols all but caught up with him; he shook them off by abandoning his encampment under cover of darkness and hiding in the mountains of Kapan, in what is today the extreme south-east of Soviet Armenia. The winter of 1230–1 he passed in Urmiyeh and Ushnuyeh; later we find him in Arrān sentencing his vizier Sharaf al-Mulk, justly or unjustly, to death and suppressing a revolt in Ganja; then involved in fruitless negotiations with the Ayyūbid governor of Akhlaq; and finally en route for DIYārbakr, apparently to join the ruler of Āmid in an attack upon the sultan of Rūm. In the middle of August 1231 he encamped in the immediate vicinity of Āmid; he drank heavily that night and was sunk in intoxicated sleep when, at day break, the Mongols launched their attack. Roused by one of his generals he effected his escape whilst the enemy was pursuing the bulk of his army, which, led by the same general, made its way to Irbīl and finally to Isfahān. The sultan, meanwhile, with only a small following, rode up to the walls of Āmid and, being refused admission, turned back in the direction of Mayyafarīqīn and encamped outside a nearby village. Again overtaken by the Mongols he killed two of his pursuers and made off into the mountains. Here, he was captured by the Kurds, who murdered him for his clothes and horse, according to some authorities, or for motives of revenge, according to others. In due course the ruler of Āmid recovered his body and gave it burial; but many refused to believe that he was dead and years later, when the whole of his domains were subject to Mongol rule, pretenders would arise claiming to be Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn.

Such was the end of the last of the Khwārazm-Shāhs. Nasawi describes him as a short, dark man, Turkish in appearance and in speech, though he spoke Persian also. Grave and taciturn by nature he smiled rather than laughed and never lost his temper or used abusive language. His qualities, in d’Ohsson’s judgment, were those of a Türkmen warrior rather than of a general or a sovereign. This is to do him less than justice. For all his faults, he alone of his contemporaries, as was recognized by friend and foe alike, was a match for the invaders. Jalāl al-Dīn and his army formed a wall between Islam and the Tartars. That wall had now been breached and neither Ayyūbid nor Saljuq was capable of stemming the flood.

1 Transl. Houdas, pp. 411–12.
THE MONGOL VICEROYS

After the death of Sultan Jalāl al-Din the military operations of Chormaghun were conducted in the Caucasus, Upper Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, and henceforth he was to exercise only an indirect influence on the course of events in Persia. One consequence of his passage through Iran had been the Mongol re-occupation of Khurāsān and the gradual establishment of a civil administration in that unhappy region now slowly recovering from the state of utter desolation in which it had lain since the invasion. At the time of the conquest of Gurğanj, a certain Chin-Temūr, a Qara-Khitayan by origin, had been appointed basqaq of that area. He now received orders to lead his forces westwards in support of Chormaghun and, arriving in Khurāsān, proceeded systematically to reduce the province to subjection, setting basqaqs over such places as had submitted. In this work he was hampered by the activities of two former generals of Sultan Jalāl al-Din, Qaracha and Yaghān-Sonqur, who were conducting guerrilla warfare against the Mongols in the Nishāpūr region. News of these operations having reached the Great Khan, he was greatly enraged and instructed the noyan Dayir to set out from his base at Bāḏghīs and, having first dealt with Qaracha, to put the whole population of Khurāsān to the sword. Dayir’s troops were already on the move when he received the news that Qaracha had been driven out of Khurāsān by Kūl-Bolat, a lieutenant of Chin-Temūr, and had entrenched himself in Zarang in Sistān. Dayir proceeded to lay siege to Zarang, which held out for nearly two years, and upon its surrender dispatched messengers to Chin-Temūr asserting his claim to the governorship of Khurāsān. In this he was supported by Chormaghun, who called upon Chin-Temūr to join him in the West, whilst leaving the administration of Khurāsān and Māzandarān in the hands of Dayir. Chin-Temūr decided to appeal to the Great Khan, to whom accordingly he dispatched a mission headed by Kūl-Bolat and including several local rulers who had made their submission to the Mongols. Ögedei was pleased with the mission, remarking that Chormaghun, despite the vastly greater territory under his control, had never sent tributary princes to wait upon him; and he issued a yarligh or rescript giving official status to Chin-Temūr as the governor of Khurāsān and Māzandarān. A second mission, led by an Uighur Turk called Korgūz accompanied by Bāhā’ al-Dīn Juvainī, the father of the historian, whom Chin-Temūr had made his sahib-divān or
minister of finance, was equally successful but brought no benefit to Chin-Temur, who had died before the mission returned (633/1235-6).

He was succeeded in his office by Nosal, an aged Mongol said to have been more than 100 years old, who died in 637/1239-40, already in effect superseded by the Uighur Körgüz, a clever and ambitious man, who, as the result of a second visit to Mongolia, had been given special powers by the Great Khan. Körgüz proceeded upon his return to hold a census and to reassess the taxes, but was soon obliged to return to Mongolia to answer charges laid against him by the family and dependants of Chin-Temur. Not only did he triumph over these adversaries, but he was granted letters-patent conferring upon him the civil administration of all the territories held by Chormaghun in Western Asia. Returning to Khurasan at the end of 1239 he at once sent agents to 'Irāq-i 'Ajam, Arrān and Āzarbājān to take over from the military commanders, whilst he established his own headquarters in Ṭūs. The town was still in ruins, only some fifty houses remaining standing, but with Körgüz's encouragement and example was now speedily re-built. Public order was restored, and Juvainī tells us, with the usual hyperbole, that an amir who had previously cut off heads with impunity would not now venture to decapitate a chicken, whilst the morale of the peasantry was so high "that if a great army of Mongols encamped in a field they might not even ask a peasant to hold a horse's head, let alone demanding provisions..." Körgüz's career was, however, nearly at its end. A dispute with his vizier, one Sharaf al-Dīn, a man of the people from Khwārazm, whose character can hardly have been as black as it is painted by Juvainī, caused him to set out upon a fourth journey to Mongolia. This was presumably in the winter of 1241-2, for he was met en route with the news of the Great Khan's death, which occurred on 11 December 1241. When passing through the territories of Chaghatai, then only recently dead, he had in the course of an altercation with an official made a remark which had given offence to Chaghatai's widow. Fearful of the consequences of his words in the new and unpredictable situation he hurried back to Khurasan. His fears were not groundless, for no sooner had he returned to Ṭūs than the emissaries of Chaghatai's family—one of them his successor, Arghun Aqa—arrived in the town. He was arrested and taken first to Ulugh-Ef, the ordū of Chaghatai near the present-day Kulja and then to the court of Tūregene, the widow of Ögedei and Regent of the Empire (1242-6)

in Qara-Qorum. Here it was ruled that the crime should be tried where it had been committed, in Chaghatai’s territory. Körgüz was in consequence brought back to Ulugh-Ef, where, by the orders of Qara-Hülegü, the grandson and first successor (1242–6) of Chaghatai, he was put to a cruel death. Originally a Buddhist despite his name (the Turkish for George) Körgüz had towards the end of his life become a convert to Islam, an indication perhaps of some feeling of solidarity with his Muslim subjects.

Arghun Aqa had already been appointed to succeed Körgüz as the viceroy of the conquered territories in the West, i.e. of a region embracing Iran, the southern Caucasus area and part of Upper Mesopotamia and Asia Minor. He arrived in Khurāsān in 641/1243–4 and left almost immediately on a tour of inspection of ‘Iraq-i ‘Ajam and Āzarbāijān. From Tabriz, where he received embassies from the sultan of Rūm and the Ayyūbid rulers of Damascus and Aleppo, he was summoned to attend the quriltai or assembly of the Mongol princes at which Gūyük, the son of Ögedei, was elected his successor as Great Khan (1246). Confirmed in his office and loaded with honours by the new khan, Arghun returned to Khurāsān in the spring of 1247. He spent some time in Marv before passing on to Tūs, where he ordered the rebuilding of the Saljuq palace called the Manṣūriyya. He then relaxed for a while in the meadows of Rādkān, a region of copious springs and lush grass, which seems to have made a special appeal to the Mongols, and in the late autumn of 1247 set out for Tabriz by way of Māzandarān. At Āmul he was magnificently entertained by Juvaini’s father, the šāhīb-divān, and was about to resume his journey when he received news of intrigues against him in the Mongol capital; and he determined to return thither without delay. On this journey he was accompanied not only by the šāhīb-divān but also by the latter’s son, the future historian. The party had reached Talas, the present-day Jambul in Kazakhstan, when they were met with the tidings of Gūyük’s death (which had occurred in April 1248); at the same time there came news of the approach of the noyan Eljigidei at the head of a large army. The purpose of this expedition is not clear: it was perhaps intended that Eljigidei, as the khan’s personal representative, was to supersede Baiju (who had succeeded Chormaghun in 1242) as commander of the Mongol forces in Western Asia. Arghun hurried forward to meet him and at his insistence returned to Khurāsān to supervise the equipment and provisioning of his army. It was not until the late summer of 1249
that he was able to resume his interrupted journey to Mongolia. His case was duly investigated in the ordu of Oghul-Qaimish, Guyük’s widow, then Regent of the Empire; and a decision was reached in his favour. On the homeward journey the party (of which the historian Juvaini was one) halted for a month or two at the ordu of Yesii-Möngke, who now ruled over the apanage of Chaghatai. The party had arrived in Almaligh in the late summer or early autumn of 1250; they left in the winter, when the roads were blocked with snow, but nevertheless made rapid progress and had soon reached Marv in Khurásân. Arghun did not remain long in Iran. In August or September 1251 he again set out for the East in order to attend the quriltai which had been summoned to enthrone the new khan, Möngke (1251-9), the eldest son of Tolui. The enthronement had in fact already taken place (on 1 July 1251), though the news did not reach Arghun until his arrival at Talas. It was now mid-winter and the deep snow made travelling almost impossible. Nevertheless the party struggled on and finally came to Besh-Baliq, the old Uighur capital, a little to the north-west of Guchen in Sinkiang. From here Arghun sent a message to inform the new khan of his approach, but the party did not reach the Mongol Court till 2 May 1252, nearly a year after Möngke’s enthronement. Arghun reported on the chaotic condition of finances in the territories under his control, and it was decided that a more equitable form of taxation known as qubchur, already in force in Transoxiana, should be introduced in the Western countries also. The deliberations over these and other matters lasted so long that it was not until August or September 1253 that Arghun finally took his leave. It was during this lengthy stay in Mongolia that Juvaini, who had again accompanied Arghun, was persuaded to embark upon his history of the Mongol conquests.

Upon his return to Khurásân Arghun dispatched officials to the various parts of Persia to carry out the fiscal reforms. He himself set out for the Court of Batu, the son of Jochi and founder of the Golden Horde, to deal with certain unspecified business, apparently on the instructions of the Great Khan. Returning by way of Darband he conducted a census and imposed the new qubchur tax in Georgia, Arrān and Āzarbāijān before proceeding to ‘Irāq-i ‘Ajam. In the meanwhile, availing themselves of his absence, certain of his enemies at the Mongol Court had secured a yarlıgh for the dispatch of an inspector to Khurásân to examine his accounts. Reports of this official’s arrival and activities must have reached Arghun more or less simultaneously with news that
the Great Khan's younger brother, Prince Hülegü, was advancing westward at the head of a great army. In November 1255 he waited on Hülegü at Kish, the present-day Shahr-i Sabz in Uzbekistan and accompanied him as far as Shuburğan before continuing on his way to Mongolia once again to triumph over his accusers.

Arghun was to spend the remainder of his life in the service of the Il-Khans. He returned to the West, according to Juvaini, in September 1258, although Rashid al-Din represents him as being present, in Hülegü's suite, at the siege of Baghdad (January-February 1258). In 1259 and 1260 he was in Georgia introducing the qubchur and conducting military operations against the rebel princes. He held, under both Hülegü and Abaqa, the office of Tax-Farmer General (muqāṭṭ-i mamālīk). As deputy to the viceroy of Khūrāsān, Abaqa's younger brother Tūbšin, he took part in the war with Baraq, the ruler of Transoxiana, in 1270. He died in the meadows of Rādkān in May or June 1275.

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At the quriltai of 1251 the Great Khan Möngke had decided to complete and consolidate the Mongol conquests by dispatching his brothers Qubilai and Hülegü to China and Western Asia respectively. The victories of Qubilai (Kubla Khan), the successor of Möngke as Great Khan (1260-94) and founder of the Yüan dynasty, fall outside the scope of this volume.1 As for Hülegü, his instructions were in the first place to destroy the Ismā'īlīs and demolish their castles and then, this task completed, to put down the Kurds and Lurs: the caliph was to be attacked only if he refused to tender his allegiance. Elaborate preparations were made for the passage of Hülegü's army through Central Asia. The road was cleared of boulders and thorny shrubs; bridges were built over small, and ferries provided for the crossing of larger rivers; and all pasturage on either side of the route, from the Khangai mountains to the Oxus, was reserved for the exclusive use of Hülegü's army. That army, probably larger than the forces which Chingiz-Khān led westward in 1219, included contingents from all the Mongol princes, the sons, brothers and nephews of the Great Khan; and special mention should be made, in view of later developments, of the contingent sent by Batu and led by two of Jochi's grandsons, Balaghai and Quli, and one great grandson, Tutar, as also of the contingent from

1 See Grousset, L'Empire des steppes. pp. 349 ff.
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Chaghatai's ulus led by one of his grandsons, Tegüder. The army likewise included a corps of Chinese mangonel-men and naphtha-throwers for employment in siege operations.

Hülegü advanced westward at a leisurely pace necessitated perhaps by the size and unwieldiness of his forces. Setting out from his own ordu in October 1253 he halted for a time at Ulugh-Ef, where he was entertained by Princess Orqi'na, the widow of Chaghatai and now (1252-61) the ruler of his ulus. The summer of 1254 Hülegü passed in mountain pastures somewhere on the eastern borders of Transoxiana. In late September 1255 he encamped in the famous meadows of Kān-i Gil to the east of Samarqand. Here he was visited by Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad, the founder (1245-78) of the Kart dynasty of Herāt, who had demonstrated his loyalty to the Mongols by taking part in their invasion of India in 1246. Early in November Hülegü pressed on to Kish, where, as we have seen, he was joined by the viceroy Arghun Aqa. From Kish he dispatched express couriers to the various Persian rulers informing them of his intention to extirpate the Ismā'īlīs and calling upon them to render assistance or suffer the consequences of their refusal or inactivity. Many of these rulers, including Sa'd, the heir and successor (1226-60) of the Atabeg Muẓaffar al-Dīn of Fārs, came to do homage in person, as did also the rival sultans of Rūm, Izz al-Dīn and Rukn al-Dīn. After a month's stay in Kish the army continued on its way to the Oxus, which it crossed on bridges of boats commandeered from the ferrymen. On the left bank of the river Hülegü amused himself with a tiger hunt, in which the hunters rode on Bactrian camels in place of their terrified horses. The next halting-place was in the meadows of Shuburqān (the present-day Shibārkhan in north-western Afghanistan), where only a short stay had been intended; but heavy snowfalls and bitter cold obliged Hülegü to pass the remainder of the winter in this area. In the early spring of 1256 Arghun Aqa took leave of the Mongol prince having first entertained him in "a large tent of fine linen embroidered with delicate embroideries, with gold and silver plate in keeping with it"; and Hülegü entered Kūhistān to come for the first time in contact with the Ismā'īlīs.

As the army was passing through the districts of Zāveh and Khwāf, there occurred a number of "incidents", a vague term used by both Juvainī2 and Rashīd al-Dīn3 presumably with reference to surprise

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attacks by Ismā‘îli fīdā‘īs; and Hūlegū dispatched the generals Köke-Ilge and Ket-Buqa to attack the Ismā‘îli stronghold of Tun. Ket-Buqa, a Nestorian Christian, famous afterwards as the Mongol commander at ‘Ain Jālūt, had had considerable experience in fighting this enemy. At the head of Hūlegū’s advanced guard, a body of 12,000 men, he had crossed the Oxus in March 1253, captured several places in Kūhistān and then laid unsuccessful siege to the celebrated fortress of Gird-Kūh in May of the same year. In August he had attacked the castle of Shāhdīz near Ray and sent a raiding party still farther west into the Alamūt region. Returning to Kūhistān he had harried the country a second time and captured several strongholds, including Tun. The town, says Juvainī,1 “had apparently not yet been humbled and still persisted in its former benightedness...” Köke-Ilge and Ket-Buqa arrived before the gates on 4 April 1256; they took the town on the 16th and slaughtered all the inhabitants, except the younger women, according to Juvainī,2 or the artisans, according to Rashīd al-Dīn.3 Their mission accomplished the two generals rejoined the main army, then on its way to Ta‘us.

At Ta‘us as at Shuburqān Hūlegū was lodged in a beautiful tent which Arghun Aqa had had especially constructed for his accommodation on the instructions of the Great Khan. After a few days of feasting and revelry he moved on to the gardens of Manṣūriyya, the Saljuq palace restored by Arghun Aqa, where he was entertained with a banquet by Arghun’s wives. Leaving Ta‘us the army encamped for a day or two in the meadows of Radkan before proceeding to Khābūshān (the modern Qūchān), “a town” to quote Juvainī,4 “which had been derelict and in ruins from the first incursion of the Mongol army until that year, its buildings desolate and the qanāts without water and no walls still standing save those of the Friday mosque”. The historian, whose motives were not altogether disinterested, for he had purchased a quarter of the town for himself, approached Hūlegū on the subject of Khābūshān and obtained his authority for the complete restoration of the town at the expense of the treasury.

Hūlegū remained in this region for a month and then resumed the advance westward. On 24 July he was rejoined by the ambassadors he had sent to the Ismā‘îli Grand Master, Rukn al-Dīn Khur-Shāh, to convey the terms of surrender. From Khurqān near Bistām, where he

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had arrived on 2 September, he dispatched a second embassy to Rukn al-Din. The Grand Master, acting on the advice of the famous philosopher Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī and other learned men detained against their will amongst the Ismāʿīlīs, decided to send his brother Shahanshāh to make professions of submission. Hūlegū received Shahanshāh with every honour and dispatched a third embassy with the message that Rukn al-Dīn should now demonstrate his submission by demolishing his castles. Dissatisfied with the Grand Master’s response Hūlegū prepared for battle. In the middle of September he advanced from Khurqān at the head of 10,000 men, whilst the various armies converged on Rukn al-Dīn’s residence, the well-nigh impregnable castle of Maimūn-Dīz, Buqa-Temūr and Köke-Ilge approaching by way of Māzandarān, Tegūder and Kēt-Buqa by way of Simnān and Khūvār and Tūtar and Balaghāi from the direction of Alamūt. And again he sent ambassadors, to notify Rukn al-Dīn of his intention and to promise an amnesty if he presented himself in person. As Hūlegū passed by Fīrūzkūh the ambassadors returned accompanied by Rukn al-Dīn’s vizier, who undertook to destroy the castles but asked that Rukn al-Dīn might be allowed a year’s respite before vacating Maimūn-Dīz and that the castles of Alamūt and Lanbasar might be spared from destruction. Meanwhile Hūlegū continued to advance through Lār and Damāvand, and the castle of Shāhdīz, to which Kēt-Buqa had laid siege two years previously, was captured within two days. Yet once again he sent ambassadors to Rukn al-Dīn calling upon him to present himself before him. The Grand Master now agreed to send his son and to demolish all of the castles; and Hūlegū halted at ‘Abbāsābād near Ray to await the son’s arrival. On 8 October Rukn al-Dīn sent a child of seven or eight, his own or his father’s by some irregular union. Hūlegū sent the boy back on the ground that he was too young and asked instead for one of Rukn al-Dīn’s brothers to relieve Shahanshāh. On 27 October the Grand Master sent his brother Shīrān-Shāh, who was received by Hūlegū near Ray; and he, or more probably Shahanshāh, returned on the 31st bearing a yarlīgh to the effect that provided Rukn al-Dīn dismantled his castles he had nothing to fear.

This message was apparently intended to lull Rukn al-Dīn into false security, just as the latter’s embassies had been designed to delay the Mongol’s assault until the winter snows rendered it impracticable. The

1 The site has only recently been identified and investigated. See Willey, The Castles of the Assassins, pp. 158 ff.
weather, however, remained unseasonably mild and, his victim being now completely encircled, Hülegü ordered the various armies to close in whilst he himself advanced from the direction of Pishkil-Dara through Tāliqān. On 8 November he was encamped on a hilltop facing Maimūn-Diz from the north and the next day surveyed the castle from every side in search of some vulnerable point. The great strength of the fortifications, the approach of winter and the consequent difficulty of procuring supplies were advanced as reasons for postponing siege operations until the spring; but a minority of the princes and generals favoured immediate investment of the castle and Hülegü supported their view. In the event the siege was to last less than a fortnight. Great pine trees, planted in former times by the Ismā'īlis themselves, were felled by the Mongols to serve as poles for their mangonels; and in addition to these normal siege instruments a Chinese ballista, with a range of 2,500 paces, discharged its missiles against the garrison. In the face of this bombardment the Ismā'īlis ceased fighting and asked for a truce, which was granted. Then Rukn al-Dīn asked for a yarlıgh granting him safe-conduct if he descended from the castle. This too was granted, the yarlıgh being drawn up by the historian Juvainī who functioned as Hülegū's secretary. Still the Grand Master failed to appear, and the bombardment was resumed on a much larger scale. Now at last Rukn al-Dīn decided to surrender and sent down his brother Shiran-Shāh and one of his sons with a group of notables including Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī; on the following day, 29 Shawwāl/19 November, according to Juvainī,1 or on the day after, according to Rashīd al-Dīn,2 who quotes a chronogram by Naṣīr al-Dīn, he came down himself.

The next day Rukn al-Dīn brought all of his family and following down out of the castle; and the Mongols climbed up to begin the work of demolition. They were attacked by some of the more fanatical fīdāʾīs, whose desperate resistance was broken only after four days of fighting. Meanwhile, Rukn al-Dīn had been kindly received by Hülegū, though kept as a prisoner at large under the surveillance of a Mongol commander. At Hülegū's behest he dispatched bodies of men to destroy the Ismā'īlī castles in the whole of the region. Forty such castles were demolished, only Alamūt and Lanbasar refusing to admit these emissaries. Alamūt was invested by Balaghāi until surrender terms were negotiated through the good offices of Rukn al-Dīn. The work of demolition then began, but the historian Juvainī, with Hülegū's

2 Transl. Arends, p. 29.
permission, was able to salvage part of the celebrated library, as also a quantity of astronomical instruments. Lanbasar was approached by Hulegu in person. Finding the garrison disinclined to surrender he left Dayir-Buqa to lay siege to the castle (which, in the event, was to hold out for a full year) and, on 4 January 1257, set out for his chief ordu, then situated some twenty miles from Qazvin, where he celebrated the Mongol New Year festival with a week of revelry. Rukn al-Din seems to have accompanied Hulegu to his ordu, though his family and possessions had been transferred to Qazvin. Because he was still of use to him Hulegu continued to treat him with honour and consideration, bestowing upon him a Mongol girl of whom he became enamoured and even humouring him in his curious pastime of watching camel-fights. With the Grand Master's co-operation it had been possible for Hulegu to secure the speedy surrender of scores of Isma'ili castles, many of which (as was in fact the case with Gird-Kūh) could have withstood a siege of many years. Once his usefulness was exhausted, however, his presence was a source of embarrassment to Hulegu, who acceded with alacrity to his request that he might be sent to the Great Khan. Rukn al-Din did not return from this journey. According to Juvaini, he actually reached the Mongol Court, was reproached by Mongke with the continued resistance of Lanbasar and Gird-Kūh and was murdered by his escort in the Khangai mountains on the way back. Rashid al-Din, on the other hand, tells us that he was put to death on the outward journey, at the express orders of the Great Khan, who protested at the wasting of relay animals upon such a visitor. His departure was the signal for a general massacre of his followers, and all the Isma'illis in Mongol custody, including Rukn al-Din's own family at Qazvin, were put to the sword, not even infants in the cradle being spared. Their wholesale slaughter was carried out, according to Juvaini, not only by order of the Great Khan Môngke but in fulfilment of a yasta of Chingiz-Khān himself.

By the virtual extinction of the Isma'ili sect Hulegu had rendered a great, if unintentional, service to orthodox Islam. His next blow was to be directed against the founthead of orthodoxy, the 'Abbāsid Caliphate. The Īl-Khān, as we may now call him, proceeded with the same

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2 Transl. Arends, p. 30.  
3 Loc. cit.  
4 The term means "subject khan" and was applied to the Mongol rulers of Persia (and sometimes to the rulers of the Golden Horde) as subordinates to the Great Khan in Mongolia and afterwards China.
deliberation as in his advance through Central Asia. In March or April 1257 he left the Qazvin area en route for Hamadan and was joined, apparently before reaching his destination, by Baiju, the successor of Chormaghun in the West, whom he presumably instructed on the role of his army in the forthcoming campaign. Hulegii himself, with the Jochid princes Quli, Balaghai and Tutar, encamped on the Hamadan plain, from whence, after a brief stay, he set off in the direction of Baghdad, arriving in Dinavar on 26 April; he then, for some unknown reason, returned to Hamadan; on 26 July he was in Tabriz and on 21 September back in Hamadan. Here began what Grousset\(^1\) has called the “dialogue epistolaire” between Hulegii and the caliph, “un des plus grandioses de l’histoire”. The gist of Hulegii’s first message, shorn of Rashid al-Din’s rhetoric, was that the caliph should either present himself in person or send his three principal officers, the vizier, the commander-in-chief and the lesser davat-där or vice-chancellor; the caliph’s reply was to the effect that this raw and inexperienced young man should return whence he had come. There followed a second exchange in similar tone, after which, wishing to secure his passage through the Zagros mountains, Hulegii established contact with the caliph’s governor of Dartang and persuaded him to hand over the castles in his area: though the governor afterwards repented of his treason, the castles were retained through the intervention of Ket-Buqa at the head of 30,000 horse. The way being thus cleared, the Il-Khan consulted his leading men as to the advisability of an attack on Baghdad. The astronomer Husam al-Din, who, despite his Muslim name, had been attached to Hulegii by the order of the Great Khan, spoke openly against such a move. Every ruler who had attacked Baghdad and the ‘Abbâsids had forfeited his kingdom and his life; and he foretold six natural disasters that would occur if Hulegii made the attempt. Hulegii then turned to Nasîr al-Din Tusi, who had now joined his suite, and asked his opinion. With equal discretion and common sense the philosopher replied that none of these disasters would occur. “What then will happen?” asked the Il-Khan. “Hulegii will reign in place of Musta’sim”, he replied; and in a disputation with Husam al-Din he had no difficulty in citing a number of cases in which the caliphs had come to a violent end without any consequent calamity.

The decision being now taken, the Mongol armies converged on Baghdad. Baiju, coming from the direction of Irbil, crossed the Tigris

\(^1\) L’Empire des steppes, p. 428.

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at Mosul and encamped to the west of Baghdad to await the arrival of the forces from the East. Of these the right wing, commanded by Balaghai, Tutar and Quli, was advancing through Şahrazûr and Daqûqâ, the centre under Hûlegû himself by way of Kirmânsâh and Hûlwân, and the left wing under Kêt-Buqa by way of Luristan and Khûzistân. Hûlegû set out from the Hamadân area in November 1257. From Asadâbâd he again summoned the caliph to his presence, and at Dinavar he received the caliph’s ambassador again advising him to turn back. He replied that having travelled so far he could not return without having met the caliph face to face. On 6 December he reached Kirmânsâh, which must have offered some resistance, for the town was sacked and the inhabitants massacred. From here he summoned Baiju and his officers to a council of war. They joined him at Tâq-i Girrâ, the so-called “Zagrian Gates”, and, their consultations completed, set off to recross the Tigris and take up their position to the west of Baghdad. Hûlegû sent yet another warning to the caliph and, passing through the defile, encamped on the banks of the Hûlwân river, where he remained from 18 to 31 December. In the meantime, Kêt-Buqa had conquered the greater part of Luristan; and Baiju, by 16 January 1258, having crossed the Tigris, had reached the banks of the Nahr ‘Isâ. Here Suqunchaq, the future governor of ‘Irâq-i ‘Arab and Fârs, obtained his permission to lead the advanced forces and pushed forward as far as Ḥarbîyya. The davât-dâr, who commanded the caliph’s army, was encamped between Ba‘qûbâ and Bâjîsrâ. Hearing of a Mongol army approaching from the west he crossed the Tigris and joined battle with Suqunchaq near Anbâr. The Mongols retreated to a place which Rashîd al-Dîn¹ calls Bashîrîyya, apparently on a branch of the Dujail called Nahr Bashîr. Here they were rallied by Baiju, who came up with the main army. The Mongols then opened a dyke and flooded the whole area behind their opponents, and, attacking at dawn on 17 January, inflicted a heavy defeat on the caliph’s troops, of whom 12,000 were killed in battle in addition to those drowned in the flood. Of the survivors some few, with the davât-dâr at their head, made their way back to Baghdad, whilst others fled as far as Ḥilla and Kûfâ.

Following up this victory Baiju’s troops had by 22 January reached the western suburbs of Baghdad. In the meantime, Kêt-Buqa, coming up from the south, had passed through Ṣârṣar and penetrated the market district of Karkh; and Hûlegû himself, leaving his heavy baggage at

¹ Transl. Arends, p. 41.
Khānaqin, had reached the eastern walls of Baghdad simultaneously with Baiju’s approach to the western side. In accordance with their practice in siege operations the Mongols ringed the whole circumference of the town with a kind of palisade called sibe; inside this fence they sunk a moat and set up their mangonels. The assault began on 29 January. On 4 February a breach in the Burj al-‘Ajami (“Persian Tower”), the great bastion to the south-east of the Halba Gate, gave the Mongols access to the fortifications. Swarming in through this gap they drove the defenders to right and left along the wall tops and by evening were in control of the whole of the battlements. The situation was now desperate, and the davât-dâr made a vain attempt to escape by boat down the Tigris, while the caliph initiated a series of parleys which led to nothing and were finally broken off by Hulegū in annoyance at the wounding of one of his officers. The caliph’s commander-in-chief, Sulaimān-Shāh, the Ive Türkmen, and the davât-dâr had been handed over to the Mongols during the parleying: they were now both of them executed. Left with no adviser except his unsympathetic and probably disloyal vizier Musta’sīm decided upon surrender. On 10 February he came out of the town accompanied by his three sons and presented himself before Hulegū. The Il-Khān addressed him with apparent kindness and affability and then asked him to order the inhabitants to lay down their arms and come out of the town. The caliph had a proclamation made to this effect, and the people poured through the gates only to be slaughtered as they issued into the open. Musta’sīm himself and his sons were lodged, in the custody of Mongol guards, at the Kalwādhā Gate, the present-day Southern Gate, near Ket-Buqa’s encampment.

The sack of Baghdad began on 13 February, and the killing, looting and burning continued for seven days, only the houses of Christians being spared. On the 15th Hulegū went on a tour of the caliph’s palace and caused the terrified Musta’sīm to disclose the whereabouts of his treasures. This is the occasion which gave rise to the story, familiar from the pages of Marco Polo and Sir John Mandeville, of the caliph’s being starved to death in a tower full of gold and silver. The nucleus of this story is the account of the interview between Hulegū and Musta’sīm as given by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, who may well have been actually present. The Il-Khān “set a golden tray before the Caliph and said: ‘Eat!’ ‘It is not edible,’ said the Caliph. ‘Then why didst thou keep it,’ asked

1 Boyle, “The Death of the Last ‘Abbāsid Caliph”, p. 159.
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the King, ‘and not give it to thy soldiers? And why didst thou not make these iron doors into arrow-heads and come to the bank of the river so that I might not have been able to cross it?’ ‘Such’, replied the Caliph, ‘was God’s will.’ ‘What will befall thee,’ said the King, ‘is also God’s will.’”

The caliph’s death was in fact imminent. On 20 February, having called an end to the pillage and slaughter, Hülegü left Baghdad for the village of Waqaf, which has not been identified but must have lain somewhere along the road to Khānaqīn. It was in this village on that same day that Musta’sim met his end. Both Naṣīr al-Dīn and Rashīd al-Dīn in his much fuller account are silent as to the manner of the caliph’s death, but the late Muslim authorities are almost certainly right in stating that he was rolled up in a carpet and trampled or kicked to death, to avoid the shedding of his blood, such being the Mongols’ method of executing their own princes.

The vizier and the šâhib-divān were both confirmed in their offices, a circumstance which throws some doubt on the latter’s loyalty also, and were ordered, in collaboration with other officials appointed by Hülegü, “to rebuild Baghdad, remove the slain and dead animals and reopen the bazaars”. And dispatching his cousin Buqa-Temūr to complete the conquest of southern ‘Irāq-i ‘Arab and Khūzistān the Īl-Khān withdrew northwards, first to his ordu near Hamadān, and then into Āzarbāijān, where he was to remain for over a year before embarking upon a third campaign, against the Aiyūbid states in Syria. He seems to have passed the earlier part of the summer in Marāgheh, which he was to make his capital city. It was here that Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī now began, under his patronage, to erect his famous observatory, and it was here, too, on 12 July 1258, that he received his vassal the nonagenarian Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’ of Mosul, to whom he owed the capture of Irbil, vainly besieged by the noyan Urqatu. He appears, however, soon to have moved on to Tabriz, the capital of his son Abaqa and the later Īl-Khāns; here he was visited by both of the sultans of Rūm and also by the Atabeg Abū Bakr of Fārs, who came to offer his congratulations on a victory on which his protégé the poet Sa’dī had composed a famous marthiya or qaṣīda of mourning. The spoils of this and Hülegū’s earlier victory over the Ismā’īlis had already been transported to Āzarbāijān, where they had been stored in a castle on the island of Shāhi in Lake Rezā’īyeh (Ūrmīyeh). From these treasures a selection had been made as

1 Boyle, op. cit. p. 160.
presents to the Great Khan to whom Hulegii had dispatched a report on his conquests in Persia and Iraq and on his contemplated campaign against Syria.

The motives underlying the invasion of Syria are somewhat obscure. The hostility between Hulegii and the Ayyūbid Naşir Yusuf, "personnage médiocre et sans courage", as Grousset calls him, is too insubstantial of itself to account for so vast an operation. Christian influences may well have been in play, and it is perhaps only a simplification of the actual circumstances when the Armenian Haithon represents his kinsman and namesake Het'um I of Little Armenia as holding counsel with Hulegii on the conquest of Palestine and as saying to the Il-Khân: "Sire, the Sultan of Aleppo holds the lordship of the kingdom of Syria; and since you wish to recover the Holy Land, it seems to me best that you first of all lay siege to the city of Aleppo. For if thou canst take that city the others will soon be occupied." Aleppo was certainly Hulegii's first and main objective. He set out from Azarbâijân on 12 September 1259, having sent on Ket-Buqa ahead with the advanced forces. As before, he commanded the centre in person, entrusting the right wing to Shiktür and Baiju and the left to Suquunchaq and his other commanders. The armies passed through the mountain pastures of Ala-Tağh to the east of Lake Vân: Hulegii was pleased with this region, afterwards a favourite summer resort of the Il-Khâns, and gave it a Mongol name. The route continued through Akhlât and the Hakkâri mountains, where there was great slaughter of the Kurdish inhabitants, into Diyârbakr. Here Hulegii set about the systematic subjugation of Upper Mesopotamia. Dispatching his son Yoşhmut to Mayyāfāriqīn, which surrendered only after a long and desperate siege, and Malik Şâlih, the son of Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu', to Āmid, he himself captured Edessa, Dunaisir, Nasibin and Harrān. Then crossing the Euphrates, the Mongols appeared suddenly and unexpectedly before Aleppo, where they were joined by allies unmentioned by the Muslim sources, King Het'um and his son-in-law, Bohemond VI of Antioch. The siege of the town lasted less than a week, from 18 to 24 January 1260; the citadel held out till 25 February. There was the usual methodical massacre lasting six full days; and King Het'um had the satisfaction of setting fire to the great mosque. The fate of Aleppo led to the bloodless surrender of Hamā; and when the news reached Damascus Naşir Yusuf fled towards Egypt while a deputation of

1 L'Empire des steppes, p. 434.
2 P. 302.
notables offered Hülegü the keys of the town. Ket-Buqa made a triumphal entry on 1 March accompanied by King Het‘um and Bohemond; and the administration of Damascus was entrusted to a Mongol shahna with three Persian deputies.

By the early summer of 1260 the Il-Khan’s troops had penetrated as far as Gaza, and it seemed that the conquest of Syria would be followed by the invasion of Egypt. It was at this juncture that Hülegü received the news of the Great Khan’s death (which had in fact occurred nearly a year ago, on 11 August 1259); and he at once returned to Persia, leaving Ket-Buqa in command of an army considerably reduced in numbers, only 20,000 men, according to Kirakos, 1 10,000, according to Haithon 2 and Barhebraeus. 3 The motive for Hülegü’s withdrawal can hardly have been, as Rashīd al-Dīn 4 implies, simply sorrow for the loss of his brother; he may have already felt some apprehension of a threat to his northern flank by Berke of the Golden Horde; but Haithon 5 is possibly right in suggesting that he saw himself as a candidate for the vacant throne. Rashīd al-Dīn 6 mentions only one point in his eastward journey: Akhlāt, which he reached on 7 June. According to Haithon, 7 he left his son Abaqa in command at Tabriz and continued for several days in an easterly direction. Then, receiving news of the election of Qubilai as Great Khan, he returned to Tabriz. It was probably here that he learnt, not, as stated by Haithon, 8 of encroachments by Berke in the Caucasus area, but of a disastrous defeat in Syria.

Before leaving Syria Hülegü had sent an embassy to Qutuz, the Mamlūk ruler of Egypt. His ambassadors, who offered the usual alternative of submission or war, had, on the advice of Baibars, Qutuz’s commander-in-chief and successor (1260–77), been summarily executed, and the Egyptians had invaded Syria to gain a decisive victory over the Mongols. Crushing the forward post at Gaza they were able, thanks to the benevolent neutrality of the Franks of Acre, who had fallen foul of Ket-Buqa, to push forward along the coastline still held by the Crusaders. At Acre, revictualled by these temporary allies, they turned eastwards through Galilee towards the Jordan. The armies collided on 3 September at ‘Ain Jalūt near Zarīn, and the Mongols were overwhelmed by the superior numbers of their opponents. The heroism of Ket-Buqa is described by Rashīd al-Dīn 9 in language reminiscent of the

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1 P. 388.  
2 P. 303.  
3 P. 303.  
4 Transl. Arends, p. 50.  
5 P. 304.  
6 Loc. cit.  
7 Transl. Arends, pp. 52–3.
native saga, the Secret History of the Mongols. The greater part of his forces turned in flight; he refused to follow their example. In a last message to his master he declares: “Let not the Khan be distressed with the loss of a single Mongol army. Let him imagine that during one year the wives of his soldiers did not conceive and the mares in their herds did not foal.” Deserted by his men he fights on until his horse stumbles and he is taken prisoner. The exchange of taunts with his captor is in true Homeric style; and in his last words, before his head is struck off, he contrasts his own faithful service of his khan with the Mamlük’s rise to power by treachery and regicide.

The news of Ket-Buqa’s defeat and death reached Hülegü in all probability at Tabriz; it must have been shortly followed by reports of the Mongols’ expulsion from the whole of Syria and their withdrawal across the Euphrates. It so happened that on the previous day Hülegü had received Nāṣir Yūsuf of Aleppo, on whom, in recognition of his renewed homage, he had conferred the governorship of Damascus. Doubts being now cast upon the Ayyūbid’s loyalty, a detachment of horsemen were dispatched to intercept him on the journey back to Syria: they overtook and massacred the whole of the party, only the astronomer Muhyī al-Dīn Maghrībī being spared because of his profession. The re-conquest of Syria was attempted by a large force commanded either by Ilge, the ancestor of the Jalayirids, or by Köke-Ilge of the Uriyangqat, a kinsman of the great Sübedei. The Mongols advanced as far as Himş, where, on 10 December, they were defeated in battle by the Egyptians and, for the second time, driven back across the Euphrates. So ended the first phase in the struggle between the Mongols and Mamlûks for the possession of Syria, a struggle in which the Il-Khâns enjoyed the support of Armenian Cilicia and sought in vain the co-operation of Christian Europe: Öljeitü, the great grandson of Hülegü and the penultimate ruler (1304-16) of the dynasty, still hoped for some such united action against the common foe.

Hülegü’s attention was now diverted to his northern frontier. The causes of the war with Berke, the ruler of the Golden Horde (1257-66), are variously given. Berke is represented by some authorities as the defender of Islam and as reproaching Hülegü for his devastation of so many Muslim countries and particularly for the execution of the caliph. It is more likely that the heirs of Jochi felt their rights endangered by the establishment of a Mongol kingdom in Persia. Arrân and Āzarbāijān, which had been incorporated in that kingdom, had already been
trodden by “the hoof of Tartar horse”\(^1\) in the reign of Chingiz-Khān and were therefore, according to the Conqueror’s directions, part of the jurt or appanage of Jochi. The *casus belli* seems to have been the death, in apparently suspicious circumstances, of the three Jochid princes, Balaghai, Tutar and Quli, who had accompanied Hulegū to Persia.

Balaghai, according to Rashid al-Din, in one place,\(^2\) Tutar in another,\(^3\) had been accused and convicted of sorcery, a capital offence with the Mongols, and had been sent to Berke as the head of his *ulus*. The latter, satisfied as to his guilt, had sent him back to Hulegū, who had carried out the sentence. The crime, as attributed to Balaghai, had taken place as early as 1256 or 1257, the execution (of Tutar) on 2 February 1260. The other two princes, Tutar (or Balaghai) and Quli, were alleged to have been poisoned. After the death of the princes their troops fled, some by way of Darband to the territory of the Golden Horde, others by way of Khurāsān to the Ghazna region, led by a general called Nigūdar (Nigüder), whence the name of Nigūdarīs by which they were afterwards to be known. The flight of these troops was apparently consequent upon a battle fought at some time in Shawwal 660/August-September 1262. It was at about the same time, on 2 Shawwal/20 August, that Hulegū set out from Ala-Tagh to meet Berke’s army, which, led by the famous general Noqai (a kinsman, as Rashid al-Din\(^4\) is careful to point out, of the dead Tutar), had advanced southwards through Darband and encamped in the region of Shīrvān to the south of the south-eastern spur of the Caucasian range. Hulegū’s advanced forces made contact with the army at Shamākhī in Dhu’l-Hijja/October-November and suffered some kind of defeat. Berke’s men must nevertheless have retreated, for on 29 Dhu’l-Hijja/14 November they were in contact once again with these forward troops near Shābarān in the region of the present-day Kuba, well to the north of the mountains. This time victory went to the Persian Mongols, and Noqai himself was put to flight. On 20 November Hulegū advanced from Shamākhī at the head of the main army; Darband was taken by storm on 8 December and Noqai’s forces routed for the second time on the 15th. Hulegū’s triumph was, however, short-lived. A force under the nominal command of Hulegū’s son and successor Abaqa was sent in pursuit of the fleeing army. Crossing the Terek they came upon their deserted but well-stocked encampment, where they feasted and caroused for three

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\(^{2}\) Transl. Verkhovsky, p. 81.

\(^{3}\) Transl. Arends, p. 54.

\(^{4}\) Ibid.
days before being attacked by Berke in person at the head of a great army. The battle raged all day (13 January 1263), and when the Persian Mongols, overwhelmed by their opponents' superior numbers, were withdrawing across the frozen Terek the ice gave way under their weight and many were drowned. Abaqa got back in safety to Şah-ba-rân, and the victorious Berke, after chasing his defeated enemies to the south of Darband, returned into his own territory, leaving Hûlegü to retire in comfiture to Tabrîz, where he arrived on 23 March. He began elaborate preparations for the renewal of the campaign against the Golden Horde, but in the event it was his son and successor Abaqa who liquidated the war with Berke.

Hûlegü had also in these last years of his reign to cope with rebellious vassals. The faithful Badr al-Dîn Lu'lu' of Mosul had died in 1261 at an age of 96 lunar years, and his son Şâlih had entered into relations with the Mamlûk ruler Baibars. The Îl-Khân was warned of these activities by Şâlih's own wife, a daughter of Sultan Jalâl al-Dîn brought up by the Mongols, and an army was dispatched against Mosul. During a siege which seems to have lasted a full year an attempt was made by Baibars to relieve the town with Syrian troops: it fell in July or August 1262, the inhabitants being massacred and Şâlih himself, at Hûlegü's express orders, subjected to a lingering death by a particularly loathsome form of torture. With the execution of Şâlih's infant son every memory of the dynasty founded in 1127 by 'Imâd al-Dîn Zangi, the great champion of Islam against the Crusaders, was finally extinguished. In Fârs, meanwhile, another old vassal, the Atabeg Abu Bakr (1226–60) had died, and the behaviour of his third successor, Saljuq-Shâh (1262–4), led to the intervention of a Mongol army. Saljuq-Shâh fled to Kâzarûn, where he was captured and killed, and Hûlegü bestowed the throne upon Princess Abish, a grand-daughter of Abu Bakr, whom he gave in marriage to his eleventh son, Mengü-Temûr (1256–82): she was the last of the Salghurids.

Hûlegü died on 8 February 1265 in his winter quarters on the Jaghatu (the present-day Zarineh Rûd), one of the four rivers which discharge into Lake Rezâ'iye from the south: he was in his 49th year. He was laid to rest in the castle on the island of Şâhî where his treasures were stored, his grave being the traditional Royal Tomb of the Northern peoples: this is the last occasion on which human victims are recorded as having been buried with a Chingizid prince. His death was shortly followed (17 June 1265) by that of his chief wife, Doquz
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Khatun, the niece of the Kereit ruler Ong-Khān, to whose influence is to be largely attributed his benevolent attitude towards the Christians.

The achievements of Hülegü as a conqueror and empire-builder have not perhaps been fully appreciated. In either capacity he will bear comparison with his cousin Batu or his brother Qubilai, the founders respectively of the Golden Horde and the Yüan dynasty. Having destroyed both the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate and its Ismā‘īlī opponents he extended the Mongol conquests to the shores of the Mediterranean and left to his successors dominion (subject, nominally, to the Great Khan) over a territory corresponding to the greater part of what we now call the Middle East. It is, however, not for nothing that we speak of the Īl-Khāns of Persia, just as to William Adam Hülegü was imperator Persidis.¹ The Mongol was, in fact, mutatis mutandis as much Emperor of Iran as the Norman William was King of England. He and his successors created at least the pre-conditions for a national state; Iran ceased to be a mere geographical expression, and its rulers, for the first time since late antiquity, entered into direct diplomatic relations with the West. The dynasty founded by Hülegü may be said to have paved the way, however unwittingly, for the centralizing and nationalistic policies of the Şafavids.

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Immediately upon Hülegü’s death the roads were closed, in accordance with the Mongol custom, and a ban laid on all movement from place to place. Summoned from his winter-quarters in Māzandarān Abaqa, the Īl-Khān’s eldest son and heir-apparent and the most obvious candidate for the throne, did not in fact present himself until 9 March. Another candidate, his younger brother Yoshmut, had arrived on the Jaghatu only a week after his father’s death but, realizing his lack of support, had returned almost at once to his post on the northern frontier at Darband. Abaqa, upon his arrival, was received with respect and deference and, the mourning ceremonies once completed, was, by the unanimous decision of the assembled princes and amirs, invited to ascend the throne. In accepting, after the conventional show of hesitance, he stipulated that his election should first have the sanction of the Great Khan. The ceremony of enthronement took place on 19 June, a date selected as auspicious by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, on the shores of the Chaghan Na’ur (“White Lake”), the modern Tualā, in the

¹ See Boyle “The Death of the Last ‘Abbāsid Caliph”, p. 149 n. 5.
Farāhān district to the north of Sulṭānābād (Arāk). Here the new Il-Khān proceeded to appoint his commanders and officials: Shams al-Dīn Juvainī, chosen as vizier by his father, was retained in that office, while his brother, the historian, whom Hūlegū had made governor of Baghdad, now became lieutenant to the noyan Suqunchaq, the viceroy of ‘Irāq-i ‘Arab and Fārs. For his capital Aḥaqa chose Tābrīz in preference to Marāḡeh favoured by his father; his summer residences he fixed at Ala-Tagh and Siyāh-Kūh (the range which forms the watershed between the Jaghatu and the Qizil Uzūn) and his winter residences in Baghdad, Arrān and the warm valley of the Jaghatu.

Hostilities with the Golden Horde were resumed at the very commencement of Aḥaqa’s reign. On 19 July 1265 Yoshmut advanced northwards against Nōqāi, who had invaded the Il-Khān’s territory at the head of a large army. In a fierce battle fought on the Aq-Su, a river descending into Shirvān from the southern slopes of the Caucasus, Nōqāi was wounded and put to flight. Aḥaqa now followed his brother over the Kur to collide with Bērke at the head of 300,000 horse; he recrossed the river and for a fortnight the two armies faced each other across the water, exchanging volleys of arrows. In search of a crossing Bērke proceeded upstream towards Tīfīs; he died en route, his body was carried back to Sarai for burial and his leaderless troops dispersed to their homes. As a kind of Hadrian’s Wall along his northern frontier Aḥaqa caused a great sibē or palisade to be erected along the left bank of the Kur, a day’s journey in length according to Hāithon,1 a deep moat being dug between the sibē and the river. Leaving his brother Mēngū-Temūr with a mixed force of Mongols and Muslims to defend these fortifications the Il-Khān set out for Khurāsān, passing the winter of 1266–7 in various encampments in Māzandarān and Gurgān.

It was during this winter, or perhaps a year or two later, that Aḥaqa was visited by Māsūd Bēg, the son of the celebrated Mūḥammad Yalavach and the governor of the whole agricultural zone of Central Asia from the Uighur country westwards. The object of this visit was ostensibly to collect revenues due to Bāraq, the ruler (1266–71) of the Chaghatai Khanate, and to his eastern neighbour Qaidu, of whom Bāraq was first a rival and then a satellite; but the real purpose of Māsūd Bēg’s journey was to spy out the land for Bāraq, who had been encouraged by Qaidu in his plans for invading the territories of Aḥaqa.

1 P 336. He takes Cyba (Ciba), i.e. sibē, to be the name of a place in the vicinity of the wall.
A day after Mas'ūd's departure the news was received of the appearance of a hostile army on the Oxus. The Il-Khan dispatched a party to apprehend him, but he eluded their pursuit and crossed the Oxus just as they reached the left bank. In the course of another embassy to Abaqa (apparently in the winter of 1267–8, when the Il-Khan was again in Māzandarān and Gurgān) the emissaries of Baraq presented Prince Tegüder, a grandson of Chaghatai who had led a contingent westward under Hülegū, with a special kind of arrow known as toghana, discreetly indicating that there was a message hidden inside it. In the message Baraq apprised his kinsman of his intention and appealed for his co-operation. Returning to his fief in Georgia Tegüder, after consulting with his amīrs, decided to make his way into Baraq's territory by way of Darband. The Il-Khan's suspicions had by now been aroused, and the noyan Shiremūn, the son of Chormaghun, was sent in his pursuit; finding the passage through Darband barred, he returned to Georgia, still pursued by Shiremūn, hid for a while in a great forest, was overtaken and defeated in battle and finally, in the autumn of 1269, surrendered to Abaqa. He was imprisoned for a year on an island in Lake Urmiyeh and then released after Baraq's defeat. Until his death, though not perhaps restored to favour, he enjoyed free access to the Il-Khan's court. The story of his revolt is told with many curious details in the Georgian Chronicle¹ and in the History of the Nation of the Archers of the Armenian Grigor.² Tegüder's name has often been misread as Nigüder (Nigūdar) and has in consequence been connected with the Nigūdaris, who, as we have seen, were in fact the troops of the Jochid princes Tutar and Quli.

Baraq's first hostile move was to demand that Tūbšin, Abaqa's younger brother and commander in Khurāsān and Māzandarān, should evacuate the meadowlands of Bādgīs, which he claimed, along with the territories stretching southwards to the Indus, to be the hereditary property of his own ulus. It was only after an exchange of angry messages with Tūbšin and Abaqa himself that he moved his forces towards the Oxus. Qaidu, to whom he had appealed for assistance, had sent, according to Vaṣṣāf, a whole host of princes to swell his army; but Rashid al-Dīn mentions only two, Qipchaq and Chabat, a grandson and great grandson respectively of the Great Khan Ögedei. The Chaghatai princes crossed the river in the spring of 1270 and advanced to Marū-

³ Transl. Hammer-Purgstall, p. 134.
chaq, where Tübshín was awaiting them. Qaidu, who saw himself in the role of tertius gaudens in this conflict, had instructed his two kinsmen, according to Rashíd al-Din,¹ to find some pretext for withdrawing their forces upon the first contact with Tübshín, and this they contrived to do, to Baraq’s no small embarrassment. Tübshín, who was accompanied by the veteran Arghun Aqa, seems nevertheless to have been unequal to opposing the invader and retired into Mázandarán to await the approach of his brother at the head of the main army.

Abaqa set out from Miâneh in Æzarbâjjan on 27 April 1270. The crops were beginning to come up and the Il-Khan, so Rashíd al-Din² tells us, “out of his perfect justice” forbade his troops to harm even a single ear. In the great plain between Abhar and Zanján, which the Mongols called Qongqur-Öleng (“Brown Meadow”) and where Öljëitü afterwards built his capital Sultânîyeh, he was met by an ambassador from the Great Khan, a man called Tekechük, who had been detained by Baraq, had managed to escape and was able to inform Abaqa of the conditions prevailing in the enemy’s camp. The Il-Khan accelerated his pace and, passing through Ray, was welcomed by Tübshín and Arghun Aqa in Qûmis. They proceeded together to the meadows of Râdkân, where Abaqa distributed largesse to the troops and presents to the amîrs, and from thence by way of Bâkharz into Bâdghîs. Abaqa, whose patrols had already made contact with Baraq’s forces, now sent an emissary to offer terms of peace. Baraq was in the Tâliqân area, which he had made his headquarters. Despite the defection of Qipchaq and Chabat he had succeeded in conquering the greater part of Khurasan. On 19 May 1270 his troops had attacked and pillaged the town of Nishâpûr, razed to the ground by their forebears nearly fifty years before, but had vacated it the next day. He had also meditated a similar attack on Herât but had been persuaded of the unwisdom of such an action and had sought instead to win over the allegiance of the ruler of Herât, the Malik Shams al-Din Kart. The latter was rescued from an embarrassing position by the news of the approach of Abaqa at the head of a great army; he withdrew into his castle to wait upon events.

The terms which Abaqa’s emissary transmitted to Baraq were generous enough. In return for the cessation of hostilities the Il-Khan offered to cede the territory stretching from Bâdghîs southwards to the Indus. One at least of Baraq’s amîrs was in favour of accepting these terms, but he was overruled by the bellicose majority and, despite the

¹ Transl. Arends, p. 74.
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warning of Baraq's astrologer, it was decided to launch an immediate attack. Doubt had been cast on the actual presence of Abaqa in Khurāsān, and it was suggested that this was a false report put about by Tūbshīn and Arghun Aqa for their own ends. Accordingly three scouts were sent on ahead to ascertain the facts. They were captured by Abaqa's men on the very spot that had been selected for the battlefield. This was a broad plain at the foot of the mountains with a river, which the Mongols called Qara Su, flowing in front of it. Brought before Abaqa the scouts were soon intimidated into declaring the nature of their mission; and the Īl-Khān conceived the idea of deceiving the enemy by means of their own spies. Leaving his tent for a moment he gave the necessary instructions to one of his men. He then returned to resume the drinking bout with his generals, the three scouts remaining, as heretofore, bound to the tent pole. An hour or two later the officer whom he had so instructed entered in the guise of a courier to declare, with simulated agitation, that Abaqa's territories had been invaded by a great army from the Golden Horde and that all was lost unless the Īl-Khān returned immediately. Affecting to believe this message Abaqa ordered his forces to abandon the camp and baggage and leave for Māzandarān that very night. At the moment of departure he detailed an officer to execute the three scouts but told him sotto voce to let one escape. As the army passed Herāt the governor was ordered to close the gates of the town to Baraq; they halted at the place chosen for the battlefield which Rashīd al-Dīn here calls Dasht-i Čchina, perhaps the Plain of the Wolf (Mongol čchina "wolf").

Meanwhile the sole surviving scout had made off post-haste to bear the imagined good tidings to Baraq. Elated with the news the Chaghātai army advanced westwards the next morning in pursuit, as they thought, of a fleeing army. The Herātīs had closed their gates as ordered but Baraq, though angered by their action, was in no mood to turn aside from the chase. Crossing the Hari Rūd the troops beheld the deserted encampment spread out before them and fell gleefully to pillaging it. Finally sated with plunder they halted to the south of Herāt and passed the remainder of the day in feasting and revelry. The next day they continued the advance westwards along the river and had ridden for about two hours when they suddenly emerged on to a broad plain covered from end to end with Abaqa's men. Baraq drew up his forces on the river bank, to meet, as best he could, the Īl-Khān's attack. Despite the advantage of surprise all did not at first go in Abaqa's
favour, and his left wing was driven back as far as Pūshang (on the site
of the modern Ghurian); but their pursuers were thrown into disarray,
and, with the third charge of Abaqa's army, the enemy broke before
them. Baraq's horse was killed beneath him and he escaped across the
Oxus on the mount of one of his guards; he was accompanied by only
5,000 of his men, whose losses would have been even greater but for
rear-guard action on the part of Jalayirtai, the same general who had
driven back Abaqa's left wing. The Battle of Herāt (as it may be called)
was fought on 22 July 1270: henceforth, apart from the incursions of
Esen-Buqa and Yasa’ur in the reign of Öljeytū, the eastern frontiers of
Iran were to remain comparatively inviolate until the rise of Timūr.

Leaving Tūbashin in command of Khurāsān and Māzandarān the
Il-Khān returned to Azarbāijān, reaching Marāgheh on 18 October and
the ordus of his wives in the Jaghatu valley on 6 November. Here he
received the ambassadors of the Great Khan, the bearers of a yarligh
conferring upon him the Khānate of Iran; and here, in accordance with
that yarligh, the ceremony of enthronement was performed for a second
time on 26 November. It is now that we hear for the last time of Naṣīr
al-Dīn Tūsī. During a hunting expedition in the Jaghatu valley the
Il-Khān had been gored by a bison (gāv-i kūbî). The primitive first aid
of an attendant had stopped the bleeding, but the wound suppurated
and an abscess was formed which none of Abaqa's physicians dared to
open. Naṣīr al-Dīn gave it as his opinion that the operation could be
performed without danger; and the lancing was successfully carried
out, under his supervision, by a Muslim surgeon. The great philo-
sopher died four years later in Baghdad and Rashīd al-Dīn¹ records some
curious details about the circumstances of his burial. His scientific work
has been dealt with elsewhere in this volume. A true disciple of Avi-
cenna, "he held fast"—in the words of Barhebraeus,² a Christian col-
laborator at Marāgheh—"to the opinions of the early philosophers, and
he combated vigorously in his writing those who contradicted them".

In the following decade the Il-Khān himself took little or no part in
military operations. In 1271 there was an echo from the past when the
Ismāʿīlī castle of Gīrd-Kūh finally surrendered. It had withstood a
continuous siege of eighteen years, having been first invested by Ket-
Buqa in May 1253. In Transoxiana, which remained without an effective
ruler from the death of Baraq (9 August 1270) till the accession of his
son Du’ā (1282), Abaqa was able to avenge himself for the invasion of

¹ Transl. Verkhovsky, p. 200. ² P. 452.
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Khurāsān. In the course of a campaign (1272–3) suggested and partially led by a renegade Chaghatai officer, Bukhārā was sacked and burnt and as a result of this and subsequent troubles remained depopulated for seven years. Only in Asia Minor was Abaqa called upon to intervene in person.

Of the two sultans of Rūm Kai-Kā’us II was now an exile in the Crimea and Qīlīch-Arslan IV had been put to death by his vizier Mu’in al-Dīn Sulaimān, better known as the Parvānā (Ṣāḥib Parvānā, “Keeper of the Seals”). Though Qīlīch-Arslan’s infant son was the titular ruler the administration of the country was and remained in the hands of the Parvānā. That he was in correspondence with the Mamlūks seems indisputable; whether he authorized the deputation of Rūmī notables (including, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, his own son) who in 1276 invited Baibars to attempt the conquest of Rūm is not so clear. The invitation was in any case accepted and, in the spring of 1277, the Mamlūk sultan invaded the territory of the Saljuqs, inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mongol army of occupation at Abulustān (the modern Albustan) on the Upper Jaihān (15 April), made a triumphal entry into Qaisariyya (Kayseri) a week later and then, with equal rapidity, withdrew into his own territory. News of this disaster was brought to Abaqa at Tabrīz, and he set out forthwith for Asia Minor. At Abulustān he inspected the battlefield, and shed tears over the piles of Mongol dead; then angered with the lukewarmness of his Saljuq allies, he gave orders for the devastation of an area stretching from Qaisariyya to Erzerum, calling a halt to the rapine and slaughter only upon the intercession of his vizier the ṣāḥib-divān Shams al-Dīn Juvainī. It was at first his intention to enter Syria in pursuit of Baibars but, convinced of the difficulties of military operation in the height of summer, he postponed till the following winter a campaign which in the event was not to be launched till the autumn of 1281. He spent the remainder of the summer in Ala-Tagh, whither the Parvānā, who had discreetly withdrawn to Tūqāt (Tokat) during the hostilities, was brought for trial. His guilt established, he was put to death on 2 August 1277. There is perhaps some truth in Haithon’s story that his body was cut up and eaten in some sort of cannibalistic ritual.

Some weeks after the execution of the Parvānā the ṣāḥib-divān was sent to restore peace and order in the Saljuq territories. This task completed we find him in the Darband area pacifying the mountain tribes of what
is now Daghestan, “peoples”, says Rashid al-Din,\(^1\) “that have never been subdued by anyone in any period”. It was at this time, about the year 1277, that the great minister was first exposed to the machinations of rivals seeking to encompass his downfall. Of these the most dangerous and persistent was a certain Majd al-Mulk, a former protégé of Shams al-Din. On the basis of some chance remarks by one Majd al-Din, a confidant of the šâhib-divân’s brother ‘Alâ’ al-Din, he accused both brothers of being in league with the Mamlûks. The accusation was made in a statement to Yesû-Buqa, a son-in-law of Hülegü, and in due course was brought to the notice of Abaqa, who ordered an inquiry. The unfortunate Majd al-Din was put to the question but refused to make any admission of guilt, so that Majd al-Mulk was not able to press the charge. However, three years later in the spring of 1279, he succeeded in gaining access to Prince Arghun, Abaqa’s elder son and second successor (1284-91), and convincing him not only that the šâhib-divân was in treasonable correspondence with the Egyptians but also that he had embezzled huge sums from the Treasury. Arghun repeated these accusations to his father, who did not, however, take any action until he had himself been approached by Majd al-Mulk in the spring of the following year. It was only through the intercession of one of the royal ladies that Shams al-Din was saved from the Il-Khân’s wrath, though Abaqa’s suspicions do not seem to have been entirely allayed and the šâhib-divân was not fully restored to favour. Against Shams al-Din’s brother ‘Alâ’ al-Din, the historian and governor of Baghdad, the intrigues of Majd al-Mulk were more successful: he was twice arrested and was actually being taken to Hamadân for trial at the time of Abaqa’s death.

The Il-Khân’s plans for an attack on Syria, for which, as we shall see, he had long been seeking an alliance with the powers of the Christian West, were interrupted by a threat from an unexpected quarter. In the winter of 1278-9 a force of Nigûdaris or Qaraunas (as they called themselves and are called by Marco Polo) invaded Kirmân and Fârs from their base in southern Afghanistan. Rashid al-Din’s\(^2\) and Vaşşâf’s\(^3\) accounts of these operations are difficult to reconcile; the latter authority writes in much greater detail and speaks of a second campaign three years later in which the invaders penetrated to the shores of the Persian Gulf. The present incursion seems to have little more than a large-scale

\(^1\) Transl. Arends, p. 92.  
\(^2\) Ibid. p. 94.  
ABAQÁ

raid, from which they returned, with their prisoners and booty, to the region of Sistân. Here in the town of the same name (the earlier Zarang) they were besieged by Prince Arghun in the summer (July–August) of 1279; they offered but slight resistance and, upon the surrender of the town, their leaders, including a grandson of the Chaghatai khan Mubārak-Shāh (1266) were taken to Herāt, where they paid homage to Abaqa (12 August 1279). The ruler or commander of these freebooters was until 698/1298–9 a great-grandson of Chaghatai called ‘Abdallāh, a convert (as his name indicates) to Islam. He was then recalled by the Chaghatai khan Du’ā (1282–1306) and replaced by the latter’s son, Qutlugh-Khwāja, under whom in 1300 the Nigūdarīs launched yet another attack upon Fārs, an action, says Rashīd al-Din,1 on which they would not have ventured but for the preoccupation of Ghazan’s forces in Syria.

To Syria ABAQA was now at last able to give his full attention. He had been in correspondence with the pope since 1267 (and apparently earlier); in 1273 he had written both to the pope and to Edward I of England. In the following year his envoys had repeated the message at the Council of Lyons; in 1276 they were in Italy and in 1277 in England. To these appeals for an alliance against a common enemy ABAQA had received no positive reply, and he decided to act alone. In September 1281 an army of some 40,000 men under the command of the Il-Khān’s brother Mengū-Temūr entered Syria by way of ‘Ain Tab. As in Hülegū’s invasion twenty years earlier, the King of Little Armenia, now Het’um’s son Leon III, had contributed his contingent of troops. The clash with the Egyptians occurred near Himṣ on 30 October. The battle is described in the greatest detail by the Egyptian historians; Rashīd al-Dīn, writing for Ghazan and Oljeitū, is naturally disinclined to dwell upon a humiliating defeat of their grandfather’s forces. The Mongol right wing, composed of Oirats, Armenians and Georgians, drove back their opponents to the gates of Himṣ, but in the centre, Mengū-Temūr, a young and inexperienced commander, was wounded by an Egyptian officer and turning in flight was followed by the greater part of his army. He recrossed the Euphrates with such of his forces as had not drowned in the river or died of thirst in the desert and made for his mother’s apanage in Upper Mesopotamia.

News of this débâcle was brought to ABAQA in the Mosul area. For some unaccountable reason, instead of taking personal charge of the

1 Loc. cit.
campaign, he had chosen to remain to the east of the Euphrates, engaged apparently on a large-scale hunting expedition, first on the Khabūr and then on the Euphrates opposite Raḥbat al-Shām: fighting broke out with the inhabitants, though Rašīd al-Dīn¹ specifically mentions that the Il-Khān did not cross the river. On 15 October he turned back towards Sinjār and on the 30th rejoined his ordus in the vicinity of Mosul. He was extremely angry with the news, declaring that those responsible would be called to account in a quriltāi to be held the next summer and that he would then take the field in person to avenge his brother’s defeat. He was to be denied this satisfaction. After passing the greater part of the winter in Baghdad (it was during this period that ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Juvainī was arrested, released and re-arrested) he set out for Hamadān, where he arrived on 18 March 1282 and where, after a bout of heavy drinking, he died in a state of delirium tremens on 1 April. He was laid to rest alongside his father on the island of Shāhī.

“Khulagu and Abaka”, says Howorth,² “were two important figures in Asiatic history. They conquered and controlled a vast empire with vigour and prudence. Their successors, until we reach the reign of Ghazan, were for the most part weak and decrepit rulers, whose authority was gradually disintegrating. Had it not, in fact, been for the utter desolation and prostration caused by the campaigns of Jīngis and Khulagu in Persia, they would undoubtedly have been driven out and displaced; and, as it was, a very little more aggressive vigour on the part of the Egyptian rulers who controlled the various forces of Islam would no doubt have led to the collapse of the empire of the Ilkhans.” It is certainly true that not until the accession of Ghazan was the Il-Khānid state ruled by a prince capable of reviving and continuing the policies of Hūlegū and Abaqa.

**TEGÜDER (AHMAD)**

After Abaqa’s death the royal ladies, the princes of the blood and the great amirs gathered together in Marāqheh to observe the usual ceremonies of mourning; they then proceeded to the Jaghatu valley to elect his successor. Of the two candidates for the throne Tegüder, Hūlegū’s seventh and eldest surviving son, was the more strongly supported, and the other candidate, Abaqa’s eldest son Arghun, was persuaded to stand down in his favour. He was proclaimed on 6 May

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¹ Transl. Arends, p. 98.
² Vol. iii, p. 393.
TEGÜDER (AHMAD)

1282, apparently still in the winter residence on the Jaghatu; but the actual enthronement took place in Ala-Tagh more than a month later, on 21 June. As a convert to Islam (it is not known of how long standing) he assumed the name of Ahmad and the title of sultan.

It was at Ala-Tagh that ‘Alâ’ al-Dîn Juvainî was cleared of Majd al-Mulk’s charges and reinstated in the governorship of Baghdad, whilst his accuser, condemned in turn, was lynched by the mob before the death sentence could be carried out. His brother, the şâhîb-divân, was likewise fully restored to favour, and it was at his advice that Tegûder now sought to establish friendly relations with the sultan of Egypt, a step diametrically opposed, as he admits himself in his letter to Qïla’un, to the wishes of his fellow princes, who at the quriltai just concluded had unanimously resolved upon the resumption of hostilities with the Mamlûks. The embassy which set out from Ala-Tagh on 25 August was coolly received. A mission in the following year fared even worse. The ambassador and his staff were cast into prison, where the former actually died. He could in any case have accomplished nothing for the delivery of his message had been anticipated by the news of Tegûder’s dethronement and death.

Relations between the khan and his disappointed rival had rapidly deteriorated. Much of the latter’s animus was directed against Tegûder’s protégés, the Juvainî brothers, particularly Shams al-Dîn, whom he accused—and the charge seems to have been widely believed—of having poisoned his father. The winter of 1282–3 he spent in Baghdad, where he revived the old charge of embezzlement against ‘Alâ’ al-Dîn, whose agents he arrested and put to the torture: he caused the body of one man, who had recently died, to be exhumed and flung upon the highway. News of these activities reached ‘Alâ’ al-Dîn in Arrân and brought on a stroke: he died on 5 March 1283. In the spring Arghun returned from Baghdad to Khurâsân, of which his father had made him viceroy and where he now began to prepare for open rebellion against Tegûder. He had an ally and perhaps a rival in his uncle Prince Qongqurtai, the ninth son of Hulegu and viceroy of Rûm. In Arrân, where he was in attendance on Tegûder, Qongqurtai formed, or was said to have formed, a conspiracy to seize the khan’s person during the celebration of the Mongol New Year falling in January 1284. He was arrested by Tegûder’s son-in-law, the Georgian general Alinaq, on 17 January and executed on the following day; and with Qongqurtai out of the way the khan at once moved against his fellow conspirator Arghun. From
an army of 100,000 men now at his disposal he dispatched, on 29 January, an advanced force of 15,000 horse under the command of Alinaq; he himself, at the head of the main army, set out from Pil-Suvár in Mughān on 26 April. On the 31st he received news of the approach of Arghun’s army and instructed Alinaq to offer battle if his forces were superior in number but otherwise to await his own arrival. There was a clash between the advance parties of either army at Khal-i Buzurg between Qazvin and Ray, and a pitched battle was fought at Aq-Khwāja (Sumghān) to the south of Qazvin on 4 May. Though the result seems on the whole to have been a victory for Arghun, he saw fit to withdraw eastwards, and the khan’s forces continued to advance. At Aq-Khwāja Tegüder received a deputation bearing a conciliatory message from Arghun. Against the advice of his generals he rejected these overtures and pressed onwards. A second deputation headed by Prince Ghazan, the future Il-Khān, reached him in the Simnān area on 31 May. His reply was that Arghun should demonstrate his sincerity either by presenting himself in person or by sending his brother Geikhatu. This message he caused to be delivered by a deputation of princes and amirs, one of whom, Buqa, was secretly in sympathy with Arghun. Despite an undertaking made to Buqa that, as a conciliatory gesture, he would halt at Khurqān, Tegüder advanced to a place called Kālpūsh to the north of Jājarm, where it had been Arghun’s intention to make a stand. At Kālpūsh, on 28 June, he was rejoined by his ambassadors bringing with them Prince Geikhatu and two of Arghun’s amirs, one of them the famous Nauruz. Buqa was annoyed to find that Tegüder had not kept his word; he ventured to argue with the khan, who expressed his displeasure by the use of threatening language and by deposing him from his office. As the result of this treatment Buqa became, in Rashid al-Dīn’s1 words, “still more ardent a partisan of Arghun” with the direst consequences to Tegüder. Meanwhile, at Qūchān, which he reached on 7 July, the Il-Khān learnt that Arghun, with only a small following, had taken refuge in the famous mountain stronghold of Kalāt (the later Kalāt-i Nādīrī). Approached by Alinaq at the head of Tegüder’s advanced forces he was persuaded to come down from the castle and surrender to his uncle (11 July 1284). Tegüder, after receiving him with apparent kindness, handed him over to Alinaq to be kept under guard until such time as he could be tried in the presence of the khan’s mother, Princess Qutui. Then, conceiving a

1 Transl. Arends, p. 109.
desire for the company of his most recently married wife, he set out for his ogbruq or base camp at Kâlpüşh, leaving Alinaq in charge of the prisoner and the princes in command of the army. Buqa availed himself of his opportunity. Arghun was released, and Alinaq killed; and, with the co-operation of the princes and commanders favourable to Arghun, all supporters of Tegüder had soon been eliminated. "At night," says Rashid al-Din,¹ "Arghun was a prisoner, and in the morning he was monarch of the face of the earth."

News of this reversal of his fortunes reached Tegüder while still en route to Kâlpüşh. He halted for a brief space and then, on 10 July, fled westwards along the great Khurâsân road. Within three days he was in Qongqur-Öleng, where he looted Buqa’s ordu and was only restrained by the Amir Suqunchaq from harming his wife and family. On 17 July he reached his own ordu, probably in Soghurluq (in Turkish “the place abounding in marmots”), the Mongols’ summer residence at Shîz (Tâkh-i-Sulaimân), the site of the famous fire-temple.² It was his intention to make for Darband and escape into the territory of the Golden Horde; but messengers arriving from Arghun with news of his changed circumstances, he was placed under close arrest by the officers in charge of the ordu. It was at this juncture that a band of Qaraunas, whom Buqa had caused to be dispatched in his pursuit, burst into the camp, which they pillaged with an indiscriminate savagery graphically described by Vaşşâf:³ “nothing was left”, says Rashid al-Din,⁴ “save the ashes in the fire-places.” They took Tegüder into their own custody handing him over to Arghun when, on 26 July, he arrived in the ordu. At a place called Âb-i-Şhûr (“Salt Water”) near Yüz Aghach (in Turkish “Hundred Trees”), an unidentified summer residence somewhere in the Üjân region, Tegüder was brought to trial, the main charge being the execution of Qongqurtai. He expressed contrition for his past actions, and Arghun himself was in favour of clemency, but the protests of Qongqurtai’s family and the possibility of a rising in Hamadân prevailed upon him to pass the death sentence. It was carried out on 10 August 1284: as in the case of his victim Qongqurtai his back was broken, a form of execution designed, like the use of the bowstring, to avoid the shedding of royal blood.

There is little or no evidence to support Howorth’s⁵ contention that

⁴ Transl. Arends, p. 113.
⁵ Vol. iii, p. 308.
his death "was mainly due to his patronage of Muhammedanism, which set against him the conservative feeling, both political and religious, of the Mongol chieftains". His overtures to the Mamluks might well have offended national susceptibilities but can hardly have been widely known of during his lifetime. In patronizing the Juvainis he merely followed the example of his shamanist or Buddhist father and brother. Like them he was, according to Barhebraeus, favourably disposed towards the Christian sects; and Rashid al-Din specifically mentions his employment of Georgian and Armenian troops in his campaign against Arghun. He does not, in short, despite the contrary testimony of Haithon, give the impression of a bigoted convert to Islam; and his downfall was probably due, not to an active or passive religious policy, but simply, as afterwards in the cases of his nephews Geikhatu and Baidu, to his ineffectiveness as a ruler.

ARGHUN

The enthronement of Arghun followed closely upon the execution of his uncle; it took place, according to Rashid al-Din, on the next day, i.e. 11 August 1284. Only the royal ladies and the amirs were present, the princes, Arghun's brothers, cousins and uncles, having not yet arrived. Rashid al-Din, it is true, speaks of his uncle Hulachu as playing a leading part in the ceremony; but this is probably an anachronistic reference to the second ceremony, held on 7 April 1286, after Arghun's accession had been officially sanctioned by the Great Khan. At the time of the first ceremony Hulachu still saw himself as a rival candidate for the throne; it was only at the quriltai held in the spring or summer of 1285 that he was reconciled with his nephew and accepted, jointly with Arghun's brother Geikhatu, the viceroyalty of Rûm. At the same quriltai Arghun's son Ghazan received the provinces of Khurâsân, Mâzandarân, Qûmis and Ray. Buqa's services had been recognized much earlier. Already in the autumn of 1284 Arghun had appointed him his vizier and, as a more spectacular demonstration of his gratitude, had caused gold to be poured over him until he was all but buried in the pile. Buqa's predecessor, Shams al-Din Juvaini, fared very differently. After his master's downfall he had made his way first to Isfâhân and then to Qum, from whence he had been urged to escape to

1 P. 467.
2 Transl. Arends, p. 106.
3 P. 312.
4 Transl. Arends, p. 115.
5 Loc. cit.
India by way of Hurmuz. However, reassured by the proclamation of a general amnesty, he decided to throw himself on the mercy of the new khan. Arghun was then at Qurban Shire (in Mongol “Three Thrones”), somewhere in the vicinity of Soghurluq. Here Shams al-Din arrived on 23 September 1284, and through the good offices of Buqa, with whom he had previously been on friendly terms, he was appointed the latter’s deputy. This improvement in his fortunes was of very brief duration; the victim of intriguers, who had once been his protégés, he was put to death at the gates of Ahar on 16 October 1284.

Such was the end of the great minister, whose role under the Īl-Khāns may be compared, not unaptly, with that of Nizām al-Mulk under the Saljuqs. Barhebræus, an observer certainly not prejudiced in his favour, bears witness that “the whole kingdom of the House of Māghōgh [i.e. Magog, the Mongols] hung on his finger, for he was very sagacious with an understanding nature; and he was well instructed in the greater number of the sciences and the various kinds of learning”. His successor’s term of office lasted little more than four years. His arrogance soon raised him enemies; their numbers increased as the result of his activities in Fārs (still nominally ruled by Princess Abish), where he had been sent to restore order after a popular rising against the Mongols; and perceiving that he had lost the khan’s favour he became involved in a conspiracy in which several of the princes seem to have been implicated. Betrayed by Arghun’s cousin Jūshkeb, who had affected an interest in the plot in order to obtain the names of the conspirators, Buqa was put to death on 16 January 1289. He was succeeded as vizier by a Jewish physician, Sa’d al-Daula of Abhar, “the most influential Jew not only of Azerbaijan but of Persia as a whole, after Mordecai and Esther, and after Ezra and Nehemiah, ever to play a role in the political arena of Persia”. Sa’d al-Daula had first won the Īl-Khān’s confidence as a financial administrator, when sent to Baghdad to restore the economy after the large-scale peculations of Buqa and his brother Aruq. A man of pleasing address conversant with both the Turkish and the Mongol languages, he so ingratiated himself with Arghun that the latter, in June 1289, bestowed upon him the vizierate of his Empire. The rule of a Jew over a predominantly Muslim community must of itself have caused widespread resentment, and such resentment was naturally aggravated by his practising the usual nepotism of his age and time and distributing the key posts in the

1 P. 473.

2 Fischel, “Azerbaijan in Jewish History”, p. 8 n. 19
administration amongst his relations and co-religionists. Nevertheless even a hostile witness such as Vaṣṣāf is constrained to admit that Sa'd al-Daula "established the administration on the basis of law and justice; that his reforms led to the disappearance of oppression, robbery and thieving, to security and facilitation of the pilgrimage to Mecca; that the finances of the state were consolidated and that all the inhabitants benefited from his successful efforts". The story, recounted by Vaṣṣāf, that he contemplated founding a new religion with the khan as its prophet is probably pure invention. Despite his unpopularity he retained Arghun's favour to the very end, his adversaries venturing to attack him only when the Il-Khan was on his death-bed.

Though he had won his throne by the sword Arghun appears only twice to have taken the field during the course of his reign: in the spring of 1288 and again in the spring of 1290, the forces under his command repelled an invasion launched by the ruler of the Golden Horde, Tole-Buqa (1287–91) and led by his successor Toqta (1291–1312). These seem however to have been little more than large-scale raids. Of far greater potential danger to the Il-Khanid state was the insurrection of Nauruz, the son of Arghun Aqa, who, as military governor of Khurasan, was the second-in-command to Prince Ghazan. The rebellion lasted for five years (1289–94), continuing into the reign of Geikhatu: at the time of Arghun's death Ghazan was in full retreat before his former lieutenant, who proceeded to rapine and slaughter upon such a scale as Rashid al-Din terms "beyond description". The terror which Nauruz had inspired became proverbial, and the natives of Khurasan, when their cattle refused to drink, would say it was because they had seen his reflection in the water. Such was the instrument whereby the Il-Khāns were to be brought into the fold of Islam.

Like his father Arghun wished to resume the war against the Mamluks, and he too sought a military alliance with the Christian West. Already in 1285 he had sent a letter to Pope Honorius IV, of which the Latin translation has been preserved in the Vatican archives. The correspondence seems to have had the sanction of the Great Khan himself, one of whose officials, a Nestorian Christian called ‘Īsā Kelemeči, took part in the embassy.

And now let it be [says the Il-Khan], because the land of the Saracens is not ours, between us, good father, us who are on this side and you who are on

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1 Fischel, op. cit. p. 8.  
2 See below, p. 541.  
3 Transl. Arends, p. 152.
ARGHUN

your side; the land of Scami [Shām, i.e. Syria] to wit the land of Egypt between us and you we will crush. We send you the said messengers and [ask] you to send an expedition and army to the land of Egypt, and it shall be now that we from this side and you from your side shall crush it between us with good men; and that you send us by a good man where you wish the aforesaid done. The Saracens from the midst of us we shall lift and the lord Pope and the Cam [i.e. the Great Khan Qubilai] will be lords.¹

In 1287 a second embassy, led by a Nestorian prelate from China called Rabban Sauma, set out for Europe, returning in the following year with letters from Pope Nicholas IV, Edward I of England and Philippe le Bel of France. The last-named at least seems to have given a favourable reply, for in a letter written in the summer of 1289 Arghun refers to his promise to send troops to his aid in a forthcoming campaign against the Mamlūks. He himself, he continues, would set out at the beginning of January 1291, so as to reach Damascus on 15 February. And he adds: “Now if, fulfilling thy sincere word, thou sendest thy troops at the time agreed upon, and if, blessed with good fortune by Heaven, we conquer these people, we shall give you Jerusalem.”²

Arghun must soon have abandoned the idea of such an expedition, for we find him in September 1289 at Marāğheh en route for Arrān, where he passed the winter of 1289-90 and where, in the following spring, he became involved, as has already been mentioned, in a brief collision with the forces of the Golden Horde. He took a great interest in the sciences, true and false, and Rashid al-Din³ records an interview with the famous scientist Qutb al-Din al-Shirāzī in the Van area, during the late summer of 1290, in which the latter showed him a map of the Mediterranean coast of what is now Turkey and answered the Il-Khān’s questions about it. Arghun had on a former occasion exchanged views with Qutb al-Din on the alchemist’s art, upon which and its practitioners he had lavished large sums of money; and at Marāğheh in the previous autumn he had been offered by an Indian yogi the elixir of life, in the form of an electuary compounded mainly of sulphur and mercury.⁴ This medicament he continued to take over a period of nearly eight months, at the end of which, having now returned to Tabriz, he retired into the castle to hold a forty-day fast in the company of Buddhist priests, apart from whom only Sa’d al-Daula and two other

¹ Moule, Christians in China, p. 106.
² Mostaert and Cleaves, Les Lettres de 1289 et 1305 des ilkhan Arghun et Oljeitü à Philippe le Bel, p. 18.
³ Transl. Arends, p 128.
⁴ See also Yule, The Book of Ser Marco Polo, vol. ii, pp. 365 and 369 n. 5.
favourites were admitted to his presence. In Arrān, where he passed the winter of 1290–1, he was taken dangerously ill, but in response to treatment by a Muslim or Jewish physician was showing some signs of recovery, when a Buddhist priest or doctor appeared at his bedside and gave him some kind of potion which had the effect of bringing on a relapse. His illness, which now became chronic, was put down by some to the evil eye, for the aversion of which they recommended the giving of alms; the qams or shamans, on the other hand, diagnosed witchcraft; and one of his ladies, who confessed under torture to having administered a love-philtre, was thrown into the river (presumably the Kur) along with a number of other women. The khan’s life was now despaired of and on 16 February 1291 a group of amirs hostile to Sa’d al-Daula and Arghun’s other favourites formed a conspiracy to overthrow them. They were all of them seized and put to death, Sa’d al-Daula himself being formally tried and executed on 5 March. His death, as was to be expected, became the signal for savage pogroms in Tabriz and Baghdad. He was survived by his master for less than a week. Arghun died on 10 March 1291 in Baghcha, one of his residences in Arrān; he was in his early thirties, having been born c. 1258. It is a curious thought that but for the measures he took to ensure longevity he might have lived to match the achievements of his father, Abaqa, and his son, Ghazan.

He was the last of the Il-Khāns to be accorded the traditional secret burial, being laid to rest on a mountain side near Sujās. The place was concealed and the whole area made a qorugh or sanctuary, to which entry was prohibited, but the ban was lifted in after years when his daughter Oljei founded a khānqāh or convent for dervishes at the site of his tomb.

**Geikhatu and Baidu**

A week after Arghun’s death messengers were sent to summon the three candidates for the throne: his son Ghazan in Khurāsān, his brother Geikhatu in Rūm and his cousin Baidu at Baghdad. Ghazan, retreating before the rebel Nauruz, received the news, which was at first kept from him, at Simnān; it was followed by reports of the manoeuvres by the partisans of the other candidates and then of Geikhatu’s election as Il-Khān; and he halted where he was, in the Simnān–Firūzkūh area, to resume, in due course, the struggle against Nauruz and his Transoxianan allies. Certain of the amirs, and particularly
those involved in the death of Sa'd al-Daula, had favoured Baidu, in whom they saw a more lenient and easy-going ruler; but the supporters of Geikhatu, amongst whom we now hear for the first time of the Amir Choban, had won the day, and he was proclaimed khan at a quriltai held near Akhlät on 23 July 1291, though the actual enthronement ceremony did not take place until a year later.

Immediately after the celebrations an inquiry, over which the Il-Khän presided in person, was held into the execution of Sa'd al-Daula's Mongol colleagues. On this, as on later occasions, Geikhatu showed remarkable clemency. One alone of the conspirators was put to death, the remainder receiving only light punishment when they were not pardoned outright. The new khan's unwillingness to spill blood was apparently due to the advice of the qams, who attributed the shortness of his predecessor's reign to the quantity of blood he had shed. He was soon to demonstrate this same leniency towards offenders against his own interests. After the trial was concluded he returned to Rūm to put down a rising and, availing themselves of his absence the Amir Taghachar, the ringleader of the conspirators so recently pardoned, and Šadr al-Din Zanjānī, a former associate of Juvaini's enemy Majd al-Mulk, plotted together to set up one of his uncles in his stead. Their plot uncovered, Taghachar was sent under escort to the quriltai held at Ala-Tagh in the summer of 1292, at which the ceremony of enthronement was to take place, and Šadr al-Din was cast into prison at Tabriz. Not only was their act of treason forgiven them, but we find Šadr al-Din invested, before the year was out, with the combined office of vizier and sähib-divān, a post for which he had had the effrontery to canvass when just released from prison, while Taghachar was actually chosen as one of the commanders dispatched from Ala-Tagh to the relief of Qa'lat al-Rūm.

This fortress, on the right bank of the Euphrates, had been invested by the Mamlūk Sulṭān Ashraf Śalāḥ al-Dīn Khalīl (1290–3), fresh from his victories over the Franks of Acre and Tyre. In June 1292 a force of which Taghachar was apparently second-in-command, was sent to raise the siege, and reinforcements followed a week or so later; but the fortress had fallen to the Egyptians already before the first troops arrived. Ashraf did not follow up this success, contenting himself, in an exchange of letters with Geikhatu, with a threat to invade the latter's territory and re-establish Baghdad as the metropolis of Islam. Meanwhile there was a détente in relations with the Golden Horde. Toqta
HISTORY OF THE ÍL-KHÁNS

(1291–1312), who before his accession had led two campaigns across the Caucasus, dispatched, in the spring of 1294, a peace mission which was honourably received by Geikhátu at Dalan Na’ur (in Mongol “Seventy Lakes”), a settlement at the western end of the Great Wall along the Kur. The period of peace thus inaugurated was to last, more or less uninterruptedly, until the reign of Abú Sa’íd.

On the profligacy of Geikhátu’s morals the authorities are with one exception unanimous. He was concerned, says the continuator of Barhebraeus,\(^1\)

with nothing except riotous living, and amusement and debauchery. He had no thought for anything except the things that were necessary for Kings, and which they were bound to have, and how he could get possession of the sons and daughters of the nobles, and have carnal intercourse with them... And very many chaste women among the wives of the nobles fled from him, and others removed their sons and daughters and sent them away to remote districts. But they were unable to save themselves from his hands, or to escape from the shameful acts which he committed with them.

Raşhid al-Din’s total silence on this subject is due no doubt to a desire not to embarrass his patrons, the nephews of Geikhátu; but even he is constrained to refer to the Íl-Khán’s wild extravagance, one of the reasons given for the curious experiment for which his reign is chiefly remembered, the attempt to substitute for metallic currency the paper money of China known as ch’ao.

In describing the situation which led up to this experiment Vaşşāf\(^2\) alludes not only to the depletion of the treasury by the gross prodigality of the khan and his vizier Şadr al-Din Zanjānī but also to a disease called by the Turkish name of jut which had caused great havoc in the Mongols’ herds in the days following on the death of Arghun. This was not in fact an epidemic but simply the consequences of a cold spell following abruptly upon a period of mild weather.\(^3\) It was probably this natural disaster rather than the exhaustion of the exchequer which led to the situation in which, according to the continuator of Barhebraeus,\(^4\) not a single sheep could be killed for the Íl-Khán’s food. The possibilities of ch’ao as a means of overcoming their difficulties had

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1 P. 494.
2 Bombay ed. p. 271.
3 The Kazakh ḏḥut’juṭ). Cf. Wheeler, The Modern History of Central Asia, p. 34: “The whole of Kazakh life was regulated by the search for summer grazing grounds with adequate water, and winter pastures sheltered from the wind and cold and particularly from the dreaded ḏḥut—the freezing over of previously thawed snow which made it impossible for cattle to reach fodder.”
4 P. 496.
been discussed by Şadr al-Din and his colleagues on several occasions. At Pil-Suvâr in the spring of 1294, they broached the subject to Geikhatu, who turned to Bolad Ching-Sang, the representative of the Great Khan at his court, for further information on the nature and working of this type of currency. It was decided, despite some opposition, to proceed with the experiment, which seems to have been put fully into practice only in Tabriz. Here on 13 August a proclamation was issued imposing the death penalty on all who refused to accept the new currency. Considerable quantities of ch’ao were then prepared and, on 12 September, put into circulation. For a week after their first issue these notes were taken from motives of fear, but soon all trade had come to a standstill and the bazaars were completely deserted. In face of public uproar Şadr al-Din was forced first to allow the use of gold for the purchase of food and then to suppress the paper currency altogether. The experiment lasted little more than two months and is perhaps most noteworthy as being the first recorded instance of block printing outside of China. It is remarkable that Marco Polo, who with his father and uncle had spent nine months in Tabriz at about this time, should make no mention of this episode, the more so as he describes at length the use of paper currency in China. One can only assume that the Polos left on their homeward journey before the scheme had been set in motion.

Unbridled licentiousness and reckless extravagance would no doubt of themselves have brought about the Il-Khan’s downfall, which was, however, precipitated by his ill-considered behaviour towards Baidu. Rashid al-Din¹, as one would expect, is extremely reticent about this incident, which took place in Ala-Tagh in the summer of 1294. He says simply that Baidu joined Geikhatu in his summer residence on 12 June, that the latter rebuked him for some unspecified reason and that he was allowed to leave on 11 July having apparently been under some kind of detention. The continuator of Barhebraeus,² on the other hand, gives a detailed account of the episode, with which Vaşşâf’s³ briefer version is in basic agreement. Insulted by Baidu during a drinking bout Geikhatu caused his cousin to be beaten up by his attendants and then, repenting of his action, sought to make amends. Concealing his resentment Baidu returned to his residence at Daquqā, where, in the winter of 1294–5, he rose in rebellion. From Tabriz Geikhatu dispatched the perfidious Taghachar against his advancing enemy; Taghachar deserted to Baidu,

¹ Transl. Arends, p. 136.  
² Pp. 494-5.  
³ Bombay ed. p. 275.
and Geikhatu fled, first to Ahar and then to Pil-Suvăr. Here he was overtaken by pursuers whom he thought to be in prison in Tabriz. These were the amirs who, under the leadership of Taghachar, had been responsible for the deaths of Sa'd al-Daula and his Mongol colleagues. Warned of their complicity in Baidu's rebellion Geikhatu had been persuaded by Taghachar to imprison rather than to execute them; and they had then, on Taghachar's orders, been released. They showed no mercy to the man who had twice spared their lives. Geikhatu was strangled with the bowstring on 26 March 1295, apparently on the amirs' own authority without Baidu's sanction or knowledge; he was 24 years of age. Vâşşăf concludes his account of the catastrophe with a phrase of which d'Ohsson renders the sense but not the concision and the elegance: "A la fin l'empire montra à Gaïkhatou ce qu'il aimait, c'est-à-dire, le derrière."

The brief reign of Baidu is ignored by Rashid al-Din, who mentions this prince only in connexion with Ghazan's campaign against him. His enthronement took place, according to Vâşşăf, in the neighbourhood of Hamadân in April 1295. On the other hand, the continuator of Barhebraeus speaks of a ceremony at Üjân, whither he had caused to be transported from Tabriz the "great throne" on which his predecessors, from Abaqa onwards, had been inaugurated. Taghachar now received, as reward for his perfidy, the post of commander-in-chief, Şadr al-Din Zanjânî was replaced as vizier by Jamâl al-Din Dastajirdânî and the executioners of Geikhatu were each appointed to the governorship of a province.

Ghazan first heard of Baidu's revolt at Qara-Teppe near Sarakhs when returning from a victory gained over the Transoxianan Mongols. He took no notice and proceeded on his way to Râdkân, where, according to Rashid al-Din, he received a message from Baidu himself formally inviting him to ascend the throne. Having consulted his amirs and sent for Nauruz, with whom he was now reconciled, he returned to his headquarters at Sultan Duvin in the plain between the Atrak and the Gurgân river, from whence, after a few days, he set out for Azarbâijân by way of Mâzandarân and ʿIrâq-i ʿAjam. At Simnân he was met by emissaries dispatched, before his death, by Geikhatu with a consignment of ch'ao for use in the provinces under Ghazan's jurisdiction.

1 Vol. iv, p. 113 n. 1. In the original (Bombay ed. p. 279): ...tā sultanat u pâdhâbî nîr mabhu-bî ʿâ yâʾni maṣbî bi-numûd.
2 Bombay ed. p. 283.
3 P. 500.
He caused it all to be burnt, remarking that even iron would not stand up to the damp climate of Mazandaran, to say nothing of paper. At Khail-i Buzurg he learnt, as Rashid al-Din⁴ puts it, that Baidu had changed his mind and now wanted the Khanate for himself; he probably learnt, in actual fact, that Baidu's enthronement was now a fait accompli. He decided to continue his advance despite the smallness of his forces: his unpreparedness for battle is illustrated by Rashid al-Din² by the fact that he had left behind his sacred banner (tuq) and royal war drum. He dispatched ambassadors to Baidu to announce his coming and to ask for a safe conduct. Baidu's reply, delivered at Aq-Khwāja, though conciliatory in tone, was to the effect that Ghazan should turn back. Disregarding this warning he still pressed on: at Qongqur-Öleng he gathered, from a close questioning of Baidu's envoys, that his reception might well be hostile, and from thence onward the troops proceeded in battle order. On 16 May they crossed the Safid Rûd, and three days later the two armies came face to face at Qurban Shire.

After a charge by Ghazan's left wing a truce was called for, apparently on Baidu's initiative, and the two princes, each accompanied by a small group of followers, conferred together on rising ground between the armies. Their negotiations that day did not extend beyond general expressions of good intent, which they affirmed, according to the Mongol custom, with the drinking of wine mixed with gold, a ceremony for which the converts to Islam such as Nauruz substituted an oath and handshake. At nightfall each returned to his own quarters. The next day the two armies proceeded side by side to Qurban Shire, where they encamped so close together as to drink from the same spring; but there was mutual distrust and the troops remained under arms throughout the whole of the night. The following day, 23 May, the representatives of the two princes met to continue their discussions, and it was agreed that the ordus of his father Arghun should go to Ghazan and that he should have control of 'Irāq-i 'Ajam, Khurāsān, Qūmis, Mazandaran and one half of Fārs. As the negotiations proceeded Baidu's troops had been strongly reinforced, and Ghazan, fearing treachery, decided to withdraw, leaving Nauruz behind to complete the negotiations. He decamped in the night of 24–5 May, crossed the Safid Rûd at dawn and by nightfall had reached Zanjan; the next day he continued on his journey to Damāvand, where he was to spend the summer. Baidu's troops set out at once in his pursuit and advanced as

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far as Qongqur-Öleng before giving up the chase. As for Nauruz, he and his colleagues were arrested and detained, and one at least of Baidu’s amirs demanded his execution. He was, however, not without friends in the Il-Khān’s entourage, and prompted, it is said, by Šadr al-Dīn Zanjānī, he undertook upon oath to deliver either Ghazan’s head or his person bound hand and foot. Released on the strength of this undertaking he fulfilled the letter of his oath, upon reaching Ghazan at Firūzkūh, by sending Baidu a cauldron (in Turkish qazan or ghazan) tied up in a sack.

In Ghazan’s councils Nauruz, himself a Muslim of long standing, now impressed upon his master (as he had done during the parleys at Qurban Shire) the desirability of following his example and adopting Islam. Ghazan, who had been brought up as a Buddhist and had himself erected Buddhist temples in Khūraşiân, responded to the suggestion with alacrity, partly no doubt out of genuine conviction, as Rashid al-Dīn, himself a convert from Judaism, is careful to insist, but partly also for reasons similar to those that weighed with Henry of Navarre. His declaration of faith, an important moment in the history of Persia and of Islam, took place on 19 June 1295 in the mountain pastures of the Lār valley, high up in the Alburz. After performing the ritual ablution he entered a pavilion frequented in former times by his father Arghun and, instructed by Shaikh Šadr al-Dīn Ḥamawi, repeated several times the Kalima or Muslim Creed. His amirs followed his example in a body, and the month of Ramaḍān coming round shortly afterwards (15 July to 13 August in that year) they observed for the first time the precepts of their new religion in the company of shaikhs and imāms. The fasting over Ghazan set out, as the Muslim commander of a Muslim army, to overthrow the last non-Muslim ruler of Persia.

His advance westwards was in the nature more of a triumphal procession than of a military campaign. Already before his departure he had learnt from Baidu’s own envoy of the support he enjoyed in the latter’s camp; and at every stage of the journey he met with fresh evidence of that support. At Firūzkūh he received Šadr al-Dīn Zanjānī, the promoter of the ch’ao experiment, now the first of Baidu’s officials to defect to his rival. Near Ustūnāvand, a castle in that same area, he welcomed the Amir Choban and Qurumshi, the son of Alinaq, whom, at their own request, he sent on ahead to join Nauruz in the advanced

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1 Transl. Arends, p. 297.
2 See also below, pp. 541–3.
GEIKHATU AND Baidu

... party. At Aq-Khwâja he learnt that Taghachar had abandoned Baidu, as he had abandoned Geikhatu before him and was now allied with Nauruz in pursuit of his master. To the west of Sujâs Ghazan was met by his brother Khar-Banda, the future Il-Khân Oljeitü; and on the banks of the Safid Rûd, a group of powerful amirs came to place their services at his disposal. He halted at Yüz Aghach to await the latest news of Baidu, who had fled before Nauruz's troops towards the Araxes and Nakhchivân. Hearing nothing he went on to Üjân, where he learnt that the Il-Khân had been captured and brought back to Tabriz and that he had requested an interview with Ghazan. Suspecting the motives of this request Ghazan gave orders not to bring the prisoner to his presence but to execute him on the spot. He was put to death in a garden outside Tabriz on 4 October 1295.

Haithon¹ speaks of Baidu as a “good Christian” and indeed ascribes his downfall to his patronage of the Christians. His pro-Christian attitude was due, according to the continuator of Barhebraeus, to the influence of Abaqa’s wife Despoina, the natural daughter of Michael Palaeologus.² The same authority goes on to say that he became a Muslim but “was never able to learn the ablutions and the fasts”. The probability is that he was one of the minority that still clung to the old shamanistic deism which showed equal respect to all faiths and religions.

GHAZAN

Ghazan arrived at the gates of Tabriz on 4 October, the very day of his predecessor’s execution. Already the first decree of the new Islamic régime was being enforced within the town, viz. that all churches, synagogues and Buddhist temples were to be destroyed here, at Baghdad and throughout the Il-Khân’s domains.

And in those days [says the continuator of Barhebraeus],³ the foreign peoples stretched out their hands to Tâbriz, and they destroyed all the churches which were there, and there was great sorrow among the Christians in all the world. The persecutions, and disgrace, and mockings, and ignominy which the Christians suffered at this time, especially in Baghdad, words cannot describe. Behold, according to what people say, “No Christian dared to appear in the streets (or, market), but the women went out and came in and bought and sold, because they could not be distinguished from the Arab women, and could not be identified as Christians, though those who were recognized as Christians were disgraced, and slapped, and beaten and mocked...

¹ P. 315. ² P. 505. ³ P. 507.
But it was on the Buddhists that the decree and its consequences weighed heaviest. “And this after the honour to which they had been promoted by the Mongol kings, and which was so great that one half of the money which was gathered together in the treasury of the kingdom had been given to them, and it had been expended (?) on the work of images of gold and silver. And a very large number of the pagan priests, because of the way in which they were persecuted became Muslims.”

Measures such as these were, it seems, due to the fanaticism of men like Nauruz who had brought Ghazan to power and whose policies, for a time at least, he was obliged to follow. Once established on the throne he reverted, as far as was consistent with his Muhammadanism, to the religious tolerance of his predecessors, and we are told by Rashid al-Din that when two years later, on 21 July 1298 (significantly a Sunday), the Tabriz mob proceeded to wreck such churches as were still left standing the Il-Khan was angry and saw to it that the ring-leaders were punished.

On 17 October Ghazan left Tabriz to spend the winter in Arrān. He halted in the early stages of the journey to go through the Muslim marriage ceremony with a lady who had been the wife of his father Arghun and then (apparently against her will) of his uncle Geikhatu. The custom of a son’s marrying his father’s widows other than his own mother can be traced back, as Togan has shown, through the whole history of the Altaic peoples: it had been observed by Ghazan’s father, grandfather and great grandfather, the Christian wife of Hülegü, the celebrated Doquz Khatun, having been previously married to Tolui. That a Muslim divine should have been willing to solemnize such a marriage seems almost incredible; that an apparently sincere convert to Islam should have formed a union expressly condemned in the Qur’ān shows how strong the old traditions still remained. After the wedding celebrations Ghazan proceeded by way of Ahar into Mūghān, where he halted for a while near Bakkabād and where he was joined by Nauruz. The latter, now appointed the Il-Khān’s lieutenant-general and commander-in-chief, had been left behind in Tabriz to deal with various administrative matters including the raising of a loan from wealthy Tabrizis, the treasury being, as was to be expected, completely exhausted. From Bakkabād they crossed the Araxes into the Qarábāgh Steppe,
where, at a ceremony held on 3 November 1295, Ghazan was enthroned as khan, assuming as a Muslim ruler the name of Maḥmūd and the title of sultan.

Ghazan had many problems to cope with in the first winter of his reign. Prince Siige, an uncle of the Il-Khān, sent eastwards to repel a Chaghatai invasion, halted on the Karaj to plot rebellion; Nauruz, in command of the advance forces, turned back to engage him in battle; he was defeated, captured and executed. A fellow conspirator, Prince Arslan, a descendant of Chingiz-Khān’s brother Jochi-Qasar, continued the rebellion in the Pil-Suvār area. Engaged by Qutlugh-Shāh, one of the most capable of Ghazan’s generals, at Bailaqān he was finally put to flight after a hotly contested battle. With his execution on 29 March 1296 the rebellion came to an end: it had cost the lives of three princes of the blood. Whilst this civil war was still in progress, a horde of Oirat, who had their grazing lands in the Diyārbakr area, migrated en masse into Syria and placed themselves under the protection of the Mamluk sultan, then Ket-Bugha (1294–6). At about the same time Prince Ilder, a grandson of Hülegü, fled for some unspecified reason into Asia Minor, was defeated in battle, hid for a while in the neighbourhood of Erzerum and was finally captured and killed. Taghachar too now met his end. In November 1295 Ghazan had sent him to Rūm on the grounds that he was a man of fickle character (sāriʿ al-inqīlāb) and that it was safer to keep him at a distance. Shortly afterwards he caused him to be discreetly put to death. The Il-Khān had some compunction about this treatment of a man to whom he owed a debt of gratitude and who was only of potential danger; and in justification of his action he recounted to his intimates an analogous episode in the history of China. The removal of Taghachar was not without its consequences. Baltu, the military commander in Asia Minor, who had been involved in his death, now rose in revolt, egged on by Prince Ildei, another of Ghazan’s great uncles. The revolt was suppressed by an expedition led by Qutlugh-Shāh in the winter of 1296–7. Ildei, who was tried and executed in the previous autumn, was no less than the fifth prince of the blood to come to a violent end within the first twelve months of Ghazan’s reign.

In June 1296 Ghazan held a quriltai in pasture lands with the Mongol name of Sayin (“Good”) between Ardabil and Sarāb. It was here that he received Nauruz, towards whom, for reasons that shall appear, his
feelings had begun to cool. Upon Nauruz's approach the Chaghatayi army had quickly withdrawn. A brief reconnaissance raid satisfied him as to the fact of their withdrawal and he at once returned to Azerbaijan to visit his sick wife. His departure and the rumours to which it gave rise led to large-scale desertions so that the defences of Khurasan were greatly depleted. Hearing of his return Ghazan was angry and ordered him back to his post; and his reply, to the effect that he must first see his wife (a daughter of Abaqa), only increased the Il-Khan's anger. At Sayin he was accorded every honour, but the amirs perceived the change in the Il-Khan's attitude and impressed upon him the inadvisability of sending this arrogant and unscrupulous man back to Khurasan. Ghazan was inclined to agree with them but his sense of gratitude prevailed over his judgment, and on 3 July Nauruz took his leave for the last time. His downfall and death little more than a year later were due, in the event, not to disloyal ambition but to the machinations of his enemies.

On his journey to Baghdad in the following autumn Ghazan halted for a while in the Hamadan region, where he received the maliks of 'Iraq-i 'Ajam, as also Afrasiyab, the atabeg of Greater Luristan (1288–96), who had risen in rebellion at the time of Arghun's death. Afrasiyab, despite his record, was treated with favour and had started on the homeward journey, when he was arrested by the general Horqudaq just returning from Fars and, on the strength of the latter's accusations, put to death. It was at Hamadan, too, that Jamal al-Din Dastajirdani was appointed sahib-divan in place of Sharaf al-Din Simnani, who in turn had displaced Sadr al-Din Zanjani, disgraced after only a brief tenure of office. Jamal al-Din's appointment lasted little more than a month. Brought to trial on charges instigated by Sadr al-Din he was executed on 27 October 1296 and was succeeded in the office of vizier or sahib-divan (the two posts seem at times to merge into one) by his antagonist.

It was during the trial of Jamäl al-Din Dastajirdani that the full facts of Nauruz's correspondence with the Mamluk sultan were first brought to light. He had, in the last months of Baidu's reign, appealed to the ruler of Egypt for help in the overthrow of the infidel Il-Khan. The sultan's reply arrived after Ghazan's triumph, when the situation was altogether changed; and Nauruz judged it prudent to show his master, not the real text, but a substitute version prepared, at his orders, by Jamäl al-Din Dastajirdani. Nauruz's emissary had been a certain 'Alam
al-Dīn Qaiṣar, the clerk of a Baghdadi merchant, who in the course of his duties made frequent visits to Egypt. He was arrested at Baghdad on 13 March 1297 and Šadr al-Dīn Zanjānī, seizing this opportunity of avenging himself on Nauruz, caused a number of forged letters to be secreted in the prisoner’s effects. Qaiṣar was taken before Ghaζan at Shahr-Abān to the north-east of Baghdad on the Khurāsān road. Questioned by the Il-Khān in person he recounted the true facts of the correspondence. His belongings were then searched and the letters, apparently addressed by Nauruz to Egyptian amirs, discovered. Šadr al-Dīn and his associates attested that the writing was that of Nauruz’s secretary, and Ghaζan, enraged by this seemingly damning evidence, had Qaiṣar executed on the spot and gave orders for the extirpation of the whole of Nauruz’s family, three of his brothers (two of them implicated in the spurious correspondence) and a son being seized and put to death within the space of little more than a month.

At Asadābād, as he returned northwards, the Il-Khān was joined by Qutluζ-Shāh from Mūghān and by the amirs Choban and Bolad-Qaya from Ray. Bolad-Qaya was at once dispatched to join advance parties under the amirs Horqudaq and Sōnītei in pursuit of Nauruz; and was followed shortly afterwards by Qutluζ-Shāh at the head of the main army. At Dāmghān Qutluζ-Shāh learnt that Nauruz’s šaḥnās here and in all towns from Ray eastwards had been put to death by Horqudaq’s forces. East of Isfārā’in he was joined by a deserter from Nauruz’s army, an officer called Dānishmand Bahadur, whom he sent on ahead with the vanguard. Dānishmand overtook Nauruz somewhere to the east of Nīshāpūr and, despite the smallness of his own force, inflicted a heavy defeat upon him. Nauruz abandoned his baggage and fled in the direction of Herāt, pursued now by Horqudaq and the whole of the advance forces. At Jām, under cover of darkness, he sprang an ambuscade on his pursuers and then continued his flight. Arrived before Herāt he was offered asylum by the Malik Fakhr al-Dīn Kart. His amirs urged him not to trust himself to the malik; he replied that for three days past he had been unable to perform the namāz and that he could neglect his religious duties no longer. He entered the town accompanied only by 400 horse, and was accommodated by Fakhr al-Dīn in the citadel. Meanwhile Qutluζ-Shāh, also a good Muslim, arriving at Maζḥhad, had visited the shrine of the Imām Riḍā and prayed that his enemy might be delivered into his hands. His prayer was to be granted. Summer was at its height when Qutluζ-Shāh invested Herāt, and
because of the great heat and the strength of the fortifications he was advised to abandon the siege and withdraw. He indignantly rejected this advice and soon found means of achieving his purpose. The šaikh al-Islām of Jām was made to write a letter to Fakhr al-Dīn urging him to surrender Nauruz if he wished to save the town from destruction. The letter was smuggled into the town and produced its effect. Despite the great debt of gratitude which Fakhr al-Dīn owed to Nauruz (who during his father's lifetime had secured his release from imprisonment by a personal guarantee of his good behaviour) he decided in the end to betray his guest rather than risk Ghazan's wrath. A device was found to separate Nauruz from his followers and he was overpowered and bound. The severed head of his secretary, the same man whose handwriting Sadr al-Dīn had affected to recognize in the forged letters, was sent to Qutlugh-Shāh as proof of his master's detention, and in return for a written assurance confirmed by oath, that no harm should come to the town, Nauruz himself was handed over to his pursuers. The jubilant Qutlugh-Shāh attempted to interrogate him. It was for Ghazan, Nauruz said, and not for the likes of him, to question him, and he refused to answer, "knowing that he had committed no crime".1 Qutlugh-Shāh ordered him to be cut in two, and his head was sent to Baghdad, where for some years it was exposed on one of the city gates. So ended the career of this powerful and turbulent man, probably destined, had his life been spared, to have played the same role of king-maker and mayor of the palace in Persia as had his elder contemporary Prince Noqai in the Golden Horde. The death of the "second Abū Muslim", as Vassaf aptly calls him, occurred on 13 August 1297.

In Tabriz, on 2 November, there took place a ceremony that would have gladdened Nauruz's heart. The Il-Khān and his amirs in a body formally exchanged their broad-brimmed Mongol hats for the Muslim turban. In our own days we have witnessed, in the very regions over which Ghazan ruled, the reversal of this process by laws which substituted for the fez and the kulāb a form of headgear as ill-suited as the Mongol for the performance of the namāz.2 Soon after the ceremony Ghazan left for Arrān, where he spent the winter of 1297-8 and where, in the following spring, the execution of a prince of the blood was

2 Bombay ed. p. 313.  
3 In Turkey a law was passed in 1925 requiring all men to wear hats and making the wearing of the fez a criminal offence. In Iran the change was made in two stages. In 1928 a peaked cap replaced the kulāb, for which in 1935 the normal European headgear was substituted.
shortly followed by that of his vizier, the infamous Šadr al-Din Zanjānī.

The prince of the blood was Taichu, a son of Mengü-Temür and therefore Ghazan’s great uncle. His crime seems to have been little more than lending a credulous ear to a prophecy made by a Muslim divine that within forty days he would succeed to the throne. He was arrested on 13 April 1298 on the banks of the Qara-Küderi (in Mongol “Black Musk Deer”), apparently a canal cut from the Kur, and was put to death on the 15th near Dalan Na’ur. His fate was shared by the prophet and by all who had been present when he made his prophecy. Whether or not Taichu’s guilt was such as to justify the death penalty, it is impossible, on the evidence available, to reach an opinion; the punishment of Šadr al-Din, the Šadr-i Jahān as his title went, was certainly richly deserved. On 28 March 1298 he was accused before Ghazan of having embezzled state funds. A couple of days later, no doubt with these accusations in mind, Šadr al-Din taxed Rashid al-Din (who now appears on the scene for the first time, apparently as a subordinate to Šadr al-Din) with having traduced him behind his back. He was silenced by Ghazan, who took Rashid al-Din’s part but seemed otherwise disposed to let matters rest. At this juncture Qutlugh-Shāh, returning from a campaign in Georgia, upbraided Šadr al-Din for the economic conditions in that country. To avert the blame from himself the vizier told Ghazan that it was in fact Qutlugh-Shāh’s officers who had ruined Georgia. Puzzled at the khan’s attitude of disapproval Qutlugh-Shāh asked Šadr al-Din who it was that had spoken ill of him. He said that it was Rashid al-Din. It so happened that Qutlugh-Shāh was on familiar terms with Rashid al-Din and he took the first occasion to reproach him for this unfriendly act; he refused, however, to disclose the name of his informant. Rashid al-Din then approached the Il-Khān in person, and when Ghazan sent for Qutlugh-Shāh he had no option but to name the vizier. Ghazan’s patience was now at an end. Šadr al-Din was arrested and put on trial; he answered his interrogators with the utmost aplomb and might, given time, have extricated himself even from this situation. However, he was handed over to Qutlugh-Shāh and, on 4 May, met the same end at the hands of the same executioner as his great antagonist the Amir Nauruz. Soon after these executions Ghazan left Dalan Na’ur for Tabrīz, where on 3 June, the brother and nephew of Šadr al-Din were likewise put to death.

From Tabrīz, on 11 September, the Il-Khān set out for his winter-
quarters in the Baghdad area, at about the same time appointing Sa’d al-Din Sāvaji as Ṣadr al-Din’s successor with, apparently, Rashīd al-Din as his associate or deputy. Travelling by way of Hamadān and Burtūjīrd he arrived on 29 November in the region of Wāsīṭ, where he remained until February 1299 and where he received the news of Sūlāmish’s revolt in Asia Minor. Sūlāmish had been sent by Qutluğ-Shāh in pursuit of Bāltu after the latter’s defeat in the winter of 1296–7, and it was presumably he who had brought Bāltu to Tabrīz, where he had been executed on 14 September 1297. It was then that Ghazan had appointed Sūlāmish commander-in-chief in Rūm. He had at the same time deposed the Saljuq ruler Mas‘ūd II, the son of Kai-Khusraw II, suspected of complicity in Bāltu’s rising, and had replaced him by his nephew ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Kai Qubād II (1297–1300). Mas‘ūd, it may be anticipated here, was restored to the throne in 1300 and reigned for four years: he was the last of the Saljuqs of Rūm. In the winter of 1298–9 there were heavy snowfalls in Asia Minor cutting off all communications with the East, and Sūlāmish took advantage of this situation to spread the rumour that Ghazan had been dethroned. He then rose in revolt, killing the generals whom Ghazan had associated with him in the command, gathering together a force of some 50,000 men and obtaining the promise of support from Syria. To suppress the rebellion an army under the command of Qutluğ-Shāh set out from Wāsīṭ on 15 February 1299. On 27 April a battle was fought near Aq-Shahr between Sivās and Arzinjān on the high road to Persia. Sūlāmish was defeated and put to flight; he escaped into Syria and proceeded to Cairo, where he was favourably received by the sultan; but deciding to return to Rūm in search of his family, he was captured by the Armenians upon entering Cilicia and handed over to Ghazan.

Ghazan, meanwhile, whilst journeying from Najaf to Baghdad, had received in audience a group of dissident Mamlūk amirs led by Saif al-Dīn Qipchaq, the governor of Damascus. Their quarrel had been with Sultān Lachūn (1296–8) and learning at Ra’s al-‘Ain of his death, they had regretted their decision to defect to the Īl-Khān. It was, however, too late to turn back and, admitted to Ghazan’s presence, they assured him, with such conviction as they could muster, of their support in the invasion of Syria and Egypt. Ghazan remained in Baghdad for less than a fortnight (8–20 March 1299) before setting out on the journey back to Āzarbājǰān. In Ījān, where he arrived on 28 May, he held a quriltāi shortly followed by the execution of several
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of Sülemişh's officers. Sülemişh himself was put to death in Tabriz on 27 September. Of the form of execution Rashīd al-Dīn says\(^1\) only that it was "horrible" (šānī'): his body was burnt and the ashes flung to the wind. Ghaazar, at about this time, was affected with ophthalmia; and wild rue was burnt and prayers offered up in order to avert the evil eye.

At Tabriz Ghaazar learnt of a Syrian incursion into Upper Mesopotamia. The invaders had captured Mārdīn and attacked Ra's al-'Aīn; they had desecrated the mosques by their scandalous behaviour in them, and this during Ramaḍān (falling that year in June); and they had carried off great numbers of prisoners when they withdrew. Ghaazar had no difficulty in obtaining a ḋawā' for a war of retaliation, and on 16 October he set out for Syria. Proceeding by way of Mosul and Nasībin he crossed the Euphrates on 7 December at Qal'at Ja'bar. On the western bank of the river in the Plain of Šīffīn, the scene of the famous battle between 'Alī and Mu'āwīya, he was heartened with news of dissension amongst the enemy, presumably reports of the attempt by the Oirat refugees to overthrow Sulṭān Naṣīr. The Mongol forces arrived before Aleppo on 12 December but did not attempt to invest the town; instead they turned southwards, passing to the east of Ḥamā on the 20th and encamping near Salamiyya on the edge of the Syrian Desert. The enemy, as Ghaazar now learnt, had concentrated their forces near Ḥimṣ in the same strategically favourable position from which, eighteen years before, they had inflicted a crushing defeat on Mengü-Temūr. He decided not to make a frontal attack but, by turning eastwards into the desert, to outflank the Mamlūks and take them from the rear. On the banks of a stream some ten miles north of Ḥimṣ the troops, in accordance with this change of plan, were ordered to draw three days' supply of water. This was on 22 December. The enemy had intended to attack the next day, but mistaking the purpose of the Mongols' movements and thinking they were about to retreat they decided to give battle at once. As the enemy approached Ghaazar drew up such of his forces as were at hand, Qutlugh-Shāh commanding on the right and he himself in the centre. Qutlugh-Shāh caused the great war-drums to be beaten and the Egyptians, imagining this to indicate the presence of the khan, charged in great strength upon the right wing, which broke before them; but the centre, where Ghaazar himself, contrary to Mongol usage, took part in the fighting and where he was

\(^1\) Ed. Alizade, p. 332, transl. Arends, p. 185.
joined by Qutluğ-Shah from the routed right, stood firm until the left wing was able to take up its position. The battle, which lasted from eleven o'clock until nightfall, ended in the total defeat of the Mamluks. Advancing slowly in the tracks of the retreating enemy Ghazan encamped some three miles from Hims. Town and citadel surrendered without a blow, and Ghazan found himself in possession of the Sultan’s treasure abandoned by the Mamluks in their precipitate flight. He distributed the contents amongst his amirs, keeping for himself, according to Haithon, only a sword and a leather bag containing the title deeds of the kingdom of Egypt and the muster roll of its army. As for his prowess in the battle, says Haithon, himself present in the suite of Het’um II, “it will be talked of amongst the Tartars for all time”.¹ A fath-nāma or bulletin proclaiming the victory, penned by none other than Vassaf, was dispatched to Tabriz and all the chief cities of Ghazan’s empire; and the next day, 28 December, the Mongols advanced on Damascus deserted, like Hims, by its defenders. On 31 December a deputation of Damascene notables came to sue for quarter, and three days later Ghazan was encamped in the famous meadows of Marj Rāhīt to the east of the town, where he received the homage of the populace. On the following Friday, 8 January 1300, the khutba was read in Damascus in Ghazan’s name; on the 23rd he learnt from the officer sent in their pursuit that the Egyptians had been driven out of Syria.

The Mongols evacuated the country as quickly as they had occupied it. Ghazan left Damascus as early as 5 February, possibly because of reports of the Qarauna inroads in Southern Persia; whatever the reason for his departure, it cannot have been, as Rashid al-Din² appears to suggest, the approach of the hot season. He crossed the Euphrates, again as before at Qal’at Ja’bar, on a bridge of his own invention consisting of inflated skins lashed together with bark rope. In the Mosul area, which he reached on 8 March, he was joined in early April by Qutluğ-Shah, whom he had left in command at Damascus. After Ghazan’s departure Qutluğ-Shah had laid siege to the citadel, which had continued to offer resistance after the capitulation of the town, but discouraged by his lack of success had abandoned these operations after a matter of days and followed in his master’s wake. According to Rashid al-Din,³ he brought news of rebellious activities on the part of Qipchaq, whom the Īl-Khān had reinstated as military governor of

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Damascus; but this is probably only an anticipation of subsequent events. On leaving Damascus Qutlugh-Shāh had handed over the command to Mulai, the same officer who had pursued the Egyptians to the frontier. Alarmed by rumours put about by Qipchaq, now in correspondence with Sultân Nāṣir, he too withdrew from Syria, catching up with Ghazan on 8 May at or near Darband-i Zangi between Ḥulwān and Shahrazūr. By this time the Egyptians had already reoccupied Damascus; by the end of May they had restored Mamlūk rule throughout the whole of Syria.

Ghazan, however, had no intention of renouncing his conquests; and in the autumn he returned to the attack. The summer he had spent in Āzarbāijān: first in Marāgheh, where he had inspected the observatory and explained to the scientists his plans for another and more elaborate one in Tabriz; then in Üjān, where, on 13 July, he had summoned a quriltai; and finally in Tabriz, where he had remained till the end of September, watching the progress in the building of the Gunbad-i ‘Āli, his future mausoleum. On 30 September he left for Syria; Qutlugh-Shāh at the head of large forces, had been sent on in advance on the 16th. Ghazan followed the same route as on the previous expedition, crossing the Euphrates on 30 December, again at Qal‘at Ja‘bar. From Jabbûl, which they reached on 3 January 1301, the Mongols approached the outskirts of Aleppo (which, as in the previous campaign, they made no attempt to invest) and then turned southwards, encamping on the 18th in the vicinity of Qinnisrin. They advanced no further and the forces under Qutlugh-Shāh were ordered to halt at Sarmin. Ghazan, according to Rashid al-Din,¹ had received no reports of enemy movements and wished to spare a Muslim country from devastation. In point of fact military operations by either side had been rendered impossible by torrential and continuous rains, and the consequent floods and the cold had caused havoc amongst the horses and camels: Rashid al-Din² himself speaks of the plight of two Mongol amirs entrapped with their men and beasts in a sea of mud. Ghazan turned back on 2 February, crossing the Euphrates at Raqqa, where he visited the tombs of the martyrs of Šiffin, and reaching the ordus of his ladies at Chahâr Tâq near Sinjār on the 25th. On 19 May he crossed the Tigris into the Kurdish country and directed a punitive expedition against the inhabitants. It was from here that he sent an embassy to the Mamlūk sultan. On 2 June he was back in Üjān.

¹ Transl. Arends, p. 191.
² Loc. cit.
Ghazan passed the whole of the summer in Újân, during which time a conspiracy against his minister Sa'd al-Din was uncovered and suppressed, three officials of the Divân being put to death. The Ïl-Khân, remarks Rashîd al-Dîn, à propos of these executions, was so tender-hearted that if a fly fell in his food he would lift it out and set it gently down so that its wings might not be broken. "It is more difficult for me," he would say, "to kill an innocent gnat than a guilty human being; for to allow a mischievous man to live only leads to disorders, especially in affairs of state." After a brief stay in Ala-Tagh Ghazan left, on 23 November, for his winter-quarters in Arrân. It was here, in the Qarabâgh country on 19 December, that he received his ambassadors on their return from Egypt with the Sultan's reply to his message. Versions of both documents have been preserved by the Egyptian historians. Nâṣîr's letter, though mainly concerned with a rebuttal of Ghazan's charges, ended on a conciliatory note with an offer of peace and an alliance. From Qarabâgh Ghazan now went on a hunting expedition into the mountains of Shirvân and Lakzistân, i.e. the south-eastern spur of the Caucasian range; from thence he proceeded to the plain called Gâvbârî in the Mûghân Steppe, where he passed some time hunting and fishing before moving into the area to which he had given the Turkish name of Qush-Qapugh ("Bird Gate"). This was the narrow coastal strip stretching northwards from the Gulf of Kirov (as it is now known) to the present-day Divichi (formerly Barmaki). Rashîd al-Dîn speaks of cranes and waterfowl flying overhead on their way back from their winter to their summer range; and in fact the shores of the gulf are to this day a resting place for migrating birds, which in 1929 was established as a nature reserve. It was from Quş-Qapugh, on 12 April 1302, that Ghazan wrote a letter to the pope (then Boniface VIII), of which the Mongol original was discovered in the Vatican archives in 1921. After referring to a message from the pope delivered by the Genoese Buscarel the Ïl-Khân speaks of a yarlıgh transmitted in reply by a mission composed of the same Buscarel and two Mongols. This yarlıgh was apparently, as suggested by Mostaert and Cleaves, a detailed plan of campaign for the invasion of Syria proposed by Ghazan to Boniface and the Christian princes. "As for now," he goes on, "we are making our preparations exactly in the manner [laid down in our yarlıgh]. You too should prepare your troops, send word to the

1 Transl. Arends, p. 192.  
3 "Trois documents mongols des Archives secrètes vaticanes", p. 469.
rulers of the various nations and not fail to keep the rendezvous. Heaven willing we [i.e. Ghazan] shall make the great work [i.e. the war against the Mamluks] our sole aim."

On the preparations to which Ghazan referred in this letter there is no precise information in the Muslim sources; but the dispatch of Qutlugh-Shāh to Diyārbakr at the end of September 1301, and his recall a month later had presumably some connexion with the proposed campaign. Ghazan himself seems not to have returned to Tabriz until the early summer of 1302. From the coastal strip he had gone back into the mountains to receive the submission of the Lakz, the modern Lezghians, the same tribesmen subdued twenty-five years earlier by Shams al-Din Juvainī. Then, returning southwards, he had entered the jungles of Tālish, where he had held a great battue, constructing for this purpose a kind of vast stockade, consisting of two wooden fences a day’s journey apart at the one end and converging to a width of less than fifty yards. Rashīd al-Dīn enumerates the various species of animals entrapped in this enclosure but, curiously enough, does not mention the tiger, still in modern times a native of that region. From Tālish Ghazan made his way, by easy stages, to Tabriz and from thence, at the end of July, to Ūjān, where he was lodged in a huge tent of gold cloth, which it had taken three years to construct and a whole month to erect. Three days of religious devotion and reading from the Qur'ān were followed by feasting and revelry, and the festivities concluded with a quriltai at which dispositions were made for the contemplated campaign in Syria. Ghazan’s brother Khar-Banda, the future Ōljeitu, was placed, as heretofore, in command of the eastern frontiers; Qutlugh-Shāh was sent into Georgia to recruit a Georgian contingent to join the Mongol forces in Diyārbakr; and Ghazan himself set out on 26 August 1302, by a circuitous route which took him southwards to Hilla by way of Kirmānshāh and then north-westwards along the right bank of the Euphrates to Raḥbat al-Šām.

From Hamadān he even made an easterly détour to the pasture lands on the Chaghan-Na’ur in Farāhān before turning back and striking the Khurāsān trunk road near Bisitūn. As he passed by Kirmānshāh he recalled how in that region, five years previously, he had slept with his followers under a great rock with a solitary tree casting its shade over them. It was during the supposed revolt of Nauruz and his party; Nauruz’s brother Lakzī had not yet been captured; Nauruz himself was

still all-powerful in distant Khurāsān; and Ghazan had passed an un­easy night, filled with anxiety for the future. He revisited the spot with all his amirs and ladies and was moved to tears at the contrast between his circumstances then and now. After he had offered up prayers of thanksgiving his amirs, reverting to a custom of their pagan fore­fathers, attached streamers to the branches of the tree and danced around it to the strains of music. Bolad Ching-Sang, the representative of the Great Khan, who was present in Ghazan's suite, related how Qutula, a great uncle of Chingiz-Khān, had performed a similar cere­mony to celebrate a victory over the Merkit; and how he and his warriors continued to dance until the pressure of their feet had formed a circular trench around the tree. Ghazan was pleased with the tale and, good Muslim though he was, himself for a while joined in the dancing.

He was apparently still in the mountains of Kurdistan when mes­sengers arrived from Qutlugh-Shāh escorting a party of Syrian amirs who had come to offer their allegiance: these were apparently distinct from a deputation of three who had joined him at Bisitūn. At about the same time he received an embassy from the Byzantine Emperor Andronicus II (1282–1328), who offered the hand of a daughter in marriage and sought the Il-Khān's protection against his Turkish neighbours. Ghazan now descended into the plains of Iraq somewhere to the north of Bandinjān1 on the Khuẕistān border, where he stayed for three days at the beginning of December before embarking upon a hunting expedition in the Wasit region. By the end of the month he was in Hilla, where he received two embassies: from the Mamlūk sultan and from Toqta, the ruler of the Golden Horde. Of the sultan's message Rashīd al-Dīn2 says only that it was not to Ghazan's liking: it was, according to Mirkhwānd, a rejection of a demand by the Il-Khān for annual tribute and the insertion of his name in the khutba and on the sultan's coinage. As for Toqta's embassy Rashīd al-Dīn gives no indication whatsoever of its purpose, which was, again according to Mirkhwānd, to revive the old claim of the House of Jochi upon Arrān and Azarbājān. The ambassadors had an escort of 300 horse—too few, as Ghazan sarcastically remarked, to conquer the country and too many for the delivery of a message. The Mongol New Year occurring at this time the members of both embassies were included in the celebrations,

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1 The modern Mandalī.
2 Transl. Arends, p. 197.
3 Vol. v, p. 412.
the sultan’s envoys being afterwards sent to Tabriz as prisoners on parole.

On 29 January, Ghazan crossed the Euphrates at Hilla on the famous bridge of boats and on 5 February visited the shrine of Husain at Karbalā. He then turned northwards along the western bank of the river. At Hāditha the greater part of the womenfolk were sent across to the eastern bank to await the Il-Khān’s return at Sinjār; his favourite wife accompanied him as far as ‘Āna (“there is”, says Rashīd al-Din, “no more delightful place in the whole world”), which he reached on 2 March. His pace along this stretch of the route had been leisurely in the extreme, averaging less than ten miles a day; and the whole of one week had been spent in pursuit of game still apparently as plentiful as in the days of Xenophon, the Arabian ostrich. It was at ‘Āna that Vaṣṣāf presented the Il-Khān with the first three books of his history and was encouraged to continue with his work. The Mongols remained here for a week before advancing on Raḥbat al-Shām, which they reached on 18 March. The inhabitants at first made some show of resistance but after some days of negotiations, in which Rashīd al-Din played a leading part, were induced to surrender. On the 26th, as Ghazan continued northwards, he was heartened with news of the defeat and death of Qaidu in a battle with the Great Khan’s forces; he learnt at the same time that Qutlugh-Shāh and the Amir Choban had crossed the Euphrates at Raqqa and approached Aleppo. He halted for three days on the river bank, dispatched his amirs and troops to join Qutlugh-Shāh, and then recrossed the Euphrates en route for Sinjār and Mosul. Why he chose to withdraw from personal participation in the campaign is by no means clear. Rashīd al-Din ascribes his retirement, unconvincingly, to the approach of the hot weather and the seasonal floods, while Haithon speaks of an invasion of his eastern frontiers by Qaidu, who in point of fact had been dead for more than a year and a half. Of his itinerary Rashīd al-Din, who evidently accompanied him, gives a detailed account. The passage of the Euphrates took place on 2 April; he crossed the Khābūr at Mākisin and advanced at a very leisurely pace across the desert, then covered with spring flowers, hunting the game animals as he went; on the 14th he joined his womenfolk at Chahār Ţāq near Sinjār, on the 19th he was at Tall A’far, where he conferred the Sultanate of Northern Mesopotamia upon Najm al-

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1 Transl. Arends, p. 198.  
2 Anabasis 1, v.  
3 Transl. Arends, p. 199.  
4 P. 379.  
Din II (1294–1312), the Artuqid ruler of Mardin; crossing the Tigris at Mosul he encamped on the plain of Kushāf, apparently to be identified with the town of Ḥadītha above the confluence of the Great Zāb: here he awaited the outcome of the campaign.

Qutlugh-Shāh's army advanced through Syria without meeting serious resistance; they reached the Damascus area on 19 April and on the following day passed on through Kiswa to encounter the sultan's army drawn up on a famous battle-field of early Islam, the meadows of Marj al-Ṣūffār. A charge by the Mongol left wing on the Mamlūk right inflicted heavy casualties on the Egyptians and drove them back in headlong rout. Meanwhile Qutlugh-Shāh, who had gone to their assistance from the centre, was attacked by the Mamlūk centre and left and forced back on to a neighbouring hill, where he was joined by the troops returning from their pursuit of the enemy's right wing. Here the Mongols were compelled to pass the night, the hill completely encircled by Mamlūk troops. In the morning, suffering by now from thirst, they were unable to break through the cordon until the Egyptians deliberately opened their ranks to let them through, the more easily to destroy them in their flight. The Mongols made their way down to the river, apparently the modern Wādi ‘Arrām, losing a great number of their horses in the muddy terrain, and the Egyptians then launched their attack, pursuing the fleeing enemy until nightfall: the pursuit was taken up in the morning by a Mamlūk amir who continued to follow them as far as Qariyatain.

Travelling with what appears to have been indecent haste Qutlugh-Shāh reached Ghazan at Kushāf on 7 May, and was presumably the first to inform him of the Mongols' disastrous defeat. Of the Il-Khān's reaction to the news and his reception of the messenger Rashīd al-Dīn says not a word. According to Maqrīzī¹ the effect of the report was so violent as to bring on a nasal haemorrhage: his attitude towards Qutlugh-Shāh may be deduced from the Egyptian's account of his subsequent behaviour at the court of inquiry held in June–July at Újān. Ghazan left the next day for Irbil, celebrating the ‘id al-fitr (falling that year on 18 May) at Darband-i Zangi in the foothills of Kurdistan and proceeding from thence to Marāḡeh. On 4 June, at some point along this route, he was joined by Choban, who, in contrast to his colleague, had remained with the defeated army, attending to the wants of the horseless and the wounded, and leading them slowly back by way of

¹ Transl. Quatremère, vol. ii, p. 204.
Baghdad. From Marāqheh Ghazan sent his womenfolk ahead to Ūjan and spent a few days hunting on the slopes of Mount Sahand; he reached Ūjan himself on 26 June and two days later inaugurated the yarğhu or court of inquiry, which lasted till 18 July. Of the results of this investigation Rashīd al-Dīn mentions only the execution of two obscure officers; it is natural perhaps that he should not refer to the humiliation of Qutlugh-Shāh, with whom he was on terms of friendship. According to Maqrīzī’s account, the Īl-Khān was with difficulty restrained from putting his commander to death; and the onlookers are said to have rushed at the prisoner and spat in his face. Maqrīzī adds that Qutlugh-Shāh was banished to Gilān; in fact, like the other commanders, he seems to have been sentenced to be beaten with the rod; even Choban, whose conduct had earned and received the Īl-Khān’s praises, was not excepted from this punishment.

On 8 September 1303 Ghazan arrived in Tabrīz and had begun warlike preparations, presumably for a fourth invasion of Syria, when he was attacked for the second time with some form of ophthalmia. After treatment by his own doctors had failed to cure the disease he finally, on 19 October, had recourse to Chinese physicians (probably in the suite of Bolad Ching-Sang), who cauterized his body in two places, apparently in the abdominal region. He left on 1 November for his winter-quarters in Baghdad; unable to sit a horse on account of the cauterization he was obliged to travel in a litter, averaging little more than three or four miles a day. By 25 November he was on or near the Safīd Rūd and finding the route southwards to Hamadān to be blocked with heavy snowfalls he abandoned his intention of wintering in Baghdad and made instead for a residence at some unidentified spot on the banks of the river to which he had given the Mongol name of Öljëitū–Nuntuq (“Auspicious Encampment”). Here he imposed upon himself the discipline of a chilla, i.e. a forty-day period of retirement, fasting and meditation such as was practised by dervishes and seekers after occult powers. His motives may well have been medical rather than spiritual, for it is clear that the Īl-Khān’s infirmity—whatever its nature—was no longer a mere inflammation of the eyes.

1 Transl. Arends, p. 201.
2 Transl. Quatremère, vol. ii, pp. 204-5.
3 The Oeuldjaitou-yamouc of d’Ohsson (vol. iv, p. 349) and Oldzheitu-Buinuk of Arends (p. 206), the second element of the name being corruptly spelt in the MSS of Rashīd al-Dīn. Howorth, vol. iii, p. 484, takes the first element for the name of the Īl-Khān and speaks of “a yurt or camp of the Mongols, which Uljaitu named Boinuk or Yamuk.”
HISTORY OF THE ĪL-KHĀNS

It was during this period of seclusion that the “Mazdakite” conspiracy (to which reference will be made elsewhere in this volume) was uncovered and suppressed. Ala-Fireng, the eldest son of Geikhatu, whom the conspirators sought to place on the throne, is depicted by Rashid al-Dīn as playing a purely passive role in their machinations; it is significant, however, that one of the first acts of Ghazan’s successor was to order his execution. On 10 January 1304 the Īl-Khān emerged from his retreat to take part in the New Year celebrations and to resume the administration of affairs. A few days later Keremūn, the youngest of his wives, died suddenly of a stroke; her death produced a deep impression on Ghazan, perhaps already conscious of his own approaching end. At the beginning of April, he set out eastwards travelling light and accompanied only by his immediate entourage: the womenfolk had been left, along with the heavy baggage, at a place called Qal‘achuq (“Little Castle”) on or near the Safid Rūd. No reason is given for this journey: it is possible that the Īl-Khān had conceived a desire to revisit his old viceroyalty of Khurāsān. His health was apparently fully restored and he was even able to indulge his passion for hunting whilst passing through the Sultan Bulāgh hills en route for Sāveh. From Sāveh, where a feast had been prepared by the vizier Sa‘d al-Dīn, a native of the town, he continued, after a three days’ halt, in the direction of Ray. It was at this stage that he suffered a relapse; he forced himself to ride on in spite of his infirmity, but by the time he had reached the district of Khāil-i Buzurg between Ray and Qazvīn he was critically ill. He sent for his chief and favourite wife Princess Bulughan, whom he had married in defiance of the šari‘a in 1294, and returning slowly westwards was reunited with her in the district of Pūshkil Darra to the east of Qazvīn at the beginning of May. Assembling his ministers he exhorted each of them individually and confirmed his previous designation of his brother Khar-Banda as his heir. This duty accomplished he passed the greater part of his time in retirement, retaining full possession of his faculties until the end. He died on Sunday, 11 May 1304 in the thirty-third year of his life, and his body, transported amid universal mourning to Tabrīz, was laid to rest in the Gunbad-i-‘Āli, the mausoleum he had himself designed and erected.

Ghazan was without question the greatest of the Īl-Khāns, a remarkably gifted man by the standards of any age of history. What strikes one above all is the catholicity of his interests. He was conversant not only

1 See below p. 548.
2 See above, p. 380.
GHAZAN

with arts or sciences such as natural history, medicine, astronomy and chemistry (or more strictly alchemy) but also with several handicrafts. He could, so Rashíd al-Din¹ assures us, perform the tasks of a goldsmith, a blacksmith, a carpenter, a painter, a founder or a turner more expertly than the masters of these trades. "No one surpassed him", says Pachymeres,² "in making saddles, bridles, spurs, greaves and helmets: he could hammer, stitch and polish, and in such occupations employed the hours of his leisure from war." In addition to his native Mongol he was said to have had some knowledge of the Arabic, Persian, Hindi, Kashmiri, Tibetan, Chinese and Frankish (i.e. French or perhaps Latin) languages. Despite his conversion to Islam he took a great interest in the history and traditions of his forefathers, on which he was an authority second only to Bolad Ching-Sang, the representative of the Great Khan. It was, in fact, at his suggestion and with his encourage­ment that Rashíd al-Din embarked upon the first part of the Jāmi' al-tawāriḵh, "a vast historical encyclopaedia such as no single people, either in Asia or in Europe, possessed in the Middle Ages".³ His measures to reform the fiscal system will be examined elsewhere in this volume.⁴ In his person he was short and of unprepossessing appearance, in complete contrast to his father Arghun, a tall and handsome man. After describing his gallantry in the Battle of Hims the Armenian Haithon, in a passage already referred to above,⁵ continues as follows: "And the most remarkable thing of all was that within a frame so small, and ugly almost to monstrosity, there should be assembled nearly all those high qualities which nature is wont to associate with a form of symmetry and beauty. In fact amongst all his host of 200,000 Tartars you should scarcely find one of smaller stature or of uglier and meaner aspect than this Prince."⁶

ÖLJEITÜ

Through his agents in Ghazan's court Khar-Banda had received early intelligence of his brother's death and had at once taken steps to remove a possible rival. This was his cousin Ala-Fireng, recently involved in the "Mazdakite" conspiracy.⁷ The unsuspecting prince was struck down

¹ Transl. Arends, p. 213.
³ Barthold, Turkestan, p. 46.
⁴ See below, pp. 494-500.
⁵ P. 388.
⁶ Quoted by Yule, loc. cit.
⁷ See above, p. 396.
in the course of a private interview by one of Khar-Banda’s emissaries (30 May 1304), himself killed shortly afterwards in a collision with the forces of the Amir Horqudaq. The latter, also apparently regarded as an obstacle in Khar-Banda’s path, was captured and summarily executed. Against the deaths of these two men should be set the fact that during the first year of Ghazan’s reign no less than ten princes of the blood had met a violent end: it is possible that the new Il-Khân’s prompt if ruthless action may have prevented the recurrence of bloodshed on a similar scale. The way now clear, he set out on the journey from Khurâsân to Azarbâijân. Progress was slow because of the heavy rainfalls: he reached Üjân on 9 July, and ten days later the ceremony of enthronement took place still, apparently, with all the traditional rites as observed and described by John de Plano Carpini nearly sixty years before. He assumed the throne name of Öljeytû (in Mongol “Fortunate” or “Auspicious”) in addition to that of Khar-Banda (in Persian “Ass-Herd”) given him either at birth, in accordance with the Mongol custom of naming a child after the first person or object that caught the mother’s eye after the confinement, or at a later stage, in accordance with the custom of altering a child’s name to protect him against the evil eye. Partly, at least, for euphemistic reasons the name was afterwards changed to Khudâ-Banda (“Slave of God”, the Arabic ‘Abdallâh), the Il-Khân’s full title being Ghiyâth al-Din Muhammad Khudâ-Banda Öljeytû Sultan.

After three days of feasting Öljeytû turned his attention to affairs of state, confirming Sa’d al-Din and Rashîd al-Din in their offices and appointing Qutlugh-Shâh his commander-in-chief. On 6 August he left Üjân for Tabriz where, on the following day, he visited his brother’s tomb. It was somewhere near Marâgheh, in the Jâghatu valley according to Vaşşâf,¹ that he received the ambassadors of the Great Khan Temîr, the grandson and successor (1294–1307) of Qubilai, accompanied by those of Chabar, the son of Qaidu, and Du’a, the son of Baraq: the object of this composite mission was to apprise the Il-Khân of a pact that had put an end to the longstanding quarrels between these branches of the House of Chingiz-Khân. From Marâgheh, where he installed Ašîl al-Din, the son of Naṣîr al-Din Tûsî, in the observatory founded by his father, Öljeytû made his way to winter-quarters in Mûghân, halting en route at Tabriz to pay a second visit to the Gunbad-i ‘Âli. In Mûghân, on 9 December, he received the ambassadors of

¹ Bombay ed. p. 475.
Toqta, the ruler of the Golden Horde, who presumably made some allusion to the reconciliation of the princes of Central and Eastern Asia, of which Toqta also had been informed. To this development, apparently betokening the restoration of the Mongol world empire as it had existed under Mongke, Öljeitü refers in a letter addressed to Philippe le Bel, which has been preserved in the French national archives. He begins this letter, written at Alivän (Barzand) in Mughan on 5 April 1305, by affirming this desire to maintain the traditional ties of friendship between the Il-Khâns and the "sultans of the Frankish people". He then proceeds: "...we, Temür Qa’an, Toqta, Chabar, Du’a and others, the descendants of Chingiz-Khân, after recriminating one another for forty-five years down to these recent times, have now, protected by Heaven, all of us, elder and younger brothers, reached a mutual agreement, and from the land of the Chinese, where the sun rises, to the sea of Talu [the Caspian, or perhaps the Mediterranean], our states joining with one another [i.e. re-establishing communications], we have caused our post stations to be linked together." The letter concludes with a veiled hint at possible concerted action against the Mamlûks: "Now, as for those who shall not agree, either with us, or with you, let Heaven decide on the manner in which, by the strength of Heaven, leagueing against them all of us together, we shall take our stand."¹ The Il-Khân’s meaning, as appears from the contemporary Italian version of the letter, was intended to be amplified by word of mouth.

Öljeitü, in fact, as the Persian authorities explicitly state, had every intention of continuing the anti-Mamlûk policy of his predecessors. In December 1305, the Egyptian ambassadors detained by Ghazan were allowed to depart; they were accompanied by Öljeitü’s own ambassadors bearing a message to the sultan. That this was not a conciliatory move is clear from the tone of the message as reproduced by Vaşşaf:² the Il-Khân wished no doubt to gain time whilst making his own preparations and awaiting the response to his appeal to the princes of Christendom. In the meantime he set his hand to the task for which he is chiefly remembered: the building or rather the completion (for the work had been begun by his father Arghun) of a new town on the plain of Qongqu-Oleng to which he (or perhaps already Arghun) had given the name of Sulṭânîyeh and which, though "neither geographically nor

¹ Mastaert and Cleaves, Les Lettres de 1289 et 1305 des il-khan Arjun et Öjeitu à Philippe le Bel, pp. 56–7.
² Bombay ed. p. 472.
HISTORY OF THE ÎL-KHĀNS

historically suited for such a high destiny”,¹ he now made his capital. Here was erected his mausoleum, still to this day “one of the most celebrated buildings in the whole of Persia”.²

It was from Sultāniyeh that he set out, in May 1307, upon a campaign against, not the Egyptians, but an enemy much nearer home, the people of the Caspian province of Gilān. That this territory, contiguous to the Mongols’ summer and winter quarters in Arrān and Āzarbāijān, should still have remained unsubjugated after fifty years of Îl-Khānid rule is readily accounted for by the inaccessibility of the country with its dense forests and impenetrable jungles and, above all, humid, unhealthy climate. Stung, it is said, by the jeers of the Chaghatai Mongols Öljeitū resolved upon an elaborate military operation against Gilān. Four armies entered the country at four different points: Choban advancing from Ardabil, Qutlugh-Shāh from Khalkhāl and Toghan and Mu’mīn from Qazvīn, whilst Öljeitū himself, passing through Tārum halted for three days on the slopes of Mount Dulfak, before pushing forward in the direction of Lāhijān. He was joined en route by Choban, to whom the rulers of Āstārā and Gaskar had surrendered without a fight. Toghan and Mu’mīn were equally successful in Southern Gilān, and Öljeitū, who had occupied Lāhijān and received the submission of its ruler, was in the region of Kūhdum on the return journey when he learnt the news of Qutlugh-Shāh’s defeat and death in battle. Advised at Khalkhāl to proceed with caution in this difficult terrain the commander-in-chief, ignoring counsel so little in keeping with his character, sent on ahead Bolad-Qaya in command of a force which defeated the Gilakīs in three bloody battles. The latter then sued for peace, and Qutlugh-Shāh was in favour of accepting their submission but was dissuaded by his son Sibā’uchi, who seems to have inherited all of his father’s impetuosity. Displacing Bolad-Qaya at the head of the advanced forces Sibā’uchi carried fire and sword through the land until confronted by a great host of Gilakīs on a battle-field of their own choosing between Rasht and Tūlim. The Mongols were defeated with great slaughter, their horses sinking in the mud as they turned in flight. Qutlugh-Shāh’s own troops withdrew in panic when they heard the news, and he was left with only a handful of men to meet the oncoming enemy: he was killed by an arrow shot, and the triumphant Gilakīs possessed themselves of the whole of the immense booty which the Mongols had captured in their territory. Such was the end of this

¹ Minorsky, Iranica, p. 47. ² Ibid.
powerful and headstrong man, the Cotolossa of Haithon: he was a
descendant of Jedei Noyan of the Manqut tribe, a general of Chingiz-
Khān. His death carried incalculable consequences for the future of the
Il-Khānate; had he survived, the Amir Choban, who now succeeded
him as commander-in-chief, might well not have achieved the all-
powerful position which he occupied in the following reign. A detach­
ment sent to avenge this disaster almost met with the same fate; the
dispatch of reinforcements caused the Gilakīs to disperse into their
forests, and, on 26 June Öljaitū struck camp to leave Gilān, having gained
what seems to have been at most a Pyrrhic victory over its inhabitants.

In the previous year the Il-Khān had dispatched an army against
Fakhr al-Dīn Kart, the malik of Herāt, with whom he had clashed during
his viceroyalty of Khurāsān because of his support for the Nīgūdāris.
Fakhr al-Dīn closed the gates of the town upon the approach of the
Mongol commander, Dānishmand Bahadur, but after a few days’ siege
entered into negotiations, as the result of which he surrendered the
town to Dānishmand, leaving one of his officers, Jamāl al-Dīn
Muḥammad Sām, in command of the citadel; he himself withdrew to
the neighbouring castle of Amān-Kūh. Whilst visiting the citadel with
a small following Dānishmand was attacked and killed; the Mongols
inside the town were slaughtered and the army outside the walls then
withdrew. Reinforcements were sent under the command of Dānish­
mand’s son Bujai to avenge his father’s death; they invested the town on
5 February 1307. The siege, which lasted till 24 June, is described in
considerable detail by Ḥāfīz-i Abrū¹ and Mirkhwānd,² as one would
expect of historians writing of their Timūrid patrons’ capital. Here it is
sufficient to say that Fakhr al-Dīn Kart, who was certainly in collusion
with Sām, died in the early days of siege; that a plot to kill Sām and so
save the town was betrayed and the conspirators executed; and that
Bujai finally negotiated terms of surrender with his father’s murderer in
order to deny another general the credit of capturing the town.

Öljaitū, baptized in infancy with the Christian name of Nicholas, had
become in turn a Buddhist and a Sunni (Ḥanafi) Muslim. Reference will
be made elsewhere³ to a curious disputation which took place in his
presence, apparently in Arrān in the winter of 1307–8, between repre­
sentatives of the Ḥanafi and Shāfī’i schools, “who, in the heat of
controversy, brought against each other such abominable accusations
that Uljāytū was greatly annoyed with both, and even the Mongol

1 Pp. 18–39.  
2 Pp. 443–68.  
3 See below, p. 544.
nobles who were by no means squeamish, professed disgust, and began to ask whether it was for this that they had abandoned the faith of their ancestors, to which they now called on Ŭljáytú to return”.¹ Shortly afterwards, during a violent thunderstorm, several of the Īl-Khān’s companions were killed by lightning. It was put to him by some of his amirs that he should purify himself according to the ancient Mongol (and indeed Altaic) custom, by passing between two fires;² and bakbhis, who must have been, not Buddhist priests but qams or shamans, were produced to supervise the ceremony. They attributed the disaster to Ŭljeitū’s conversion to Islam, which they called upon him to abjure. A return to shamanism was of course altogether out of the question, but his anti-Sunni feelings persisted and he was gradually persuaded to become a Shi‘ite, making the final decision after a visit to Najaf in the winter of 1309–10.

The vizier Sa‘d al-Dīn Sāvajī, who had always enjoyed Ghazan’s confidence and favour, fell from grace under his successor. The basic cause of his downfall seems to have been an arrogance bred from long years of power; he made enemies, one of whom was his colleague Rashīd al-Dīn; and it was the latter’s report to Ŭljeitū on the peculations of his subordinates that led to his arrest and execution (19 February 1312). He was succeeded in his office by Tāj al-Dīn ‘Alī-Shāh, a dealer in jewels and precious stuffs who had insinuated himself into the Īl-Khān’s good graces; with no previous knowledge of public finance (‘ilm-i daftar u siyāqāt)³ and in no way more honest than his predecessor, he achieved, in the following reign, the distinction of being the first Īl-Khānīd vizier to die in his bed.

Őljeitū must by now have long abandoned the hope of a European alliance against the Mamlūks. There is no record of Philippe le Bel’s having answered (or even received) the Īl-Khān’s letter; but a similar letter addressed to Edward I of England was acknowledged in a letter from his son Edward II dated at Northampton, 16 October 1307, and in a second letter⁴ dated 30 November and written at Langley the English king replies to what must have been an oral message conveyed by the Īl-Khān’s ambassadors. He wishes Ŭljeitū well in his enterprise, which he takes quite naturally, and without necessarily being misled by the envoys, to be the extirpation of the “abominable sect of Mahomet”,
but regrets that the distance and other difficulties prevent his cooperating in this "laudable design". Pope Clement V, in a letter\(^1\) dated at Poitiers, 1 March 1308, disclosed some of the details of the proposed alliance: "We have noticed with pleasure, from these letters and communications, that appealing to our solicitude on behalf of the Holy Land, you have offered us 200,000 horses and 200,000 loads of corn, which will be in Armenia when the army of the Christians arrives there, and in addition to march in person with 100,000 horsemen to support the efforts of the Christians to expel the Saracens from that Holy Land." He expresses his appreciation of the offer, which, he says, "has strengthened us like spiritual food", but makes only a vague reference to future collaboration. He and his brethren, he assures the Il-Khan, "will execute as far as we can what God had inspired us to do, and when a favourable season for crossing the sea shall come we will advise you by letters and messengers so that you may accomplish what your magnificence has promised".

It was encouragement from another quarter that prompted Öljëitû's one and only invasion of Mamlûk territory. At Sultâniyêh, in August 1312, he welcomed the arrival of a group of dissident Syrian amirs headed by Qara-Sonqur, the governor of Damascus, and Aq-Qush al-Afram, the governor of Tripoli. On Qara-Sonqur, whose Turkish name ("Black Gerfalcon") he changed, on account of his years, to Aq-Sonqur ("White Gerfalcon"), he bestowed the governorship of Marâqeh and on al-Afram that of Hamadân; both men accompanied him on a campaign for which they must have convinced him the time was now propitious. Setting out from his capital at the beginning of October he proceeded by way of Mosul, crossed the Euphrates at Qirqisîyâ and, on 23 December, sat down before Rahbat al-Shâm. He had been encouraged by Qara-Sonqur and al-Afram to think that the governor, a protégé of the former amir, could be induced to surrender the town. In this he was disappointed: the townsfolk offered fierce resistance, and because of their heavy casualties and lack of provisions the Mongols, on 26 January 1313, raised the siege and withdrew across the Euphrates, never to return.

So ended, after a lapse of fifty years, the Mongol-Mamlûk struggle for the possession of Syria. That the outcome would have been different had the princes of Europe accepted the proffered alliance cannot seriously be doubted. Nor need we question the sincerity of the Mongols'\(^1\) Quoted by Howorth, vol. III, pp. 376-7.
promises with respect to Palestine; the restoration of the Kingdom of Jerusalem would have been as much in their interest as was the preservation of Little Armenia. The views of the Armenian Haithon, dictated in Avignon in 1307 when the question of such collaboration was still under earnest consideration, deserve more attention than has perhaps been accorded them. Having captured the district of Tripoli the Christian expeditionary force should, according to the strategy laid out in his work, rebuild the city, make it their base of operations "and thus be ready when the Tartars had completed their conquest of the Holy Land to take over from them the towns there, which he was confident they would make over to the Christians for custody, because they could not endure the heat of the summer in those parts; nor did they fight with the Sultan to conquer more lands, for they were masters of all Asia, but because the Sultan was very unfriendly to them and always doing them some injury, especially when they were at war with the neighbouring Tartars (i.e. those of Kipchak and Jagatai)." There were, of course, disadvantages to an alliance with the Mongols.

If Karbanda, or some one sent by him, should invade Egypt with a very large army, it would be well to avoid him, for the Lord of the Tartars would deem it derogatory to follow the counsel of the Christians, and would insist on their following his commands. Besides which, the Tartars were all mounted and marched rapidly, and a Christian army, much of which marched on foot, could not keep up with them. The Tartars, again, when in small numbers and humble were obsequious, but when in large numbers were overbearing and arrogant, insulting to their allies who were weaker than themselves, and would be found unbearable by the Christians.

In the event of a large-scale campaign of this sort Haithon recommends that while the Mongols follow their normal route to Damascus the Christian army should advance along a parallel route to Jerusalem. "And in this way, because of the distance between them, peace and friendship would be preserved between the Christians and the Tartars..."

Some kind of collaboration must in fact have been possible, and it is interesting to speculate what might have happened if, for example, the Crusade of Edward I and Abuqa's invasion of Syria in 1281 had, by accident or design, exactly coincided, instead of occurring nearly ten years apart.

In the last years of his reign the Il-Khâns's attention was directed

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1 The Flos Historiarum Terrae Orientis is dismissed by Spuler, p. 231, as "nur ein Tendenzwerk".
2 Quoted by Howorth, vol. III, p. 578.
3 Ibid. p. 579.
4 P. 361.
eastwards. His annexation, in 1313, of the Nigūdari territories in Southern Afghanistan provoked an invasion of Khurāsān by a Chaghatai army led by Kebek, the brother of the khan (Esen-Buqa), Dā'ūd Khwāja, the ousted Nigūdari ruler, and Prince Yasa’ur, a grandson of Baidar, Chaghatai’s sixth son. Crossing the Oxus in the middle of January 1314, they inflicted a heavy defeat on the army of Khurāsān near the banks of the Murghab, pursuing their fugitive opponents to the gates of Herāt. Upon receiving news of this disaster Oljeitu at once set out from Sultāniyeh (18 February 1314), and the enemy withdrew as he approached, recalled, apparently, by Esen-Buqa, who was being hard pressed by the troops of the Great Khan. It was about this time that Oljeitu appointed his son Abū Sa’id to the viceroyalty of Khurāsān, a post traditionally held by the heir-apparent, the actual duties being carried out by Abū Sa’id’s atabeg, the Amir Sevinch, for the prince was only an eight-year old child. The situation in the East was somewhat eased by the defection of Prince Yasa’ur, accused by Kebek of collusion with the Persian Mongols during the invasion of Khurāsān. Oljeitu’s troops crossed the Oxus to intervene in a battle between Yasa’ur and the Chaghatai forces and to swing the balance in the former’s favour: he accompanied them back into Khurāsān, where Oljeitu allowed him to occupy the pasture lands of Bādghis and where, as we shall see, he rose in rebellion against Oljeitu’s successor.

It was the expenses of the army of Khurāsān that occasioned the first rift between Rashīd al-Dīn and ‘Alī-Shāh. Abū Sa’id’s requests for funds were passed on by Oljeitu to the two viziers. Rashīd al-Dīn disclaimed all responsibility, saying that he had never had the management of the finances nor affixed his seal to assignations made upon the revenue. “I only possess the robe that covers me, and have not a single coin, and, inasmuch as we govern the empire together,” replied Alī-Shāh, “why should we separate from one another when it is a question of paying?” “Because you have undertaken that responsibility yourself”, said Rashīd. “You are the guardian of the Great Seal, and are charged with the carrying out of the Sultan’s orders.” “Why then not affix your seal after mine?” was the reply. “I do not want to join myself with you who profess poverty when asked for money, while each of your employés has made a hundred tumans and become a Carun...”

After listening to this dispute Oljeitu ordered the division of his empire into two administrative spheres, Rashīd al-Dīn becoming responsible

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1 Howorth, vol. iv, pp. 570-1. His ultimate source is Kāshānī: the passage is quoted by Bayānī in his edition of Ḥāfiz-i Abrū, pp. 65 ff., n. 1.
for Central and Southern Persia to the confines of Khurāsān whilst ‘Ali-Shāh was placed in charge of North-western Persia, Mesopotamia and Asia Minor. But even this segregation of their fields of operation failed to restore harmony, and ‘Ali-Shāh, having survived an investigation into his accounts, continued a vendetta which resulted, in the following reign, in his colleague’s disgrace and execution.

Öljeytu died in Sultāniyeh on 17 December 1316; he was in his thirty-sixth year. The cause of his death seems to have been some kind of digestive disorder brought on by the intemperate habits common to all the Mongol princes (with the exception, if we may believe Rashid al-Dīn,1 of Ghazan) and aggravated by the excessive administration of astringent medicines. Without his brother’s energy and strength of character Öljeytu was an even greater patron of the arts. It was at his suggestion that Rashid al-Dīn, having completed the first volume of his work, the Ta’rikh-i Ghāzānī, dealing with the history of the Mongols from the beginnings down to the death of Ghazan, embarked in a second volume upon “the first attempt to record the history of all the great nations of the continent of Eurasia”;2 an enterprise which “has not as yet been accorded the recognition it deserves as a unique achievement...”.3 We think of Öljeytu, however, first and foremost as a builder. In addition to Sultāniyeh he constructed, at the foot of Mount Bīsitūn, a second capital called Sultānābād Chamchimāl or simply Chamchimāl (Mongol chabchimal “hewn”), of which the ruins still exist and which has given its name to the Chamchimāl plain. Mustaufī4 speaks of his interest in the surveying of his dominions: roads were measured and milestones set up and in 1311, presumably when the foundations of Chamchimāl were being laid, Mustaufī himself, on the instructions of the Īl-Khān and with the assistance of engineers, made a calculation to ascertain the height of Bīsitūn.

**ABŪ SA‘ĪD**

The heir-apparent, still only in his twelfth year, was in Māzandarān at the time of his father’s last illness. It was not until the spring of the following year that he arrived in Sultāniyeh, the enthronement ceremony following in the middle of April or, according to the Mujmal-i Faṣṭī,5 not until 4 July. The delay in his arrival appears to have been

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1 Transl. Arends, pp. 215-16.  
2 Jahn, Rashid al-Dīn’s History of India, pp. ix–x.  
4 Pp. 160–1 and 183.  
due to the ambition of his atabeg the Amir Sevinch, who for a while had aspired to the post of amir of the ulus or commander-in-chief before conceding the superior claims of the Amir Choban, who had occupied this office ever since the death of Qutlugh-Shâh and to whose charge Öljeitü, upon his deathbed, had specifically committed his son.

The new Il-Khân retained the services not only of Choban but also of Rashid al-Din and 'Ali-Shâh. The two viziers were still at loggerheads, and 'Ali-Shâh, jealous of the credit his colleague enjoyed with the now all-powerful amir of the ulus, renewed his former intrigues to such purpose that, at the beginning of October 1317, Rashid al-Din was dismissed from office. The Amir Sevinch wished to secure his reinstatement, but died near Baghdad, where Abû Sa'id was passing the winter of 1317-18, before he could achieve his object. In the spring, when the Court moved northwards, the Amir Choban summoned Rashid al-Din from Tabriz, where he was living in retirement and persuaded him, against his better judgment, to re-enter the Il-Khân's service: he was, Choban said, as necessary to the state as salt to food. 'Ali-Shâh and his henchmen now redoubled their efforts to discredit him; they accused him of having poisoned the Il-Khân's father; the accusation was believed and Choban, far from defending his protégé, seems actually to have assumed the role of prosecutor. Rashid al-Din was put to death on 17 July 1318, having first been made to witness the execution of his son, a lad of sixteen, who, as the cupbearer, was alleged to have actually administered the poison. His death was the signal for the looting of Rub‘-i Rashidi, the suburb of Tabriz which he had founded and given his name, and all his lands and property were confiscated by the Divân, even his pious foundations (raqfâts) being robbed of their endowments. His severed head, according to Nuwairi,1 was taken to Tabriz and carried about the town for several days with cries of: “This is the head of the Jew who abused the name of God; may God’s curse be upon him!” Such was the ignominious end of the celebrated statesman and historian, “the greatest vizier of the Il-Khan dynasty, and one of the greatest men the East has produced”;2 he was a little over seventy years of age. His Jewish origin, denied by some scholars and queried by others, has been fully established by the researches of Fischel3 and Spuler.4

1 Quoted by d'Ohsson, vol. iv, p. 611.
2 Howorth, vol. iii, p. 589.
3 See “Azarbaijan in Jewish History”, pp. 15-18.
4 See Die Mongolen in Iran, pp. 247-9.
Yasa’ur, the Chaghatai prince established in Bādghīs, had at first professed towards the young Il-Khān a loyalty with which his activities in Khorāsān were difficult to reconcile, but early in 1319 he rose in open revolt, and news of his invasion of Māzandarān was received simultaneously with a report that Öz-Beg, the ruler (1313–41) of the Golden Horde, was approaching Darband at the head of a great army. It was decided that the Amīr Ḥusain—the father of Ḥasan-i Buzurg or Ḥasan the Great, the founder (1336–56) of the Jalayīr dynasty—should be sent against Yasa’ur, whilst the Il-Khān marched in person against Öz-Beg. Choban, reviewing his troops near Bailaqān, learnt that Abū Sa‘īd was facing the enemy across the Kur with a force of no more than a thousand men at arms and the like number of grooms, muleteers and camel-men, his advanced forces having retired in disorder upon the mere report of Öz-Beg’s approach. It had been Choban’s intention to proceed to Khorāsān, being alarmed by exaggerated accounts of Yasa’ur’s strength; he now hurried to his sovereign’s assistance, crossed the Kur at the head of 20,000 men and inflicted heavy losses upon an enemy already in full retreat. The fighting over, disciplinary action was taken against the officers who had deserted their posts: the most culpable were beaten with the rod, a display of severity which was not without its consequences. In 1325 Choban repulsed a second invasion by Öz-Beg and even carried the war into the enemy’s own territory. Thirty years later Öz-Beg’s son and successor Jānī-Beg (1340–57) succeeded where his father had failed and for a brief space of time Āzarbāijān was incorporated in the territories of the Golden Horde.

Yasa’ur’s revolt was soon suppressed. He withdrew from Māzandarān as Ḥusain’s forces advanced against him; from Tūs he sent an army to invest Ḥerāt, where the Malik Ghiyāth al-Dīn had rallied to Choban and the Il-Khān; in April he sat down in person before the town but raised the siege upon the approach of the Il-Khān’s army and withdrew into Southern Afghanistan. In the following year he was defeated and killed, not by the Persian Mongols, but by the troops of his Chaghatai kinsman Kebek, who had now succeeded to the Khanate. A rebellion nearer home was of far greater danger. The officers subjected to corporal punishment after the battle with Öz-Beg sought to take their vengeance on Choban; they waylaid him near Lake Sevan in Armenia; he escaped, made his way to Ṭabriz, and thence to Sultānīyeh. The malcontents, meanwhile, had been joined by the Amīr Irenjīn, whom Choban had

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1 Near Shusha in the present-day Soviet Āzarbāijān.
dismissed from the governorship of Diyarbakr; they collected an army at Nakhchivan and advanced on the capital. A fierce battle was fought near Mianeh (June 1319); the Il-Khan’s men were on the point of giving way, when they were rallied by Abu Sa‘id’s personal intervention and, returning to the charge, completely routed the enemy. Many of the rebel amirs were killed in the fighting; Irenjin, captured in the village of Kaghadh-Kunān, was taken with two of the other ring-leaders to Sultāniyeh, where they were suspended from hooks and fires kindled beneath them. Because of the bravery he had displayed in this battle the young Il-Khan received the title of Bahādur¹ (“Hero”) and in subsequent firmans and the like his name appeared as al-Sultān al-‘Ādil (“the just Sultan”) Abu Sa‘id Bahādur Khān. The fath-nāma announcing this victory was issued from Qarabagh, whither Abu Sa‘id had betaken himself to pass the winter of 1319–20. For the part he had played in the battle Choban was rewarded with the hand of the Il-Khan’s sister, the Princess Sati Beg.

The mayor of the palace—for such Choban had by now to all intents and purposes become—had soon to cope with the rebellion of his own son. In 1322 Temür-Tash, appointed viceroy of Rûm at the beginning of the reign, proclaimed himself the independent ruler of that province, causing coin to be struck and the khutba to be recited in his name; he gave himself out to be the Mahdi or Messiah whom the Muslims expect at the end of the world and sought the alliance of the Egyptians in the conquest of Persia. With the Il-Khan’s permission Choban intervened in person. Though suffering from gout he advanced through the snows of an Anatolian winter to secure his son’s surrender; and Temür-Tash was for his father’s sake not only pardoned but actually reinstated in his post, in which, attacking now the Turks and now the Greeks, he extended the Mongol conquests to the very shores of the Mediterranean.

Early in 1324 occurred the death of the vizier ‘Ali-Shāh, the first and only holder of his office under the Il-Khāns to die of natural causes. He was succeeded in due course by Rukn al-Din Ṣā’in (Mongol sayin “good”), a protégé of Choban, who, however, soon began to intrigue against his benefactor. The latter’s power was now at its zenith, and Abu Sa‘id was “only king in name”,² the whole of his dominions being parcelled out amongst Choban and his sons, one of whom, Dimashq

² The History of Shaikh Uwais, transl. van Loon, p. 54.
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Khwāja ("Master Damascus"), the viceroy of Āzarbāījān and the two 'Irāqs, also exercised the authority nominally vested in Rukn al-Dīn. A natural impatience with such tutelage was aggravated by the whisperings of the new vizier, the arrogant and dissolute behaviour of Dimashq Khwāja and, above all, a violent passion which the Īl-Khān, now in his 21st year, had conceived for Baghdād Khatun, the latter's sister and the wife of Shaikh Ḥasan. In accordance with the Yasa2 of Chingiz-Khān the sovereign could exercise a kind of droit de seigneur with respect to any married woman who took his fancy. In Üjān in the late summer of 1325 Abū Saʿīd approached the Amīr Chobān through an intermediary with a view to claiming this right. Without making a direct reply Chobān extricated himself from an embarrassing situation by persuading the Īl-Khān to pass the following winter in Baghdad and then, after the departure of the Court, dispatching his son-in-law and daughter to Qarābāgh. Absence did not, however, have the effect that Chobān had expected and Abū Saʿīd's feelings for Baghdād Khatun remained unchanged. Early in 1326 the fear of an invasion of Khurāsān caused Chobān to lead an army to the eastern frontiers, where in the autumn of that year the Chaghātai khan Tarmāshirin (1326-34) crossed the Oxus to be defeated by Chobān's son the Amīr Ḥasan in a battle near Ghaznā. The vizier Rukn al-Dīn Šā'īn had accompanied Chobān on this campaign, leaving Dimashq Khwāja in complete and untrammeled control of the administration. Disgusted with his excesses and ashamed of his own complete destitution of authority, the Īl-Khān was seeking some opportunity for ridding himself of Dimashq when the pretext was provided by the discovery of an intrigue with a former concubine of Ōljeitū; and Dimashq, trapped in the citadel of Sulṭāniyeh, was killed whilst trying to escape on 25 August 1327.

The Īl-Khān was now resolved to extirpate the whole race of Chobān. The amīrs in Khurāsān, notified of his intention, at first affected to take the part of their commander-in-chief, who set out westwards to avenge his son. At Simnān he persuaded Shaikh Ḍalā' al-Daula, the local religious leader, to intercede with Abū Saʿīd, then encamped near Qazvīn. The shaikh's arguments producing no effect Chobān continued his march, his troops pillaging and burning as though in enemy

1 Cf. the name of his sister Baghdād Khatun ("Lady Baghdad"). Dimashq might well have been born in Damascus during the Syrian campaign of 1299-1300.

2 Ḥāfīz-ʾī Abru, p. 117, seems to be our only authority for the existence of such a law, which Togan, p. 220, believes to have obtained amongst the ancient Turks.
ABŪ SA‘ĪD

territory, until he reached the village of Qūha to the south-east of Ray, only a day’s journey distant from the Īl-Khān’s camp. Here, under cover of darkness, the greater part of his amirs with a force of 30,000 men went over to Abū Sa‘īd, and in the morning he found himself with no alternative but a rapid withdrawal. He made off in the direction of Sāveh, from whence he sent his royal wife, Princess Sati Beg, back to her brother, and then struck eastwards across the desert to Ṭabas. It had at first been his intention to seek refuge in Transoxiana, but upon reaching the Murghāb he changed his mind and made for Herāt, where history was to repeat itself almost exactly. Like Nauruz before him, he trusted his life to the Kart ruler and like Nauruz he too was betrayed. Ordered by Abū Sa‘īd to execute the refugee, Ghiyāth al-Dīn, though bound by ties of friendship to Choban (as his brother Fakhr al-Dīn had been to Nauruz), had no choice but to obey. At his own request Choban was not beheaded but suffered an honourable death by strangulation, a finger of his hand being sent to the Īl-Khān as proof of his execution. His last wish that his body should be buried in Medina was carried out under the supervision of his daughter Baghādād Ḫatun, whom Abū Sa‘īd had now at last married, having compelled her husband Shaikh Ḥasan to divorce her. Choban, according to Ibn Baṭṭūta, was laid to rest, not in the mausoleum he had caused to be built for himself near the Mosque of the Prophet, but in the famous cemetery of Baqī’. “It was al-Jubān”, Ibn Baṭṭūta1 adds, “who had the water brought to Mecca”, referring to his restoration of the conduit of Zubaida “with the result that good water became abundant and cheap in Mecca during the Pilgrimage, and plentiful enough to grow vegetables in the city”.2 The pious Muslim did not forget his Mongol origins: his son by Princess Sati Beg was called Sorghan Shīra after his ancestor the Sūdūs tribesman who had helped the youthful Chingiz-Khān to escape from captivity amongst the Taichi’ūt.3

Temūr-Tash learnt of his father’s death at Qaisariyya; he fled by way of Lāranda (now Karaman) into the territories of the Mamlūk sultan, who had offered him asylum. At Cairo he was received at first with every honour but was afterwards imprisoned and put to death (22 August 1328). Nāṣir, desirous of keeping on good terms with Abū Sa‘īd, found it expedient to execute his guest rather than accede to the Īl-Khān’s request for his extradition. Had Temūr-Tash survived he might, after

the collapse of the Il-Khanid dynasty, have founded a successor state in Anatolia and so hampered and perhaps prevented the rise of the Ottoman empire. "His death," says Grousset,\footnote{L'Empire des steppes, p. 464.} "followed seven years later by that of Abū Sa'īd, left Anatolia without a master and liberated the local Turkish amirs, the Qaraman in the South-East and the Ottoman in the North-West. Thus the rise of the Ottoman Empire was an indirect consequence of events at the Il-Khanid court in the crucial years 1327–1335."

The duties of vizier were confided, after the death of Dimashq Khwāja, to Ghiyāth al-Din, the son of Rashīd al-Din, a minister, according to the contemporary historian Mustaufi,\footnote{Transl. Gibb, p. 540.} of such "angelic temperament" that "instead of punishing those who had wrought towards his noble family ill deeds whereof the recapitulation would disgust the hearts of my hearers, he drew the pen of forgiveness through the record of their crimes, recompensed their evil actions with good, and made each one of them an exemplar of the prosperity of this empire, raising them to the highest ranks, and entrusting to them the most important functions..." Such indeed was the vizier's complaisance or simplicity that we find him interceding with the Il-Khān on behalf of the rebellious viceroy of Khurāsān, Narin-Taghāi, who was plotting his downfall. The execution of Narin-Taghāi and his fellow conspirator the Amir Tāsh-Temūr in September 1329 ended the last serious threat to Abū Sa'īd's authority. Three years later Shaikh Hasan-i Buzurg, accused of conspiring with his former wife, Baghdād Khatun, to assassinate her husband, was banished to the castle of Kamākh (the modern Kemah) on the Western Euphrates. He was cleared of the accusation and in 1333 returned to Rūm as viceroy, a post which he still occupied when called to intervene in the struggles that followed Abū Sa'īd's death. In the summer of 1335 there were rumours that Öz-Beg was again preparing an invasion of the Il-Khān's dominions. The armies of Baghdād and Dīyārbakr were dispatched to Arrān and stationed along the Aq-Su. Abū Sa'īd followed in person; he died in the Qarabāgh area on 30 November 1335, his death being apparently due to poisoning though he had previously been attacked by some epidemic disease. The poison according to Ibn Baṭṭūta,\footnote{Quoted by Browne, vol. iii, pp. 56–7.} was administered by Baghdād Khatun, jealous of a younger rival, Dil-Shād Khatun, the daughter of her brother Dimashq Khwāja and afterwards the wife
of Shaikh Hasan-i Buzurg and the mother of his son and successor (1356–74) Shaikh Uvais.

The last of his line, Abū Sa‘īd was in no way degenerate or effete. He is described by Ibn Taghribirdi as “a brave and brilliant prince of majestic appearance, generous and witty”. He wrote an excellent hand in both the Mongol and the Arabic scripts, was a good musician and composed poetry in Persian, of which two specimens are preserved in the Ta’rikh-i Shaikh Uvais. Ibn Taghribirdi also praises him for demolishing churches, though in fact in matters of religion he seems to have continued the tolerant policy of his predecessors. It was during his reign that Pope John XII, by a bull dated 1 May 1318, had founded the archbishopric of Sultānīyeh, of which the first incumbent was Francis of Perugia, succeeded in 1325 by William Adam. And if he ignored the pope’s exhortation to embrace Christianity he at least paid some attention to his appeal to protect the Christian Armenians against their Muslim neighbours.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE IL-KHĀNID STATE

With the death of Abū Sa‘īd the House of Hūlegū had become virtually extinct. A prince of another line, Arpa Ke‘ūn, a great grandson of Tolui’s youngest son Arīg Bōke, was raised to the throne as his successor. A Mongol of the old school he showed himself during his brief reign a strong and energetic ruler in complete contrast to the puppets that were to follow him. One of his first acts was to order the execution of Baghdād Khatun, accused of correspondence with the Golden Horde and at least suspected of having poisoned her husband. In the depths of winter he confronted Öz-Beg across the Kur and, by an outflanking movement, put his forces to flight. Returning from this victory he consolidated his position by marrying Princess Sati Beg, the sister of Abū Sa‘īd and the widow of Choban; at the same time he put to death several Chingizid princes whom he saw as possible rivals. He had reckoned, however, without ‘Alī Pāḏshāh, the Oirat governor of Baghdad, who proclaimed a new khan, Mūsā, a grandson of Baidu, and took up arms against Arpa. A battle was fought on the Jaghatu on 29 April 1336; Arpa fled, defeated, was captured in Sultānīyeh and

1 Quoted by d‘Ohsoun, vol. iv, p. 717.
2 Persian text, pp. 155–6.
3 i.e. Prince Arpa, the Mongol ke‘ūn “son”, like its Turkish equivalent ʾoğul, being used as the title of princes of the blood.
brought to Üjān, where, on 15 May, he met his end at the hands of the son of one of his own victims. His vizier Ghiyāth al-Dīn, the son of Rashīd al-Dīn, was already dead, having been executed by the amīrs against ‘Ali Pādshāh’s wishes.

It was now that Shaikh Ḥasan-i Buzurg intervened in the struggle for power, setting up as his own claimant a great grandson of Mengü-Temür, a young child called Muḥammad. A battle between the rival khans in the Ala-Tagh area (24 July) resulted, through an act of treachery on the part of Shaikh Ḥasan, in the defeat of Mūsā and the death of ‘Ali Pādshāh. After pursuing Mūsā in the direction of Baghdad and inflicting heavy losses on his followers Ḥasan accompanied Muḥammad to Ṭabriz, where he fixed his residence and where he married Princess Dil-Shād, the favourite wife of Abū Saʿīd, who had recently borne him a posthumous child—a daughter. Meanwhile the amīrs in Khurāsān, hostile to Shaikh Ḥasan, had elected their own khan, Togḥa-Temūr, a descendant in the sixth generation of Chingiz-Khān’s brother Jochi-Qasar. Under his leadership they undertook the conquest of ʿAzarbājān and ʿĪraq-i ‘Ajam, arriving in March 1337, before Sulṭānīyeh. Shaikh Ḥasan judged it prudent to withdraw from Ṭabriz into Arrān, and the Khurāsānis proceeded to overrun the greater part of ʿĪraq, clashing with Mūsā’s men and finally making common cause with them against Shaikh Ḥasan. The two princes encountered their opponent in the Marāgheh area, at Soghurluq, according to the Taʾrīkh-i Shaikh Uvais,1 on 15 June. For some unexplained reason Togḥa-Temūr at once retired from the battlefield and did not draw rein until he had reached Bīstām. Mūsā for his part stood firm and gave a good account of himself, but was none the less defeated, captured in flight and taken to Shaikh Ḥasan, by whom, on 10 July, he was put to death. Despite his apparently pusillanimous conduct Togḥa-Temūr maintained control over Khurāsān and Māzandarān, while Shaikh Ḥasan’s authority in ʿAzarbājān and ʿĪraq was challenged from an altogether unexpected quarter.

His new antagonist was another Shaikh Ḥasan, the son of Temūr-Tash and the grandson of Choban, called Shaikh Ḥasan-i Kūchak or Shaikh Ḥasan the Little to distinguish him from his namesake. To advance his cause Ḥasan-i Kūchak conceived the idea of passing off a Turkish slave as his father Temūr-Tash who, he claimed, had escaped from prison in Egypt and had wandered for several years in distant

1 Transl. van Loon, p. 64.
lands. By this pretence he attracted to his party both the supporters of the Choban family and also the Oirat tribesman who had fought under Mūsā. Advancing under the banners of his spurious father he engaged Ḥasan-i Buzurg at a place called Naushahr ("New Town") in the Ala-Taḡ area on 16 July 1338. The latter, deceived by a ruse of Ḥasan-i Kūchak, withdrew on Tabriz leaving in the lurch his protégé, the young khan Muḥammad, who was captured and killed.

The pseudo-Temūr-Tash now thought to exploit this victory to his own advantage. He attempted to assassinate Ḥasan-i Kūchak, who, however, escaped and made his way to Georgia; he then advanced on Tabriz, hoping to occupy the town before his secret became known. He was defeated by Ḥasan-i Buzurg and, joining the Oirat whom the latter had expelled from Sulṭāniyeh, accompanied them to their encampment in the Baghdad region. Meanwhile Ḥasan-i Kūchak, who had joined Princess Sati Beg in Arrān, proclaimed that lady, the sister of Abū Saʿīd and the widow of his grandfather, as khan and advanced against his rival. The latter fell back on Qazvin, and Ḥasan-i Kūchak’s forces occupied Āzarbāijān; Ḥasan-i Buzurg then launched a counter attack, but before they actually came to blows an uneasy peace had been patched up between them. The advantage now being with his opponent Shaikh Ḥasan-i Buzurg tried another tack: he offered the throne of Abū Saʿīd to Toḡa-Temūr, who arrived in ‘Irāq-i ‘Ajam with his following in January or February 1339. By a Machiavellian ruse Ḥasan-i Kūchak succeeded in so discrediting this prince that he withdrew into Khūrāsān in the early summer. Ḥasan-i Buzurg then set up yet another khan, Jahān-Temūr, the son of Ala-Fireng and grandson of Geikhatu. Ḥasan-i Kūchak, not to be outdone, deposed Princess Sati Beg and replaced her by Sulaimān, a great grandson of Hūlegū’s third son Yoshmut, whom he forced her to marry. The two Ḥasans with their rival khans met in battle on the Jaghāt at the end of June 1340: Ḥasan-i Buzurg was defeated and fled to Baghdad, where he deposed Jahān-Temūr and himself assumed sovereignty as the founder of the Jalāyir dynasty.¹

The deposition of Jahān-Temūr may be regarded as the final dissolution of the Il-Khānid state. His rival, it is true, retained his nominal power a year or two longer, surviving the death² of his protector, but

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¹ Called also the Ilkānī dynasty after Ḥasan’s great grandfather, Ilge ( İlğa) Noyan, one of Hūlegū’s generals. See van Loon, p. 6.
² He was murdered by his wife in a manner described by Salmān of Sāveh in verses which, as Browne, who reproduces them (A Literary History of Persia, vol. III, p. 60), says, “hardly bear translation.”
then he too was deposed by Hasan-i Kūchak’s brother and, like Jahān-Temūr, vanishes into obscurity. So insignificant had these figureheads become that we are not even informed as to the time and manner of their death. The same applies to another puppet, Anushīrvaṇ, of Persian, Turkish or Il-Khānid origins, who replaced Sulaimān in 1344 and in whose name his Chobanid masters continued to strike coin until 1353. In the latter year Togha-Temūr, the last of the Persian Chingizids, was killed by the first of the Sarbadārs of Sabzavār, who, along with the Jalayirs in Baghdad and Tabrīz, the Muẓaffarids in Fārs and the Karts in Herāt, were to fill the vacuum left by the Il-Khāns until the advent, towards the end of the century, of another Mongol or semi-Mongol conqueror, Timūr, born, by a curious coincidence, in the same year in which Abū Saʿīd died.

The Il-Khāns, and before them the viceroys of the Great Khan, had dominated Western Asia for a period of more than 100 years. The economic decline of that region, induced by the havoc of the invasion, aggravated by the taxation policy of the earlier rulers and only partially arrested by the reforms of Ghazan will be examined elsewhere in this volume. Here is perhaps the place to consider the more positive consequences of Mongol rule. Unlike the Saljuqs, who entered the Iranian world already converted to Islam and with their backs turned upon their Oghuz past, the Mongols, whilst gradually abandoning their shamanist, Christian or Buddhist beliefs, never forgot their historical origins or severed their ties with their kinsmen in Eastern, Central and Northern Asia. The persistence of national feeling amongst their conquerors may well have strengthened the Persians’ own sense of nationalism, reinforcing the effect of what Minorsky has called the “Iranian intermezzo”, i.e. the period between the withdrawal of the Arabs and the arrival of the Ghaznavids and Saljuqs, an “interval of Iranian domination” but for which “the national tradition would have become blunted and the Safavids would have found it infinitely more difficult to restore the particular moral and cultural character which distinguishes Persia from her Muslim neighbours”.

Certainly this process of differentiation must have been greatly facilitated by the existence, for almost a century, of a centralized state occupying approximately the same area as the Sassanian

1 Strictly speaking Temūr (in Turkish “Iron”), the Taimūr/Teimūr usual in Middle Eastern countries and even the conventional European Tamerlane representing the original pronunciation more closely than the Orientalist’s Timūr.
2 See below, chapter 6.
3 Studies in Caucasian History, p. 110 n. 1.
empire and entering, for the first time since the Sassanians, into direct relations with the Christian West. The fact that Persian, under Il-Khānid patronage, now finally displaced Arabic as the vehicle of historical writing must also have encouraged nationalistic tendencies. But perhaps the greatest, if the least tangible, benefit of Mongol rule was the widening of Persia's horizons. Situated on the communication routes between East and West, Il-Khānid Iran was exposed to the influence of both China and Europe. The first Chinese to reach Persia seem to have been artillery men—mangonel experts—in the armies of Chingiz-Khān and Hülegū. Among the "numerous company of wise men from various countries" that were gathered around Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī in his Marāğheh observatory was one Fu Meng-chi who explained to him the principles of Chinese astronomy. There were, as we have seen, Chinese physicians at the Court of Ghazan. Chinese artists, operating for the most part, we must presume, in the Buddhist temples, were to leave an indelible impression upon Persian miniature painting. European contacts were mainly in the fields of commerce and diplomacy. Since the reign of Hülegū Italian merchants had been established in Tabriz, where they remained and prospered until after the death of Abū Sa‘īd; it was from their numbers that the Il-Khāns recruited their ambassadors and interpreters for the various missions to Europe; the most famous of them, the Polos, escorted from China to Persia a Mongol princess destined to be the bride of Ghazan. There is some evidence of the employment of European artisans: in the correspondence of Rashīd al-Dīn there is a letter addressed to his son, then governor on the Byzantine frontier, asking for the dispatch of twenty weavers, apparently to be purchased as slaves from a Cypriot slave-dealer. Of intellectual relations the only concrete evidence is Rashīd al-Dīn's History of the Franks, which is based on a Latin work translated for him by some unknown scholar, perhaps a monk or friar resident in Tabriz. The collapse of the Il-Khānid state followed by the rise of the Ming in Eastern and the Ottomans in Western Asia brought an end to all such intercourse. Had Ghazan lived longer or had he shed less royal blood at the commencement of his reign, relations with Europe would have been continued and perhaps intensified with incalculable consequences for the future. What is certain is that the Middle East would today bear an altogether different aspect if the House of Hūlegū had retained its full vigour for a decade or two longer.

1 Barhebraeus, p. 51.  
2 Quoted by Minorsky, "La Perse au Moyen Age", p. 421.
Table 1. The Great Khans and the Yuan Dynasty of China.
Table 2. The Il-Khans of Persia.
Table 3. The Khans of the Golden Horde, 1237-1357.
Table 4. The Chaghatai Khanate, 1227–1338.
CHAPTER 5

THE ISMĀ'ILĪ STATE

ISMĀ'ILĪ RULERS OF ALAMŪT

Dā'īs of Dailam

483/1090–518/1124: Hasan-i Sabbāh (34 years)
483/1090 Alamūt occupied
485/1092 Death of Nizām al-Mulk and Malik-Shāh
487/1094 Death of al-Mustansir; Nizāri schism
494/1100 Ahmad-i 'Atṭāsh in Shāhdiz
498/1104 Death of Berk-Yaruq; Muḥammad Tapar in power
500/1107 Fall of Shāhdiz
511/1118 Death of Muḥammad Tapar; Siege of Alamūt lifted

518/1124–532/1138: Buẓurg-Ummīd (14 years)
520/1126 Maimūn-Diz built
529/1135 Assassination of al-Mustarshid
532/1138–557/1162: Muḥammad b. Buẓurg-Ummīd (24 years)
532/1138 Assassination of al-Rāshid

Imāms of the Qiyāma

557/1162–561/1166: Hasan II ‘alā-dhikrihi ‘l-salām (4 years)
559/1164 The Qiyāma: Abolition of sharī'a law
561/1166–607/1210: Muḥammad II b. Hasan II (44 years)
588/1193 Death of Rāshid al-Dīn Sinān, head of Syrian Ismā'īlis
590/1196 Saljuqs replaced by Khwārazmians in ʿIrāq-i ʿAjam

Imāms of the Ṣatr

612/1215 Defeat of Mengi
628/1231 Death of Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn Khwārazm-Shāh
651/1253 Gird-Kūh holds out against the Mongols
653/1255–654/1256: Khur-Shāh Rukan al-Dīn b. Muḥammad III (1 year)
655/1257 Mongols massacre Ismā'īlis and kill Khur-Shāh

In the midst of states held together by direct military power alone, the Ismā'īlis—or “Assassins of Alamūt”—formed a challenging exception. From 483/1090 to 654/1256, they maintained a vigorous state of their own. Their state was small and widely scattered territorially, but it retained its cohesiveness throughout a series of upheavals that would have disrupted most polities, and it was strong enough to resist
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successfully the relentless enmity of the rest of Muslim society. In the cultural life of the time, moreover, the Ismā‘īlī state played a perceptible role—even to the point of acting as host to prominent non-Ismā‘īlī intellectuals. We cannot yet trace all the sources of its vitality, but we can make out some of them.

The student of Ismā‘īlī history is faced with problems that do not arise in the study of most dynasties. No Ismā‘īlī chronicles have survived intact. We must depend on the Sunni chroniclers, who were most of them blindly hostile to, and ignorant of, Ismā‘īlī internal developments. The most important exception is Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl Allāh, who was not only fair-minded but excerpted extensively the Ismā‘īlī chronicles surviving in his time.1 But the hostility of the chroniclers is a less serious obstacle than our ignorance of the institutions and intellectual assumptions of the Ismā‘īlīs. To understand the conditions prevailing among Sunni Muslims, we have access to a large body of literature which has been preserved in the Sunni tradition. The Ismā‘īlī tradition has preserved very little from that period—only a few doctrinal works. Often we are at a loss to understand what a given event meant in its Ismā‘īlī context, even when we are tolerably sure of the date of the event and some of its more visible features. Yet we understand better now than we used to.

Earlier Western scholarship, basing itself on the impressions of the Crusaders as well as on the Sunni tradition, was inclined to see in the Ismā‘īlīs a romantically diabolic "order of assassins", not quite human in their fanatical subservience to an enigmatic but self-seeking and all-powerful master, the "Old Man of the Mountain". This picture can no longer be taken seriously. As we use such Ismā‘īlī materials as are available and learn to sift the chronicles more cautiously, it proves to be chiefly legendary. But the reality that is emerging turns out to be almost as extraordinary as the legend. That this handful of villagers and small townsmen, hopelessly outnumbered, should again and again reaffirm their passionate sense of grand destiny, reformulating it in every new historical circumstance with unfailing imaginative power and persistent courage—that they should be able so to keep alive not

1 Rashīd al-Dīn’s section on the Ismā‘īlīs has now been edited by M. J. Dānesh-Pajuh and M. Modarresy (Tehrān, 1960). See also Juvainī, vol. iii, tr. J. A. Boyle, vol. ii. Other chronicles, notably that of Ibn al-Athīr, are cited in the relevant notes of Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Order of Assassins: the Struggle of the Early Nizari Ismā‘īlīs against the Islamic World (The Hague, 1955). See also pp. 25-6 of that work; and for the relationship between Rashīd al-Dīn and Juvainī, see ibid., p. 73 n.
only their own hopes but the answering fears and covert dreams of all the Islamic world for a century and a half—this in itself is an astonishing achievement. To comprehend it at all, we must understand the vital religious convictions out of which it grew.¹

1 The main steps in the development of Nizari studies by modern Westerners are traced in Hodgson's *Order of Assassins* (hereafter cited as *OA*), pp. 22–32. W. Ivanow has done especially important work; but his translations and interpretations are often very arbitrary and misleading, and warnings on their use are to be found in *OA*, pp. 31–2, 329, 232 n., 233 n. and 235 n. *The Order of Assassins* (unfortunately mistitled) seems to remain the standard work and will be referred to throughout this chapter. It suffers from some immaturity of scholarship: references are sometimes too imprecise and translations from the Persian too clumsy; above all, too slight an acquaintance with the general political life of the time occasioned some vagueness of focus. Several of its interpretations have been sharpened in this chapter (and some details made more precise). Nevertheless, the argument of the book seems to remain sound, so far as it goes; both political and theological history need to be further explored, however.
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elucidate with authority. But only the élite, wholly devoted to Islam, could recognize the special role of the imāms or appreciate the spiritual insight which resulted from their teaching. Exposure of these sacred matters before the common Sunnis would not enlighten them but might rather lead to profanation and persecution of the imām’s cause. Until the time was ripe for all mankind to see the truth, Shi’is were invited to exercise taqiyya (pious dissimulation), disguising their true convictions under a seeming conformity to the standards of the world. Only at the end of the age, with God’s aid, would the imām appear, in triumph, to vindicate his true adherents, and set the world to rights.

Among the several Shi’i movements, that of the Ismā’īlis was distinguished by being organized hierarchically and secretly. Ismā’īlis recognized Ismā’īl son of Ja’far al-Ṣādiq, and Ismā’īl’s son, as the authorized imāms. But for many years the imāms were held to be in hiding and inactive. Meanwhile, the organization seems to have been self-perpetuating. Adherents were ranked in several grades, in principle according to the degree to which they had advanced in the esoteric teachings ascribed to the imām. An adherent of an upper rank was set over adherents of a lower rank in his own area. Set over all adherents in a given province was the dā’i, or head of religious teaching.

The whole organization was kept secret on the principle of taqiyya. Among Ismā’īlis this taqiyya was more far-reaching than among most Shi’is: the adherent was initiated in a special ceremony and forbidden under oath to reveal anything about the teachings or membership of the community. The doctrine presented as the inner meaning, the bāṭîn, of the Qur’ān was correspondingly more elaborate. Whereas for some Shi’is it went little beyond the identification of various Qur’ānic phrases as symbolic references to the imām and to the Shi’is’ loyalty to him, for Ismā’īlis a whole spiritual cosmos was to be traced in the Qur’ān by those who held the clue—not only in the immediate symbolism of its words but in an extensive set of numerical correspondences. To be an Ismā’īlī was to share in the secrets of the universe. The historical origin of the hierarchism and secrecy of the Ismā’īlis is not clear, but in any case they made possible two things as disquieting to Sunnis as they were heartening to many Shi’is: a proliferation of cosmological and historical speculation, often rather sophisticated, without regard to its intelligibility to the masses; and at the same time
an extensive preparation of disciplined cadres to support any political move which the leadership should find desirable.1

After the triumph of Ismä'ilī power in Egypt in 257/969, when the Fāṭimid dynasty of caliphs was established, Ismä'ilī hopes everywhere were high. Some Ismä'ilīs may once have doubted the claims to the imāmate put forward by the leader of that section of the Ismä'ilī movement which now seemed to be blessed with success. But soon almost all Ismä'ilīs rallied to the Fāṭimid line. Throughout Iran they recognized the Egyptian Fāṭimids as the true 'Alid imāms, descendants of Ismā'il and entitled, as custodians of the spiritual inheritance of the Prophet, to exclusive obedience among all Muslims. The imām had at last appeared in power. As Fāṭimid arms were attended with victory in Syria and the Hijāz, and as Fāṭimid prestige and naval power ensured the new caliph's recognition from Sicily to Sind, Ismä'ilīs could hope that the promised days were at hand, when the imām was to reunite the Muslims, overwhelm the infidels, and "fill the earth with justice as it is now filled with injustice", the long-standing dream of all Shi'i's.

Now the whole movement was focused in Cairo at the Fāṭimid court, under the direction of the chief dā'i there. Dā'is in the Iranian highlands seem to have been responsible to the chief dā'i in points of doctrine and in planning overall strategy for the victory of the Ismä'ilī cause in their area—a victory identified with submission to the Egyptian caliphate. Efforts were made to convert local rulers, many of whom were in any case Shi'i in the tenth and early eleventh centuries, or to find support for military coups on behalf of the imām. As the result of one such coup, Baghdad itself was held briefly in the name of the Fāṭimid caliph. When an Ismā'ilī propagandist was ready to retire from such activities, or to withdraw from them for a time, he went to Cairo, where a number of Iranian Ismā'ilī philosophers, commonly persecuted at home, ended their lives as respected officials. Indeed, the intellectual leadership of Cairo was largely of Iranian origin.

But after the rise of Saljuq power, confidence in Egypt could not but be undermined. In Iran, the several localized dynasties established in

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Būyid times were replaced by a single strong power, ardently Sunni. The Egyptian government itself was manifestly weakening; under al-Mustansir in the 1060s it went through a period of internal chaos which paralysed its foreign policy. After this crisis, from 468/1074 on, the government was directed by a military man, Badr al-Jamālī, who kept the imām under his control. His foreign policy was defensive, and it was clear that he did not expect the Egyptian government to recover the lead it had once had. Its power remained visibly inferior to that of the Saljuqs during the rest of the eleventh century. The promised days of victory and justice seemed indefinitely postponed.

But the Ismāʿīlī movement in Saljuq lands, and especially in the Iranian highlands, continued as strong as and perhaps stronger than it was before the Egyptian Fāṭimids appeared and stirred the temporary hope of victory by way of their armies. Ismāʿīlīs seem to have been numerous in towns in all parts of Iran, but in this period we have evidence of them in the countryside only in a few areas. Many are reported to have been craftsmen and some appear as merchants; they were often led by men of the liberal professions. They made many converts among common soldiers and occasionally among lesser officers. It is easier to tell what they opposed than whether they had any very concrete positive plans. We have a few details which suggest dislike of the Turks, not surprising among Iranian and Arab populations whom military rule must have irked. (Hasan-i Šabbāh is reported as saying the Turks were jinn, not men.) Certainly, at least in a generalized way, they stood against the social injustice of a stratified society, which the occupation by Turkish troops seemed to aggravate; there is a story that the Ismāʿīlīs boasted of assassinating a vizier (Nizām al-Mulk) in revenge for his treatment of a carpenter—who was thus drastically asserted to be his equal. Finally, and perhaps most important, it is clear from the nature of their propaganda that they despised and resented the pettiness and aridity of the personal outlook sometimes encouraged by that shariʿa-minded Islam which was taught in the multiplying Sunnī madrasas. The Ismāʿīlīs were resisting the Sunnī intellectual and moral synthesis that is often regarded as the glory of the age—an age then being introduced by the Sunnīs after the victory of Sunnī power over the various Shīʿī dynasties.

Iranian Ismāʿīlīs, in their struggle with the spirit of the age, did not have to look so far as Egypt to find the means of some sort of co-ordination of their activities. The Ismāʿīlīs of the upper Oxus valleys, beyond
the Saljuq presence, had, at least at one time, a local dā'ī independently responsible to Cairo; at any rate they do not seem to have been involved, at least at first, in the movements which took place among the Ismā'īlis in the Saljuq lands. But many, if not most, of the Ismā'īlis under Saljuq rule seem to have owned the authority of a single superior dā'ī, whose headquarters were at Isfahān, the chief Saljuq capital. We know that 'Abd al-Malik-i 'Attash, dā'ī at Isfahān in the 1070s, was head of the movement throughout the west Iranian highlands, from Kirmān to Āzarbāijān, if not beyond. We do not know whether any dā'īs for Khurāsān and Kūhīstān or for Iraq or the Jazīreh were subordinated to him. It does appear that the Syrian Ismā'īlis, even though their province was being occupied by the Saljuqs, were not placed under Isfahān. But 'Abd al-Malik-i 'Attash was respected for his scholarship even in Sunni circles, and seems to have been a focus of widespread renewed Ismā'īli activity in the Saljuq dominions.1

During the 1080s the Ismā'īlis of the Saljuq lands were preparing active insurrection on an unprecedented pattern. Before any overt moves were made, the Ismā'īlis at Sāveh in 'Irāq-i 'Ajam were accused of murdering a muezzin lest he betray their secrets. More than one dedicated young man was sent to Egypt and came back ready to seize a fortress in revolt. By 483/1090, revolt broke out simultaneously in Dailam and Kūhīstān, and in the next few years in many other areas as well. This time the Ismā'īli hopes were not concentrated on a great army to sweep over all the Muslim lands from a single centre, on the model of the rise of the Egyptian Fātimids. Now they were looking to a multiplicity of risings everywhere at once, to overwhelm the established social structure from within.

1. REVOLT

The Ismā'īlis of the Iranian highlands and the Fertile Crescent were not destined to overthrow the Saljuqs but rather to found a society apart, which was set over against Muslim society as a whole. We shall trace the fate of this society in four phases, each representing a new departure in their relations with the outside world. After the failure of the initial revolt came the second period, that of stalemate, in which the Ismā'īlis were regrouped on a more permanent basis. From this basis they went

1 On the organization of those Ismā'īlis who were to become Nizāris, see O.A., pp. 45, 64, and 69.
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on, in a third period, to attempt a spiritual defiance, consummating their apocalyptic vision among themselves on the level of the inward life. Later yet, as history impinged even on their inwardness, they dreamed of world leadership in a quest which sent their envoys far beyond the old Saljuq territories, and which was terminated only by a special effort of the all-conquering Mongols. But the first and decisive moment was that of their great revolt.

Hasan-i Şabbāḥ at Alamūt

The role of any one man in great historical events is hard to isolate and is limited at best. In the case of Hasan-i Şabbāḥ, the most famous figure in the revolt, we have even less basis than usual for judging the role he played. Yet the accounts present him as more than just an ordinary leader, and his personality may well have offered the other Ismā'īlis a crucial rallying-point of unyielding strength. In any case, our story must revolve about him if only because he is the only figure about whom we have even moderately detailed evidence.

Hasan-i Şabbāḥ tells us, in an autobiographical passage, that he was brought up as a Shī'ī, but that he had supposed Ismā'īlism was just heretical philosophy till a friend whom he respected for his uprightness convinced him—without at first revealing himself as an Ismā'īli—that the Ismā'īli imām was the true one. Even so, Hasan hesitated to commit himself in the face of the popular opprobrium which the Ismā'īlis suffered. Only after an illness that had seemed fatal, when he thought he would die without having acknowledged the true imām, did he seek out an Ismā'īli propagandist and become initiated.¹

He came to the attention of 'Abd al-Malik-i 'Aṭṭāsh in due time, and was appointed to a post in the Ismā'īli organization and sent to Egypt, arriving there in 471/1078. On the way, he had to make a detour in southern Syria because of Turkish military operations at the very doorstep of the imām. What we have about his experiences in Egypt, then under the rule of Badr al-Jamālī, seems to be mostly legendary, but he did not see the imām himself and he cannot have been much encouraged to rely on Egyptian power to achieve anything for the Iranians in their own confrontation with Turkish military power. When he came back to Iran after two years, he set out on extensive travels throughout the west Iranian highlands, presumably

¹ On the biography of Hasan-i Şabbāḥ, see O.A., pp. 43–51.
propagandizing and getting acquainted with local circumstances. In the later 1080s he is represented as seeking an appropriate base for carrying out his part in the Isma‘ili revolt that was to come. We do not know whether this work was still under the direction of ‘Abd al-Malik-i ‘Aṭṭāsh, but this is likely, for his repute in the Sunni chronicles suggests he was still chief dā‘i in that period.

Eventually Ḥasan was appointed dā‘i of Dailam, potentially an important post since that was one of the few regions where the bulk of the population were already Shi‘i. He chose the fortress of Alamūt in Rūdbār (the valley of the Shāhrūd) in the Alburz [Elburz] mountains north of Qazvin as his base (see the map of Rūdbār and vicinity, p. 431). He won over the garrison to his views by way of secret emissaries, infiltrated the place with converts from elsewhere, and finally arrived himself under a pseudonym. The commandant, realizing the danger, had feigned conversion so as to ferret out the Isma‘ili leaders and get rid of them, but he had shown his hand too soon and now found himself impotent. Forced to come to terms with Ḥasan, he accepted a check in payment for the fortress and left. The date was 483/1090. Both Isma‘ilis and Sunnis regarded this as the first great blow in the revolt.

At about the same time, and at least partly inspired from Alamūt, the Isma‘ilis of several small towns in Kūhistān, the arid lands south of Khurāsān, declared their independence from the Saljuqs. Taking advantage of insults made by a Saljuq amīr to the locally respected Simjūrid family, they identified their cause with local self-respect, and seem to have won solid support in the population. When it became apparent that the local amirs could not cope with the Isma‘ilis either at Alamūt or in Kūhistān, larger Saljuq forces were sent in 485/1092 against them in both places. At Alamūt the Isma‘ilis were few in number at the moment, but some 300 Isma‘ilis were brought in from around Kazvin and Ray for the emergency, and the reinforced garrison, supported by Isma‘ilis from other parts of Rūdbār, was able to make a sally against the Saljuq forces. The Saljuqs were defeated and withdrew. Before they could make a new effort, first the vizier Nizām al-Mulk was assassinated and then Malik-Shāh himself died. The Saljuq force in Kūhistān concentrated on one small town, Dareh, but failed to take it before Malik-Shāh’s death led to the break up of the expedition. The Isma‘ilis had established permanent footholds.

Alamūt was physically a large towering rock, with steep slopes hardly

1 On the early revolt, see ibid. pp. 72–5.
negotiable on most sides, but with a considerable expanse at its top where extensive building could be done. Situated in mountainous terrain, its approaches could be guarded with relative ease. Yet it was strategically placed, commanding the shortest passage between Qazvin and the Caspian coast, while control of Rūdbār as a whole could permit harassment of the main route between all 'Irāq-i 'Ajam and the Caspian. The Dailamī inhabitants of the area had been long noted for their military capabilities as well as for their Shi'i inclinations. It was not the first time Alamūt had served as a rebel’s stronghold.¹

In the years following 485/1092, while intestine Saljuq quarrels gave the Ismā‘īlīs a respite, Ḥasan-i Šabbāh made Alamūt as impregnable as possible. He strengthened the fortifications and built up a great store of provisions. It is said he caused vast storerooms to be hollowed out in the rock, in which large amounts of food could be kept in good condition for a long time—presumably largely cut off from air and especially from warmth. He also took care to arrange irrigation for the fields immediately around Alamūt. Physically, Alamūt became as nearly self-sufficient as might be, ready to resist an indefinite siege. Likewise the mood of Alamūt became martial. Personally, Ḥasan set an austere example. Once he had taken up residence there, he is said to have left the four walls of his house only twice, and twice to have gone up on the roof; he spent his time writing and directing operations.

He had his two sons executed, one on the charge of murder (which later proved false) and the other on that of wine-drinking; he sent away his wife and daughters to spin along with other women in a distant fortress at a time of difficulty, and never brought them back. It is said that Isma'ili chiefs followed his precedent and never had their women with them while they were executing military command, in contrast to usual Muslim practice. Though Alamut was probably not the official centre of the movement at first, it was in a position to offer leadership at need.

Once Alamut was secured and much of Kuhistan independent, the rising proceeded rapidly. A year before Malik-Shah’s death, another fortress had been seized (in 484/1091): Sanamkuh near Abhar, in the mountains westward from Qazvin. On Malik-Shah’s death (485/1092), the quarrels between Berk-Yaruq and Tutush and then Muhammad Tapar called troops away from any efforts they might have made against the Isma'illis; moreover, they created just the conditions of uncertainty and disorder in which the Isma'ilis found numerous opportunities for action and also, perhaps, a more sympathetic hearing for their message of resistance against the Turkish rulers.
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Within a few years the Ismā‘īlīs held strongholds in a number of mountainous zones in the Iranian highlands. (See the map of the Ismā‘īlī state.) Along with Alamūt and some neighbouring places at the western end of the Alburz, they seized at least two other places of defence at the eastern end of that range. In Kūhistān—not a mighty mountain range yet mountainous enough and relatively inaccessible in central Iran just east of the deserts—they controlled a group of towns extending north and south over 200 miles. In the Zagros range, especially in the south around Arrajān, they seized several forts at key spots. In 488/1095, a captain said to be an Ismā‘īlī was entrusted with the town of Takrit on the Tigris, north of Baghdad; but this town does not seem to have become Ismā‘īlī in sentiment. Less decisive Ismā‘īlī activity is reported from many towns throughout the area of Saljuq rule—even where fortresses were not seized, the Ismā‘īlīs became an active faction in the cities, even, as in Kirmān and Aleppo, winning the support of Turkish amirs themselves, at least for a time.¹

The new doctrine

The official Ismā‘īlī doctrine at Cairo had developed into a complex and sophisticated cosmological system, in which one might think the only role of the dā‘īs and other ranks in the organization was to learn and teach a proliferating stock of esoteric lore. All this learning was certainly not rejected by those Ismā‘īlīs who were launching the rebellion. But observers got the impression that there was a “new teaching” associated with the movement which could be contrasted with the old; and this would not be surprising. If there was, however, it was not a wholly new system but a new emphasis and development of a doctrine of long standing among Ismā‘īlīs and indeed among Shi‘īs generally: the doctrine of ta‘lim, authoritative teaching. Those Sunnīs who were most closely acquainted with the Ismā‘īlī movement at the time concentrated on this doctrine as the main Ismā‘īlī thesis, and later Ismā‘īlī writings refer to the doctrine in contexts which likewise associate it with the time of the revolt. In its fully developed form, the doctrine is ascribed in particular to Ḥasan-i Sabbāh, who expounded it in a Persian essay. But we cannot assume that he is the one who developed it; ‘Abd al-Malik-i ‘Attāsh, for instance, was intellectually

¹ Cf. ‘Izz al-Dīn Ibn al-Aṯīr, al-Kāmīl fi‘l-ta‘rīkh, A.H. 492, 494, 500; and O.A. pp. 75–8, which the present account makes more precise.
active and was more prominent than Hasan at the time when the doctrine was first taken notice of; but we have no writings of his to go by.\footnote{On the authorship and role of the new doctrine, see O.A., p. 52; also pp. 131–2.}

The Shi'is had always condemned the Sunnis for presuming to choose for themselves in religious questions—starting with the choice of Abū Bakr as first caliph, admittedly not designated by Muḥammad as his successor, whereas the Shi'is were sure that 'Alī had been divinely indicated as the successor. Then the Sunnis had continued, in the Shi'i view, to interpret religious truth and in particular the shari'a law arbitrarily, according to their own sense of propriety: they even called the founders of their great schools of law imāms, though these founders could claim no special status except that which resulted from the respect accorded them by their own followers. The Shi'is, in contrast, claimed to base their understanding of religious truth and law on the teaching of true imāms, designated not by human choice but (like the Prophet himself) by divine election. If Islam could be founded only by divine authority, surely it must be interpreted also by divine authority. Men were no more in a position to decide on ultimate truth in subsequent times than in the time of Muḥammad himself. Accordingly, over against the Sunnī systems of determining law the Shi'is set their own doctrine, that one must seek the only authoritative teaching, ta'lim, that of the authoritatively designated 'Alid imāms.

As to how Muslims were to know who was the true imām, Shi'is were not at a loss to adduce evidentiary miracles; but every sophisticated person knew how limited the evidentiary strength of any wonder is; hence on a sophisticated level the Shi'i case was really made to rest on history. If one were once convinced, by the logic of the situation, that a true imām must have been designated (for God would not be so inconsistent as to appoint a prophet and then leave mankind in the dark as to the imāms to come after him), then one looked for any relevant indications; and it was not hard to find anecdotes about the Prophet which could be construed as designating 'Ali to succeed him. 'Ali in turn, and each of the other imāms, could be assumed to have designated his own successor.

But such a proof of the imām's identity is by no means rigorous. Moreover it presupposes that one has already accepted Muḥammad as Prophet. In Ḥasan's book, mentioned by several writers and sum-
marized for us by Shahrastānī, this argument was transformed into an incisive and self-contained instrument for validating the Ismāʿīlī position regardless of one’s prior commitment. Hasan’s work established four propositions. First, either one needs a teacher to know ultimate truth—truth about God—or one does not; but if not, one has no grounds for preferring one’s own speculations to those of another, since this is implicitly to teach the other, or at least to accept one’s own authority in preference to his. With this proposition, the position of Muslims generally was asserted against philosophers who denied the need for any authority at all. The second proposition was that either the required teacher must be authoritative, or any teacher will do; but if any teacher will do, we are in as bad a situation as if we had no teacher at all, for we have no ground for preferring one teacher to another. With this proposition, the Shi‘is’ insistence on authoritative teaching, ta’lim, was asserted against the Sunnis, who, in any given generation, must depend on a host of learned men none of whom is inherently more authoritative than the others. But Hasan’s third proposition brought out the weakness of the ordinary Shi‘is themselves. Either the authority of the authoritative teacher must be proved or any teacher may be accepted as authoritative, which would leave us where we were before; but how can his authority be proved except on the basis of some further authority?—which authority would have to be proved in turn.

With the fourth proposition, Hasan showed how the authority of the final teacher could be known not through something beyond itself but by way of the structure of knowledge itself. All true knowledge requires a contrast of two opposites, which can be known only through each other; thus we can conceive the (Aristotelian) “necessary” only by contrast to what is merely possible—and the “possible” only by contrast to what is inherently necessary. Neither can be conceived without the other. Again, in the phrase “no god but God”, the unique God can be conceived properly only by contrast to the many godlings; while we see the inanity of these godlings only by contrast to God Himself. The phrase “no god but God”, in turn, cannot stand without its complement, “Muḥammad is God’s Prophet”: God’s unity can be properly known only by way of the Prophet’s revelation, while the very notion of prophethood presupposes the idea of God. A like conjunction of opposites determines the very source of ultimate knowledge itself—the relation between the individual
person who wishes to know and the authoritative teacher whom he must discover. The reasoning of the individual, if he pursues it rigorously, leads him to the dilemma presented in the third proposition: not only can the reason not discover ultimate truth for itself, it cannot even determine what authority to turn to. On the other hand, the claimant to ultimate authority, the imām, cannot substantiate his claims by recourse to any proof beyond himself, or he ceases to claim ultimate authority. But put the individual’s reasoning and the authoritative teacher, the imām, together, and each solves the other’s dilemma. What the individual’s reasoning does is show him, not the imām, but his need for the imām and for his teaching, his ta’līm. It is only when reasoning has reached this point that the imām can present himself as fulfilling this very need. That imām, then, is true who does not allege extraneous proofs for his imāmate but only his own existence as fulfilling the need which, and only which, reasoning can demonstrate. This imām, said Ḥasan, is the imām of the Ismā‘īlīs.¹

Such an argument presupposes that there is a truth which is absolute and ultimate and yet unconditionally rational—a common enough assumption, in pre-modern times at least, which only Sūfis were successfully challenging in Ḥasan’s day. Given this intellectual atmosphere, the argument was hard to refute directly. Moreover, as compared with the general Shi‘ī notion of ta’līm, the more refined doctrine of ta’līm which Ḥasan presented was not only more rigorous logically but more self-sufficient. It did not deduce the position of the imām from the position of the Prophet, but rather deduced the prophethood of Muḥammad from the office of the imām, whose authoritative teaching provided the only ultimate demonstration of the validity of prophethood. Thus the Ismā‘īlī doctrine was supported on its own terms independently of any doctrine accepted by the Sunni community at large.

The rigor and self-sufficiency of the doctrine were appropriate to the new sternness required of a movement in active and universal revolt. In effect, it laid its emphasis upon the movement itself, rather than on any ulterior reality or purpose to which the movement was the means. The imām was self-sufficient and the movement to establish his authority was self-contained, not to be justified by any given practical consequences. The critics complained that, in effect, this authoritative teacher taught nothing but his own authority. For men in the stress

¹ Shahrastānī’s summary of Ḥasan’s book is translated in the appendix to O.A and analysed there on pp. 52–61.
of an all-encompassing rebellion, it was precisely loyalty to the move­
ment—expressed as loyalty to the imām as its head—that mattered; once they were committed to the revolt, there was no leisure to con­
sider questions which might divide or at least confuse them. Presum­
ably, indeed, older and less urgent Ismā'īlī doctrines continued to be taught, but Ḥasan’s doctrine of ta'lim could well help to unite and discipline the movement in its immediate urgency.

The schism

In the midst of the risings, the Ismā'īlī movement suffered an internal schism which tested the vitality of its doctrine. In 487/1094 died al-Musta'nsir of Egypt. The Fāṭimid state was now in the hands of al-Afdal, son of Badr al-Jamālī, as vizier. Badr had married al-Afdal's sister to a younger son of al-Mustanṣir, whom al-Afdal now raised to the caliphate as al-Musta'li. But it was an older son, Nizār, who had been known to have been designated by al-Mustanṣir as future imām. Nizār revolted with the support of an anti-Afdal military faction and of the Ismā'īlī qādī of Alexandria, and was put down only the next year.

Within Egypt and in the Yemen, the majority of Ismā'īlis went along with al-Afdal and accepted al-Musta'li as the true imām; but in Syria the Ismā'īlis were sharply divided, and in the rest of the Saljuq-ruled lands they insisted on the rights of Nizār, which they continued to recognize even when he was finally executed. The Iranian Ismā'īlis did not, however, attempt then to interfere actively in Egypt, nor did they even identify any one of the descendants of Nizār as claimant to power in Egypt.

For the Egyptian state it was an advantage to retain power in the vizierial family by recognizing their creature, al-Musta'li. Al-Afdal continued the cautious and firm policies of his father. But what was advantageous to the conservative Egyptian state would have been at most an encumbrance to the rebels against the Saljuqs, to whom the state gave no effective support. For the Iranians, it may well have been with relief that they found themselves no longer tied to the Fāṭimid power, free to pursue their own policies without the danger of in­
appropriate intervention from Cairo.

The justification of the schism, however, was quite legitimately doctrinal. The basis on which the Ismā'īlis, at least retrospectively, had justified their adherence to Ismā'īli and his son (as against Mūsā, whom
the Twelvers followed) was that Ja’far al-Ṣadiq had explicitly designated Isma‘īl as the next imām, and that a subsequent designation of another son—supposing it had occurred—could not validly supersede the first designation. Al-Afdal claimed that al-Mustanṣir had designated al-Musta‘lī on his deathbed, but it was understandable that pious Isma‘īlis should hold by the earlier designation of Nizār. Nevertheless, on Nizār’s death a difficulty arose. Nizār seems to have designated no one of his sons as his successor; at any rate, no Nizārid rose to claim the imāmate. Who then was the imām of the rebel Isma‘īlis (who now called themselves Nizāris)?

Before long, many outsiders and probably some Nizārī Isma‘īlis believed that a son or grandson of Nizār had been smuggled out of Egypt and was kept secretly at Alamūt. But we have no evidence that this was done, and some evidence that it was not: later, the Egyptian government could claim to know that all the male descendants of Nizār were quiescent; the notion of a descendant of Nizār being at Alamūt had to take the form of his having been a posthumous son by a slave girl, and hence unknown in Cairo. At any rate, at Alamūt no account seems to have been taken of the presence of any Nizārid. If we may judge by bits and shreds of evidence in later Isma‘īli works, no imām at all was named, after Nizār. It was known that one of the Nizārids must be he, but not which one. Eventually, it seems, Ḥasan-i Sabbāh, as the most important of the dā‘īs, was recognized as hujja, “proof”, of the imām. The term hujja had already been used, at least informally, of a figure in the ideal spiritual hierarchy ranking next after the imām; now its use seems to have become more precise: Ḥasan was custodian of the Isma‘īli mission until the imām should reappear, at which time he would point out the imām to the faithful.

When this interpretation was adopted we cannot tell, but there is nothing against its having been adopted already in Ḥasan’s lifetime; perhaps it was accepted at the same time as his leadership of the whole movement. We have still less way of knowing how Ḥasan himself felt about the doctrine, which presumably had not been taught him by any actual imām though it concerned the most ultimate truths, which should come by ta‘lim. Yet the imām had been inaccessible to the faithful before, in the days before the rise of the Fāṭimids, and Ḥasan might

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1 The Nizāris are properly to be distinguished, not from “Musta’lians”, but from the Tayyibis on the one hand and the Ḥāfizis on the other. For a discussion of the schism see O.4, pp. 62–9.
THE SCHISM

well feel himself divinely singled out, with his logical gifts, for bearing a burden now which someone had borne before. For the faithful generally, the expectation of the near-coming of a promised imām, whose mere humanity meanwhile was veiled by absence, might be more inspiring than a present and all-too-human ruler who in fact contributed nothing positive to the cause anyway. In Ḥasan’s doctrine, the role of the imām had become so abstract as to amount to little more than a guarantee of the validity of the Ismāʿīlī movement as such. In the atmosphere of total dedication and imminent expectations which must have surrounded the Ismāʿīlī risings, such a role could be played perhaps as well by an abstract postulate as by a distant and irrelevant monarch.

Methods of struggle

The revolt was unprecedented in form. The very leadership of the risings in their first years seems to have been as decentralized as the sites of their activity. After ‘Abd al-Malik-i ‘Attāsh’s death, there is no assurance that the dāʾī of Isfahān had even a nominal precedence over an important dāʾī like that of Dailam. But the dāʿīs did co-operate, and the revolt soon showed a characteristic overall pattern precisely in its co-ordinated decentralization.

Many movements which aimed at reforming Muslim society had taken as their model Muḥammad’s emigration to Medina, accordingly, they set up a dār al-hijra, a place of emigration, as headquarters for their campaign, from which to return victoriously into Muslim society at large as Muḥammad had returned to Mecca. For the early Khārijīs this had been a military camp to which all the truly faithful ought to move, and which commonly was shifted freely about the countryside as a base for something like guerilla warfare. For the Šīʿīs it had usually been a fixed base, where a strong army could be recruited and from which the other provinces could be conquered in regular military operations, as had happened in the rise of the ‘Abbāsids and of the Fāṭimids. For the rebel Ismāʿīlīs now there were many dār al-hijras, as many as there were local groups who could seize a stronghold for themselves and hold out against the established rulers. But all these dār al-hijras formed one community, and if one of them was lost, its people could find refuge in another.

At almost every town there was an Ismāʿīlī cell. Such cells seem to have become the nucleus for armed bands, which—like some other
armed bands formed in the artisan population—could even be accepted as allies in the fighting by one Saljuq faction against another. It was such armed bands that seized key fortresses as defensible headquarters—or occasionally were granted them by an amīr who was glad to use their support. Such fortresses were garrisoned in a fairly conventional way: in each case, the troops were likely to owe allegiance first to their immediate commander, and only through him to the Saljuq regime or some faction in it. Hence it was not always immediately clear whether a given fortress was in Ismāʿīli hands or merely in the hands of a commander willing to use Ismāʿīli manpower. When necessary, an Ismāʿīli garrison could maintain its position by offering submission to some Saljuq amīr—which merely meant that it would send him part of any taxes raised on the surrounding lands and send forces to join in his battles. In the towns themselves, naturally, the ambiguity was even greater. Since the Ismāʿīlis kept their allegiance secret, only the fulltime leaders were likely to be identified with any certainty by public rumour. As the Sunni public came to recognize the revolt as a serious threat, the Ismāʿīlis still in the towns began to look like a secret fifth column within the gates.

The decentralized pattern of the revolt was appropriate to the times. There was no longer, after Malik-Shāh’s death, a single all-powerful Saljuq ruler to be replaced. But even before his death, with the decay of a centralized bureaucracy, the Islamic lands had come to be increasingly parcelled out in the hands of individual commanders of garrisons; to subdue the Saljuq domains meant subduing them all piecemeal. Even on the civilian side, the social structure put power in the hands of individuals of local standing, qādis or prominent ‘ulamā—individuals whose power often resulted less from any special office dependent on a central authority than from relatively informal ties of local prestige and private patronage. There scarcely existed any single target for a military conquest by a regularly organized army, conquest which would have resulted in the submission of an obedient realm as had happened in Egypt. If the Ismāʿīlis were to win, it was reasonable to expect that, at least at first, it would be locality by locality, fort by fort.

The same atomization of power suggested the use of an important auxiliary technique for achieving military and political aims: assassination. Where local authority was relatively personal, so that an official furnished with basically the same means of power as another official did not automatically succeed him, the elimination of a key individual
could disrupt any social undertaking. Thus the death of Malik-Shâh automatically terminated the expedition against Kûhistân; it was thought of, not as a project of the state, but as the personal command of Malik-Shâh himself, and the new ruler would have to launch it all over again if he cared to. In these circumstances, assassination was quite commonly resorted to by all factions.

At first, doubtless, the Ismâ'îlis resorted to it as an occasional convenience, as did anyone else. But before long they made a relatively systematic use of it. It is clear that they did not rely solely on assassination or the threat of it, nor did they always bring it into play even in the case of notorious enemies. But they used it sufficiently often so that almost any assassination was likely to be ascribed to them, and many prominent Sunni figures took precautions against it—even to wearing armour beneath their regular clothes. The Ismâ'îlis seem to have thought of it as a specially meritorious service in the war for the holy cause; those ready to accomplish missions of assassination were called fida'îts, devotees, and received special honour. (And if they were killed in action they would be rewarded as martyrs in Paradise, of course, according to the general Muslim doctrine.) Perhaps it was felt that it was better to kill one great man who caused trouble than to slaughter many ordinary men on a battlefield—a viewpoint presumably more acceptable to the Ismâ'îlis, who looked on the Sunni leaders as traitors to Islam, than to the Sunnis, who thought that the death of a great man, on whom the social order depended, was more disastrous than the death of many peasants. Certainly the risky action of killing a great man, who was normally surrounded by armed servants, was glorified as heroic. The Ismâ'îlis preferred to do it in as public a setting as possible, since part of the purpose was to intimidate any others who took too strong a position against them. Many of the murders were consequently highly dramatic; and the assassins did not often escape with their lives.

The Ismâ'îlis' readiness to use assassination went so far, it seems, that already in the days of the revolt they were willing to use it not only for their own immediate purposes but also in aid of non-Ismâ'îli political allies. Much later the Ismâ'îli chiefs were willing to hire out assassins to relatively friendly rulers for pay, but in the time of the revolt, even if an assassination were on behalf of a friend, it was clearly undertaken with an eye to the strategic advantage to the Ismâ'îlis of that friend's career; no clear line could be drawn between the several
purposes for which assassination might be used. It is doubtful if the assassinations were specially ritualized at that period, or that the assassins formed a special corps, as later they probably did; all Ismāʿīlīs called one another “comrades”, and presumably all were in principle ready to perform any needful act in the common struggle. But doubtless some men held themselves in special readiness and were likely to be called on. It seems that at some point the practice arose of sending Ismāʿīlīs to insinuate themselves into the households of various great men as servants, who would be in a position to kill such men if they made themselves troublesome. A dramatic warning could be given—a knife by the sleeping man’s cushion, with a note attached—so that the man would realize his peril without being able to identify the responsible member of the household, and be persuaded, by way of precaution, to curb his hostility to the Ismāʿīlīs.¹ It is not clear how often such means were used, but one or two cases would be sufficient to stimulate a general fear of such secret Ismāʿīlī agents; no one knew whether he was one of those selected for secret surveillance. That fear would be quite as effective in many cases as the actual presence of an Ismāʿīlī in a given household. Nevertheless, normally assassination was carried out not by members of the household but by men specially sent to perform it, who stalked their victim till an appropriate occasion offered—as at a mosque or in a bath.

The assassinations were balanced almost from the beginning by massacres. The assassination of a popular leader or preacher who had initiated or incited action against the Ismāʿīlīs could rouse the Sunnī population of a town to round up all those in town who were suspected of being Ismāʿīlīs and then kill them summarily. Those who took the lead in such a massacre became themselves, in turn, the targets of assassination attempts. Massacres and assassinations appear together, frequent in some periods and areas, infrequent in others; rarely was one phenomenon unaccompanied by the other. The massacres were spurred by tales of Ismāʿīlī atrocities—Ismāʿīlīs were accused of bearing an indiscriminate hostility against mankind, or at least against all Muslims, and no sadistic practice seemed too improbable to be ascribed to them. About 486/1093 ʾIṣfahān was outraged by the report that a certain couple had been luring passing young men into an obscure alley (a blind man would ask a young man to guide him home there) and

¹ Such a ruse was employed, according to Juvaini (transl. Boyle, pp. 681–2), by Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ himself in order to intimidate Sulṭān Sanjar.
METHODS OF STRUGGLE

putting them to death in their house in exquisite and gradual tortures; the couple were identified as Ismāʿīlī, and they and all others accused of the same allegiance were dragged to a large bonfire and burned alive. As in all such cases of mass fright, many besides Ismāʿīlīs fell victim to the massacres: anyone could get rid of an enemy by making a plausible accusation.¹

Between assassinations and massacres, popular feeling hardened against the Ismāʿīlīs. They were called by many names, notably Bātiniyya (men of the bātin, the inner meaning of texts); Malāhīda (heretics par excellence); and in Syria Hashishīyya (smokers of hasḥīsh, narcotic hemp). The latter name was sufficiently current locally to be picked up by the Crusaders, under the form “Assassin” (from Ḥashšābin); it became the normal Occidental designation of the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs and was ultimately used, as a common noun, for anyone who committed what readers of Crusading history associated most with them: public murders. The name also became the basis for several modern misunderstandings. It has been supposed, for instance, that the fidaʿīs sent on assassination missions were drugged with hasḥīsh—which would have been singularly inappropriate to the patient waiting and perfect timing which the assassinations required. It has also been supposed, on the basis of a modern reinterpretation of Muslim legends, that hasḥīsh was used to give the fidaʿīs dreams of Paradise, convincing them to kill the more readily so as to go to Paradise as their reward; but for this there is no more real evidence than for the other. The name seems to have been used simply as an ugly sobriquet, perhaps on the basis of some now-forgotten local incident. In any case, it represented the popular feeling, which combined contempt and hatred with a bewildered astonishment at the Ismāʿīlīs’ mad courage.²

The Saljuq counteroffensive

At the start of the revolt it was still possible to evaluate the Ismāʿīlīs in differing ways. It seems that several, but not all, captains on Berk-Yaruq’s side looked on the Ismāʿīlī bands as little more than another faction among the subject population, to be co-operated with when convenient, as would be done with local bands of Sunnis. Berk-Yaruq’s

¹ On the methods used in the struggle and in its repression, see O.A., pp. 77–84, 87–9, 110–15; on assassination, see especially pp. 82–4, 110–15.
² On the name “Assassin”, see O.A., pp. 135–7, and references there.
THE ISMĀ'ĪLĪ STATE

brothers and enemies, Muḥammad and Sanjar, gained prestige among the more consciously Sunnī by refusing any dealing with the Ismā'īlis. But whatever the amirs' attitude, none of them on either side had leisure to campaign against the Ismā'īlis, except sporadically as the occasion arose in the course of other activities. From the time of the schism with Egypt till the death of Berk-Yaruq (498/1104), the Ismā'īli fortunes seemed to be steadily on the rise.

About 492/1099 the ra'īs Muẓaffār, a secret Ismā'īlī well connected among the Saljuq officers at Isfahān, persuaded one of Berk-Yaruq's amirs to acquire Gird-Kūh, a strong fortress in the Alburz near Dāmghān in Qūmīs, and to install him there as his lieutenant. Gird-Kūh was along the main route between western Iran and Khurāsān—part of the famous route between the Fertile Crescent and the Mediterranean to the west and the Tarim Basin and China to the east. As Ḥasan had done at Alamūt, the ra'īs Muẓaffār strengthened and stocked up the fortress as for an indefinite siege. A troop of Ismā'īlīs from Kūhistān intervened on Berk-Yaruq's side shortly after, in 493/1100, in a battle near there between the ra'īs's patron and Sanjar, but they were unable to save the day for Berk-Yaruq; and the ra'īs's patron was killed in the fighting. The ra'īs nevertheless carried his patron's treasure to Gird-Kūh and held that stronghold, some time afterward openly declaring himself an Ismā'īlī.

But even closer to the middle of things, at least politically, was the seizure of the fortress Shāhdīz not far from Isfahān. Ahmad-i 'Attāsh, the son of 'Abd al-Malik, set up as schoolmaster at the garrison, which was composed of presumably Shi'i Dailamīs, and won them over; by about 494/1100 he was master of the place, and soon the Ismā'īlīs were able to collect taxes in the nearby lands to the detriment of the Saljuq treasury. The Ismā'īlīs seized a second fortress in the vicinity, Khālinjān, about the same time. Ahmad's father is said to have retired to Alamūt under Ḥasan's protection at about this time, as a result of rising hostility in Isfahān; but the report seems questionable. In any case, he was no longer active by now. Ahmad had the reputation of being a learned man, though not so much so as his father; the Sunnī reports speak of him as if he were his father's successor as dā'i at Isfahān and probably as head of the whole Nizārī movement.

By this time, the association of some of Berk-Yaruq's captains with the Ismā'īlīs was proving disastrous. While the opposing Saljuq forces accused all Berk-Yaruq's men of Ismā'īlism, and Berk-Yaruq
THE SALJUQ COUNTEROFFENSIVE

was held responsible for Ismâ'îli attacks on amirs who opposed him, he was himself attempted by assassins when he appointed a vizier who was strongly anti-Ismâ'îli. In 494/1101, Berk-Yaruq in western Iran and Sanjar in Khurâsân came to an agreement to regard the Ismâ'îlis no longer as local bands but as a general threat to Saljuq power, and to act against them. The chief fruit of Berk-Yaruq’s resolve was a grand massacre of suspected Ismâ'îlis at Isfahân, Baghdad, and elsewhere. Army officers were especially affected and several of them fled. Sanjar, with fewer friends of the Ismâ'îlis to purge within his own ranks, sent instead an expedition against Tabas in Kûhistân, which was said to have been bought off after causing much devastation; and three years later he sent another which wrecked Tabas and destroyed as much else as possible. The second expedition, as a jihâd (holy war), was joined by many Sunni volunteers in addition to the regular troops, and the Ismâ'îli captives, as apostates, were enslaved. Yet the next year Ismâ'îlis from Turshiz in Kûhistân were in a position to raid a Sunni caravan as far west as Ray; and in Berk-Yaruq’s lands no Ismâ'îli fortresses seem to have been overthrown at all.

Meanwhile, the Ismâ'îli position was being consolidated in Rûdbâr, where several other fortresses were aligned with Alamût, apparently in many cases by agreement with the local leaders, who received aid from the Ismâ'îlis against domination from Ray and Qazvîn. The most important addition was Lanbasar, considerably west of Alamût in the Shâhrûd valley. After its garrison went back on their first agreement with the Ismâ'îlis, it was re-subjugated by Hasan’s lieutenant Buzurg-Ummîd and built into a major stronghold. In Syria in this period the Ismâ'îlis controlled as yet no fortresses, but they were strong in Aleppo and in the nearby towns of the Jazr region, and they enjoyed the patronage of Ridwân, Saljuq amîr of Aleppo.

With the advent to power of Muḥammad Ta’par, however, the more important dynastic disputes ended and the Saljuq forces made greater headway against the Ismâ'îli revolt. Even in Syria, Ridwân turned gradually against the Ismâ'îlis, who had become embarrassing, and he allowed more than one massacre of them; on his death in 507/1113, they were scattered from their headquarters in Aleppo and for some time sought vainly a citadel which they could hold for their own. Most of the Ismâ'îli strongholds in the Zagros mountains seem to have fallen during Muḥammad’s reign. In 500/1107 Muḥammad sent an expedition against Takrit; to avoid letting it fall into his hands, its
master turned it over to an Arab chief, Sadaqa, who was a Shi'i but no Isma'ili.

The most important project, led by Muhammad in person, was to rid the neighbourhood of Iṣfahān of its Isma'īlis. Āḥmad-i ‘Attāsh negotiated long and, for a time, successfully to maintain himself in Shāhdiz, arguing that he was a Muslim and should be accepted as a legitimate garrison chief so long as he submitted to Muhammad's overall direction—that is, above all, paid him tribute and served in his wars. There were those in Iṣfahān who were willing to let him serve if in future he would indeed be obedient to the Saljuq ruler. But the more zealous Sunni ulamā turned the day by arguing that the Isma'īlis were not in fact true Muslims; that by exalting the batin, the supposed inner meaning of the law, they had abandoned Islam even though they still observed the law, as they did. In this case no accommodation could be made with them. Finally a capitulation was agreed to in 500/1107 in which many of the Isma'īlis were allowed safe-conduct to more distant Isma'īli fortresses while the nucleus of the garrison was to surrender outright when the others had got away. In the end the nucleus resisted nonetheless, fighting even for the last turrets. Āḥmad was finally captured, paraded ignominiously through the town, and skinned alive.

Sanjar was encouraged to send a further expedition against the Isma'īlis of Kūhistān. But we hear more of the expedition against Alamūt. After the fall of Shāhdiz and the death of the dā'ī of Iṣfahān, if not even earlier (as some reports seem to suggest, at least in some Isma'īli circles), Ḥasan-i Sabbāḥ presumably was acknowledged as head of the whole Nizārī Isma'īli movement, and Alamūt as its headquarters. After a futile expedition by the vizier himself, a son of Niẓām al-Mulk, the reduction of Alamūt was entrusted to Shīrgīr, the amir of Sāveh. He tried attrition, taking some places fairly near Qazvin, but above all Rūdbār in a yearly expedition for seven years. At length, in 511/1118, he was ready for a full-scale siege. Other amirs were sent to help him. But as the surrender of Alamūt seemed to draw near, the news of Malik-Shāh's death arrived and the army broke up despite Shīrgīr's pleas. Alamūt was saved.¹

¹ On the Saljuq counteroffensive, see O.A., pp. 76-8, 84-9, 95-8.
THE TERRITORIAL POSITION

II. STALEMATE

Though Alamūt was safe, the revolt as such was over. In the almost thirty years since Alamūt had been seized, the Ismāʿīlīs had done their best to establish themselves throughout the Saljuq domains; they had posed a serious threat to Saljuq rule for a time, with considerable strength in and around Isfahān itself. But their partisans in the cities had been massacred or disorganized, and many of their strongholds had been destroyed. What remained could not seriously serve as a base for general revolt, at least not till their party had been widely rebuilt and a new effort prepared. The imām had never appeared in power to save the situation, and the times did not seem propitious for him to do so now. To be sure, the rebellion had been successful on a local basis in Rūdbār and Kūhistān, where whole districts had asserted and maintained their independence of the Saljuqs. But with the failure of the overall effort, one might have expected the surviving Ismāʿīlīs to break up into local groupings and to be assimilated into the evolving Sunnī social and political structure on a local ad hoc basis. Yet the Ismāʿīlīs held together from Kūhistān to Syria. The sons of the rebels were still dedicated. A further generation with essentially the same puritan and power-oriented outlook had to pass before a new beginning would be attempted. Meanwhile the Ismāʿīlīs carried on the old struggle as best they could.

Definition of the territorial position

Though there was no major succession dispute on Muḥammad Taʿpar’s death, his successor at Isfahān, Maḥmūd, and Sanjar, as general head of the Saljuqs, were sufficiently occupied with other troubles not to press much further against the Ismāʿīlīs. Sanjar is said to have made a truce with the Ismāʿīlīs, persuaded by a dagger which Ḥasan contrived to have thrust into the floor next to Sanjar’s pillow. The historian Juvainī found conciliatory letters from Sanjar in the Ismaʿīlī archives. The Ismāʿīlīs at Alamūt reoccupied fortresses which they had given up to Shirgir. During the rest of his life (to 518/1124) Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ, while remaining dāʿī of Dailam, seems to have been regarded as head of the community. He presumably devoted himself to consolidating its position in the territories it had won, and perhaps also to reaffirming, in some degree, a central authority over them.

These territories consisted primarily of two main districts: Rūdbār
and a large part of Kūhistān. Rūdbār was felt to be the core portion of Dailam and inherited the militant and particularist temper of the Dailami mountaineers. There were dozens of fortresses in its mountains, not only in the Alburz proper north of the Shāhrūd but in the lower mountains between that valley and Qazvin; the Ismā‘īlīs sometimes held a fortress or so sufficiently near Qazvin to serve as a special irritant to the Qazvinīs. The chief of the Rūdbār Ismā‘īlīs, who was also head of the whole community, commonly resided at Alamūt, but by no means always. The most immediate neighbours and enemies of Rūdbār were Qazvin to the south and Rūyān to the north (between the Alburz and the sea); accordingly, the rulers of ‘Irāq-i ‘Ājam at Iṣfahān and of Māzandarān at Āmul, the respective suzerains of those two neighbours, intermittently felt it their duty to destroy the Ismā‘īlī power, which lay between their territories. The Ismā‘īlī territory in Kūhistān was distinctly more extensive, including several towns more substantial than any in Rūdbār. In the north, Turshīz was readily involved in hostilities with the authorities in Khurāsān, while Nīḥ in the south was commonly at odds with Sīstān. The Kūhistānī Ismā‘īlīs owned the authority of a single chief, appointed at Alamūt, who resided usually, but not always, in either Tūn or Qā‘īn or in the fortress of Mu‘minābād.

In addition to the two main territories, the Ismā‘īlī state included three other scattered tracts. The other fortresses in the eastern Alburz seem to have been lost, but Gird-Kūh at Dāmghān was held and stood isolated but firm as an Ismā‘īlī outpost. Though the fortresses in the southern Zagros had been lost, farther north in the Zagros, in Luristān, some fortresses were retained or else soon after acquired, with the support of some local Jewish clans. Lastly, after Ḥasan’s death, the Ismā‘īlīs in Syria finally acquired their long-sought independent base in the mountains west of Hāmā and Ḩims, where they acquired a small group of fortified towns; here they were ruled by an appointee of Alamūt, who sometimes resided at Maṣyāf.

For a time, even after Ḥasan’s death, the Ismā‘īlī community included not only those in the independent territories but a substantial number in at least some Iranian cities. Correspondingly, not everyone in Rūdbār or (probably) in Ismā‘īlī Kūhistān was an Ismā‘īlī. But gradually we cease to hear of Ismā‘īlīs outside of their own territories, except in the Jazr district of Syria, east of Aleppo, and possibly in parts of Kūhistān and Sīstān that were not ruled by Ismā‘īlīs. Doubtless
some such Ismāʿīlis persisted, though without playing a large role in
the Ismāʿīlī state, or presumably, in the fortunes of the religious com-
1
munity. At some time, but we do not know whether in the Alamūt
period, the numerous Ismāʿīlis of the upper Oxus basin were won over
to the Nizārī position. But in large measure the state formed henceforth
an independent Ismāʿīlī society with little stake in the wider Sunnī
society except so far as its often active trade and, indeed, its continuing
intellectual interests, enforced interaction.1

The continuing struggle

On Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ’s death in 518/1124, his position as dāʾī of Dailam
and as head of the community fell to his lieutenant at Lanbasar,
Buzurg-Ummīd. This man was well connected, at least by marriage,
with ruling families in the Caspian region, but clearly he was chosen
also for his personal qualities. He moved to Alamūt and carried on the
rigorous policies of his predecessor, aided by a council of three advisers
who had also been appointed by Ḥasan. One gets the impression that
the Ismāʿīlis’ enemies hoped he would prove a lesser man than Ḥasan;
within two years of his accession, the Saljuqs were attacking both
Rūdbār and Kūhistān. At Āmid there was a massacre of suspected
Ismāʿīlis. But the attacks seem to have had no success. On the contrary,
in the first years of Buzurg-Ummīd’s rule, the Ismāʿīlī position in
Rūdbār was strengthened. The fortress of Tāliqān was taken, then or
earlier—this was presumably the strongest place in the Tāliqān
mountains; and a new fortress, Maimūn-Diz, was built at the border
of the Ismāʿīlī territory downstream from Alamūt.2

Meanwhile, the Ismāʿīlis were becoming embroiled on a more local
basis. The Bāvandid rulers of Māzandarān, who had refused to join
Muḥammad Tapar against Alamūt, had become their active enemy by
the time of Maḥmūd’s campaign. Then the Ismāʿīlis’ envoy to Maḥmūd
at Iṣfahān had been lynched, and they avenged themselves, not on the
Iṣfahānis, but on the more accessible Qazvinis, thus exacerbating an
enmity with that city which persisted even when the ruler of ʿIrāq-i
‘Ajam was inactive. At least some of the Kūhistānī Ismāʿīlis were at
war with the amīrs of Sistān with little regard to what arrangements

1 On the Ismāʿīlī territorial pattern, cf. O.A., pp. 115–16, pp. 244–5. The maps given here
supplement the vaguer data there.
2 The site of Maimūn-Diz has now been identified. See Peter Willey, The Castles of the
Sanjar might make. The greatest triumph of Buzurg-Ummid's reign seems to have been the defeat and execution by fire of a Zaidi imām, Abū Ḥāshim, who had arisen to power in the non-Ismā'īlī districts of Dailam.¹

When Buzurg-Ummid died in 532/1138, his son Muḥammad became dāʿī, and, like him, held the allegiance of all the several Ismā'īlī territories. In the earlier part of his reign, at least, he increased the area under the control of Alamūt, seizing some fortresses in the direction of Gilān. But the quarrels with the Ismā'īlīs' neighbours sometimes seemed little more exalted than personal feuds. An amīr of Ray campaigned against them in Rūdbār after his master's assassination, perhaps even despite Sanjar's orders; he built a tower of Ismā'īlī heads. The ruler of Turshiz tried at one point to restore Sunnism there, was expelled, and failed to regain his position even with an army from Sanjar. For at least six years after 545/1150, one of Sanjar's amīrs, Ibn Anaz, carried on an almost personal series of raids in Kūhistān. Perhaps the most disastrous such vendetta for the Ismā'īlīs was the hostility of Shāh Ghāzī of Māzandarān, who built several towers of Ismā'īlī heads gathered from his Rūdbār campaigns, though even he does not seem to have made permanent conquests of land. The raids and counter-raids exchanged with Qazvīn persisted throughout; the Ismā'īlīs' chronicler has recorded the number of sheep taken on each raid.²

Though the Nīzarīs had made no serious attempt to support the Nīzarī cause in Egypt after the schism, bitterness yet remained between the two parties, especially in Syria. Under al-Musta'li's son al-Āmir (personal rule, 515/1121−524/1130), beginning with what was held to be a Nīzarī assassination of the vizier al-Afḍal, the Nīzarī cause seems to have been especially active even in Egypt. The succeeding vizier took extensive measures to guard against a new assassination, allegedly even trying to keep track of any who might be setting out from Alamūt, and at any rate blaming directly on Alamūt the activity of Nīzarī agents uncovered. A public defence of al-Āmir's rights as imām, as against those of his uncle Nīzar, was deemed necessary. But in 524/1130 al-Āmir was assassinated (again, but more clearly, by Nīzarīs); thereupon the Egyptian Ismā'īlīs themselves split. He seems to have had a son in that last year, al-Ṭayyīb; but whether because the infant died or because he otherwise disappeared, on al-Āmir's

¹ On Buzurg-Ummid's reign, see OA, pp. 99-104.
THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE

death there seemed to be no male heir. After a time of confusion, al-Āmir’s cousin (by another uncle) took power as al-Ḥāfiẓ and claimed the imāmate. The main body of Egyptian Ismā’īlis accepted him, being called Ḥāfiẓiyya; the Ismā’īlis of the Yemen, the chief body of non-Nizāris Ismā’īlis outside Egypt, rejected him in the name of al-Ṭayyib, and they became the Ṭayyibīs. Henceforth, though the Nizāris and Ḥāfiẓīs seem to have had occasional hostile and even friendly relations, the Nizāris seem to have taken no further account of the Fāṭimid caliphate.¹

After a spate of assassinations and massacres at the beginning of Muḥammad’s reign—these were now limited pretty much to the relatively northerly lands from Kūhistān to Syria, without the involvement of such cities as Baghdad—traces of Ismā’īli activity in cities away from the Ismā’īli-ruled territories become few. It is said that under Jahan-Suz Ghūrī (d. 556/1161) Ismā’īli propagandists were invited into Ghūr, where his successor had to kill them along with their converts. But even if this is not a case of maliciously mistaken identity, it is not typical of the Ismā’īli activity of the time. Nevertheless, the Ismā’īlis continued to maintain a large sense of their mission. The chroniclers of Buzurg-Ummīd and his son stressed their acts of generosity—as in the case of a militant enemy amīr whose fortunes at home had changed and who sought refuge with the Ismā’īlis and was not yielded up to his enemies despite their reminder that previously he had acted treacherously against the Ismā’īlis. The Ismā’īlis gloried especially in two acts that seemed to take them on to the world stage again for a moment: the assassinations of the ‘Abbāsid caliphs al-Mustarshid and then of his son, al-Rāshid. Neither caliph was master any longer of a caliphal empire: indeed, both were out of favour with their Saljuq masters, and were either in prison or in exile. Yet the Ismā’īlis gave their assassins the accolade of al-‘Abbāsi, victors over the house of ‘Abbās, and they even interpreted the necessary exile of al-Rāshid as an expedition by the lord of all Sunnis against the Ismā’īlis to avenge his father.

Reactions among the Sunnis

By the end of Muḥammad b. Buzurg-Ummīd’s reign, the picture of a great life-and-death struggle with the ‘Abbāsid caliphate was as inappropriate to the Ismā’īli state as it was to the ‘Abbāsid. Yet the

¹ On the later relations with the Fāṭimid Ismā’īlis, see O.A, pp. 107–10.
Ismā'īlī sense of their own grandeur was answered by the Sunnis' corresponding feeling that they still constituted a major threat to Sunni Muslim society. The impact of the Ismā'īlī revolt had been far-reaching and was only then losing its immediacy. Zealous Sunnis were still inclined to see the Ismā'īlīs as the arch-enemies of Islam.

The first results of the revolt had been, of course, highly disruptive—not only by way of direct Ismā'īlī action but also by way of the Sunnis' panic in response to it, which launched indiscriminate massacres. But apart from immediate political and social consequences, the movement had significant intellectual and imaginative consequences among the Sunnis which were more enduring. The first question that was raised was what limits should be put to the Sunni doctrine that membership of the Muslim community should be determined by external acts—notably by acknowledgement of Muhammad and performance of the salāt in the direction of Mecca—while hearts could be judged by God alone. At Iṣfahān those who insisted that the privileges of being a Muslim should be less freely granted had their way when the Ismā'īlīs were excluded despite their external conformity; many later Muslims followed this precedent. This problem as presented in the Ismā'īlīs was also a major one for Ghazālī, who wrote an incisive treatise to resolve it; he then cited that treatise in many other connexions, as fundamental to deciding what sort of intellectual position was and was not compatible with Islam.

But Ghazālī was touched by the Ismā'īlī position, and especially by Ḥasan’s doctrine of taʿlīm, more deeply than this. He wrote many works designed to refute the Ismā'īlīs, some of which seem equally designed to settle his own conscience with regard to their challenge. In the Munqidh min al-dalālāl he came to terms with four categories of seekers of the truth, as representative of all the intellectual positions worthy of serious consideration: the philosophers of the Greek tradition; the mutakallimūn, taken en bloc as those who argue on behalf of historical revelation; the Sufis with their immediate mystical consciousness—and the Ismā'īlīs with their doctrine of taʿlīm. To each of the first three groups he allowed a carefully defined role in his total vision of truth-seeking; and though he condemned the Ismā'īlīs roundly, it can be argued that, if not to them, at least to their position he likewise allowed a certain role. He claimed that Muḥammad himself was the true authoritative teacher whose existence, as the Ismā'īlīs showed, reason posited and might verify, but whose teaching it could
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not reach by itself. In doing so he not only undercut the Ismā'īlī doctrine but introduced a new approach into the Sunni doctrine itself: the historical revelation was to be kept central yet was to be tested and interpreted by the inner need of the human being—at its highest, of course, in Şūfī experience. The Ismā'īlī logic helped make possible this integration of history with personal inwardness.

No other Sunni was so intimately influenced by the Nizārī Ismā'īlī doctrine as was Ghazālī; but few other Sunni writers were so influential. Other Sunnis of the time wrestled with the questions raised, but less perceptively. Probably the last to whom the questions were intellectually actual was Shahrastānī (d. 548/1153), who debated with Ismā'īlis and was more irritated than challenged by them (though he may have used their writings incidentally in his history of doctrine). For later writers, the doctrine of ta'lim was something out of the past—Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī used it to make a debating point against Ghazālī, for instance.

The stimulus to the Muslim imagination was more lasting and has carried over into the Occident. At the time of the revolt itself, the popular reaction came to be an unthinking enraged terror, which created as its objects diabolically clever and ruthless leaders manipulating gullibly stupid followers. The people of Rūdbār were so stupid, it was said, that one of them would saw off the branch he sat on; while Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāh was felt to have almost superhuman powers of insight, by which he could win the blind devotion of many skilled individuals and direct them successfully in the most widely ramified and delicate undertakings. The old explanation of Ismā'ilism—that it was invented by a Persian Zoroastrian who resented the Arab victory and wanted to subvert Islam and replace it with dualism, to which doctrine Ismā'ilism would lead—no longer sufficed; it was not dropped, but rather than Islamic doctrine, the Ismā'ilīs' target was now said to be the Muslims themselves: their whole purpose, some believed (as during the panic at Isfahān), was to kill as many Muslims as cruelly as possible.

Soon this temper was crystallized into romantic legends. The idea that Ḥasan used drugs to make his human tools more manipulable appeared early in a crude form (walnuts, coriander, and honey to expand the brain). By the time of Marco Polo, the tale was current in Iran that Ḥasan had had a garden made to resemble Paradise, with beautiful maidens at the disposal of the young man who (drugged asleep so as to be transported there unawares) was told (when he awoke a second
time and the garden had vanished) that Hasan could send him to that Paradise at will, and would send him there permanently if he died in his service. In Arabic, too, the story turned up in a historical novel set in al-Hākim’s time, in which the master of the garden was one Ismā‘īl at Maṣyāf, a subsequent headquarters of the Syrian Nizārīs. It was a Western scholar, Silvestre de Sacy, who later put together the nickname Ḥashīshiyya and the notion of the drug, and surmised that the drug was no mere sleeping powder but a vision-engendering narcotic, and that no real garden was necessary. But the garden was too fascinating a theme to be dispensed with, and modern popular lore has retained both the hashish and the garden.

Other tales were told: at a nightly orgy, males and females would gather and mingle sexually at will with no regard to status or relationship; then the next day, at a word from their master, Ismā‘īlī fīdā‘īs would leap from a turret to their death, for the edification of a visitor. For ordinary Muslims—and for medieval Westerners, whose imaginations proved quite as lurid—the Ismā‘īlīs became a dreamworld embodying whatever fascinating horror the sober actuality ruled out from their prosaic lives. But some of the tales seem to have originated with the Ismā‘īlīs themselves, notably the tale of the three schoolfellows, which FitzGerald retold in his introduction to the Rubaiyat. As the Ismā‘īlīs told it, Ḥasan-i Šabbāḥ was the hero. Since the three students had agreed to share among themselves the good fortune that any of them should achieve, Hasan came, as did ‘Umar Khayyām, to Nizām al-Mulk when he became vizier, expecting his favour. But when Hasan, duly established at court, proved much more capable than Nizām al-Mulk, the latter’s condescension to his old friend gave way to jealousy, and he plotted to cover the unsuspecting Hasan with ignominy and have him disgraced. It was thus the vizier who began the hostility which Hasan brought to a conclusion by launching the revolt and getting the vizier assassinated in revenge. The efforts of Sunni versions to whitewash the vizier were only partly successful, but the story was so appealing that it continued to circulate nonetheless. In the realm of the imagination, the Ismā‘īlī inspiration, direct or indirect, ruled unchallenged even after their political power disappeared.¹

¹ On the imaginative and intellectual repercussions among the Sunnis, see O.A., pp. 121–39.
The continuing vitality of the Ismā'īlīs

Indeed, the Ismā'īlī imaginative power may have contributed to the un­wonted vitality which the Ismā'īlī state continued to show even in its reduced form. That vitality is already exhibited in its very survival. In the Islamic society of that age, when so much in the political sphere depended on direct military power, the authority of a government did not normally extend beyond the range of its armies. The five parcels that went to make up the Ismā'īlī state could obviously not be controlled militarily from any one centre; its unity could in no way be enforced. Nor were the Ismā'īlis of one area able to send much material assistance to another area; there was no immediate profit to be gained from the unity. Yet the state remained one; the governors of Kūhistān and of Syria were regularly appointed by the authority at Alamūt until Alamūt itself fell, despite drastic changes of policy which some of the rulers of Alamūt were to institute. Surely it was a common vision as much as mutual service that kept those widely dispersed territories together for five generations.

The vitality of the state is also attested by the stability of its dynasty. There seem to have been no succession disputes, either at first when it was a dā'ī who ruled, or later when the imāmate was at stake. Twenty years is a relatively long reign in a Muslim dynasty where the effective power is vested in the ruler; but of the seven reigns at Alamūt (the eighth was cut short by the Mongols), four are longer than that: twenty-four, thirty-four, thirty-four, and even forty-four years. Two rulers were murdered (and just possibly a third); one of them after a peculiarly drastic change of policy, the other after his personality showed signs of deterioration—he was the only ruler of the seven who was not fully competent personally (and even he may have been blackened posthumously). The rulers were supported by a vigorous and independent community life in each of the Ismā'īlī districts, and though they could initiate extreme changes of policy they were not allowed to grow soft.¹

Considering the small extent and limited economy of the state, it retained a disproportionate power: repeatedly the Ismā'īlīs were able to expand beyond their holdings, and their diplomacy often ranged far and effectively—at more than one period they were respectfully listened to as far away as in the courts of Western Europe. To the

¹ On the stability of the state, see O.A., pp. 115–20, 244–6.
Sunnis, their power seemed greater than it really was: the continuing intense hatred for the Ismā’īlīs, which finally led Sunnis to call the Mongols down on them when no Muslim power seemed capable of defeating them, bears witness to the Ismā’īli reputation. It has been suggested that this power was based on the weapon of assassination. Doubtless that played a role; but the Ismā’īlīs were by no means the only ones who resorted to assassination, nor could such a weapon have been systematically effective over many generations unless it were backed up by strong institutions.

The Ismā’īlī society was not a typical mountaineer and small-town society, despite the counting of sheep after raids. Each community maintained its own sense of initiative in the framework of the wider cause, and probably a sense of larger strategy was never completely absent: the immediate consequence everywhere of changes in their overall external policy suggest this. But what was most distinctive was the high level of intellectual life. The prominent early Ismā’īlīs were commonly known as scholars, often as astronomers, and at least some later Ismā’īlīs continued the tradition. In Alamūt, in Kūhistān, and in Syria, at the main centres at least, were libraries which included Qur’āns and religious literature of all sorts, but also scientific books and equipment; visitors were impressed with the libraries, which were well known among Sunni scholars. To the end the Ismā’īlīs prized sophisticated interpretations of their own doctrines, and were also interested in every kind of knowledge which the age could offer.

The vitality of their community was reinforced by the continuing arrival of a certain number of outsiders into the Ismā’īlī centres. We hear of few Ismā’īlīs coming in from outside; after the time of Buzurg-Ummid the Ismā’īlīs of the diaspora would not have been sufficiently numerous to help much, either in supporting Ismā’īlī external policies or in revitalizing the isolated communities. Yet the Ismā’īlīs did challenge the imagination and were able to attract individuals of high calibre. Some of these were political refugees—amirs who had lost out in quarrels within the Sunni world and who knew the Ismā’īlīs would never give them up to their enemies. Some were adventurous youths who adopted Ismā’īlism, such as Rāshīd al-Dīn Sinān, who later became head of the Syrian Ismā’īlīs; he seems to have been brought up in a Nuṣairī community in Iraq, and to have gone to Alamūt when he wanted to get away from home. Finally, in the later period, there were a number of outside scholars attracted to the Ismā’īlī libraries.
THE CONTINUING VITALITY OF THE ISMĀʿĪLĪS

and to their generous patronage of learning; most of them seem to have remained frankly non-Ismāʿīlī, but they helped maintain the high intellectual tone of the community. The greatest of them, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, even wrote major Ismāʿīlī treatises.

Accordingly, we must attribute the Ismāʿīlī strength only in part to their military methods or to the political genius of their early leaders, and to the irrationally persistent reputation which the later generations retained. In large part it resulted from the solidarity they could maintain among themselves under outside pressure; from their ability to renew a social and religious tradition which encouraged their continued independence; and from the special appeal they made, in the contemporary Muslim society, to the exceptional individual.

III. RESURRECTION

Theological doctrines usually serve as a criticism and discipline of religious practice, warning of pitfalls to be avoided in terms of a given tradition. But sometimes they can form a positive charter for spiritual renewal, as was now to be the case. Doctrines cannot really describe such a renewal, but the nature of its spiritual life can be deduced from them. By the shifts they make in terminology and emphasis, and in particular by the points which prove crucial at moments of polemic with other viewpoints, they indicate what sorts of mood, insight, aspiration, and commitment are to be legitimized and given social encouragement. We know the next stage of the Ismāʿīlī community life almost exclusively through its theological production; from this we must try to deduce the life of the time. But such a procedure is not entirely inappropriate. Theological doctrines are especially important in a community like that of the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs, which depended so much on a continual revitalizing of their distinctive group orientation.

Hasan II: sublimation of expectations

In the later years of Muḥammad b. Buzurg-Ummīd, there was a movement among the younger Ismāʿīlīs to revive what had always been a popular doctrine in Ismāʿīlī circles, though it had been suppressed by the Ismāʿīlī leadership: the doctrine that the shariʿa ritual law no longer applied to those who understood the bāṭin, the inner meaning of it, for the shariʿa was simply a set of symbols intended to
incite to more understanding beyond itself, and when it had fulfilled its function it was no longer binding. Those who believed this had seen the imposition of shari'a on enlightened and devoted Isma'ilis as a kind of taqiyya, or dissimulation designed only to help keep the ignorant, wilful Sunnis in place—lest they follow the free Isma'ilis' example prematurely and, without even the symbols of truth to restrain them, give rein to their evil natures and cast aside all law and order altogether. In any case, at the end of the age, when the imam established full justice in the world—an eschatological time which many Isma'ilis identified with the Last Judgment and the coming of Paradise—the shari'a would be abolished, for it would no longer be relevant when the imperfect conditions of the present life were past. But many Isma'ilis were restive, at least in their private lives, at waiting for the grand consummation. During the active revolt the Isma'ilis puritanism had been accentuated as all energies were focused on the immediate goal of material victory. But now it would seem that in their own districts, set apart from the Sunni world, the Isma'ilis no longer had any responsibility to set a cautious example to the Sunnis. Why shouldn't the Isma'ilis assume their rightful freedom from the petty restrictions of the shari'a and live in full recognition of the spiritual truths of their faith, which preoccupation with the shari'a ritual tended to obscure?

When Muhammad found that among the young men who inclined to this viewpoint was his own son Hasan, who was expected to succeed him as dā'i, he took drastic action. It is said that Hasan drank wine in secret to show that he was above the law, and that some of the Isma'ilis took this to be a sign that he was the true imām. Muhammad had 250 men killed and exiled 250 more, and Hasan denied publicly that he was the imām; apparently from that time till Muhammad's death Hasan curbed his tongue. But Hasan had read widely not only in the older books of the Isma'ilis but also in philosophic and Sufi writings. He seems to have learned to interpret the old Isma'ili hopes in the light of Sufi psychological insights. He is said to have been very affable and popular in Rudbar, where he was regarded as more learned than his father; on his father's death (557/1162) he succeeded without dispute and proceeded to prepare the way, cautiously, for a reform. After two years he was ready.¹

On 17 Ramadān 559/1164 he gathered together at Alamūt representatives from the various dispersed Isma'ili groups, at least those in

¹ On Hasan II's youth, see O.A., pp. 146–8.
Iran (the Syrians are not mentioned, and the new dispensation may not have been fully introduced to them till later). He read them a message supposed to be from the imām, naming Ḥasan as the imām’s special representative with plenary authority, entitling him not only dā’ī but also ḥujja, proof of the imām (like Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ), and finally caliph, representative of the imām, presumably a higher rank yet. At last the imām was emerging. But he announced yet more: the long-foretold Last Day had arrived—qiyāma, the Resurrection—when all mankind would be judged and committed forever to either Hell or Paradise; henceforth those who refused to accept the imām were cast into Hell, which was spiritual non-existence, while those who accepted him were in Paradise. Finally, as was fitting in Paradise, taqiyya was no longer necessary and the sharī’a was at an end. Accordingly, the fast of Ramadān (which in the bāṭin had been held to stand for taqiyya) was broken with a feast then and there. Toward the time of the ḥajj pilgrimage, a similar ceremony was held at the fortress Mu’minābād in Kūhistān, where Ḥasan’s position as caliph was explicitly identified with that of the Fāṭimid caliph al-Mustansir—who had in fact been imām.1

The great resurrection, the end of the world, was thus understood (in a typically Ismā’īli manner) in a symbolic sense. It was the end of a religious era, and the beginning of a spiritual dispensation of moral, not physical, perfection. The end of earthly life, of the external level of reality, at least as possessing religious significance, and also the end of the sharī’a law, was the moment when the inward meaning of reality became evident and what mattered henceforth would be a purely spiritual life of inward states of the soul. The event may be compared with the advent of the dispensation of grace and the end of the dispensation of the law as Paul presented them. More properly, it must be interpreted in Sūfī terms: the inner life of moral and mystical experience was the sole reality henceforth to be attended to. Those who could respond were, spiritually, already in eternal life, and those who could not were spiritually lifeless. This was the long-awaited culmination; the faithful Ismā’īlis who understood were to leave behind all material compromise and rise to the spiritual level which was the only true victory; that is, they were to become spiritually perfect; while the Sunnis were defeated in the most final sense possible, in that all their

1 On the declaration of qiyāma, see O.A., pp. 148–58. The chief sources are Rashīd al-Dīn, Juvaini, and Haft Bāb-i Abū ʿIshāq. The latter is to be found in Kalām-i Pir, ed. W. Ivanow (Bombay, 1935), as indicated by Ivanow in an appendix.
THE ISMĀʿĪLĪ STATE

Further efforts were rendered spiritually meaningless. Thus was established the doctrine of the qiyyāma, the Resurrection, as the new basis of Ismāʿīlī life.

From one point of view, Ḥasan’s proclamation was the natural fulfillment of Ismāʿīlī hopes. But it raised serious difficulties, covered over for the time being by the enthusiasm of the reform and the personal popularity of Ḥasan himself. The dominant moral tone of Nizārī Ismāʿīlīsm had been a rigorous moral purism founded on the shariʿa as such; the doctrine of the qiyyāma made a radical reversal in this. The reversal was not merely permissive: Ḥasan seems to have insisted that the Ismāʿīlīs must all live according to the new dispensation, in inward spiritual alertness and without the law, just as previously they all had to live according to the old legalistic dispensation. Some persons are said to have emigrated rather than comply. Then the doctrine of the qiyyāma itself presented difficulties: though Ismāʿīlīs might be willing to find that the new heaven and the new earth were not geophysically new but only spiritually new, yet it had been supposed that the eschatological event would still produce a drastic transformation at least of all human society. The first moment was doubtless exhilarating; perfection often does seem within reach at the moment of revolution. But the Ismāʿīlīs had yet to learn to live with the implications of the new doctrine.

Muhammad II: formulation of the doctrine

Ḥasan did not live to solve the problems. A year and a half after the declaration of the Resurrection, he was murdered by a brother-in-law, a partisan of the shariʿa. However, his nineteen-year-old son Muḥammad succeeded to his position, reaffirmed Ḥasan’s policies, and devoted his life to elaborating the doctrine of the qiyyāma in numerous treatises.

The doctrine of the qiyyāma effectively replaced the doctrine of taʿlim as central in the theory of the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs. Each of these doctrines carried one aspect of older Ismāʿīlī teaching to its extreme: as the doctrine of taʿlim exalted the lone authority of the imām, so that of the qiyyāma exalted the lone validity of the bāṭīn. The doctrine of the qiyyāma was even more extreme than that of taʿlim and presented a contrasting temper, substituting high personal consciousness for group rigorism. It was surely facilitated by the legacy of radical Ismāʿīlī ideas which had always been present among Ismāʿīlīs (sometimes
transformed into folklore), and which might be expected to come to the fore in out-of-the-way areas when the discipline of city-bred scholars was relaxed. In the case of the Syrian Ismā'īlis, at least, we have good evidence that such radical ideas, taking popular form, did prevail. Notions of reincarnation and even of transmigration, rejected by most official Ismā'īli teachers, had long been associated with extreme emphasis on the bātin, and now reappeared. But the Ismā'īlis remained sufficiently sophisticated to require a scholarly defence even of popularly appealing ideas.

The first theoretical problem lay in the person of the imām. At the qiyāma, the great Resurrection, the imām must be present in person: it was precisely the role of culminating imām (called the qa'im) to usher in the qiyāma, for which all his followers were waiting and to which the other imāms were but as links in a chain. Indeed, if taqiyya was lifted, if the bātin became evident and the inner secrets were revealed, the first of those was precisely the identity of the imām and his true position. Where then was the imām? It would seem that before the end of his life Ḥasan II had hinted that he was himself not merely the caliph, representative of the imām, but the imām himself. But the imām ought to be a direct descendant of ʿAlī and in particular of Nizār, which Buzurg-Ummid, Ḥasan’s grandfather, certainly had not been. Probably Ḥasan maintained that he was imām in the bātin, to which the external descent in the flesh would be indifferent. Muḥammad II took the step of announcing that Ḥasan had been imām according to physical descent also; and thus Muḥammad II likewise, being his son, was imām. The story which he seems to have sponsored was that Ḥasan was not the son of Muḥammad b. Buzurg-Ummid but of a descendant of Nizār who had in fact been hidden in Alamūt just as the outside tales had had it. Either the babies had been interchanged or the imām (not bound to the law) had actually slept with the dāʾī’s wife. In any case, the Nizārid line of imāms had appeared and was acting on its own authority in Alamūt. If one believed that the qiyāma was valid to begin with, some such conclusion followed almost necessarily in the ingrown community and the particular way chosen to show how it could have happened was perhaps of secondary consequence.

The second theoretical problem lay in the qiyāma itself. The great Resurrection, even if merely regarded as a turning-point in human history and not as a geophysical epoch, was still expected to be a time of evident wonders in which the faithful would triumph and their opponents
disappear. The dead were to be raised, nature was to be purified, no labour was henceforth to be needed, no sin could be committed, all was to be well. Indeed, personal spiritual perfection was sufficiently wondrous already, that the wonders and the transformations of the world at large could readily enough be rendered at such a moment into symbolic terms; thus the "world" of the Isma'ili religious organization came to an end with the ending of the old system of rankings and their hierarchy (which must have been inappropriate to the isolated communities anyway); at the Resurrection all the faithful were equal in the realm of religion. But the imam's appearance had led, still less than in the early Fatimid period, to a visible triumph over the Sunnī world. The Resurrection was the moment when Hell and Paradise were no longer distant possibilities but immediate actualities. To justify the high claims, it could be said that the Sunnīs had been resurrected in that they had been offered the opportunity—which Isma'īlism had not offered before—not merely of a high promise and meanwhile a deeper insight, but of the immediate, perfected living of the life of the spirit unencumbered by shari'a; and in the Sunnīs' refusal they had ipso facto been judged and condemned to a spiritual non-existence that was all the more absolute the more complete was the spiritual reality offered them. But the doctrine of the qiyāma introduced a further element which distinguished the Isma'īlis from the Sunnīs more graphically: the figure of the imām-qā'im.

Turning back to various religious traditions of the Islamic region, Muhammad II pointed to a darkly known figure, the eternally living man Elijah, who had been swept up to heaven, and Enoch, and, in a more strictly Islamic context, Khīḍr, the Qur'ānic figure whose literary ancestry went back not only to Elijah but to Utnapishtim in the Gilgamesh epic and to Alexander's cook, who had drunk of the water of life and would live forever. Khīḍr had been adopted by the Sūfīs as an eternally wandering mystic, ready to bring material and spiritual sustenance to lonely dedicated Sūfīs in their hour of extremest need. Among some Christians Melchizedec, the priest forever whom Abraham honoured and who was a type of Christ, had likewise captured the imagination. This ever-living, recurrently reappearing figure of unlimited wisdom and irresistible authority had always been at best marginal to the Sunnī world, mysterious and inaccessible. Muhammad II now identified with that figure the imām-qā'im, the special imām who was master of the qiyāma.
MUHAMMAD II: FORMULATION OF THE DOCTRINE

Some Ismā'ilis (and not only Ismā'ilis among the Shi‘is) had always been inclined to exalt ‘Ali over Muḥammad, the imām over the prophet, on the ground that the inward meaning of external symbols (the meaning that ‘Alī was charged with teaching) was of higher status than the external symbols themselves (which Muḥammad had brought). Until now, however, such a doctrine was not admitted officially among the Ismā’ilis, perhaps lest it undermine the status of the sharī‘a. Muḥammad II now adopted it, and, by identifying ‘Alī as a figure with Melchizedec and Khīḍr-Elijah, he endowed the newly exalted imām with all the potency of their tradition. What had happened in the qiyyāma, then, was much more than any mere conquest of the Sunni world might have been, an event already foreshadowed in the time of the Fāṭimids. Into a different world, the elusive world of Khīḍr-Elijah, which the Sunnis only glimpsed in fragments of legend or occasional momentary experiences of Sūfis, the Ismā’ilis had been admitted in full and permanently. It was as if Dailam and Kūḥistān had been wrapt, like Elijah himself, and carried out of sight of the Sunnis, and their inhabitants were privileged to walk, as on everyday ground, the sacred soil upon which Moses removed his shoes to tread, when, in the incident of the burning bush, God spoke to him through Melchizedec, the imām-qa‘im of his time.¹

Ismā'ilism and Sufism

It is not easy to estimate what all this could mean, substantively and psychologically. For some, transcendence of ordinary life by way of symbolism was probably quite enough. At the very least, the qiyyāma meant the declaration of the Ismā’ilis’ psychological independence from the world outside, an independence in some ways quite real once the wider revolt was abandoned; and this abandonment was likewise symbolized in the qiyyāma, in that it declared the Sunni world irrelevant. For others, the qiyyāma could mean a personal transformation. This was summed up in the doctrine that the perfected faithful should no longer see anything but the imām, and God in the imām.

The great boon of Paradise, according to Muslim tradition, was

that there one could see God face to face. In the Paradise of the qiyāma, the locus of divinity was the imām, now reinterpreted as the Elijah–Khīḍr–Melchizedec figure. The imām was God made visible. To see the imām was to see God—and it was in this seeing that Paradise essentially consisted, not in being in Rūdbār or in Kūhistān. But to see the imām was a matter of viewpoint. To see just the body of the imām (which might, moreover, appear to have its imperfections) was useless: one had to see him in his spiritual reality. If one saw the imām, i.e. understood and concentrated on him in his spiritual reality, then all else that one saw and did would follow from that—one would see the whole world from his viewpoint and no longer from one's own personal vantage-point at all: one would see the imām only and not oneself, as they put it. Thus one would live the totally enlightened and spiritual life which was the afterlife the Ismāʿīlīs had expected—and it would make no difference whether this was in the body or not. Accordingly, in the qiyāma the faithful were summoned not to the worship of God, which was their own imperfect activity, but to God Himself, now present in the imām, in Whom their own selves no longer mattered.

The imām, then, was to serve for the Ismāʿīlīs as a Ṣūfī pīr sometimes did for his disciples. They were to cultivate their own divine awareness by focusing their attention on him, seeing the divine presence hidden within him, and forgetting their separate selves. But the imām was more than a Ṣūfī pīr. Muḥammad II is reported to have written his discourses in the language of the philosophers, and certainly he made use also of the Ismāʿīlī tradition. The doctrine of the qiyāma and its discipline formed a new synthesis among traditions. The imām was not simply one experienced Ṣūfī teacher among many, who might be the object of a transference process in those disciples who chose to explore their inward selves under his guidance. Beyond that, he was felt to be a unique, single cosmic individual who summed up in his position the whole reality of existence; the perfect microcosm, for whom no lesser pīr could be substituted. In him the faithful found not only a guide to personal awareness but also the embodiment of a whole symbolic system in terms of which he could place himself in the whole cosmos.

This new sense of the cosmos into which the deepening sense of self-awareness fitted was described in Ismāʿīlī terms as a third level of being, in effect a bāṭin behind the bāṭin. This third level, that of ultimate reality, went beyond the old Ismāʿīlī interpretations of the shariʿa as
these had gone beyond the sharī'a itself. On that level all things were one in the imām. Only personal relations counted, for only persons had an inward, spiritual life; and even persons, when perfect, were merged into their idealized roles as expressions of cosmic harmony. Every imām, when seen rightly, was seen to be 'Ali; every disciple was again Salmān, the faithful disciple of Muḥammad and adherent of 'Ali. The accidents of space and time did not matter. On this level not only the arbitrary rules of the sharī'a were pointless, but even the hierarchically organized discipline of the Ismā'īlī organization in the time of taqiyya. The qiyāma was a declaration of spiritual adulthood, in which all rules and discipline were outgrown and the individual acted directly from his inmost self—which was at one with all the rest of existence in the present and revealed imām.

Even this cosmic aspect of the qiyāma doctrine contained much that was analogous to the doctrines of cosmic unity professed by the Ṣūfīs of that time and especially later. The cosmic position of the imām was very like that of the Perfect Man, who is the microcosm, i.e. the final end of creation in that God brings the world to full consciousness of Himself through that saint. But such general and abstract teachings about an invisible Perfect Man, or qutb among the Ṣūfīs, could not offer a full equivalent of the sense of joint spiritual experience which the Ismā'īlis seem to have shared in the presence of their quite visible and present one true imām, who was at once pīr and qutb.

On the whole, the doctrine of the qiyāma seems to have had far less impact on the Sunni world than did Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāh's doctrine of taʿlīm. Until the time of Juvainī, writing after the fall of Alamūt, the Sunni chroniclers and theologians seem scarcely to have been aware of it. To be sure, if it had any effect it would have been among the Ṣūfīs, to whose ideas the doctrine was most congenial, and who travelled widely and were commonly receptive to new ideas; and movements of thought among the Ṣūfīs were little chronicled by the standard authors unless they caused special scandal. The Sunni Ṣūfī doctrines of cosmic unity and of the Perfect Man, in fact, were brought to full flower only by Ibn ʿArabī, who was eighteen years the junior of Muḥammad II. But such ideas were already developing in Ṣūfī circles. Ibn ʿArabī, indeed, made use of Ismā'īlī concepts and terms, but presumably not of the doctrine of the qiyāma. Rather, it was the earlier forms of such doctrines among the Ṣūfīs which will have served as suggestions to Ḥasan II and Muḥammad II.
What is more likely is that the doctrine of the qiyāma may have influenced later Shi'i thinking. If there is one person in Twelver Shi'i history who answers to Ghazali among the Sunnis as legitimizer of philosophy and mysticism, it is Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī, the leading figure in Shi'ism at the time of its revival in the thirteenth century. He was one of the earliest within the Twelver community of a synthesis of the Šūfi experience developed among Sunnis with a strongly Shi'i attitude on the imāmate—a synthesis which was later made yet more explicit, with the imām in the role of Perfect Man, and became a primary basis for Shi'i thought under the Šafavids. But Tūsī himself in his earlier years lived among the Isma'īlīs and wrote works of theology for them, expounding the doctrine of the qiyāma in a slightly later form, when the imām was again technically hidden (as he was to the Twelvers). It seems likely that later Twelvers did not need the Isma'īlī example to suggest to them the possibility of such a synthesis, but in fact that example was present in the most intimate way to one of the Twelver Shi'i's first and greatest expounders of Šūfīsm.

In any case, the qiyāma laid the foundation for the ultimate identification of Nizārī Isma'īlīsm as a Šūfi tarīqa, which was the guise it appeared in after the fall of Alamūt. In the time of the qiyāma, the Isma'īlīs remained consciously opposed to Šūfīsm as such, yet already they found it convenient to borrow Šūfī terminology. Later, when a new taqiyya was necessary after their state could no longer protect them from Sunnī wrath, the protean forms of Šūfīsm were easily available to them with almost no alteration in their own ways.

The Resurrection within history

Among the Isma'īlīs the qiyāma meant, along with independence from the Sunnī world and its opinion, an admission of their failure in the attempt to transform that world. The attempt to rival Sunnism within that world came to an end with the revolt itself. From the viewpoint of both Sunnis and Twelver Shi'īs, however, what mattered was not the end of the revolt as such, which might have made for easier relations, for in any case hostilities continued on both sides. For them the great

1 Henry Corbin has studied closely the relations among Shi'ism, Isma'īlīsm, and Šūfīsm. In his Histoire de la philosophie islamique, vol. 1 (Paris, 1964), see especially pp. 47–50; but all of Parts 1 and 2 are highly relevant. He discusses the doctrine of the qiyāma quite soundly and perceptively (pp. 137–51), though with almost no regard to its historical conditions and development.
fact was that the shari'ā was abolished. In the time of Aḥmad-i ‘Attāsh (494/1100) it could be debated whether the Ismā‘īlīs were Muslims, entitled to the privileges and immunities of membership in the Muslim community. At that time the Ismā‘īlīs’ chief plea was that they kept the Muslim shari'ā law and differed from other Muslims only on the question of the imāmate. But now, for those who chose to notice at all the changes within the Ismā‘īlī society, the worst suspicions of the Ismā‘īlīs’ opponents were confirmed. Rejecting the shari'ā, the Ismā‘īlīs put themselves beyond the pale of Islam by any obvious standard: variations in the shari'ā could be tolerated, but now the Ismā‘īlīs were no longer even “people of the Qibla”, who performed worship (as prescribed by the shari'ā) in the direction of Mecca. Thus they failed the minimal test of adherence to Muḥammad’s mission.

Technically, Paradise was not in history. On the level of ultimate reality, in the doctrine of the qiyāma, only the type, i.e. the role that persons played in the eternal drama with the imām, was real; not the dated and placed individual event. As the faithful was always Salmān, so he who rejected the summons was forever ‘Umar, banished from Paradise and so in reality non-existent. Yet already in the time of Ḥasan II warfare with the outsiders seems to have flared up more intensely than it had for some years—warfare waged on a lower level than that of ultimate reality, but necessary in its own way. Ibn Anaz continued his raids in Kūhistān. More significantly, the RūdBāris intensified their quarrel with Qazvin after a lapse of years without much raiding; building a fortress just outside the city, we are told, they harassed it almost to the point of siege (560/1165).

In the first half of the reign of Muḥammad II, however, the Ismā‘īlīs were relatively at peace with their neighbours; or at least we hear little of warfare in either Sunnī or Ismā‘īlī chronicles. A ruler of Rūyān, at odds with the local gentry and with his superior, the ruler of Māzandarān, fled to the Ismā‘īlīs for refuge and with their help carried out some raids—in which he was worsted. But for the most part little of headline note happened among the Iranian Ismā‘īlīs. In Syria it was the time of the Muslim struggle to oust the Crusaders, of Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin. There the Ismā‘īlīs were under the leadership of Rāshid al-Dīn Sinān, a companion of Ḥasan II who seems to have been sent there to introduce the doctrine of the qiyāma. He was occupied in consolidating the independence of the Ismā‘īlī fortresses, which straddled the line between Muslims and Franks, and also in establishing
their relations with their several neighbours. He seems to have inter­preted the qiyāma in his own way, perhaps with relatively little reference to Muḥammad II, and to have managed a quite personal foreign policy in his very limited territory. There was a rumour that Alamūt would have liked to be rid of him. Nonetheless, at his death there was no question of the succession: Alamūt appointed the chief in Syria as elsewhere.

In the last sixteen years or so of Muḥammad II’s reign—after Sinān’s death (588/1193), that is—we hear increasingly of petty warfare in which the Ismāʿīlis were often on the defensive. The Kūhistānis had trouble with the rulers of Sistān to the south and then with the rulers of Ghūr (the great Ghūrid dynasty that overcame the Ghaznavids), who delighted in destroying any Ismāʿīlis whom they might chance to discover in their path. The Ismāʿīlis were reduced to making humble terms with the Ghūrid Ghiyāth al-Dīn, when he was setting about conquering Khurāsān; and when his brother began attacking them all over again, they had to beg Ghiyāth al-Dīn to intervene with him in their favour. Rūdbār had trouble again with Māzandarān, supporting a rebel ruler of Rūyān—evidently with such success that the Ismāʿīlis were granted some villages as a reward. Then the Khwārazmians established themselves as the partisans of Qazvīn against the Ismāʿīlis, taking the place of the Saljuqs; but their activities were relatively minor and at least partly defensive. Though the Ismāʿīlis of Rūdbār could still undertake daring ventures, one gets the impression that many Ismāʿīlis had grown used to peace and did not care for interruptions of their commercial activity. Occasionally assassination was still used, but in one case, the assassination of the Ghūrid Shihāb al-Dīn, the Ismāʿīlis laid claim to an act which may well not have been their own—and did so as a pretext for winning favour with the rising Khwārazmian power, enemy of the Ghūrids. Even the vigour of Rūdbār could be turned to winning tributary villages in alliance with a Sunni ruler. Politically the Ismāʿīli situation carried little glamour.1

IV. ACCOMMODATION

The great revolt, after it was contained, was followed by a period in which the Ismāʿīlis, even while retaining the doctrines and viewpoints of the revolt itself, in fact were defending a limited territorial state

1 On Ḥasan II’s reign, see O.A., pp. 157–9; on Muḥammad II’s reign, pp. 182–4, 210–14; on Sinān, pp. 185–209.
against its neighbours. Such ideals were at odds with such a practice. The high sense of mission the Ismā'īlis retained had led finally to the proclamation of the spiritual Resurrection and to the whole inward-turning discipline of the qiyāma, in which they tried to raise their own little society to the highest conceivable level of human realization and relegated the rest of the world to insignificance. But again the bold effort was checked, though again not fully defeated. The outer world refused to remain insignificant; but what was more important, for an effort aimed at inner perfection rather than outer empire, the effort faltered internally. It failed in the person of the imām himself; but not only in him.

In the fourth and last phase of the Ismā'īlī state, the Ismā'īlis retained the ideal of perfection but restricted it to a limited spiritual sphere and in fact were working out an accommodation, both inward and external, with its human and historical limitations. The rising generation wanted peace and normalcy. After some hesitation they did not wholly reject (as did their imām for himself) the ideal of the qiyāma; but they adapted it to a more limited estimate of the human condition. Then they supplemented its crippled inward grandeur with revived political ambition: ambition both within the Sunni world and even beyond it, not hesitating to dream of material world domination. Thus the sense of mission persisted, if anything growing more comprehensive as the Ismā'īlī state itself grew weaker.

The shift of phase was more unmistakably marked at the end of the time of the qiyāma than it had been at the end of the active revolt. That the death of Muḥammad Tapar and the abandonment of Shīrgīr's siege of Alamūt would be the end of generalized military involvement became evident only in the years that followed. The end of the effort for perfection in the qiyāma was announced as abruptly as had been the qiyāma itself.

Muḥammad II's son Ḥasan did not like the Ismā'īlī isolation and rejected the doctrine of the qiyāma. Relations between father and son were strained during Muḥammad's last years, and it is said they each went in mortal fear of the other; but there is no reason to suppose, as some later claimed, that Muḥammad was murdered when he died at a ripe age (607/1210). In any case, Ḥasan III's accession was well
preparing. From an Isma'ili point of view he was undeniably the imam: he had received the irrevocable designation by the preceding imam and whatever he ordered was to be received in faith. At the same time, Hasan had written to a number of Sunni rulers assuring them that he abjured Isma'ilism and intended to lead his flock into the fold of Sunni Islam. Accordingly, his accession was accepted by the Isma'ilis and acclaimed by the Sunnis too. Many Sunni rulers were glad to receive by conversion the dread enemy whom they had never been able to overcome by conquest. Hasan's rights to the territory which the Isma'ilis happened to hold were acknowledged, and he was accepted as a Sunni amir among other amirs.

This did not happen without effort, however. Hasan's mother, said to have been a Sunni from the first, went on pilgrimage to Mecca under the patronage of the Caliph al-Nāṣir and received an honoured place in the Baghdad caravan. At Mecca the pilgrims from Syria challenged the honour paid to her, and so to the ex-Ismā'ilis, and a fracas ensued. But Hasan did his best to convince everyone that the community was really reformed and had readopted the shari'ā—this time, the Sunni shari'ā, not the Shi'i shari'ā which Hasan's grandfather had done away with. He had every village build a proper mosque and also a bath, to prove its status as a full-fledged centre of normal Muslim life; we know that this was done at least in some places in Syria. He imported Sunni scholars (of the Shafi'i school) and insisted that all his people obey them. The Qazvinis naturally remained sceptical, recalling the Isma'ili propensity to taqiyya, or dissimulation of their true religious position; he allowed their religious scholars to come up into Alamūt and burn whatever they disliked of the books in the famous library—a procedure which, like many men of religion, they found much to their taste and which seems to have won them over. Thus from chief of an execrated and increasingly marginal sect, Hasan made himself into a celebrated hero, whose actions reverberated throughout the Islamic lands. What remained unchanged was that his repute and the role he could play still waxed far out of proportion to the material resources of his little state.

All the Isma'ili territories seem to have obeyed Hasan's orders without any question. Whether he laid claim to the dignity publicly or not, he was still the imām: indeed, he never renounced the power which was based on that position, even though he denounced the position that had brought him the power. Hasan himself was almost certainly
sincere in his adoption of Sunnism. His people, however, almost certainly regarded his action as a reimposition of taqiyya; and, given the extensive meaning that had been assigned to taqiyya by implication when its lifting was decreed at the qiyāma, this could imply any sort of accommodation with the world, even to the concealment, doctrinally, of the person of the imām. In fact, the adoption of the Sunnī shari‘a brought immediate tactical advantages in both Kūhistān and Syria, though Rūdbār had been less threatened and now benefited less politically. In Kūhistān, the Ghurid attacks were effectively ended. In Syria the Ismā‘īlīs had just got into serious trouble with the Franks and now received opportune assistance from Aleppo. The Ismā‘īlīs found occasion to reciprocate the Sunnī friendliness. Toward the end of Hasan’s reign the Mongol terror swept over much of the Islamic lands, including Khurasan. Many refugees, and in particular Sunnī scholars, found asylum in the Ismā‘īlī towns of Kūhistān (these were relatively less attractive, or less accessible, to the Mongols), and they were given lavish hospitality by the head of the Ismā‘īlīs there, himself a scholar.

Hasan III’s reform was accepted sufficiently by his own people to allow him not only to impose it without recorded disruption in all their territories, but even to leave Rūdbār, accompanied by an Ismā‘īlī army, for a couple of years of foreign adventure without losing control at home. When Hasan first acceded to power, he had the khūṭba recited in the name of the Khwarazm-Shāh, the most potent monarch in Iran at the time and successor to the Saljuqs. However, fairly soon he shifted to the alliance of the Caliph al-Nāṣir, the great opponent of the Khwārazmians. The caliph was in a position to show Hasan much honour—as in the pilgrimage of his mother; then Hasan wanted to marry into the noble Sunnī houses of Gilān, and the caliph’s letters persuaded those nobles to allow their daughters to go to Alamūt. Perhaps even more important, the shift brought with it an alignment with Öz-Beg of Āzarbāiǰān, an important member of the caliph’s alliance. Hasan seems to have struck up a real friendship with that other ruler; when they decided to make a joint campaign, Hasan went to his court for a long stay to make preparations.

The campaign was a major one. ‘Irāq-i ‘Ajam was a primary point of contention between the Khwārazm-Shāh and the caliphal alliance. The Āzarbāiǰānī forces had succeeded in gaining control of the greater part of it, but then Mengli, Öz-Beg’s lieutenant there, made
himself independent and threatened seriously to weaken the alliance. The caliph persuaded troops to come from as far away as Syria to help Öz-Beg, but Hasan's help seems to have been reckoned of considerable importance. Öz-Beg subsidized Hasan substantially, and after the victory (which was not a very brilliant one, though immediately effective enough), Hasan was given Abhar and Zanjan. Thus the Ismā'īli state was expanding more decisively than in its whole history since the revolt—not through either settlement or conversion, but simply by annexing tribute-paying dependent territory. Hasan seems to have lost that territory later, presumably to the Khwārazmians.

After the campaign, Hasan retired to Rūdbār and stayed there. When Öz-Beg's next lieutenant in 'Irāq-i 'Ajam also broke with him and went over to the Khwārazm-Shāh, there was no great campaign; rather, at the caliph's bidding, Hasan sent Ismā'īli fidā'īs, who assassinated him. Hasan seems not to have been very venturesome by nature, despite his one fling, and he looked well to the constellation of forces around him: he was the first Iranian ruler to submit to the Mongols after they crossed the Oxus. After an otherwise undistinguished reign of eleven years, he died of dysentery while still a fairly young man (618/1221). His Sunni wives were (most implausibly) accused by his vizier of having poisoned him, and they were done away with; but in principle his Sunni policies were maintained under the nominal headship of his little son Muḥammad III.¹

Adjustment of the doctrine

Under Muḥammad III (618/1221-653/1255) the ṣalāt worship prescribed by the shari'a was carried on, at least in the main centres, till the end; the community remained officially Sunni. But gradually the shari'a came to be little enforced, and the ideas and practices associated with the qiyāma revived. In any case, the community regarded itself as specifically Ismā'īli. Muḥammad III himself seems to have been brought up as an Ismā'īli imām. He clearly accepted that role and probably also felt himself to be dispensed from the shari'a law and perhaps from many other human limitations. However, he was no scholar and probably contributed little personally.

¹ On Hasan III, see OA, pp. 215–22. There has been some question of Hasan's sincerity and as to whether, if converted, he was in fact Sunni or Twelver Shi'i; on this cf. ibid. pp. 222–5.
ADJUSTMENT OF THE DOCTRINE

to Ismā'īlī thinking; indeed, he seems to have looked to a Şūfī pir in Qazvin for his personal spiritual guidance, or at least for some sort of blessing; he sent gifts to the pir as an admirer. If it was not the Sunni teachers of the šari'a, neither was it the imām in person who guided the community spiritually. Rather, it was others, thrown up by the community itself.

Hasan III and his Sunnism were not repudiated: they were explained. In the course of this explanation the doctrine of the qiyāma was reinterpreted to allow for ordinary human and historical processes without repudiating the work of Hasan II either. In the process “popular” and folkloric ideas gained a still larger place over against the older learned tradition. The result was a doctrinal system in which the Ismā'īlis were prepared to maintain their spiritual independence under almost any circumstances. Their potential affinity to a Şūfī tariqa was increased, and the way was further prepared—as it turned out—for the community to survive intact even though the Ismā'īli state itself fell.

It was explained that the qiyāma, the resurrection, was not simply a final event but a condition of life which could, in principle, be withheld or granted by the imām-qā'im to mankind, or to the élite among mankind, at any time. The tacit identification between šari'a law and taqiyya, implied in the teaching of Hasan II, was confirmed, and with it the identification of haqīqa (spiritual reality) with qiyāma. Human life, then, alternated between times when reality was manifest and spiritual perfection could be sought directly; and times when reality was veiled and, instead of perfection, even the élite, for the most part, were directed to an outer symbolic acting-out of the tokens of reality, as laid down in the šari'a. Hasan II had introduced a brief period when reality was manifest; Hasan III had closed that period again.

This could be because any imām was potentially imām-qā'im, immediate representative of God on earth, and hence could decree whether there should be a time of qiyāma or not. It was still expected, as earlier among Ismā'īlis, that full qiyama would come only at the end of the sixth millennial period after Adam: that is, at the end of the millennial period introduced by the sixth great prophet, Muḥammad, which would also be the end of the present cycle (roughly seven thousand years) of history. But within the millennial period of Muḥammad, and in special honour of his greatness, there could be anticipatory periods of qiyāma, each one a foretaste of the final period of qiyāma: such was the qiyāma of Hasan II. Correspondingly, the rest of the
time, when taqiyya and the shari'a prevailed, was a time of satr, or "concealment".

The term satr had originally referred to those periods when the whereabouts of the imām was unknown to the world at large, or even, at times, to the faithful, as had been the case among Isma'iliIs before the rise of the Fātimids and again after the death of Nīzar. But now it came to mean not merely concealment of the person of the imām but any concealment of his ultimate reality, of his true religious role as the point where God became visible. In particular, Ḥasan III was known in his outward person as a worldly ruler, but he chose not to be recognized in his inner reality as imām; hence, despite his physical availability, his reign was a time of satr. Moreover, it was pointed out retrospectively that even the period when the imāms ruled in splendour in Egypt and the Isma'ili bātin was officially taught in Cairo had been a time of satr. In comparison with the qiyāma, all lesser degrees of the imām's manifestation were equally concealment; hence the concealment ordered by Ḥasan III differed only in degree from what had happened often before. If reality was to be hidden, it might as well be by imposition of the Sunni shari'a as by that of the Shi'i; and the imām might as well deny his own special relation to Muḥammad along with his status as visible locus of the divine.

Satr, the period of concealment, carrying with it shari'a and taqiyya, was the more normal lot of mankind because of human weakness. Even within the period of satr, spiritual reality was not entirely suppressed and could be known on a certain level. A small élite within the community of the faithful could even then look on the reality of the imām and so live the life of spiritual perfection. But, in theory the members of this élite, like the imām himself, were born to their status. In the time of Ḥasan III and perhaps even, in principle, in that of Muḥammad III, this élite may have been reduced to a single figure, the ḥujja, the "proof" of the imām—a position that had been filled by Ḥasan-i Șabbāh and now again rose to prominence, though we cannot identify the actual individuals who filled it in this last period of the Isma'ili state. It sufficed for most persons to remain on the second level, the level of the bātin, understanding what lay behind the shari'a and seeing the secret status of the imām, without going beyond that to the full personal realization in which they beheld nothing but the imām's ultimate reality.

1 On the doctrines of the satr, see OA, pp. 225-37.
ADJUSTMENT OF THE DOCTRINE

For most Ismā’īlis, what was primarily retained from the qiyāma times was not so much the hope for spiritual perfection as the imaginative richness which found its fullest embodiment in the Khīḍr–Elijah–Melchizedec imām-qā’im figure. If the élite still existed, even in the person of a single man, then at least such secrets could still be expounded, even though they were not fully lived out by most of the faithful; their exposition was what most mattered. Under Muḥammad III, however, a way was left open for the practice of qiyāma perfection by the more spiritually minded even of ordinary persons. The faithful were divided into “strong” and “weak”, and the “strong” could hope to achieve what seems to have amounted to a status of secondary or derived élite alongside the few élite who were born to their roles. Thus those who were devoted not merely to the imaginative splendour of the qiyāma but also to its moral and spiritual practice could devote themselves to this, freely transcending the šari‘a as did the imām and his ḥujja themselves.

With such a distinction, the Ismā’īlis moved even closer to the practice of a Šūfī tariqa, which allowed both for close disciples dedicated wholly to the pir, and for a wider circle of adepts who looked to the pir’s wise teachings and especially to his blessing but did not attempt to enter into the pir’s spiritual life themselves. The qiyāma was losing even such social dimensions as it had still had under Muḥammad II, when it was the foundation for the life of the whole state, and was becoming, like the Šūfī mystical life, a special vocation for an individually selected few. Even so, the Ismā’īli imām retained his unique cosmic position, to which a flesh-and-blood Šūfī pir, himself no qūṭ or Perfect Man, could not pretend.

The only religious writings which we can certainly date to the time of Muḥammad III are those ascribed to Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, who figures as the most important Ismā’īlī writer of the whole period of the satr following Hasan III. Legal work of his—presumably Shī‘ī rather than Shāffī—expounded the šari‘a for later Iranian Ismā’īlis; his theological works expounded the spiritual situation under conditions of satr. In them he answered with sophistication the numerous problems of detailed adjustment which arose when the doctrines of the satr and of the qiyāma, and also of Fātimid Ismā’īlism were mutually confronted; and he dealt with the more strictly philosophical problems that arose in the new doctrine taken for itself. (He was also very careful to give as little leeway as possible to those who might wish to fancy themselves
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among the “strong”—who must have been rather too numerous in fact.) We have from him a work of technical precision on Ismāʿīlī theology, and a briefer work clearly designed for the ordinary Ismāʿīlī, yet written with a wonderfully succinct clarity. Moreover his famous work on ethics was originally dedicated to an Ismāʿīlī chief in Kūhistān and furnished with an Ismāʿīlī preface.¹

Ṭūsī may not have been, even then, an Ismāʿīlī; later he was certainly a Twelver. But it was not entirely by chance that the Ismāʿīlīs were able to make use of the services of so able a writer. From the time of Hasan III, at least, though especially after the Mongol holocaust, they attracted to their libraries and to their learned patronage a large number of scholars like him, if not quite so eminent, from the outer world. Such scholars were free to maintain their prior religious convictions, and though Ṭūsī and some of the other non-Ismāʿīlī scholars who were in Rūdbār at the time of the Mongol invasion claimed that they were being kept there by force, it seems unlikely that such force long antedated the Mongol invasion itself, when special measures must have been unavoidable. At any rate, they were on terms of mutual confidence with the Ismāʿīlī leadership. The Ismāʿīlīs of the satr had worked out a religious system which allowed the most extreme spiritual daring of their heritage to coexist with a folkloric Shiʿī imaginativeness and even with the religious scholarship of the wider Muslim world. In such an atmosphere, their out-of-the-way fortresses were becoming centres of an intellectual life no longer limited to their own particular tradition; perhaps more important, the Nizārī Ismāʿīlī tradition itself was ceasing to be necessarily dependent upon the Ismāʿīlī state as such.

Persisting ambitions

As in religion, so in political action the Ismāʿīlīs developed a flexible policy, one which allowed for co-operation with the Sunni powers without abandonment of Ismāʿīlī solidarity or even of Ismāʿīlī ambitions. In this sphere also Muḥammad III was not the central figure, though he played his role. In his first years he was a minor, having become imām at the age of nine, and the chiefs of the community acted with little reference to him—and without leaving much trace of quarreling among themselves. When he grew up he seems to have been moody and capable of violent fits of anger; he could be drunk for

¹ On Ṭūsī's Ismāʿīlī work, see O.A., pp. 239–43.
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days at a time. The chroniclers have accused him of being mentally
deranged, and say that his courtiers were afraid to bring unpleasant
news to him; but in fact he seems to have kept pretty well in touch
with events and was probably less brutal and unpredictable than many
another tyrant born to absolute power. Nevertheless, though he
maintained his authority effectively enough, most of the initiative in
practical decisions probably came from others.¹

Muḥammad III's reign began (618/1221) just after the first wave of
the Mongol conquest had destroyed the Khwārazmian power. The
scholarly refugees came to the Ismāʿīlī towns at this time, not simply
because they were out of the way and so ignored by the Mongols, but
because at that point the Ismāʿīlī state was proving stronger than most.
The prudently early submission to the Mongols, which gave it an
initial immunity, did not preclude an independent policy. In Kūhistān
the Ismāʿīlīs maintained an island of prosperity and stability from which
all benefited when in so many other places even what the Mongols
had spared was being disrupted by the lesser warrings they left in their
wake. The scholarly gentleman Shihāb al-Dīn, a ruler whom even
bigoted Sunnis spoke highly of, aroused complaints that his policy of
wholesale hospitality was lavishing too freely the resources of the
community upon non-Ismāʿīlī strangers, and he was eventually replaced.
But Shams al-Dīn, the replacement, sent from Alamūt, also compelled
respect among the Sunnis. After an attempt on his life by a Sunnī
foreigner, he was able to prevent a spontaneous lynching of all the
resident Sunnis, taking soldierly command of a mob situation and
drastically enforcing order. The Kūhistānīs were able to take a
forward policy in Sistān, but by and large they limited their
objectives to defence. Sunnis whose style of life had been interrupted
by the Mongols could go to Kūhistān to renew their wardrobes, and
the main burden of negotiations between the Ismāʿīlīs and their neigh-
bours seems to have been the reopening of trade.

In Rūdbār the Ismāʿīlī policy was more aggressive, though in one
sense it likewise was on the side of order, being favourable to the caliph
and opposed to Khwārazmian disruption. In the first six years after the
fall of the Khwārazmian empire, the Ismāʿīlīs annexed a number of
places, including Dāmghān near Gird-Kūh. At some point, perhaps
earlier but most probably in this period, they seized other places
in Qūmis, presumably in the Zagros mountains, and in the Tārum

¹ On the personality of Muḥammad III, see O.A, pp. 256–8.
mountains of western Dailam where once they had had little foothold. The arrival of the Khwārazmian adventurer Jalāl al-Dīn put an end to this expansion. The old Ismā‘īli quarrel with the Khwārazmians was renewed with him. A Khwārazmian chief who had raided Ismā‘īli Kūhīstān was assassinated, and Jalāl al-Dīn’s vizier was secretly surrounded by Ismā‘īlis in his service, ready to cut him down at a word from the imām (these latter were burned alive when their presence was revealed—and Alamūt was duly compensated financially for their deaths). Before long the Ismā‘īlis agreed to pay Jalāl al-Dīn tribute for Dāmghān; but they continued to co-operate with both the caliph and the Mongols in opposition to him. The heirs to power in both Azarbāījān and ‘Īraq-ī ‘Ajam whom he had dispossessed took refuge in Rūdbār and received Ismā‘īli help.

After the death of Jalāl al-Dīn in 628/1231, the Ismā‘īli began to shift their hostilities once more: from the Saljuqs they had shifted their enmity to the Khwārazmians, who were the Saljuqs’ most powerful successors; from the Khwārazmians they shifted it now to the Mongols. The Mongols took Dāmghān from them, the only major (and Sunni) city that they then had a garrison in. The breach with the Mongols became decisive only after more than a decade, when the Mongols refused to recognize the Ismā‘īli envoys in Mongolia. The breach may have been exacerbated by the attitude of Muḥammad III, who eventually, at least, proved much more insistent than most Ismā‘īli leaders in resisting the Mongols. But it was made inevitable by an outlook which was popular with the Ismā‘īlis quite independently of the imām’s attitude. The Ismā‘īlis continued, as before, to be involved in neighbouring quarrels: again supporting a chief of Rūyān against his overlord in Māzandarān, for instance. But in the open political situation that the first Mongol operations had left behind, they were envisaging a field of action wider than had been possible since the time of Ḥasan-ī Ṣabbāḥ.

Soon after the death of Ḥasan III, Ismā‘īli agitators were already at work in Ray, evidently looking toward winning a new popular following and perhaps arousing a new general revolt. Syrian Ismā‘īlis, on a rumour of Jalāl al-Dīn’s death, boasted to the ruler of Anatolia that the Ismā‘īlis of Rūdbār would now take over all ʿĪraq-ī ‘Ajam, whose previous Khwārazmian ruler was a refugee among them. Prophecies of how the imām was going to conquer the world had long appeared in Ismā‘īli works, but we find an unusually detailed prophecy in one of
Persisting ambitions

Tūsī’s works of this period. After occupying Dailam, the imām would conquer the several other districts south of the Caspian—Māzandarān, Gilān, and Mūghān—and would then carry the holy war to India, China, and Europe—that is, to all the main civilized regions, beyond the Islamic lands in the eastern hemisphere. At this juncture, all this need not have seemed too fantastic. The nearest we know of Ismā’īlīs getting to China is by way of embassies in Mongolia. But Indian tradition places the first Nizārī Ismā’īlī missionary activity, which produced the Khoja sect there, at just this time. And the Ismā’īlīs are reported to have sent envoys in 1238 to the courts of France and England in Western Europe to try to arrange for joint action by Christians and Muslims against the Mongols: a project which would presuppose the Ismā’īlīs still having some common understanding with the caliph, even that late in Muhammad III’s reign. Popular fantasy—presumably not discouraged by the Ismā’īlīs—represented many of the rulers of the earth as sending regular ransom payments to the Ismā’īlīs, at least to those in Syria, to avoid being assassinated; kings were named as distant as the Yemen and Germany and Spain. But pretensions to any sort of world domination could only conflict irreconcilably with the overriding ambitions of the Mongols, who regarded themselves as the only masters of the world.¹

The collapse

The Ismā’īlīs were playing a larger role in the outer world after the first Mongol conquests than they had played since the original revolt, and their political structure, like their intellectual life, seems to have been vigorous and sound. Nevertheless, they had not ceased to be a marginal power in territory and manpower. Though the Būyid family had once dominated all western Iran on the basis of the loyalty of Dailam and of its peasant soldiery, the times called for more than the stop-gap regime which the Būyids had been able to supply. To be successful, the Ismā’īlīs would have to depend on the Shi‘īs of the Islamic lands; but the Shi‘a was still at a low ebb then, and most Shi‘īs had rejected the Ismā‘īli imāms anyway; nor was Alamūt in a position to come to an arrangement with Twelver Shi‘īsm such as Shāh Ismā‘īl could later make to found the Safavid state on. In any case, many of the Ismā‘īlīs were more concerned to avoid hindrances to

¹ On politics under Muhammad III, see O.A, pp. 244–8, 250–6.

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commerce than to conquer the world. The Mongols, on the contrary, were fully serious about their intention to rule everywhere and to suppress every possible rival.

With time, the Mongols consolidated their position in Iran, and the Isma‘ilis—who, apart from the caliph himself, were almost alone in remaining hostile—became isolated. The welcome accorded Hasan III as a convert had long since been dissipated, and most Sunnis were again eager to see the old enemies of orthodoxy suppressed. At last Möngke, urged on by Muslims at his court, decided in 650/1252 to send a major expedition against the two powers that still held out in the central Muslim lands: the Isma‘ilis and the ‘Abbāsid caliphate. Hülegü took his time in making the long trip from Mongolia with the main Mongol force, but his advance armies joined with the Mongol garrisons already in Iran to attack as many Isma‘ili fortresses as possible. In Dailam they did little more than raid. They failed to take Gird-Kūh; it seemed impregnable until disease decimated the garrison, and in that emergency men from Rudbar were successfully thrown in to bring the garrison up to strength: on which the Mongols gave up. They managed to take Tūn and some other places in Kūhistān, on which they then concentrated; but later the Isma‘ili regained what had been lost even there. When Hülegü finally arrived, however, the Mongols more successfully overrun a great part of Kūhistān, destroying Tūn and deporting its artisans according to their custom. Then Hülegü moved toward Rudbar.

This situation seems to have aggravated a tension between Muḥammad III and his chief officers, who wanted to come to an agreement with the Mongols. It was said, perhaps for political reasons later, that after the Mongol armies approached, Muḥammad’s mental aberration became more marked, so that the leading Isma‘ilis feared for their lives. Muḥammad’s son and designated successor as imām, Khur-Shāh, had long been on bad terms with his father (it is said the Isma‘ilis, holding to their principles, would not let Muḥammad designate any other son, though he wished to). Now Khur-Shāh likewise began to be frightened. He came to an agreement with the Isma‘ili chief men that Muḥammad was to be set aside without suffering any harm to his person, and Khur-Shāh, as effective regent, was then to negotiate with the Mongols. But before the plan could be put into operation, Khur-Shāh fell ill and was confined to his bed. At this point (653/1255), a favourite of Muḥammad’s, whom Muḥammad had injured, murdered him.

Khur-Shāh and his advisers set about a change of policy with due
THE COLLAPSE

cautions. First they completed a campaign in western Dailam, where the Ismā’īlis seized a fortress they had been besieging. Then Khur-Shāh sent letters to the neighbouring rulers announcing his father’s death and his own accession. At the same time he ordered all the Ismā’īlis to follow the shari’a more closely than they had generally been doing, clearly hoping to conciliate the Sunnī powers again. Then he sent to the Mongols, offering his submission.

Unfortunately, the Mongols were not ready to be satisfied with anything less than total surrender. They required Khur-Shāh’s personal attendance on Hūleqū and the demolition of the Ismā’īli fortresses, including Alamūt. Khur-Shāh asked for a delay of a year in his own appearance and for exemption of Alamūt and Lanbasar from the demolition order. Meanwhile the chiefs in Gird-Kūh and in Kūhistān submitted personally, but the fortress nonetheless held out. Khur-Shāh was finally permitted to send his son in his place, but the seven-year-old lad was sent back as being too young. By this time, Hūleqū himself was near Ray and speeding his pace as he moved nearer Rūdbār; he demanded that Khur-Shāh demolish immediately at least Maimūn-Diz, the fortress where he was staying, and then come himself to Rūdbār. Khur-Shāh still lingered, and suddenly found himself besieged in Maimūn-Diz by the full Mongol force.

There is some evidence that, given the spirit of an earlier time, the key Ismā’īli fortress might have been held at least long enough to persuade Hūleqū that some accommodation, leaving the Ismā’īli power humbled but still essentially intact, would be expeditious. The Mongols themselves were doubtful whether they should press the siege of Maimūn-Diz at that time; subsequently, when they found how massively constructed and well-provisioned were such fortresses as Alamūt, they congratulated themselves on their good fortune in persuading their master to surrender them. Muḥammad III may have been correct in his calculation that the Ismā’īlis could resist the Mongols as well as they had the Saljuqs or the Khwārazmians. Indeed, the Ismā’īli spirit was not wholly gone. No traitors are recorded, and at least Gird-Kūh, which later elected to resist despite Khur-Shāh’s final surrender, held out alone for a long time. But Khur-Shāh seems to have listened to the foreign scholars at the court, such as Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī, who were eager to see the Ismā’īli state at an end, and to be free to taste of the yet larger munificence of the Mongols (which they did); nor did his Ismā’īli advisers strongly counteract that influence, though the lesser fidā’īs
threatened to kill him if he tried to surrender. Before long, Khur-Shâh came down to Hûlegû's camp, and the greater number of the Isma'îlîs followed his lead (654/1256). A devoted band which yet attacked the Mongols as they entered Maimûn-Dîz was exterminated, and with some trouble most of the fortresses were persuaded by Khur-Shâh, now a puppet of the Mongols, to surrender. The Mongols, who could not expect to hold them themselves in a hostile Dâlam, undertook the major labour of dismantling them stone by stone.

Gird-Kûh and Lanbasar still held out for a time, but isolated they could no longer hope for such succour as had come earlier to Gird-Kûh from Rudbâr; after some years they too had to surrender. Meanwhile, the Sunni Muslims persuaded the Mongols to destroy the whole Isma'îlî people so far as they could. The library of Alamût was burned as a matter of course (though Juvainî, a Sunni scholar, was first allowed to take out copies of the Qur'an and other "safe" items). Rather less expected was a general massacre of all the Isma'îlîs who, exiled from their fortresses, were relatively accessible to the Mongol sword. The men of Kûhistân were summoned to great gatherings—presumably on the pretext of consultation—and slaughtered. The slave markets of Khûrâsân were glutted with Isma'îlî women and children, denied the privileges of Muslims. Khur-Shâh was sent to Mongolia but was rejected by Mûngke and killed on the way back; however, the remnant of the Isma'îlîs claimed to have saved and hidden away his son to father a continuing line of imâms.

In the next decades there were attempts in both Rudbâr and Kûhistân to restore the Isma'îlî state, but without success. The Syrian Isma'îlîs, situated at the farthest limit of the Mongol tide, barely managed to survive it, only to become dependent on the Mamlûk state, whose ruler they were bound to furnish with assassins on demand. In Iran, the surviving Isma'îlîs at last took refuge in obscurity, cloaked by the forms of a Şûfî tariqa whose pîr was the imâm.

1 Gird-Kûh did not in fact surrender until 29 Rabî' II 669/15 December 1270. See Rashîd al-Dîn, ed. Alizade, p. 140, also above, p. 360.
2 Apparently in the Khangai mountains. See Juvainî, tr. Boyle, p. 724 n. 8, also above, p. 345.
3 On the Mongol operations, see OA, pp. 258-71. The basic references are Juvainî and Rashîd al-Dîn; each of these must be consulted at two points: when he describes the expedition of Hûlegû, and then also when he describes the history of the Isma'îlîs, under the reign of Khur-Shâh.
CHAPTER 6

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITION OF IRAN UNDER THE ĪL-KHĀNS

We can distinguish the following periods in the socio-economic history of Iran during the Mongol dominion.

*The first period*—from the twenties to the nineties of the thirteenth century—is marked by the colossal economic decline of Iran, caused both by the devastation wrought during the Mongol conquest, and still more by the administrative practices, in particular the taxation policy, of the first conquerors (the viceroys of the Great Khan, and then from 1256 the Il-Khāns). Typical phenomena of the time are a reduction in population and cultivated land, the decline of agriculture, the migration of fresh multitudes of Mongol and Turkish nomads, and the expansion of migrational cattle-breeding, a decline in urban life, the growth of tendencies of natural economy, an increase in state taxes and feudal rent, the attachment of peasants to the soil, and the growth of a peasant insurrectionary movement.

*The second period*—from the nineties of the thirteenth century to the middle thirties of the fourteenth century (to the death of Il-Khān Abū Saʿid in November 1335) is characterized by something of an economic upsurge, especially in agriculture, as a result of the reforms of Ghazan. During this and the following periods conditional private ownership of land and large-scale unconditional landownership expanded at the expense of state and small-scale peasant landowning. The economy of the country did however attain its pre-1220 level.

*The third period* extends from the mid-thirties to the eighties of the fourteenth century (to the beginning of Timur’s conquest). This period is marked by feudal dismemberment, the struggle for power of feudal groups, and the political disintegration of the Il-Khānid state as a result. This disintegration began in 1336 and was completed in 1353 on the occasion of the killing of the last Il-Khān, Ṭogha-Temūr, and the destruction of his headquarters—ordu—in Gurgān by rebel Sarbadārs. The restoration of pre-Ghazan methods of peasant exploitation provoked violent rebellions among the peasantry (the Sarbadārs of Khurāsān in 1337–81, analogous movements in Māzandarān and Gilān
from the fifties to the seventies of the fourteenth century, and others), which were supported by minor Iranian landowners as well as urban artisans.

**THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE MONGOL INVASION**

In the Middle Ages invasions by conquering nomads of cultivated settled areas were normally devastative. The Saljuq conquest of Iran in particular was accompanied by pillage and destruction. The destructive nature of the invasion of Khurāsān by the Oghuz of Balkh in the fifties of the twelfth century is notorious. But the Mongol conquest brought to Iran as it did to other lands destruction and decline on an incomparably greater scale. This was because the conquests of Chingiz-Khān, uniting under his rule most of the Mongol, Turkish, and other nomads of Central Asia, were accompanied not by spontaneous cruelty, but by the systematic extermination of the civilian population in a series of towns (Balkh, Marv, Nīshāpūr, Herāt, Tūs, Ray, Qazvin, Hamadān, Marāgheh, Ardabil, etc.) and the laying waste of whole regions. This mass-killing was a complete system, put into practice on initiative from above, and had as its goal the planned destruction of those elements of the population that were capable of resistance, the intimidation of the remainder, and sometimes the providing of pasture for the nomads.

Ibn al-Athīr spoke of the Mongol invasion as of an enormous universal catastrophe. Even the pro-Mongol historian Juvainī, speaking of the massacres perpetrated by the generals of Chingiz-Khān, concludes with this assertion: “... where there had been a hundred thousand people there remained ... not a hundred souls alive.” More than a century after the invasion, in 740-1339/40, the historian and geographer Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī refers to the “ruin (in the present day) as a result of the irruption of the Mongols and the general massacre of the people which took place in their days” and adds: “Further there can be no doubt that even if for a thousand years to come no evil befalls the country, yet will it not be possible completely to repair the damage, and bring back the land to the state in which it

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1 See, for example, Gurgānī, *Vis u Rāmīn*, pp. 23-4 (preface of the author concerning the destruction of the villages of the Isfahān oasis); Ibn al-Balkhī, *Fārs-Nāma*, pp. 132, 134 (about the devastation of Shirāz).
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE MONGOL INVASION

was formerly.” Such is the testimony of the contemporaries of the Mongol invasion.

Thus the economic and cultural decline of Iran after the conquest, as also of neighbouring lands, cannot be doubted. But we can only conceive the scale of the decline clearly if we collect and correlate the separate and varying pieces of information given by historians and geographers of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and compare them with information from the pre-Mongol period.

The primary result of the Mongol conquest was a fall in population, mostly among the working people in town and country, due to massacre and abduction into slavery and captivity, the flight of the remaining population, and the desertion of areas that had been thickly populated at an earlier date. Arab and Persian sources, speaking of the universal slaughter in a series of towns and districts, give figures which stun the imagination. Thus at the taking of Nishápūr, in 1220, 1,747,000 men alone are said to have been massacred. At the capture of Marv, according to Ibn al-Athīr, about 700,000 people were killed, according to Juvainī, 1,300,000. At the second Mongol capture of Herāt, at the end of 1222, 1,600,000 people were said to have been killed. The number killed at the capture of Baghdad by Hülegū is fixed by Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī at 800,000. Describing massacres in the lesser towns, the sources give smaller figures: in Nāṣa 70,000 were killed; in the district of Bāhāq (of which the chief town was Sabzavār) 70,000 dead were counted; 12,000 were killed in Tūn (Kūhistān), and so on.

Of course we cannot accept these figures as entirely reliable. Such sizeable numbers are difficult to accept for a population living in a feudal economy, even in the case of such major cities as Nishápūr and others like it, and even assuming that the figures refer to the country

1 Nasūḥ al-qulūb, p. 27, transl. le Strange, p. 34.
2 Saifī, Ta‘rīkh-Nāma-yi Harāt, p. 63. This figure is of course improbable.
4 Juvainī, vol. I, p. 128. This figure is arrived at in an arbitrary manner by the author, who considers that the total ought to be 1,300,000, as the counting of the dead lasted thirteen days, and 100,000 corpses could be counted in a day and a night. See the English translation by J. A. Boyle, vol. I, p. 164.
5 Saifī, p. 60; similar figures are given by other sources. Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī informs us that there were 440,000 households in Herāt under the Ghūrids, that is 2,000,000 people, since household signifies family (Nasūḥ al-qulūb, p. 152). According to Saifī (p. 67), 190,000 men took to arms in Herāt and district; if men fit for military service were 10 per cent of the population, we arrive at a figure of 1,900,000 souls for Herāt and district.
6 Ta‘rīkh-i Gūzāda, p. 580.
7 Nasawi, p. 52.
9 Nasūḥ al-qulūb, pp. 54-5; Clavijo, edition of I. Sreznevsky, p. 187.
districts surrounding the towns. But admitting exaggeration, we cannot however dismiss these figures as pure products of fantasy: the very fact that such numbers could be given, and in different sources, both pro- and anti-Mongol in orientation, implies a grandiose scale of mass-extirmination, astounding the imagination of contemporaries. So does the fact that such towns as Ray were never rebuilt and remained uninhabited and in ruins for centuries. We should take into consideration also that many people were led away into slavery and captivity, or died of epidemics or hunger—the normal concomitants of foreign invasion.¹ Taking all this into account, we cannot doubt that between 1220 and 1258 the population of Iran declined several times over, the northern and eastern areas suffering most of all. Regrettably, the sources do not contain any overall figures for the population of Iran before and after the Mongol conquest.

Khurāsān suffered most of all. Yaqūt in the second decade of the thirteenth century speaks of the prosperity of the districts of Khurāsān.² According to Nasawi, all the towns and castles had been ruined and the major part of the population both in the towns and the rural areas either killed or carried off into slavery during the first Mongol invasion of Khurāsān in 1220–23, whilst the young men had been taken away for employment in siege operations; the conquerors left nobody in peace.³ Juvainī says that in a couple of months, Tolui so ravaged many regions of Khurāsān that he made them like the “palm of the hand”.⁴ Writing about the year 720/1321 Saifī cites the stories of old men, based on the memories of eye-witnesses, to show that at the time of the invasion there were in Khurāsān “neither people, nor corn, nor food, nor clothing”,⁵ and that “from the frontiers of Balkh as far as Dāmghān people ate only human flesh, dogs and cats for a whole year,⁶ because the warriors of Chingiz-Khān had burnt down all the granaries”.⁷

What life was like in the Herāt region of Khurāsān, one can judge from the stories of Saifī: after the slaughter of 1220 only sixteen

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¹ According to a writer continuing the Tārīkh-i Sistān (p. 396), about 100,000 died of famine and a disease of the legs, mouth and teeth (scurvy?) at the Mongol siege of Sistān (Zarang) in 632/1234–5.
² Mu'jam al-buldān, passim under the names of the towns and districts of Khurāsān; among other things are given the numbers of villages in districts. In the region of Tūs alone there were about 1,000 villages (ibid. vol. iii, p. 560).
³ Nasawi, p. 52–4.
⁵ Saifī, p. 83.
⁶ 618 = 1220–21.
⁷ Saifī, p. 87.
people survived in the city of Herāt, and only forty, if we include fugitives from other places, whilst not more than a hundred survivors remained in the surrounding countryside. Saifī relates a vivid tale drawn from the memories of old men about the life of the forty chance survivors in their ruined and devastated city: first they fed upon the corpses of animals and men, then for a period of four years this handful of people were only able to get food by attacking passing caravans; and this too at distances of from 150 to 800 kilometres from Herāt. When in 1236 the Great Khan Ögedei gave assent to the rebuilding of Herāt and brought back some of the weavers (jāma-bāfān) who had been carried off into captivity, these latter had first of all to restore one of the canals that had been destroyed and then to harness themselves to the plough and sow corn, because there were neither peasants nor cattle in the countryside around the town.

The Balkh region, according to Yāqūt, at the beginning of the thirteenth century before the Mongol conquest abounded in riches, producing silk and such a quantity of corn that it was the granary of the whole of Khurāsān and Khwārazm. From the life of the great Persian poet and mystic Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī we learn that Balkh had about 200,000 inhabitants in the twelfth and at the beginning of the thirteenth centuries. The Mongols sacked it, massacring the whole population. Travellers who passed through Balkh, the Chinese Taoist Ch’ang-ch’un (1223), Marco Polo (the second half of the thirteenth century), and Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (the thirties of the fourteenth century), inform us that it and its environs were derelict and deserted. After the Marv oasis had been destroyed three times by the Mongols (1221–5), its agriculture and the dam on the river Murghāb were ruined, cattle had been driven away, and corn had been taken. Massacre followed massacre until “in the town and the villages there were not a hundred souls alive and not enough food even for these enfeebled few”. In Ṭūs only fifty houses remained occupied. Nishāpūr was
completely empty and ruined after the wholesale slaughter; in the town there was not a wall still standing and the rural area was also devastated.¹

According to the poet Nizārī, many villages were still deserted in Kūhistān in the seventies, the town of Qā'in being still without water;² 12,000 people had been killed in Tūn; all the Ismā'īlīs in Kūhistān had been slaughtered in accordance with the decree of Hūlegū.⁴

The Mongol conquest took an equally heavy toll in Tabaristān (Māzandarān). In the words of the historian of the region Ibn Isfandiyār (beginning of the thirteenth century) “all land was cultivated from the mountains to the shores of the sea, and villages adjoined one another, so that there was not one span of waste land that did not bear the fruits of the earth”;⁵ here “the whole countryside was garden or orchard, so that the eye saw nothing but green”.⁶ Harvests were such that there were many fresh vegetables at each season of the year and a great quantity of corn, rice, millet, and every kind of meat and fowl;⁷ in the area “there had never been poverty, such as there was in other places”.⁸ The same historian states that the region was desolate after the Mongol conquest and that throughout the whole of Khurāsān there were crowds of slave-captives from Tabaristān.⁹ The local historian Zahir al-Dīn Mar'ashī, writing about 1470, speaks of the terrible devastation of Māzandarān by the Mongols and says that the ruins and heaps of ashes were still there in his time.¹⁰ Yāqūt wrote of neighbouring Gurgān at the beginning of the thirteenth century as of a rich district, abundant in garmisīr (i.e. subtropical) crops and silk. As an example of the wealth of the region Yāqūt cites the case of an estate which cost 1,000,000 dirhams and was leased for 500,000.¹¹ But Hamd Allāh Qazvīnī speaks of the destruction of Gurgān by the Mongols, and says that in his time (1340) there were few people living there.¹² The decay of the irrigation network is referred to by Ghazān in his decree concerning the cultivation of desolate land.

³ Nizārī, Kulliyāt, manuscript in the Institute of Language and Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the Tajik S.S.R. no. 100 (manuscript) of 972/1564–5), 1.292 a.
⁵ Ta'rīkh-i Tabaristān, ed. of Persian text of 'Abbās Iqībāl, vol. i, p. 74.
⁶ Ibid. vol. i, p. 76.
⁷ Ibid.
⁸ Ibn Isfandiyār, Ta'rīkh-i Tabaristān, abridged English translation by Browne, GMS, p. 238.
⁹ Zahir al-Dīn Mar'ashī, p. 264.
¹⁰ Mu'jam al-buldān, vol. i, p. 49.
¹¹ Nuṣḥat al-qulūb, p. 159.
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The dislocation in the life of Iran during the conquest was not however the only cause of the catastrophic decline in the economy of the country. There were other factors aggravating the decline. First of all, the conquest of Iran did not create a stable peace inside the land. The invasions of the armies of the Qipchaq and Chaghatai rulers, enemies of the Il-Khāns, were almost as destructive as the first Mongol invasion. We shall quote here only one example: in 1295 the Chaghatai ruler Du’a terribly ravaged and burnt the rural areas of Khūrāsān (especially the Herat oasis), the rural districts of Māzandarān, and the Yazd oasis, driving 200,000 prisoners (women and children) into servitude.\(^1\)

Equally devastating were the incursions of the Nigūdari Mongols, who led a nomadic existence in Afghanistan and did not recognize the authority of the Il-Khāns,\(^2\) into Khūrāsān, Sistān, Kirmān and Fārs,\(^3\) and the punitive expeditions of the Il-Khāns themselves against their recalcitrant vassals, or in order to put down popular revolt (for example the revolt in Fārs led by the qādi Sharaf al-Dīn, who proclaimed himself Mahdī in 663/1265).\(^4\) It is sufficient to say that Khūrāsān remained desolate;\(^5\) the Herat oasis and Herat itself were devastated with the loss of part of the population in 1270, 1288, 1289, 1295, 1306–07 and 1319.\(^6\)

The increase in the number of nomads in the country had a part in the decline of the economy, especially that of agriculture. Contrary to the opinion of V. V. Barthold that “the Mongol invasion was not connected, as was the Germanic invasion of the Roman Empire, with transmigration of people”,\(^7\) the sources permit us to speak of a considerable migration of Mongol nomadic tribes into the territory of the Il-Khāns,\(^8\) not to mention that of Turkish nomads. Some previously agricultural territory became pasture for the nomads, as for example Bādgīs in Khūrāsān, where before the Mongol conquest there were

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\(^1\) Saifi, pp. 402, 408, 416.

\(^2\) Ancestors of the present-day Hazāra Mongols in Afghanistan.


\(^4\) Vassaf, pp. 191–92.

\(^5\) Saifi, p. 346 (under the year 975 or 1276).


\(^7\) Istoria kul’turnoi zhizni Turkistana, p. 86.

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several towns with populations of 20,000–30,000. The influence of the nomads proved unfavourable to Iran in the economic sphere. Nomadic cattle-rearing, without knowledge of fodder-grass cultivation and based upon cattle being at grass the whole year round, was extensive in character and required great uninhabited expanses of summer and winter pasture. The nomads, always armed and strong by reason of their tribal organization, ruined grain and trampled crops underfoot in their migrations, not scrupling to rob unorganized, unarmed, and defenceless peasants. But the political rule of the nomads or, more exactly, of their feudal military aristocracy, who regarded the subjugated Persians as a permanent source of plunder and revenue and no more, also created great difficulties for Iran. Because, although nomad cattle-breeding was known in Iran from ancient times, it had never occupied as important a position in the economy, as it did under the Mongols and later. Neither under the Umayyads, nor even under the Saljuqs did the military nobility of nomad tribes play such a leading role, as it did under the İl-Khāns and their successors, the Jalayirids, Qara-Qoyunlu, Aq-Qoyunlu, and the first Şafavids.

The most important factor hindering the economic renaissance of the country and contributing to further economic decline was the fiscal policy of the viceroys of the Great Khan, and of the İl-Khāns. This policy was particularly hard on peasant farmers, since the taxes were not precisely established, were levied in an arbitrary manner, were collected several times over, and were often of arbitrary size. We shall speak later in greater detail about the fiscal system of the İl-Khāns. Let us for the time being note that towards the end of the thirteenth century the peasants had been brought to the verge of poverty and mass-flight. Thus even those regions which had not fallen prey to the invasion of Chingiz-Khān and Hülegü, as for example Fārs, were ruined. Vaššar gives a typical example of the decline of agricultural productivity in the Fārs region. The district of Kurbāl, considered one of the most fertile, watered by canals from the river Kur, on which were two large dams (the Band-i Amīr and Band-i Qaššār), yielded about

1 Ḥāfuẓ-i Abrū, geographic works, f. 228a.
2 Mukātibāt-i Rashīdī, pp. 177 (no. 33), 277–8 (no. 46); Dastūr al-kāʾib, ff. 34a, 224b, 233b, etc.
3 Herodotus, History, Book 1, chapter 125.
6 Ibn al-Balkhī, Fārs-Nāma, pp. 151–2; Nuzhat al-gulīb, p. 124.
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700,000 kharvārs (ass-loads) of grain in the annual harvest under Būyid 'Aṣd al-Daula (949–83). Under the atabeg Sa'd b. Abi Bakr, a vassal of the Īl-Khāns, the annual harvest there about the year 1260 fell to 300,000 kharvārs, and before the reforms of Ghazan fell even further, and the kharāj of Kurbāl consisted of only 42,000 kharvārs of grain. The deliveries of grain from the other districts of Fārs decreased in a like manner. Rashīd al-Dīn gives the following general characterization of the decline of Iran and neighbouring countries before the reforms of Ghazan:

At the time of the Mongol conquest they submitted the inhabitants of great populous cities and broad provinces to such massacres, that hardly anyone was left alive, as was the case in Balkh, Shuburqān, Tāliqān, Marv, Sarākhs, Herāt, Turkestān, Ray, Hamadān, Qum, Īsfahān, Marāğheh, Ardabil, Barda’a, Ganjah, Baghdad, Irbīl and the greater part of the territories belonging to these cities. In some areas on the frontiers, frequently traversed by armies, the native population was either completely annihilated or had fled, leaving their land waste, as in the case of Uighuristān and other regions that now formed the boundary between the ulus of the Qā’an and Qaidu. So also were several districts between Darband and Shīrvān and parts of Abulustān and Diyārbakr, such as Harrān, Ruḥa, Sarūj, Raqqah and the majority of cities on both sides of the Euphrates, which were all devastated and deserted. And one cannot describe the extent of the land laid waste in other regions as a result of the slaughter, such as the despoiled lands of Baghdad and Āzarbājjan or the ruined towns and villages of Turksistan, Iran and Rūm [Asia Minor], which people see with their own eyes. A general comparison shows that not a tenth part of the lands is under cultivation and that all the remainder is still lying waste.

TENDENCIES IN THE SOCIAL POLICY OF THE ĪL-KHĀNS

We can trace two political trends in the upper strata of the Mongol victors and the leading group of Iranian aristocracy allied to them. The supporters of the first trend, admirers of Mongol tradition and the nomadic way of life, were antagonistic to a settled life, to agriculture

1 Conventional measure of weight; 1 kharvār = 100 mans, but the man varied in different districts; Shīrāz man = 3.3 kg, Tabrīz man = app. 3 kg.
2 Vāṣf, p. 445. Taking the kharāj to be 20–24 per cent of the crop, the overall crop can be estimated at from 221,000 to 175,000 kharvārs. See calculations in: I. Petrushevskiy, Zemledelie . . ., pp. 81–2; also reference to sources.
3 Vāṣf, p. 445; see ibid, p. 435.
4 The ancient Edessa, now called Urfa.
and to towns, and were supporters of unlimited, rapacious exploitation of settled peasants and town-dwellers. These representatives of the military feudal-tribal steppe aristocracy regarded themselves as a military encampment in enemy country, and made no great distinction between unsubjugated and subjugated settled peoples. The conquerors wished to plunder both, albeit in different ways, the former by seizure of the spoils of war, the latter by exacting burdensome taxes. The supporters of this policy did not care if they ended by ruining the peasantry and the townspeople; they were not interested in their preservation. The most self-seeking and avaricious members of the local Iranian bureaucracy supported the adherents of this first trend, as did the tax-farmers, who closely linked their interest to that of the conquerors and joined with them in the plunder of the settled population subject to taxation—the ra‘iyyat.

As well as being supported by a small group of nomad aristocrats, closely connected by service with the family of the Il-Khán in his headquarters (ordú) and demesne (injú), the second trend was mainly supported by the majority in the Iranian bureaucracy, by many of the Muslim clergy, and by the large-scale merchants. This tendency aimed at the creation of a strong central authority in the person of the Il-Khán, the adoption by the Mongol state of the old Iranian traditions of a centralized feudal form of government, and in connexion with this the curbing of the centrifugal proclivities of the nomad tribal aristocracy. To do this it seemed necessary to reconcile the feudal leaders of Iran to the Il-Khán, to reconstruct the disrupted economy of the country, particularly of agriculture, and to foster town-life, trade, and the merchants. Some lightening of the fiscal burden, an exact stabilizing of imposts and obligations (there was no stability in these under the first Il-Kháns) laid upon the ra‘iyyat, and protection from such taxes and services as would ruin them completely, were necessary conditions of this.  

1 The Yasa of Chingiz-Khán required the Mongols to lead a nomadic existence, not to settle nor to dwell in the towns: see the Ta‘rikh-i Guzída, manuscript in Leningrad State University, no. 155, 472 (not in edition of E. G. Browne); quotation in W. Barthold, Turkestan, G.M.S. N.S. (London, 1958), p. 467 n. 3.  
2 Such were the great bitikči Sharaf al-Din Juvaini, the sáhib-diván Shams al-Din Muhammad Juvaini (the brother of the historian), and particularly his son Bahá’ al-Din Juvaini.  
3 Under the first Il-Kháns Christians also (mostly of the Nestorian and Monophysite clergy).  
4 For more about these two trends see: I. Petrushevsky, Zemledelie i agrarnie otnosheniya v Irane v XII-XIV vv., pp. 46-53; there are also references to sources and literature for research.
conflict between the pristine trends of the Iranian Middle Ages, towards feudal disintegration and feudal centralization.

A policy in the spirit of the first tendency predominated under the first six Il-Khâns. For this reason, although there was no lack of attempts by individual rulers to rebuild cities and irrigation networks, nevertheless these attempts were not successful, because of the policy of unbounded exploitation of the ra'iyyat—both peasant and city-dweller. Since the work of construction was carried out by unpaid forced labour, it only laid an extra burden upon the ra'iyyat, who were ruined previous to this, and in general such work was not completed.¹

The second trend gained the upper hand in the ulus of the Il-Khâns during the reign of Ghazan, from 1295 to 1304. His vizier, the historian, Shâfi'ite theologian and encyclopaedist Rashîd al-Dîn Faḍl Allah Hamâdânî (1247-1318), who carried out the reforms of this Il-Khân, was the most notable representative and ideologist of this policy. After the publication of the correspondence of Rashîd al-Dîn, we cannot doubt but that his was the initiative in the reforms of Ghazan. In a letter to his son Shihâb al-Dîn, governor of Khûzistân, Rashîd al-Dîn expressed in the following words the idea that it was necessary to keep the well-being of the ra'iyyat up to a certain level, since they were the fundamental payers of taxes:

It is fitting that rulers have three exchequers; firstly of money; secondly of weapons; thirdly of food and clothing. And these exchequers are named the exchequers of expenditure. But the exchequer of income is the ra'iyyat themselves, since the treasuries that I have mentioned are filled by their good efforts and their economies. And if they are ruined, the king will have no revenue. After all, if you look into the matter, the basis of administration is justice, for if, as they say, the revenue of the ruler is from the army, and the government (saltanat) has no revenue but that paid by the army,² yet an army is created by means of taxation (mâl), and there is no army without taxation. Now tax is paid by the ra'iyyat, there being no tax that is not paid by the ra'iyyat. And the ra'iyyat are preserved by justice. There are no ra'iyyat, if there is no justice.³

This same idea is expressed by Ghazan in a speech made to amirs, i.e. to the Mongol-Turkish military and nomad aristocracy. In this speech he says amongst other things:

² That is, out of plunder, one-fifth of which went to the state.
³ Mukâtabât-i Rashîdî, pp. 118-19 (no. 22).
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I am not on the side of the Tāzik1 ra‘īyyat. If there is a purpose in pillaging them all, there is no-one with more power to do this than I. Let us rob then together. But if you wish to be certain of collecting grain (taghār)2 and food (āsh) for your tables in the future, I must be harsh with you. You must be taught reason. If you insult the ra‘īyyat, take their oxen and seed, and trample their crops into the ground, what will you do in the future? . . . The obedient ra‘īyyat must be distinguished from the ra‘īyyat who are our enemies.3 How should we not protect the obedient, allowing them to suffer distress and torment at our hands.4

GHANZAN’S REFORMS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

The most important of Ghazan’s reforms aimed at restoring the Iranian economy were: a new method of levying the land tax (ḳabarāj) and other taxes payable to the divān, fixing a precise sum for each particular area in money or kind to be paid twice yearly, in spring and autumn;5 the cutting by half of the impost on trades and crafts (tamgha)6 in some towns and its complete abolition in others:7 this measure was intended to assist the revival of town life. Other reforms important for the Iranian economy were enacted during the reign of Ghazan:8 the abolition of barāt, i.e. the system of payment of state liabilities to soldiers, officials, pensioners, and creditors of the state by means of notes drawn against local exchequers, transferring payment on them to peasants, on whose shoulders was thus laid an additional fiscal burden; abolition of the practice of quartering military and official personnel in the homes of the ra‘īyyat, which practice, accompanied always by extortion and maltreatment of the taxable population, was one of the heaviest

1 I.e. Tajik; this term was then used to describe Iranians in general; see W. Barthold’s article, “Tädjik”, EI.
2 I.e. payment in kind of the military personnel of the state out of taxes.
3 I.e. rebels.
4 Probably this manifesto of Ghazan to the amirs was inspired by Rashīd al-Dīn, if not written by him and ascribed to his master. The same speech in a somewhat varying form is in the Jalayirid collection of official documents Dastūr al-kāšīb (ff. 34a–b); we find it in another slightly varied form in the “Introduction” to the Persian tract on agriculture Irshād al-zājd’a of the year 915/1509–10; the text and the Russian translation of the latter (from the manuscript of E. M. Peshchereva, Leningrad; in the lithographed edition of Abd al-Ghaffar, 1323/1905–6, the “Introduction” is omitted) are to be found in: I. Petrushevsky, Zemedel’i., pp. 57–8.
7 See the Mukhtābāt-i Rashīdī, pp. 32–4 (no. 13), 122–3 (no. 22).
8 Copies or descriptions of Ghazan’s decrees are to be found in Jam‘ al-tawārīkh.
impositions upon them; limitation of carriage and postal services, which were a heavy burden; the decree permitting the settlement and cultivation of deserted and neglected land belonging to the Divān and private owners, together with the creation of fiscal incentives; the restoration of the currency and the establishment of a firm rate for silver coin: 1 silver dinār, containing 3 mithqāls of silver = 13.6 grammes = 6 dirhams: the establishment of a single system of weights and measures (using the Tabrīz system) for the whole state. It is true that even after these measures taxes were still quite high.1 But in comparison with the previous system of pure club-law and unrestricted pillage, the new regime was an improvement from the point of view of the ra‘īyyat. The decrees of Ghazan, forbidding the use of violence by amīrs, their households, servants of the khan, messengers, officials and nomads against the ra‘īyyat also played a part in this development. Ghazan also enacted wide-ranging measures for the restoration of the ruined irrigation network2 and for the revival of agriculture.3

The reforms of Ghazan and the temporary transfer of a leading political role in the State from the nomad Mongol-Turkish aristocracy to the Iranian civil bureaucracy made some economic improvement possible, especially in agriculture. Rashīd al-Dīn evidently exaggerated the importance of Ghazan’s reforms: Vaṣṣāf speaks of them in a more modest manner. Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī however witnesses to the revival of agriculture in his factual description of the state of agriculture in a series of regions: he speaks of rich harvests, low prices, an abundance of foodstuffs, the export of corn and fruit, and so on.4 The effect of Ghazan’s reforms was still felt during the reign of his brother Ōljeitū (1304–16), when control of affairs remained in the hands of Rashīd al-Dīn. The information that we are given concerning the social policy of Abū Sa‘īd (1316–35) is contradictory. Vaṣṣāf speaks of fresh fiscal oppression and of the arbitrary abuse of power by financial officials about the year 718/1318.5 Fifteenth-century writers like Zahir al-Dīn Mar‘ashi and Daulatshāh, on the other hand, describe Abū Sa‘īd as a most ra‘īyyat-loving ruler, under whom the country flourished.6 These pieces of information probably contradict one another because they

1 See below for more on this point.
4 Nizhat al-qulūb, pp. 49–55, 59, 71–89, 109–12, 147–58; see also the description of Khurasān in the geographical work of Ḥāfiz-i Abrū.
5 Vaṣṣāf, pp. 630 ff.
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refer to different periods—either to the beginning of Abū Saʿīd’s reign, when the influence of the nomadic military aristocracy again predominated under the amir and favourite Choban, or to the end of his reign, when the vizier Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad Rashīdī, the son of Rashīd al-Dīn, reintroduced his father’s policy.

After the death of Abū Saʿīd civil wars between feudal cliques (connected with the development of a system of military feoffs) the political disintegration of Iran and the inclination of certain local dynasties to use pre-Ghazan methods of government put an end to further economic revival. If the earlier Jalayirids (Ḥasan-i Buzurg, 1340–56, and Shaikh Uvais, 1356–74) had attempted to rule in the spirit of Ghazan, the Chobanids, having established themselves in Āzarbāijān and Persian ‘Īraq (1336–56) and basing their power exclusively on the Mongol-Turkish nomad aristocracy, resurrected the system of unrestricted and unregulated force and the unrestrained pillage of the raʿīyyat. This distinction between the policies of the two dynasties is made by the author of Tarīkh-i Shaikh Uvais in a story in which he relates the following: At the gates of Baghdad, before a battle, the amirs of the Jalayirid army said to the amirs of the Chobanid forces: “You are tyrants, but when we left you Āzarbāijān it was like Paradise, and we have made Baghdad into a flourishing city”; the Chobanid amirs answered: “We were in Rūm and wrought havoc; you made Āzarbāijān flourish, we drove you from it, and ravaged the country as we did before; now we have come here and shall drive you out and ruin this region also.”

In spite of a certain revival at the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth centuries, the economy had far from reached its pre-conquest level. We can deduce this if we compare the numbers of villages in various regions (vilayat) before and after the Mongol conquest.

In the vilayat of Herāt there were about 400 villages in the tenth century, at the beginning of the fifteenth 167. In the vilayat of Iṣfahān alone the number had increased.6

1 See below.
2 Dastūr al-kāḥib, passim, especially ff. 36b–37a, 47b–48b, 51a–51b.
5 Ḥāfiz-i Abrū, Geographical Works, manuscript quoted, ff. 225a–227b (list of villages).
6 According to Yāqūt (f. 292)–360 villages; according to Nuzhat al-qulūb (p. 50)–400 villages, not including hamlets; according to the Tarjama-yi Maḥāsin-i Iṣfahān, p. 47 (in 1329)–800 villages (dīb) and hamlets (maqrā′a).
**GHAZAN’S REFORMS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vilâyat</th>
<th>Yaqūt (early thirteenth century)</th>
<th>Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī (approx. 1340)</th>
<th>Ḥānīz-i Abrū (early fifteenth century)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamadān</td>
<td>660 villages</td>
<td>212 villages</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rūdrhrāvar</td>
<td>93 villages</td>
<td>73 villages</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khwāf</td>
<td>200 villages</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>30 villages (qarya), excluding hamlets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isfārā’īn</td>
<td>451 villages</td>
<td>50 villages</td>
<td>26 villages, excluding hamlets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baihaq</td>
<td>321 villages</td>
<td>40 villages</td>
<td>84 villages, excluding hamlets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvin</td>
<td>189 villages</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>29 villages, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turshīz (Busht)</td>
<td>226 villages</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>20 villages, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*b* Nuṣḥat al-qulub, respectively: pp. 72, 73, 149.

*c* Geographical Works, quoted manuscript, ff. 251a-2, 229b, 231a-233a.

*d* According to the Ta’rikh-i Baibaq of Ibn Funduq (approx. 1168), p. 34—395 villages.

Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī names more than thirty towns that were still in ruins in his time, among them Ray, Khurramābād, Saimara, Tavvaj, Arrajān, Dārābjird and Marv. According to the same author some cities had become small towns, such as Qum and Sirāf. A series of former towns had become villages such as Ḥulwān, Māneh, Barzand, Kirmānṣhāh and Kirind.1

We can judge the condition of Iran’s economy in the Il-Khānid period from the tax-returns received by the divān of the central government. According to Vāṣṣāf, previous to the reign of Ḥazan the divān received each year 18,000,000 dinārs,2 according to Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī the sum was 17,000,000, whilst after Ḥazan’s reforms the figure rose to 21,000,000 dinārs;3 but in 1335–40 the sum was 19,203,800.4 It is interesting to compare these figures with the returns of the Saljuq period (in Il-Khānid dinārs) also quoted by Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī in his work,5 as well as with the figures given in the Risāla-yi Falakiyya.6

1 Nuṣḥat al-qulub, passim (see index).

2 Vāṣṣāf, p. 271.

3 Nuṣḥat al-qulub, p. 27.

4 These calculations were made by adding the figures given for separate districts in the Nuṣḥat al-qulub.

5 As an important official of the finance department, Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī had access to the account-books of this department and had seen the overall roll composed by his grandfather Amin al-Dīn Nāṣīr, former head of the financial administration of the Saljuq sultans of ‘Irāq. He also worked out the value of the returns in dinārs of the Il-Khānid period.

6 Composed by ʿAbdallāh Māzandarānī about 1364. It is not clear whether the figures given here refer to the time of the Il-Khān Abū Saʿīd or Sulṭān Uvais. This risāla is examined and analysed in: Walter Hinz, “Das Rechnungswesen orientalischer Reichsfinanzämter im Mittelalter”, *Der Islam*, vol. 29/1–2 (1949). We quote this article below.

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bch
### IRAN UNDER THE ĪL-KHĀNS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions of the Il-Khān state</th>
<th>Divān taxes of pre-Mongol period (Nuṣḥat al-qulūb)</th>
<th>Divān taxes of 1335-40 (Risāla-yi Falakiyya)</th>
<th>Divān taxes (Risāla-yi Falakiyya)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabian ‘Iraq</td>
<td>Over 30,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persia ‘Iraq (‘Iraq-i ‘Ajam)</td>
<td>Over 25,000,000</td>
<td>2,333,600</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lur Great</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lur Little</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Āzarbāijān</td>
<td>Approx. 20,000,000</td>
<td>2,162,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrān and Mūğhān</td>
<td>Over 3,000,000</td>
<td>303,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shīrvān</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>115,000</td>
<td>820,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gushṭāsī (delta of the Kur and the Araxes)</td>
<td>Approx. 1,000,000</td>
<td>118,500</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gurjistān and Ablāhāz (Georgia)</td>
<td>Approx. 1,000,000</td>
<td>1,202,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In both regions of Lur 1,000,000 dinars were collected, but the central divān received only 90,000, the rest being kept by the divāns of the local atabegs.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions of the Il-Khān state</th>
<th>Divān taxes of pre-Mongol period (Nuṣḥat al-qulūb)</th>
<th>Divān dues in 1335-40 (Risāla-yi Falakiyya)</th>
<th>Divān taxes (Risāla-yi Falakiyya)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rūm (Asia Minor)</td>
<td>Over 15,000,000</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Armenia</td>
<td>Approx. 2,000,000</td>
<td>390,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbakr and Diyar Rabī’a (Upper Mesopotamia)</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>1,925,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistān (Eastern, now Iranian)</td>
<td>Approx. 2,000,000</td>
<td>201,500</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuzistān</td>
<td>Over 3,000,000</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fārs</td>
<td>Approx. 10,500,000</td>
<td>2,871,200</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shabānkāra</td>
<td>Over 2,000,000</td>
<td>266,100</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirmān and Makrān</td>
<td>880,000</td>
<td>676,500</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100,580,000</td>
<td>10,203,800</td>
<td>15,920,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Thus, according to Hamd Allāh Qazvīnī, the seventeen regions forming the Il-Khānid state paid the central divān 19,203,800 dinars in 1335–40 as against 100,580,000 before the Mongol conquest, both sums being in Il-Khānid dinars. In other words the revenue of the Il-Khānid divān was but 19 per cent of that of the pre-Mongol period, and in some districts even less, 9–13 per cent. Also in the pre-Mongol and Mongol budgets sums which were paid to the divāns of vassal landowners and sums
derived from the rent or tax on military fiefs—*iqta*, which had fiscal immunity, were not taken into account. Inasmuch as the situation remained the same in this respect,¹ the abrupt fall in tax-receipts can hardly be explained in any other way than by the general economic decline of Iran.

Ḥamād Allāh Qazvīnī does not give figures for eastern and northern Iran, since all taxes in Sīstān, Kūhistān, Khurāsān, Gurgān and Mazandarān were expended on the local budgets, and the central divān received nothing at all,² whilst it received only a tiny share of the local revenue of Gilān—a mere 20,000 dinārs.³ *The Risāla-yi Falakiyya* gives the returns on the rent-tax of *khāṣṣa* lands, i.e. from the private estates of the Īl-Khān and his family, according to district:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Dinārs</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Dinārs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khurāsān</td>
<td>4,220,000</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>540,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māzandarān</td>
<td>2,570,000</td>
<td>Dīyārbakr</td>
<td>430,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ray</td>
<td>754,220⁸</td>
<td>Āzarbāijān</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilān</td>
<td>1,220,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistān</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>Total from lands of the khāṣṣa²</td>
<td>12,434,220⁸</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ According to the *Nuzhat al-qulūb* (p. 55), 151,500 dinārs were paid by the Ray *vilāyat* to the central divān; in pre-Mongol times Ray and its *vilāyat* paid 7,000,000 dinārs.


As is well known, taxes from khāṣṣa lands were not paid to the Great Divān (the central divān), but were paid to the private divān of the khāṣṣa for the upkeep of the Īl-Khān’s quarters and those of his wives and the princes. According to the *Risāla-yi Falakiyya*, only 28,354,220⁸ dinārs were paid annually by divān and khāṣṣa lands.⁴ The divergence in the figures—both the overall figures and those for particular districts quoted in the *Nuzhat al-qulūb* and *Risāla-yi Falakiyya*—makes us think that the budget given in the latter source cannot refer to 1334-5, as Hinz supposes. *The Nuzhat al-qulūb* in fact gives nominal figures for the years 1335-40, years of feudal civil strife and peasant uprisings. According to the *daftars* not a half of the amount collected under Ghazan was collected.⁵

³ There were no fewer *iqta* lands under the Saljuqs, in all probability, than there were under Ghazan, judging by the fact that Malik-Shāh (1072-92) granted *iqta*s to 46,000 soldiers (Rāvandi, ed. Iqbal, pp. 130-1).

⁴ *Nuzhat al-qulūb*, p. 147.


⁶ In Hinz’s article (pp. 133-4) the incorrect figure 28, 264,220⁸ dinārs is given, as a result of a miscalculation.

⁷ *Nuzhat al-qulūb*, p. 27.
Therefore it is possible to assert that the economy of Iran during and especially after Ghazan's reign did not reach its pre-Mongol level. A certain relative improvement was experienced mainly in agriculture. Hamd Allāh Qazvini gives reason for thinking that from Ghazan's time the irrigation works of all four types in use from ancient times in Iran—mountain springs, river channels, wells and kārīz, i.e. underground galleries (with clay pipelines, timbering and inspection-wells) for bringing underground water to the surface—were to a considerable extent restored. The same author gives almost complete information concerning the kind of irrigation in use in each district or vilāyat.1

THE CONDITION OF AGRICULTURE AT THE END OF THE ÎL-KHĀNID PERIOD

We can judge the condition of agriculture in Iran after Ghazan's reforms not only from the Nuṣbat al-qulūb but also from the anonymous Persian agrotechnical tract Kitāb-i 'ilm-i fālahat u zirā'at, the author of which speaks of himself as a contemporary of Ghazan,2 from regional historico-geographical works, from information given by travellers, and from the letters of Rashīd al-Dīn.

According to these sources wheat and barley were cultivated wherever there were water supplies and wherever agriculture had been preserved. The author of the Fālahā mentions many kinds of wheat and barley; millet was less widely distributed. Hamd Allāh Qazvini names more than twenty districts (including Ray, Qum, Tabriz, Isfahān, all Khūzistān and some regions of Fārs and Khurāsān) with especially high yields of corn. Bread made from barley or millet, frequently with the admixture of beans, chestnuts, or acorns, was the bread of the poor.3 Rice was grown in the territory near to the Caspian and in a series of regions in Azarbājān, Persian 'īrāq (Zanjān, etc.) and Fārs (Kurbāl, Firūzābād, etc.), and also in Khūzistān.4 The author of

1 For the table based on this information see Zemledelie..., pp. 130-6.
3 See Sa'dī, Gulistān, chapter 1, hikāyat 7; Farhang Shams-i Fakhrī, pp. 103 (no. 87), 124 (no. 96), 134 (no. 194). Ibn Bāṭṭūta, vol. II, p. 32; Nuṣbat al-qulūb, p. 130.
the *Falāḥa* informs us of various methods of cultivating rice. In some areas crops were a hundredfold and more, whilst the best rice was considered to be that of Gilān, the second best being that of Māzandarān. The same author says that under Ghazan experiments were carried out (in which the author took part) to sow the best kind of Indian rice in Iran, but without result.1 Evidently the *dzurrat*2 of the author of the *Falāḥa* is wheat-sorghum (*anthropogon sorghum*). Much dhurrat was sown in the vilayats of Kāshān and Isfahān, and the crops are supposed to have been nearly three-hundredfold.3 Rye and oats were unknown in Iran, as now.

First place amongst fodder-crops was taken by lucerne,4 used to feed horses. Greek clover was also known.5 Cotton was the most common of the textile plants, the cultivation of which pushed flax and other textile plants into the background. Ḥamd Allāh Qazvini speaks of the cultivation of cotton in a series of regions, some fifty or so, of Persian ‘Irāq (among them Ray, Qum, Nihāvand, Yazd); of Fārs—such as Shīrāz, Abarqūh, Kāzarūn, Lār; of Kirmān, Kūhistān, and Khurāsān (Khabūshān, Zāveh); throughout the whole of Khūzistān and Gurgān; and also in Māzandarān, Gilān, Qūm, and Šārbāūjān.6

According to the author of the *Falāḥa* cotton gave its finest crops in the *garmāsir* regions, but was also cultivated on *sardsir* land,7 primarily in sandy clay areas (*rigbūm*). Fine cotton (*narm*) and coarse cotton (*zibr*) were known, but in general Indian cotton was thought of as better than Iranian.8 Flax (*katṭān*) was less widely grown in the fourteenth century than it had been in the tenth century, mostly in the south-west of Iran (the districts of Kāzarūn, Rīshahr, Sīnīz in Fārs), and not as a textile plant for the most part, but as a source of lamp-oil.9 Hemp was culti-

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2 for the correct *dhuura* (Arabic).
3 *Falāḥa*, pp. 88–9.
4 Strabo mentions the culture of lucerne (*uḥṣaḥ*) in Media, *Geography*, xi, 13.
5 *Shams-i Fakhri*, p. 33 (no. 32), under the term *Shanbalid*.
6 See a table based on the *Nizhat al-qulūb* in *Zemledelie...*, p. 195; also references. The list in the *Nizhat al-qulūb* is not complete. Other cotton-producing regions are given in other sources, in particular the Herāt region (Ṣaḥī, p. 111).
7 As is well-known, medieval geographers in Moslem countries distinguished land according to its height, between “cold” (Arabic *surūd*, Persian *sardsir*, more than 1,000–1,200 m above sea-level) and “hot” (Arabic *jurūm*, Persian *garmāsir*, less than 1,000–1,200 m above sea-level) districts. The coasts of the Caspian Sea and of the Persian Gulf belonged to the garmāsir, as did the province of Khūzistān. Sardsir were the Iranian uplands, excepting the various depressions (Sistan, the Bālkh oasis, etc.). In conformity with this idea cultivated plants were divided into *garmāsir* = subtropical, and *sardsir* = all the rest.
8 *Falāḥa*, pp. 93–4.
9 *Nizhat al-qulūb*, pp. 126, 130–1.
vated not so much as a textile, but rather for the production of a well-known narcotic (Arabic hashish, Persian bang); evidently the distribution of hemp was not widespread, judging by the fact that Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī and Ḥāfiz-i Abru do not mention it in their geographical works. The same can be said of the castor-oil plant (ricinus communis) and of safflower (carthamus tinctorius). Saffron was made from the plant called in Arabic za'farān which yielded a yellow-orange dye (Burūjīrd, Rūdhrāvar, Qum, Hamadān, Kūhistān).1 Other dye-yielding plants were madder, which gave a red dye (Khwāf in Khurāsān,2 and other regions), henna, which gave an orange dye and was used for cosmetic and medicinal purposes,3 and indigo, which yielded a blue dye and had been cultivated in Persia from the sixth century but was only commonly met with in Kirmān.4 Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī does not mention it in the fourteenth century, but the author of the Falāḥa says that the cultivation of indigo had ceased in Iran, and that it was imported from India, despite the fact that Ghazan had attempted to revive its cultivation.5 Cultivation of the opium poppy, known in Iran from the end of the eleventh or twelfth centuries, was insignificant, to judge from the rarity of references to it in the sources. Sesame occupied the leading position amongst the oil-plants, and sesame oil had practically replaced olive oil.

The melon was grown everywhere in Iran, in the words of the author of Falāḥa, “in every garden”,6 and there were many varieties of it. In the garden of one “refuge of a naqibat (naqābat panāb)”, i.e. of an elder (naqīb) of the Sayyids, a religious fief-holder, the Herat soil grew fifty kinds of melon.7 Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī names ten regions (amongst others, Isfahān, Tabriz and Marv) producing the best melons which were exported.8 The pumpkin was also grown throughout Iran,9 as were cucumbers (particularly in Gilān, Māzandarān, Shīrāz, Isfahān).10 The water-melon is however rarely spoken of; Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī only mentions it as growing in Qazvin.11

Vegetable-growing was less developed in the period under consideration than fruit-growing; vegetables were to be found for the most

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1 Ibid. pp. 70, 73, 144, 146; Falāḥa, p. 112.
2 Nuṣbat al-qlūdīb, p. 154. The author of the Falāḥa also mentions the regions of Yazd and Nā’in (p. 94).
3 Continuation of the Ta‘rīkh-i Sistān, p. 396.
5 Falāḥa, pp. 92–3.
6 Nuṣbat al-qlūdīb, manuscript of Peshchereva, f. 87 (types of melon named).
8 Falāḥa, p. 105.
9 Ibid. p. 100.
10 Ibid. p. 58.
AGRICULTURE AT THE END OF THE IL-KHĀNID PERIOD

part near to the large commercial cities, such as Isfahān.¹ The Falāḥa describes in detail the vegetables and spices which were cultivated in Iran at the beginning of the fourteenth century; the most common of them were cabbages, carrots, onions, garlic, rue, mangel-wurzels and also leguminous plants.

As at an earlier date, fruit-growing occupied an outstanding position in the economy of Iran under the Mongols. Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī enumerates more than eighty regions of Iran where fruit-growing was widespread and produced abundant crops. Among them was for example Sīstān where horticulture has almost disappeared nowadays. The fig-palm occupied the foremost position amongst the garmsir plants, and was cultivated in Gurgān and Māzandarān, as well as Khūzistān, Fārs, Kirmān and Sīstān. The citrus fruits—the lemon, orange, and bitter orange—were grown in the southern and Caspian regions. The coconut-palm only grew in the regions of Hurmuz and Wāsit,² whilst the olive grew only in Khūzistān and near to the Caspian in small quantities. The sugar-cane was cultivated in Khūzistān, Kirmān and Balkh, and its export and cultivation had greatly declined in comparison with the previous centuries. According to the author of the Falāḥa the sugar produced in his time was poor in quality and reddish in colour, and Iranian craftsmen were unable to make refined sugar (gand).³ The peach, apricot, plum, pear, apple (of which there were more than nowadays), pomegranate, mulberry tree, walnut, almond, pistachio (wild in eastern districts only) were the commonest sardsīr plants. The fig was also widely distributed, both the garmsir and the sardsīr varieties.⁴ The remaining sardsīr fruits were less widespread. In particular it was not the custom to grow the black and red cherry, the filbert and chestnut, in the garden; but the hazel-nut and the other fruits and nuts just mentioned were plentiful in the wild.⁵ Viticulture was also highly developed.

Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī and other authors name about seventy regions in which the best vines were cultivated. There were many varieties. In one district alone, Pūshang (Khurāsān) a hundred kinds of vine were being grown.⁶ In the horticultural enterprise of the naqīb near Herāt, which we mentioned, exactly a hundred varieties of vine were under cultivation.⁷ Apparently after Ghazan’s reforms viticulture did not

¹ See, for example, Tarjuma-yi Maḥāsin-i Isfahān, pp. 46, 64.
² Falāḥa, p. 46.
³ Ibid. p. 102.
⁴ Ibid. pp. 7.
⁵ Ibid. pp. 15, 21, 29.
⁷ Irshād al-zārāʿa, cited manuscript, f. 80.
achieve the level it had attained around the beginning of the thirteenth century. Thus Ibn Funduq, writing about 1168, informs us of the abundance of vines in the regions of Baihaq and Nishāpūr, but Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī says nothing of Nishāpūr grapes, and states that few grapes were grown in Baihaq.1 Dried fruit and grapes were exported from a number of regions (Īsfahān, etc.) to such distant countries as Asia Minor (Rūm), India and China (via Bāṣra).2 Wine-making and the drinking of wine were very widespread, despite the Islamic prohibition. Date-palm brandy and other alcoholic drinks were produced and consumed.3

The cultivation of flowers and scented plants (mašhmūmat) had also been preserved in Iran—in Fārs and Māzandarān4—and they were used in the production of perfumes, cosmetics, medicaments, aromatic essences (flower-waters), and flower-oils, especially the renowned rose-oil, etc.5

Unlike other branches of agriculture silk-growing (i.e. the culture of the silk-worm) not only showed no sign of decline in the second half of the thirteenth and the fourteenth century, but showed progress. If in the tenth century the main areas of silk-production were the Marv oasis, Gurgān, Māzandarān, and the Bārdā valley in Arrān and Shīrūn, and the silk-weavers of, say, Kūhīzistān worked the raw imported silk of Bārdā, in the period under consideration silk-weaving existed also in the Yāzd oasis, in Fārs (in the region of Bīshāpūr), Kūhīzistān (Tūshīz, Gunābād), Khūrāsān (Khwāf and Zāveh) and Gīlān,6 as well as the areas previously mentioned. At the beginning of the thirteenth century Gīlān silk was still considered to be of poor quality,7 but by the end of the thirteenth century its quality had so improved that merchants came from Genoa to buy it.8 Italian sources of the thirteenth–fourteenth centuries—the commercial records of the Florentines Pegolotti and Uzziano, the statutes of Pisa, etc., utilized by W. Heyd in his book—know of the following sorts of raw silk imported from Iran for manufacture in the towns of Italy: seta ghella—Gīlān silk;

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1 Taʾrikh-i Baihaq, p. 273; cf. Nāqūt al-gulāb, pp. 147, 150.
2 Nāqūt al-gulāb, pp. 37, 49.
4 Nāqūt al-gulāb, pp. 118, 166; Ibn al-Balkhī repeats other details in this source in the Fārs-Nāma, pp. 134, 142, 143, 147, 148.
5 See Fālábū, pp. 40–5 (the method of making rose-oil is also described here); Mukātibāt-i Rāshīdī, pp. 54 (no. 18), 93 (no. 21), 272 (no. 45).
6 Nāqūt al-gulāb, pp. 74, 126 (compare Ibn al-Balkhī, p. 142), 143–5, 154, 159–60, 163.
7 Yaqūt, vol. iv, p. 344.

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seta masandroni—Amul silk from Māzandarān; seta stravatina or seta stravai—Astrabad silk from Gurgān; seta talani—Dailām (?) silk; seta mardacascia—silk from Marv-i Shāhijān, etc.  

According to the author of the Falāha a special kind of mulberry tree (white mulberry) was used for the culture of the silkworm. It did not have much fruit, but many leaves, “for one diram of pupae (tukhm-i kirm) eats 500 mans of leaves and gives one man of silk”. The organization of silk-production was best managed in the Yazd oasis. There one mulberry tree yielded 500 mans of leaves and one man of raw silk, as much as was yielded in other regions by 4–5 dirams of silkworm. The culture of cochineal still had some importance—although incomparably less than that of silk—and was used in the manufacture of red dye which was then exported to a number of countries. Cochineal was collected near Marand in Āzarbāījān, and to the south of Ararat.

In general an impression is created that irrigation (in particular the construction of karīzges and channels, and the building of dams) and agricultural engineering were kept up in Iran after the Mongol conquest. But there was no noticeable progress in the application of the tools of labour. This is most readily explained by the dominant form of feudal exploitation of the peasantry (the quit-rent system) and the high rates of feudal rent, as a consequence of which the introduction of improvements in tools (the same that have survived into the twentieth century) was advantageous neither to the peasant nor to the landowner.

THE TOWN IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

From what has been said previously, it is evident to what extent the towns had suffered after the Mongol conquest—in particular the large cities such as Marv, Balkh, Herāt, Nišāpūr, Ray, Qazvin and so on. Some of the shattered and ravaged cities were restored, as was Herāt in 1236, but they were now much smaller. In 639 or 1241/2 there were 6,900 people in Herāt, but Herāt was again sacked several times, as we have already seen, and only became a large city again under the

2 Falāha, p. 23; 1 diram is here equivalent to 3 grammes (diram = dirham) approx.; 1 man (here Tabriz) equals about 3 kilogrammes.
3 Falāha, pp. 21–5.
4 Naṣḥat al-qulūb, p. 88.
5 Clavijo, p. 156.
6 The Śahib-Dīvān Shams al-Dīn Muhammad Juvainī (executed in 1284) built a great dam on the river Gāvmāsā near Sāveh (Naṣḥat al-qulūb, p. 221); Rašḥīd al-Dīn spent 700,000 dinārs on the reconstruction of the dam on the river Kārūn (Mukātibāt-i Rašḥīd, p. 180, no. 33).
7 Saifi, p. 238.
Timúrids. According to the well-informed Rashīd al-Dīn, on the eve of Ghazan’s reforms five out of every ten houses in the sacked cities of Iran were uninhabited.¹ In Nakhchivān as late as the reign of Sultān Uvais five out of six houses were empty, the occupants having gone to live elsewhere.² The heavy tax on crafts and trade, which had not existed under the pre-Mongol rulers,³ hampered the revival of town-life. If we take into consideration the remarks of Ḥamd Allāh Qazvinī that many towns were still ruined and that others had become villages we can make the deduction that in general urban life had suffered a decline in Iran during the Mongol period.

But this decline did not affect all towns. Some towns and cities revived after the reforms of Ghazan and made considerable economic progress. This depended not only on the fact that there were towns which had not been destroyed during the conquest (Tabriz for example avoided destruction by paying the conquerors), but also on the economic nature of the town. In medieval Iran towns could be divided into several economic types. First of all there were many small and medium-sized towns occupied in commerce and craft-industry serving a limited local market. Other towns of a moderate size were centres of craft-industry producing exports for the international market such as Kāzarūn—the centre of flax-spinning, Yazd—weaving silk—and Kāshān—the centre of the ceramics industry—which also weaved silk and made carpets.

There were city-emporiums lying on international caravan and shipping routes, which were storing places, points for trans-shipping, and exchanges for the export and transit trades, such as Tabriz, Marāgheh, Hamadān, Qazvin, Iṣfahān, Shirāz, Nishāpūr, etc. Hurmuz, transferred from the coast to a bare little island in the Persian Gulf, flourished entirely thanks to the transit of Iranian, Arabic, Western European, Indian and Chinese goods. Frequently such towns were also centres of craft-industry serving the international market, as Iṣfahān (cotton and silk-weaving) and Shirāz (iron goods, wool-weaving, the production of rose and other flower oils and aromatic essences).⁴ There is no

² Dastūr al-kātib, p. 167a.
³ Naṣīr ad-dīn Ṭūsī, p. 761. Tamgha was collected on each business transaction, even in the case of prostitution and the sale of wine. The exact size of the tamgha is not known, but from one of the letters of Rashīd al-Dīn (no. 13, see below) it is possible to conclude that until the time of Ghazan it was paid at the rate of 10 per cent of the value of each deal. The tamgha was retained in Iran, but at a reduced rate, until the reign of Tāhmāsp I.
⁴ Rose water and other aromatic liquids were even exported to China from Fārs in the twelfth–thirteenth centuries; see Chau Ju-Kua, p. 134.
THE TOWN IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

There is no doubt that the great city-emporia by far surpassed the greatest cities of Western Europe of the late medieval period, such as Venice, Milan, Florence or Paris, in the scale of their economic activities and their populations (at least before the Mongol invasion). Thus we should pay a certain respect to the figures given in the sources for the populations of the great cities of the pre-Mongol period. In general we do not possess reliable statistical information for the Mongol period as regards population, but we do have some figures for the fifteenth century. Clavijo fixes the population of Tabriz in 1403 at 200,000 households. An anonymous historian of Shāh Ismā'īl, more modestly, and probably more correctly, gives the figure as from 200,000 to 300,000 people. The Mongols are supposed to have slaughtered about 800,000 people in Baghdad in 1258, whilst Timur is said to have killed 90,000 in 1401. Josapha Barbaro gives the population of Isfahān as a mere 50,000 in the second half of the fifteenth century. That of Kāshān he gives as 20,000 households (= families, i.e. approx. 90,000 people), and that of Shīrāz as 200,000 households (about 900,000 people), which is probably a great exaggeration. Such towns were able to recover quickly after the Mongol conquest and even to prosper because of income from exports and the transit trade, despite high rates of taxation (tamgha). This prosperity however came to a rapid end and such towns were deserted when the trade routes altered, as happened in the case of the south Iranian port of Sirāf, the importance of which passed to Hurmuz. Towns living off the transit trade had comparatively little influence on the economic development of Iran as a whole, although of course they influenced the economies of the suburban regions. It is in part possible to assess the development of such towns, as well as the market character of their suburban agriculture, from their tax-returns. Regrettably Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī rarely gave figures for tax (tamgha) paid by cities separately from that paid by the cities and their surrounding districts (see p. 508).

The residences of the Il-Khāns represented a peculiar type of town or city. Such were Marāgheh, Tabrīz, Uǰăn, and the bazaar-cities that had arisen around the Il-Khānid headquarters (ordu)—the summer camps.

1 See above, pp. 485-6.
2 That is “families”. Persian khdna, lit. house, signified “family” ordinarily. Assuming that the average family consisted of 4-5 persons, we obtain 900,000 inhabitants of Tabriz. This is an evident exaggeration.
3 Isfahān was sacked twice after the Mongols had pillaged it (1237), by Timūr and during the reign of Jahān-Shāh.
4 Barbaro, pp. 72-4.
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(Ala-Tagh, Sultāniyeh) and the winter ones (Maḩmūdābād). According to Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī the tamgha paid in Sultāniyeh rose from 200,000 to 300,000 dinārs when the khan had his residence (ordu) there. The satisfaction of the requirements of the Court and trade with the nearby summer camps (yailaq) of the Mongols gave both wages and income to the motley population of craftsmen and traders gathered in Sultāniyeh. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa calls Marāğheh a little Damascus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vīlāyat</th>
<th>Tax (tamgha) from cities in dinārs</th>
<th>Tax (kbarāy) from the country district in dinārs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tabrīz</td>
<td>875,000</td>
<td>275,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdād</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shīrāz</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wāsīt</td>
<td>448,000</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isfahān</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamadān</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>136,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marāğheh</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>185,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qazvīn</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>55,000 (a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Nuṣḥat al-qulūb, pp. 78, 36, 116, 47, 50, 71-2, 87, 59 respectively.

It is worthy of note that, whereas the Arab geographers of the ninth and tenth centuries and an anonymous Persian at the end of the tenth century give detailed information concerning articles produced by craftsmen and their export from the towns of Iran, Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī and Ḥāfīz-i Abrū say almost nothing about the economic life of the towns, although they dwell upon the agricultural production of various regions in some detail. In this it is impossible not to see reflected the decline of the towns. Essentially we know very little about the economy of the towns and life in them during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Nevertheless objets d’art in museums and various collections witness to the fact that Iranian craftsmanship remained at a high level. In the correspondence of Rashīd al-Dīn the following articles of export from various towns are mentioned: Tabrīz—monochrome woven silks (kimkhā), cloth of camel-hair, variously coloured velvets (qatīfa-yi alvān), shagreen and leather footwear, fur and fur goods; Shīrāz—cotton cloths (karbās) and printed cotton goods, linen (qadaq of Kāzarūn), leather footwear; Isfahān—cotton cloths (valad, ābyārī, shamsiyā, etc.; Kāzarūn—cotton cloths; Kāshān—woven silks; Herāt—kimkhā and other silken cloths.

1 Ibid. pp. 55-6.  
2 Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, vol. 1, p. 171.  
3 For more detail see: Zaki Muhammad Ḥasan, Ṣanā’i-yi Iran ba’d Islam, tarjuma-yi Fārsī-yi Muḥammad ‘Alī Khalkhālī.  
4 Mukāṭibāt-i Rashīdī, pp. 183 ff. (n. 34).
THE TOWN IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

The towns of the pre-Mongol period and after had no overall self-government such as that given by statute to the city communes of the eleventh–sixteenth centuries and the German imperial cities in western Europe. There was however self-administration within the limits of the quarter (mahalla; the householders of the quarter, gathering in the mosque, elected their mayor, discussed their business) and the guild or corporation—either merchant, craft, or religious. The corporations of the Sayyids and their elders—naqib—in particular were very influential; there were about 1,400 Sayyids in the Shiraz corporation.¹

The influence of the Sufi-dervish shai khs was also enormous. At the beginning of the thirties of the thirteenth century the majority of the population in Balkh were murids of Shaikh Bahâ' al-Dîn Valad, the father of Jalâl al-Dîn Rûmî.² A century later the inhabitants of Ardabil were thought to be mostly murids of Shaikh Šâfî al-Dîn Ishâq, the ancestor of the Safavid dynasty.³ In the towns the power of the local feudal landowner, known generally under the title of malik, was interwoven with the power of the khan’s vicegerent (Mongol basqaq, Persian shahna) who controlled the activities of the malik, collected taxes and was endowed with military might.⁴

The town nobility as previously had great influence in the towns forming a kind of patriciate. These were landowners or feudalists of the surrounding area who before the Saljuq conquest had lived in their castles, but who now lived more often in the towns than upon their estates. The characteristic peculiarity of this nobility was its close connexion with the great commercial companies and with big wholesale and transit trade. They invested a part of their income in the companies of the great wholesale merchants, called usually urtaq (Turkish ortaq—“partner in a share”, investor), “the Emperor’s own merchants” (tujjâr-i khâṣî), or “trustworthy merchants” (tujjâr-i amîn), who returned the feudal lords their share of the profit in goods, mostly textiles. Thus the above-mentioned vizier, the historian Rashid al-Dîn, himself a great feudal landowner,⁵ invested a major part of his fortune, 32,500,000 dinârs out of 35,000,000, in a large wholesale undertaking; “the greater part of the money I gave to trustworthy merchants (tujjâr-i amîn),” writes Rashid al-Dîn in his will, “and they conduct their trade with this money, and I have written down their names in my

¹ Ibn Battûta, vol. ii, p. 78.
² Afdâlî, trans. Huart, pp. 7–9, 15.
³ Nu^hat al-qulub^ p. 81.
⁴ For more on the inner structure of the towns and corporations see A. K. S. Lambton, Islamic Society in Persia.
⁵ See below, pp. 521–2.
account book”.¹ In his letters Rashid al-Din gives huge lists of goods, mostly textiles, and partly leather and fur goods, etc., which he had received from the merchants.² Such a rapprochement of some groups of feudalists with the large-scale merchants is a phenomenon typical of medieval Iran, as also of other lands of the Near and Middle East. Thus in contrast to Western Europe from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries the merchants did not oppose the great feudal landowners, but made common cause with them against the craftsmen, the lower classes of the towns and the local peasantry.³

The town authorities—ra’is (mayor), qādī (the religious judge and head of the religious estate in the area), khaṭābī (the imam of the mosque meeting), muḥtasīb (the censor of morals supervising bazaars, social life, and morals of the citizens), and others—came from the local patriciate. Often they inherited their positions. As did the family of the Qâdiyàn in Shīrāz, the Mustaufiyân in Qazvīn⁴ and the Juvainiyân in Khūrāsān.⁵ The writer of these lines analysed the information given by Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī concerning the aristocratic families of his native town of Qazvīn in order to give an idea of the nature of the urban nobility of his time.⁶ It appears that despite the fact that on 7 Shā‘bān 717/7 October 1220 the Mongols had carried out a “whole-sale massacre”,⁷ many of the local noble families survived or were spared. Of the 28 families mentioned by the author 25 had settled in Qazvīn long before the Mongol conquest,⁸ and only three (one of Mongol, one of Turkish, and one of Persian origin) again distinguished themselves in the service of the Mongol Il-Khāns. These families possessed estates in the district of Qazvīn and carried out state and religious duties.⁹

¹ Mukâtibât-i Rashâdî, p. 238 (no. 36).
² Ibid. pp. 183–93 (no. 34), 282–9 (no. 47).
³ See Barthold, K istorii krestyan’eskikh dvizheniy v Persii, pp. 61–2.
⁴ The hereditary heads of the financial administration of the district. From this family came the historian and geographer Ḥamd Allāh Mustaufi Qazvīnī (approx. 1280–1350).
⁵ From these came the sâhib-dîvān Shams al-Dīn Muhammad Juvainî and his brother ‘Alà al-Dīn ‘Atâ-Malîk Juvainî.
⁸ Amongst this ancient aristocracy outstanding were the Zākâniyân, from whom stemmed the poet ‘Ubaid-i Zākānî (died 1371) and the Ghaffāriyân, from whom sprang the Shâfî‘ite theologian Najm al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Ghaffār (died 1267), and the theologian of the sixteenth-century, Ahmad Ghaffārī.
⁹ Sadr al-Dīn Khâlîlî was the grand vizier under Geikhatu; for more than sixty years, from 651 = 1253/4, the maliks of Qazvīn were by inheritance of the İftihârîyân family.
Noble families owned large estates with servants and slaves, suburban gardens, and sometimes whole quarters, in the towns. The enormous quarter or rather suburb rebuilt by Rashid al-Din in Tabriz, belonging to him by right of unconditional ownership (mulk), is described not without boasting in his letter to his son Sa’d al-Din, the governor of Qinnisrin and ‘Awāsim. In this quarter (Rub‘-i Rashidi) he claims that there were 30,000 homes (= families), 24 caravanserais, 1,500 shops, bath-houses, gardens, mills, workshops for weaving (ṣba‘r-bāfī) and papermaking (kāghadb-sāzī), a dye-works (rangraz-khāna), a mint (dār al-ẁarb), etc. Rashid al-Din brought tradesmen (sanā‘ī va muhtarafā) from a variety of towns to his suburb, and asked his son to send 50 wool-weavers (ṣaf-bāfān) from Antioch and Cilicia, and 20 from Cyprus. Four-hundred theologians and lawyers were settled here in the “quarter of the learned” (kūcha-yi ‘ulamā‘), and there were 1,000 students (taḥlīb-i ‘ilm). Fifty of the best doctors of Syria, Egypt, India, and China (oculists, surgeons, bonesetters) worked in the hospital (dār al-ṣibā‘), and so on. In Hamadan Rashid al-Din had his own quarter with 1,500 houses. Nobles, mosques, theological academies or madrasas, and religious bodies owned by right of mulk or vaqf caravanserais, bazaars, and shops, which they leased for rent and from which they derived income.

In medieval Iran there were four fundamental centres of social life in a town: the shahrīstān and the quarters of the patriciate; the madrasas, the khānqāhs of the dervishes, and other religious institutions together with religious corporations and dervish brotherhoods; the bazaar centre (Persian chārū, Arabic murabba‘a), together with the caravanserais, big merchants, and wholesale trade; and the quarters of the craftsmen, and their corporations (Arabic ṣinf, plural aṣnāf), the lesser bazaars with their petty retail trade. Wares were sold by craftsmen in the workshops, the latter also serving as shops (dukkān in Arabic). Most often but not always craftsmen of one and the same trade lived in the same quarter; in every town there were quarters occupied by silk-weavers, cotton-carders, shoemakers, saddlemakers, dyers, potters, etc.

The sources are meagre concerning the craftsmen’s corporations. Ibn Baṭṭūta mentions them, saying that the Isfahān craftsmen elected

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1 Mukāhibīt-i Rashidi, pp. 315-27 (no. 51).
2 Ibid. p. 318: “thirty” is perhaps a mistake for “three”.
3 Ibid. pp. 318-20; apart from the 1,000 students mentioned there were another 6,000 supported by Rashid al-Din who studied in Tabriz itself.
4 Concerning the corporations see A. K. S. Lambton, Islamic Society in Persia, pp. 17 ff.
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elders from amongst themselves (al-kulū, Persian kulū, kulū). He also mentions guilds of craftsmen in Shirāz. In the sources rank is mentioned: ustād "master", khalifa "apprentice", and shāgird "pupil", apprentice. The craft guilds in the towns of Iran were much weaker than the guilds of western Europe. They could not obtain a corporative monopoly nor could they fix the price of their products to their greatest satisfaction, as was the case in western Europe. A connexion is traceable between the craft guilds and the dervish brotherhoods. In literature there is more than one mention of the connexion between the corporations and the movement of the futuwwa—the unions of the ākhīs. The ākhīs are also mentioned in the towns of the fourteenth century, but there is no information concerning a connexion between them and the guilds. There were also corporations of declassé indigent elements (āyyarān) and guilds of beggars (sāsāniyān or sāṣīyān).

Corporate craftsmen were freemen although they had to give part of their produce to the treasury or to the local landowner, and take part without recompense in the construction of public buildings and in the decoration of the city for festivals organized by the authorities. But there were also unfree craftsmen working in the towns of Iran and Central Asia under the Mongols. At the time of the Mongol invasion many craftsmen were turned into slaves; some of them (for example

2 Ethnological investigation of Central Asian craft guilds show that there were thought to be two ranks in the corporations—apprentice (shāgird) and master (ustād); khalifa was the title of a person who had qualified as a master but who did not have the means to start his own dukkan and who worked for another craftsman. When a khalifa was able to start his own workshop he required no new initiation. The initiation of a master necessitated a threefold act: the reading of the first sura of the Qur’ān, the tying on of a belt (kamarhandi), and a ritual feast, called arvdh-i pir. See, for example, E. M. Peschereva, Goncharnoe proizvodstvo v Srednei Azii (Moscow, 1959), pp. 313-72. The Persian guilds are first mentioned in the Georgian hagiographic source of the sixth century—The Life of St Eustaphius of Mtskheta.
3 Aflaki, translated by Huart, p. 117, says that during the lifetime of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī the greater part of the dervishes of the Maulavi order consisted of craftsmen and poor people; the life of Şāfī al-Dīn also mentions many murid craftsmen of the Shāfiḫ Şāfī al-Dīn (Şafvat al-safa, passim).
5 Şafvat al-safa, B. 54 b, 142 b, 155 b, 163 b, 352 b, 353 b, 484 b, 497 b, 497a, etc.
6 A. K. S. Lambton, op. cit. pp. 117 f., and for the Akhāwī and the Futuwwa VI. Gordlevsky, Gosudarstvo Sel'dzhukov Maloi Azii, pp. 103-106; see also the bibliography of the subject in the latter work.
7 Legend connected the creation of a guild of beggars with the descendants of the Sassanids (see the Burhān-i Qafī under ساسان). Regarding the Sāṣīyān and their secret language or argot see the qaṣida of Abū Dulaf (tenth century; Tha‘ālibī, Yatīmat al-Dahr, Damascus, 1304, vol. iii, pp. 179-94) and the manuscript of the fourteenth century in the Kitāb-i Sāṣīyān.
the silkweavers of Herat) were taken to Mongolia, some remained in Iran and worked in special large workshops (kār-khānas) belonging to the treasury, or the Il-Khanid family, and so on. Rashid al-Din mentions kār-khānas in Khabūshān, Nishāpur, Tus, Isfārā'īn, Tabriz;1 Vaṣṣāf speaks of kār-khānas and craftsmen belonging to individual Chingizids in Bukhārā and Samarqand;2 whilst Saʿīfī mentions a kār-khānā in Herāt.3

It is evident from a decree of Ghazan that craftsmen working in such large workshops—saddlers, tanners, armourers, etc.—were slaves (asīrān), and received no wages in money. Payment was in kind, but most of this payment was stolen by officials running the workshops. The whole product of the enslaved craftsmen went to the Divān. Since such labour was not very productive, Ghazan put the craftsmen on a fixed tax, after paying which the slaves could work for themselves.4

A general phenomenon of the Iranian economy during the Il-Khan period was the decline of commodity economy (which remained in the areas near the main caravan routes and the large towns) and the growth of natural economy. Taxes from agricultural districts were mostly paid in kind—primarily in grain.5 And although the geographical work of Hamd Allāh Qazvīnī shows taxes in money, it is evident from a list of taxes from Khūzistān quoted by Rashid al-Dīn in a letter to his son Shihāb al-Dīn, ruler of Khūzistān, that the basic tax—the land tax—was paid in kind, in the form of grain and as a share of the crop.6 The wages (mavājib) and pensions (marsūmāt) of the military caste, theologians, shaikhs and others were mostly paid in kind—in the form of wheat, barley, rice, cattle, etc.7 In one of his letters Rashīd al-Dīn gives a list of fruits which his estates were to supply him with for the winter. The estates, lying in different parts of the country, had to send 50,000 mans of grapes, 62,000 mans of pomegranates, 37,000 mans of apples, 5,900 mans of raisins, 4,500 mans of fine raisins (kishmish), 9,000 mans of pears, 7,000 mans of quince, 100,000 mans of dates, 200,000 oranges, 20,000 lemons and other fruits and fruit-juices.8 The fact that Rashīd al-Dīn did not buy this mass of fruit on the spot at his

1 Jāmīʿ al-tawārīḵh, ed. Alizade, pp. 39, 179, 414.
2 Vaṣṣāf, pp. 67, 68; see ibid. p. 51, concerning the dependants (craftsmen?) of the Chingizids in Bukhara; analysis of text in I. Petrushevsky, Iz istorii Bukhary v XIII v., pp. 114–17.
3 Saʿīfī, p. 283.
5 Jāmīʿ al-tawārīḵh, ed. Alizade, pp. 474–5; Mukātibāt-i Rashīdī, pp. 122–3 (no. 22); cf. ibid. p. 121: “with the stipulation that they be paid in kind.”
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid. pp. 252–6 (no. 41), 265–72 (no. 45).
8 Ibid. pp. 198–206 (no. 54).
winter residence in Tabriz, but brought it from distant regions, shows that the historian-minister extracted feudal rent from his estates primarily in kind.

FEUDAL RELATIONSHIPS. THE CATEGORIES OF LANDOWNERSHIP

The Mongol conquest had a great and in general evil influence on the economic development of Iran; it had much less influence on the social structure of the country. The most typical features of specifically Iranian feudalism antedating the conquest survived it also. Such were the outstanding importance of irrigation; the coexistence of settled agriculture and nomadic and semi-nomadic cattle-breeding; the absence of demesne and corvée in the villages; the combination of large-scale feudal landownership with small-scale peasant tenants; the predominance of product rent (money and labour rent had only secondary importance); the growth of the military fief system; the close connexion between the big merchants and the caravan trade and a group of feudal lords, and even their coalescence; the absence of self-governing towns, so typical of western Europe in the Middle Ages; and the widespread use of slave labour in the crafts and agriculture (irrigation and market gardening) alongside the exploitation of the labour of dependent peasants. Rashid al-Din employed 1,000 (500 men and 500 women) and 200 (100 men and 100 women) enslaved prisoners (astirān va ghulāmān) respectively in the great gardens Fathābād and Rashīdābād near Tabriz—Georgians, negroes, Abyssinians, Greeks and Kurds (?), who “showed zeal in the planting of the vine and of fruit trees, in the digging of channels underground (qanāvāt) and on the surface (anhār), in the watering and gathering of fruit”.

The governing class of feudal lords consisted of four main groups: (1) the military aristocracy of the nomad tribes—Mongol, Turkish, Kurd, etc.; (2) the settled local provincial nobility, not connected by service with the central government; (3) the civil service; (4) the Muslim religious caste, more exactly the theologians. The last three groups were primarily composed of Iranians. These feudal groups, who struggled with one another to control the State, expressed two parallel political tendencies in Iranian society—that of feudal disintegration together with a system of military fiefs, and that of a centralized feudal state.

1 Mukātibāt-i Rashīdī, p. 53 (no. 17); cf. ibid. pp. 194–5 (no. 34), 236 (no. 36).
Together with a ramifying bureaucratic apparatus. Opposed to this class of exploiters was the principal exploited class—the settled peasantry. The nomads were also exploited by their nomad feudal lords, but on a much smaller scale. The nomad feudalists exploited not only the nomads subject to them, but also the settled peasants who dwelt on their fiefs. Along with the class division there existed that of estates:1 “people of the sword” (ahl-i šamshir—the first two groups mentioned), “people of the pen” (ahl-i qalam—the last two groups of feudalists mentioned), and the taxable estate or the ra'īyyat (Arabic ra'āyah, plural of ra'īyyat, literally “herd” or “flock”)—the peasants and townspeople. This latter division of the population, not reflected in Muslim law, was evidently a survival from the Sassanian period, when society was divided into soldiers, priests, clerks, and the taxable people, composed of peasants, craftsmen and merchants.

The old categories of feudal landownership long recognized by Muslim law (to be more explicit, conditional and unconditional ownership of land and water, i.e. irrigation works) continued to exist under the Il-Khāns: (1) State lands (Arabo-Persian arāḍī-yi dīwānī); (2) the private demesne of the Il-Khān and the members of his family (Arabic khāṣṣa, Mong. synonym injū); (3) the lands of the religious and charitable institutions (arāḍī-yi vaqfī); (4) the lands of private persons belonging to them by unconditional right, Arabic mulk, mlk, Arabo-Persian arāḍī-yi mālīkī, arbābī), corresponding to the western European allodium.

A peculiarity of State ownership of land was that the State itself exploited its tenants—the village communes (jamā'at-i dībī)—by means of finance officials ('ummāl). In this case the notions of rent and tax coincided, and the rents or taxes (the land-tax, etc.), paid in cash and kind to the State by the tenants, were then distributed amongst the military caste as wages, pensions, subsidies, gifts, etc. The abundance of state-owned lands was a characteristic of Asiatic feudalism. In the time of the caliphate such land was absolutely predominant in Arab 'Irāq, in Egypt, and possibly in certain areas of Iran, but by no means in all. In Fārs for example privately-owned lands (mulk) prevailed until the tenth century.2 After the Mongol conquest the area of the Divān lands greatly increased at first as a result of confiscations or the exter-

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1 By class is understood union on the basis of attitude towards production and by estate union on a legal basis.
2 Ibn al-Balkhi, Fārs-Nāma, pp. 171-2; cf. Istakhri, p. 158.
mination of the previous owners. But afterwards under the Il-Khâns the greater part of these lands were converted into private property, unconditionally (mulk) or conditionally (iqṭā'), by means of payment, sale, or seizure.

If the income of the Divân lands was spent on the upkeep of the State apparatus and the army, the income from khâṣṣa properties (injū) was spent on the upkeep of the Il-Khân, of his legal wives (khâtun), of his sons, and of their residences (ordu). These lands were under the control of a special ministry—the divân-i injū. Often injū and state-owned lands were leased. Lands belonging to the ruling house (injū) were distinguished from lands belonging to the Il-Khân himself (injū-yi khâṣṣ, mulk-i pâdshâh). Rent coincided with tax in these lands also. By the term injū was understood not only the land, but also the people living on the land, both peasants and landowners, who were personally dependent on the Il-Khân, his wives or sons, on the basis of commendation (Arabic ʾiltijd) and patronage (Arabic ʾiljā, himāyat).

The injū land fund was composed of lands confiscated from the Iranian nobility after the Mongol conquest and of lands granted to members of the Il-Khâni family by the previous owners. This fund was extremely large. The lands of Ghazan himself amounted to 20,000 faddâns (plough-strips), that is to 120,000-140,000 hectares of irrigated land. The injū land of Fârs district was leased for four years in 682/1292-3 for the sum of 10,000,000 dinârs, i.e. for 2,500,000 dinârs a year. If we consider that State taxes from Fârs (from divân and mulk land) were 2,871,200 dinârs, we can conclude that the injū lands of Fârs gave a slightly smaller income than all the remaining lands. According to the Risâla-yi Falakiyya, the overall income from the lands of the khâṣṣa (injū) amounted to 12,434,220 dinârs per annum.

A certain kind of land mentioned in the sources was called khâlīṣtâl ("clean lands", i.e. those free of taxes payable to the divân). Nowadays in Iran the term signifies precisely lands belonging to the Divân or the State. But in the period under consideration, as is obvious from the

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1 See for more about this A. A. Alizade, Zemel'naya Politika Ilkhanov, pp. 5-23.
2 Thus under Arghun, the governor of Rûm, Fâkhâr al-Dîn Ahmad Arkûshî sold State land (amlâk-i divânî) to men of standing (arbâb-i namâštî), and most of the land in Rûm became thereby mulk (Ta’rikh-i Guţida, p. 485).
3 Vaşşâf, pp. 231, 268, 317, 336, 404, etc.
4 See A. A. Alizade K voprosu ob institute injû, p. 98.
5 See Quatremère, Histoire des Mongols de la Perse, pp. 130-2, n. 12; Alizade, op. cit. pp. 95-108
7 Vaşşâf, p. 349.
8 Ibid. p. 268.
9 See above. p. 499.
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explanations of Vaşşaf and Raşhid al-Din,¹ this name was given to ruined and deserted land (kharâb u bâ‘îr) which was leased to landowner tenants (tâūn pl. tunnâ‘ in both authors) under a decree of Ghazan,² on condition that it was restored and occupied again, and that part of the kharâj was paid in the form of a share of the crop (muqâsama). Conditions of ownership were favourable to the tenants. These lands formed a separate part of the ruler’s lands (khârsa-yi pâšbâbi) under the administration of a special divân-i kâlišât which made contracts with landowner tenants.

The character of the vaqf as an institution, and therefore of vaqf landowning also, suffered no change under the Il-Khâns. Inasmuch as the expenditure of vaqf income was limited by conditions laid down by legators, vaqf land may be regarded as a conditional form of feudal landowning. The income of owners of vaqf land did not only come from the exploitation of land and peasants, but also from canals, bazaars, shops, bathhouses, mills and other items of income which were leased for a money rent (Arabic ijâra). Owners of vaqf land paid nothing to the Divân, since they had tax immunity. The vaqf constituted the main source of income for dervish shaikhs and theologians. A whole body of religious persons and their servants lived on the income of each large vaqf, receiving from its curator (mutavallî) pensions (marsûmdt) partly in money but mainly in kind (bread or grain, rice, meat, soap, cloths, etc.), as is shown by the list of expenditure of the vaqf set up by Ghazan in Baghdad.³ After the Mongol conquest many vaqf estates were seized by the “despoilers” (Arabic mutaghallibâ)—the Mongols. But under the Muslim Il-Khâns vaqf landownership expanded and formed a large part of the land fund.

By mulk, milk, or arbâbi is meant a feudal institution completely analogous to the western European allodium: the full ownership by the landowner (malîk) of land and water (channel or kârîz), unconditional and without obligation of service to the State, free to be sold and bequeathed. Mulk or milk denoted small-scale peasant landownership as well, providing the land did not belong to the commune. Mulk land as a rule paid land tax to the divân but mostly paid a tenth (Arabic ‘ushr, Persian dab-yak) and not the kharâj. It is evident from the correspondence of Raşhid al-Din that the arbâbi regions of Iṣfahân and

³ Mukâtibât-i Raşhî, pp. 34–40 (no. 14).
Khūzistān were obliged to pay a tenth part of the harvest (‘ūshr) in kind (bi-jins). But there were also “free” mulks (mulk-i hurri) with fiscal immunity.

Military fiefs were formally accounted a part of the State lands—iqṭā’. But in fact they were a form of conditional private property, equivalent to the Western fiefs, with fiscal immunity and the transfer to the fief-holder (Arabic muqṭa’, Arabo-Persian iqṭā’-dār) of the right to collect the taxes for himself. Thus tax was the same as rent on these lands and the land tax and other taxes benefited the iqṭā’-dār. The feudal institution of the iqṭā’ had evolved from the tenth century, from the time of the Umayyads, up to the time of the Saljuqs. It changed from a peculiar kind of free benefice (a grant by the State to a member of the military caste of the right to collect for himself the kharāj, the ‘ūshr, the jīzā from a certain fixed territory great or small for the period of service or for life; in which case the taxes became rent) into a military fief or grant of land with the people on it, which was already usually hereditary in the tenth century. Under the Saljuqs the hereditary iqṭā’ had become the general rule, but this practice apparently only became established in law under Ghazan. From the time of the Saljuqs the iqṭā’ became the specific form of domination by the Turkish, and, from the thirteenth century, by the Mongol-Turkish nomad military aristocracy, of the Iranian farmers settled on the iqṭā’ lands.

Under the Saljuqs iqṭā’ land was very common in Iran. Under the first six Il-Khāns also iqṭā’ land was granted to the military, but not to all soldiers, the grants being mainly to the higher ranks. The mass of ranker soldiers, mostly nomads, received only wages in kind (grain), and some money under the name of jāmagī. Under Ghazan iqṭā’ fiefs were given to all Mongols who were warriors of the general levy, and according to Rashīd al-Dīn whole regions became iqṭā’ “in every vilāyat”. Ḥamd Allāh Qazvīnī locates iqṭā’ land in Āzarbājān, Arrān,

1 Mukāṭihād-i Rāghūdī, pp. 33 (no. 13), 121-3 (no. 22).
2 Nāṣir al-Dīn Tūsī, pp. 760-1.
3 See C. Cahen, Evolūtiun de l’iqṭā’ du IX au XIII siècle.
5 Ravnůd, pp. 130-1.
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Shirvan and Khurasan, which is completely explained by the fact that the main summer (jailaq) and winter (qishlaq) camps of the Mongol and Turkish tribes forming the backbone of the Il-Khânid army were there. Cultivated land with settled peasants near to nomad camps was given as iqta'.

Ghazan's decree of the year 703/1303, dealing with the apportioning of iqta' land amongst the Mongol levy, was formally an act of beneficence on the part of the Il-Khân, but was in fact made necessary by the pressing importunity of the army, about which Rashid al-Din speaks. This explains the publication of this decree, which was in contradiction to the general centralizing policy of Ghazan and stimulated thereafter the growth of feudal disintegration. According to the decree, a certain fixed area was granted in fief to the amir of a thousand, i.e. to the leader of a branch of the Mongol tribe who provided the army with a thousand horsemen. The amir of a thousand divided this amongst the amirs of hundreds by sortition (casting lots with a whip). In the same way amirs of hundreds divided land amongst amirs of tens, and these did likewise amongst the rankers. All of the soldiers received a large portion by right of iqta'—a village or part of a village—and the amirs received correspondingly more. The ownership of iqta' was conditional upon doing military service; the iqta' could be taken back upon execution of poor service. In accordance with the decree iqta' lands were to be inherited, but not necessarily by the son, but by whomsoever of the family could best carry out military service. The sense of the decree indicates that taxes which were previously paid to the divān could now be collected as a right by the landowner himself (apart from a small tax of 50 mans of grain). Thus the possessor of iqta' land had fiscal immunity but not administrative immunity. The inspector of the divān of the army—bītikchi-yi 'arid—was required every year to carry out an inspection of iqta' lands and to take back the fiefs of those who had failed to do their military service or did not care to cultivate their land. The decree gives the rights of fief-holder in respect of peasants living on the iqta' lands. This decree firmly established the caste-hierarchical system of military fiefs.

Jalayirid charters (of Sultan Uvais) granting iqta' to an amir of a tiimen, an amir of a thousand, and a lower rank, possibly an amir of a

1 Nuṣrat al-qulub, pp. 82, 92, 93, 147.
3 See below, pp. 522ff.
4 Military-administrative district capable of providing approximately 10,000 men.
hundred, have come down to us. In these decrees there is also talk of the granting of a whole district to the complete control (taşarruf) of a grantee. The terms jâmâgî and iqṭâ‘ are here used as synonyms. Along with a clearly expressed fiscal immunity the iqṭâ‘-dâr also received the right of administrative immunity, with a prohibition against officials of the Divân entering upon immune territory, set apart (mafrûz) from the vilâyât and not subordinate to local authority. Thus we have here a further evolution of the iqṭâ‘.

Apart from the fiefs of the military nobility (iqṭâ‘) there existed conditional grants of land and rent to members of the bureaucracy and the religious bodies. The grant for life of rent in kind (corn, barley, rice) or money was called ma‘îşhat (Arabic literally “livelihood”) and when granted into heredity (maurûtî or when it was “eternal” (abâdi) it was called idrâr (literally “pension”). Often such a grant was replaced by the grant of a village of the Divân, the income (= amount of taxes) from which equalled the sum of the ma‘îşhat or the idrâr. This kind of grant was called the muqâṣṣa and was either for life (muqâṣṣa-yî ma‘îşîhat) or for eternity (muqâṣṣa-yî idrâr). It is clearly evident from the charters of Sultan Uvais that the owner of muqâṣṣa lands not only had fiscal immunity but also administrative immunity. The latter is expressed in the formula (which is met with in the charters of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries): “Let them [the officials of the Divân] make brief and remove quills and feet” (that is, let them not carry on correspondence nor trespass on immune land).

Further development of the iqṭâ‘ led to the soyurghal (Mong. literally “grant”)—a military fief which appeared under the Jalayirids, was hereditary, and had fiscal and administrative immunity. After the middle of the fourteenth century the term soyurghal had replaced iqṭâ‘. The latter term is encountered thereafter from time to time in narrative sources as an archaic and bookish expression ordinarily signifying soyurghal. The sources do not bear out the opinion expressed earlier that the soyurghal was introduced into Iran by Timūr.

Pasture lands can be distinguished as a special category of land. The nomads—Mongol, Turkish, Lur and Arab—utilized it for their summer

1 Dastûr al-kâtib, ff. 182 b–183 b.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. ff. 221 b–223 b; for more about the idrâr see also Nasîr al-Dîn Tûsî, p. 760; Juwâni, vol. ii, p. 277; Vâşâfî, p. 453; Mukâtibât-i Raşhîdz, pp. 255–6 (no. 41).
4 Dastûr al-kâtib, f. 22 b.
The Categories of Landownership

camps in high mountainous regions and for their winter camps in the plains, with great distances between. Such pasture was normally designated by the terms _yurt_ (Turkish) or _'alaf-khwār_ (Arabo-Persian, literally "pasture").

The _iqṭāʿ_, soyurghal, or yurt could encompass territory great or small and could include the land of landowners lower in rank (e.g. the _iqṭāʿ_ land of an amir of a thousand contained the lands of ranks subordinate to him). Both this system and the confusion of the concepts of state-owned land and the feudal estate which we find in the sources were in general typical of feudal societies with their hierarchic disintegrated form of property.

As we have said, private ownership, both conditional (_iqṭāʿ_) and unconditional (_mulḵ_), greatly expanded at the expense of state-ownership under the last Īl-Khāns. A general feature of this process was the concentration of land in the hands of great landowners. There were various ways in which this occurred: the granting of land by the Īl-Khāns, law-suits (in respect of land the title-deeds of which had been lost), purchase (_mulḵ-_land), and often straightforward seizure by the strong. The term _mutaghallib_, meaning "seizer of land", is often met with in the documents of the period. Already under the first two Īl-Khāns the powerful Šams al-Dīn Muḥammad Juvainī, taking advantage of his position, bought land (_mulḵ_) worth 40,000,000 dinārs. The greater part of the estates of Rashīd al-Dīn consisted of mulks which he bought in small pieces scattered about various regions. One supposes that this land was bought in separate lots from small landowners driven by ruin to sell their lands. The historian-minister also possessed deserted and neglected land (_zaminḥā-yi ḫarāb u bāʾīr_), which he had taken on the basis of Ghazan’s decree granting all such lands to those who would cultivate them. Lastly he derived income from _vaqf_ lands of which he was the trustee (_mutavalli_).

From Rashīd al-Dīn’s will it is evident that, beside those lands which he had given to his sons earlier, he intended to leave his sons and daughters, friends and trusted servants, 12,770 faddāns (plough-strips) of _mulḵ_ ploughland, i.e. approx. 75–85,000 hectares of irrigated ploughland, and 39,000 date-palms in Arab ‘Īrāq and the southern

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1 See Quatremère, _Histoire des Mongols de la Perse_, p. 137 n. 12: "The sultan ordered every tribe to be given an _iqṭāʿ_ and a _'alaf-khwār_.”

2 See Alizade, _Zemel'nya politika Il'khanoz_; see reference to sources there as well.


4 _Mukāţibtār-i Rashidi_, pp. 14 (no. 6), 21 (no. 9), 22–3 (no. 10), 180–1 (no. 33).
regions of Iran. As well as this he bequeathed to them an enormous number of gardens (1,200 men and women were slaves in but two of them near Tabriz), vineyards, 30,000 horses, 250,000 rams, 10,000 camels, and so on. Rashid al-Din had elders of nomad tribes (ahsham) pasture his cattle and used to give his poultry and geese to dependent peasants (dabeqin) to be fed. The Il-Khan Abu Sa'id presented the Shirazi qadi Majd al-Din Fali with 100 settlements in the Fars valley of Jamkhan.

The Il-Khans presented the Shlrazi qadi Majd al-Din Fali with 100 settlements in the Fars valley of Jamkhan.

As is well known, Moslem law did not recognize serfdom and a special category of serfs. It knew only of free Muslims, dhimmis (ahl al-dhimma); the heterodox, Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians—who were personally free but had limited civil rights; and finally the slave, in principal a heterodox prisoner or the descendant of a heterodox prisoner. The taxable estate (ra'ayad)—peasants and townspeople—were formally regarded as personally free. De facto feudal dependence existed as a result of bondage to the soil, in virtue of which the State transferred populated land conditionally (iqta', vaqf) or unconditionally (mulk) to the military caste and to the faqih, together with the right to receive either wholly or in part the kharaj and other taxes, in which case tax became rent. Thus the relationship between the landowner and the peasant had the character not of personal but of territorial dependence. Nizam al-Mulk said that the muqta' had no rights over the person (tan) of the peasant, nor over the members of his family, nor over his plot of land, nor over his household; he had only the right to collect the rent. Such was the formal legal position of the peasant. Things were of course different in practice. As early as the twelfth century the owners of iqta' land exercised legal and police powers over their peasants. The confusion of administrative and State functions with the rights of the landowner was a feature typical of both Western and Eastern feudalism.

1 Mukahbat-i Rashid, pp. 224–40 (no. 36), 194–5 (no. 34), 53 (no. 17). See for more detail I. Petrushevsky, Feodalnoe khozyaystvo Rashid ad-dina.
3 In the period under consideration the words for slave were usually ghulam, asr and barda. The terms 'abd (Arabic) and banda (Persian) on the other hand were most often used in a different sense—"slave of God", or "humble servant". In the sources slaves are never confused with feudal bondsmen—the ra'iyat.
4 Siyasad-Nama, ed. Schefer, p. 28; ed. Khalkhali, p. 22.
The self-government practised from ancient times by the village communes in Iran limited to an extent the arbitrary powers of the landowners and the financial officials in State lands. However, this communal self-government had begun to decay long before the Mongol conquest as a result of the inner stratification of the village commune already noticeable under the last Sassanians—the small landowners, the diqhâns, were then distinguished from the commune—and also as a result of the arbitrary practices of the financial officials and, after the Saljuq period, of the possessors of military fiefs. The village commune is rarely mentioned in the sources of the Mongol period and is usually called jama'at-i dib, jama'at-i qurâ, or jama'at-i ahâlî-yi dihhâ.1 However we did not chance upon any material descriptive of life in the commune in the sources, although we are told here and there of conflicts and law­suits between commune and landowner. We completely failed to find any mention of the periodic redistribution of land or about communal crop-rotation; it is evident that both had disappeared about the begin­ning of this period. The impression is created that the village commune was in a state of decline under the Mongols.

Before the thirteenth century we have no information that the feudal dependence of the peasants had taken the form of serfdom, with pro­hibition of travel. The binding of the peasants to the soil occurs apparently only after the Mongol conquest.2 It was provoked primarily by the general economic decline of the country and by the catastrophic curtailment in the number of its inhabitants with the concomitant lack of workers and taxpayers on the land. There was now too much un­cultivated and empty land and too few hands. In addition the fiscal policy of the conquerors and unbridled lawlessness on their part drove the peasants to mass flight.3 For these reasons the State and the feudal classes had a stake in prohibiting the right of movement of peasants and their forced return if they should flee. On the other hand the “Great Yasa” of Chingiz-Khân looked upon the dependence of the low-ranking Mongol warrior on his lord as a personal dependence. The Mongol warrior (garaçhu) was considered a serf and was attached, but of course not to the soil, for this would not make sense amongst nomads, but to

1 See Safwat al-safâ, ff. 184b, 192a-192b, 196a, 325a, 469a, 474b; Mukâtibât-i Rashîdî, p. 236 (no. 36); Dastûr al-kâtib, f. 51a.
2 For more detail see I. Petrushevsky, Zemledelie . . . , pp. 324–39; references to sources and also literature on the question.
3 See Jami’ al-tawârîkh, ed. Alizade, pp. 458–9, 514; Mukâtibât-i Rashîdî, pp. 12 (no. 5), 146 (no. 27); Saifi, p. 464; Hâfiz-i Abrû, Dhaîl-i Jami’ al-tawârîkh, p. 20; Dastûr al-kâtib, ff. 119b, 120a, 167a-167b, 177b, 183a, 198a-198b, 200a, 229a.
the person of his hereditary lord, the nomad aristocrat. The Mongol conquerors attempted to extend this notion to include the Iranian raʿiyyat. The Yasa prohibited movement to another place under pain of death to “any man from a thousand, hundred, or ten”, and forbade the concealing of fugitives. And although this law only applied to soldiers of the Mongol levy at first, it produced the feudal attachment of the raʿiyyat, in so far as the Yasa was extended to them and in so far as the basis of the Yasa was the principle of universal attachment to the service of the State. The Armenian historian Grigor of Akner relates how tax-payers who had run away from the place of their registration were captured, bound and whipped without mercy. The Mongol view of the peasants as the personal property of the lord is recorded in a decree of Ghazan, in which it is clear that the fief-holders are speaking of their peasants: “They are given to us in the iqṭāʾ, they are our slaves.” This is a confusion of slaves with the raʿiyyat, previously impossible and inadmissible in Muslim law.

The decree of Ghazan concerning the military fiefs or iqṭāʾ confirms the previously existing attachment of peasants to the soil. Peasants who had fled from inhabited and deserted villages granted as iqṭāʾ were ordered to return to their former habitations, unless thirty years had elapsed from the time of their flight, or unless they were included in the tax lists (qānūn) of other vilayats. All were forbidden to shelter fugitive raʿiyyat. Another decree of Ghazan prohibited the further movement of peasants settled upon land. Thus attachment to the soil had spread to all peasants.

At the same time the decrees of Ghazan of the period after his conversion to Islam must be regarded as an attempt at judicial compromise between the Yasa of Chingiz-Khān and Muslim law. The right of movement of peasants was denied, but they were treated as free in law. It was emphasized that landowners should not move the peasants from village to village arbitrarily and they were forbidden to call them slaves. The peasants were not attached to the landowner but to the place of registration, to the tax list of a given area. This tendency to compromise between the Mongol Yasa and Muslim law is characteristic of the whole of Ghazan’s domestic policy. Of course the formal freedom of peasants was pure fiction in their actual situation without rights.

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2 Ibid. p. 25.  
5 Ibid.  
THE PEASANTS UNDER THE İL-KHĀNS

The attachment of peasants to the soil was also in existence under the Jalayirid sultans. Frequent orders for the search for peasants and their return to their former homes can be found in the documents collected in the Dasṭūr al-kātib. One document mentions the return of fugitive ra‘īyyat of the Hamadan vilâyat. The reasons for flight given in these documents were the heaviness of the taxes, the arbitrary and illegal exactions of the local authorities, and sometimes the devastation of an area.

Quit-rent (muẓāra‘a) was the basic form of exploitation of the peasants in Iran both before and after the Mongol invasion. Peasants regarded as free in law depended on the landlord as tenants or subtenants, and in most cases hereditary tenants. The rent they paid was mostly feudal rent, a share of the crop, or in regions near to towns and there only, rent half in kind and half in money. The predominance of quit-rent was due to the fact that the landowners’ own demesne was by and large absent from the economy. It is at least true that landlords did not possess, as a rule, their own grain-producing properties. Thus the peasants did not do the corvée. In so far as landowners still worked their own estates (gardens and virgin land—bâqî), they employed slave prisoners and not peasants.

The five part division of the harvest between the landlord and the farmer (one part for the land, irrigation, draught animals, seed, and workmen) which exists at the present day is not mentioned in the medieval sources. Then also the share of the landowner (in other words, the feudal rent) varied according to local conditions and depended for its size on whether the tenant received from his landlord land only, or oxen, seed, and the benefits of his irrigation as well. The share of the landlord was designated by the term hîṣṣa-yi mālīki, bahra-yi mālikāna.

In general there was not a clear distinction between this rent and taxes. Both were either paid wholly to the State, as was the case on the land of the Divān where tax and rent were one; or to the İl-Khān and his family, if the land was injū land; or wholly to the landlord on vaqfi, iqṭā, muqāṣṣa, and mulk-i hurr territory; or lastly income from

1 See above p. 523, n. 2; see especially Dasṭūr al-kātib, f. 229a (three documents).
2 Ibid. the first document.
3 Mukāṭībī-i Razī, pp. 53 (no. 17), 236 (no. 36); Jāmi‘ al-tawārīkh, ed. Alizade, p. 513: “Let virgin land be worked by their slaves oxen, teams of draught animals, and with their seed.”
4 Vassāf, p. 630; Dasṭūr al-kātib, f. 151b.
land would be divided between the State as tax and the landlord as rent in fixed proportion on mulk and khālisāt land. What was this proportion? We have but little information on this point. We see from the tax regulations of Khūzistān that the Divān took 60 per cent of the harvest on state-owned land and 10 per cent from arbābi or mulk land in kind.\footnote{Mukātibdt-i Rashīdī, pp. 121-3 (no. 22).} Assuming that the same amount was paid by the tenant on the latter land as on the former, we may conjecture that the landowner derived 50 per cent after the State’s 10 per cent (dab-yak) had been paid to the divān, and that the peasant kept 40 per cent of his crop. We can suppose that the same applies to the Isfahān vilāyat where the divān took 10 per cent.\footnote{Ibid. pp. 33-4 (no. 13).} On khālisāt land in Arab Iraq however the tenant (tāni) had one-third of the crop, one-third was paid to the divān, and the subtenant farmer (barzgar) kept one-third for himself.\footnote{Nuẓhat al-qulub, p. 31; instead of \textit{ גדול and \textit{כיה as in the edition of le Strange, should be בגא and תאני.} \footnote{Mukātibdt-i Rashīdī, pp. 244-45 (no. 38; Rashīdī gathered together 20,000 ra‘iyat from Jazīreh, Rum, and Armenia in order to dig a canal), 246-7 (no. 39); compare Rashāḥūy al-fayn al-haydt, p. 227 (3,000 peasants from the estates of Khwaja Ahrār sent to clean channels).} \footnote{Jāmi‘ al-tawārikh, ed. Alizade, p. 558; Kirakos transl. Brosset, p. 193; Saifi, pp. 440, 444, 739-472; cf. Juvaini, vol. 1, p. 20.} \footnote{Zahir al-Dīn Mar‘āghi, p. 413.}

Money rent existed in suburban regions near to large towns (money rent on land—\textit{ijāra}); auxiliary forms of rent were the labour rent and rent in kind. Labour rent signified the forced labour of the ra‘iyat on behalf of the State or their landlords and consisted of irrigation work such as the digging of channels and kāriz and their periodic cleansing,\footnote{Mukātibdt-i Rashīdī, pp. 244-45 (no. 38; Rashīdī gathered together 20,000 ra‘iyat from Jazīreh, Rum, and Armenia in order to dig a canal), 246-7 (no. 39); compare Rashāḥūy al-fayn al-haydt, p. 227 (3,000 peasants from the estates of Khwaja Ahrār sent to clean channels).} building work such as the construction of houses, palaces, fortress walls, etc.,\footnote{Jāmi‘ al-tawārikh, ed. Alizade, p. 558; Kirakos transl. Brosset, p. 193; Saifi, pp. 440, 444, 739-472; cf. Juvaini, vol. 1, p. 20.} and the clearing of woodland for the plough in the lands near the Caspian.\footnote{Zahir al-Dīn Mar‘āghi, p. 413.} The words used for this labour rent were \textit{bīgar, shīgar,} and \textit{hashār.} The terms \textit{akkār, manage, and barzgar} meaning “farmer, sower”, as the sources show, took on the sense of quit-rent tenant. The economic unit was \textit{juft-i gān,} literally a “team of oxen” (synonyms were \textit{faddān, gauj,} and \textit{pāqāw}). This term had a twofold technical sense: (1) a team of oxen together with light or heavy plough and ploughmen, the team often consisting of several pairs of beasts and sometimes as many as twelve; (2) a strip of land for ploughing which could be worked by one team in one season. The size of the \textit{juft} or faddān varied in different
regions but an average would possibly be 6–7 hectares. The juft normally included several peasant farms and served as the unit of taxation of the peasants. It was a unit for fixing the returns—the injunction estates of Ghazar in Fars were leased at 61 dinars and 4 dangs per annum from each faddan and also as the unit for the distribution of compulsory labour amongst the peasants.

The official acts rarely touch upon the condition of the peasants on privately owned estates and give meagre information. This is understandable since the State regarded the relationship between the peasant and his malik as the private affair of the latter; narrative sources rarely mention this subject. On the other hand we possess much information from the most varied sources concerning the condition of the peasants on injunction and Divan land, and they all paint a dark picture. Hamd Allah Qazvini gives us to understand that the position of the peasant was better on the estates of the private landowners (arbab), and that they took care to preserve their own property. Managers of Divan and waqf land, in which there was a rapid turnover, were in a hurry to get rich, and did not worry about the prosperity of their estates, with the result that they ruined them. The poet Nizari in the seventies of the thirteenth century saw an estate (privately owned) in Kuhistan which had been deserted because of the oppression of a tyrannical landlord. The same poet gives the following description of the practice of collecting tax in kind (wine) in the same province. The tax collector (muhassil) arrived at the village of Baidan and presented the elder (mihhtar-i dih) with an assignation (barat) on 100 mans of wine. The elder announced that his village was ruined and that he did not have a single man of wine. He was given 200 blows with a stick, which only ceased when the hidden jars of wine were discovered. Rashid al-Din, speaking about the mass flight of peasants from their villages, continues: "When the tax collectors went around the locality, they found some villain or other who knew the houses, and at his direction discovered the people in corners, cellars, gardens, and ruins. If they could not find the men, they seized their wives. Driving them before them like a flock of sheep,

1 See for calculations I. Petrushevsky, Feodalnoe khozyaystvo Rashid ad-dina, pp. 90–3; references and literature on the question.
2 Dastur al-kâtib, f. 151 b.
5 Rashid al-Din, speaking about the mass flight of peasants from their villages, continues: "When the tax collectors went around the locality, they found some villain or other who knew the houses, and at his direction discovered the people in corners, cellars, gardens, and ruins. If they could not find the men, they seized their wives. Driving them before them like a flock of sheep,
they brought them to the tax officials who had them hung up on ropes so that the wails and plaints of the women rose up to the heavens.”

The same author relates that one of the landowners (målāk) arrived at his village in Fīruzābād in the region of Yazd to collect the rent and could find neither elder nor peasant: they had all fled. On the other hand he saw seventeen tax collectors, come with barāts to be met from the taxes of the village. They had managed to capture three ra’īyyat who had hidden in the steppe. They brought them back to the village and hung them on ropes to force them to tell where the other peasants were hidden, but they discovered nothing. Rashīd al-Dīn wrote to his son Maḥmūd, governor of Kirmān, about the poverty-stricken condition of the peasants of the province of Bam, ruined and in flight because of the extortion and violence practised by the military. Rent and taxes not only devoured a great part of the peasant’s crops, but were often more than the peasant could pay, so that arrears (baqdāyā) mounted from year to year, and the peasant remained an eternal debtor. Tax-farming did more than a little to ruin the peasants, and this practice, called muqāta‘a or ḍamān, remained in existence after the reign of Ghazan. Tax-farmers were mainly nomad aristocrats, local landlords, officials or moneylenders attempting to get as much out of the ra’īyyat as possible, and not caring if they drove them to total ruin. Rashīd al-Dīn and Vassāf give us much information concerning the malpractices and exactions of the tax-farmers. The fiscal system established by the Mongols and tax-farming were primary reasons for the calamitous situation of the ra’īyyat, particularly the settled peasants, almost the majority of whom were on the verge of penury previous to Ghazan’s reforms. The lawlessness and violence of the feudal lords, first and foremost, of the Mongol-Turkish nomad nobility and the military caste down to its lowest ranks, were causes no less important. These are typified by the remarks of Ghazan, that “in the eyes of the governors and others even clods of earth call forth esteem, but the ra’īyyat do not” that “the rubbish on the roads was not trodden underfoot as were the ra’īyyat”, and that the Iranian ra’īyyat were so demeaned and terrorized,

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2 Ibid. p. 460.
3 Mukātbāt-i Rashīdī, pp. 10–11 (no. 1).
5 Mukātbāt-i Rashīdī, p. 269 (no. 45).

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That were a fly to steal their bread, they would not dare oppose it.¹ These words show clearly the contrast between the fiction of freedom in law (in accordance with Moslem law) and the actual unprivileged and depressed position of the ra'īyyat.

THE FISCAL SYSTEM UNDER THE IL-KHĀNS

The fiscal system, like the whole Mongol system of government, was a monstrous and self-contradictory combination of methods introduced by the nomad conquerors (partly influenced by China—taxation per head of the population) and ancient Iranian traditions kept up by the 'Abbāsīd caliphate. The Mongol fiscal system has attracted the attention of a number of investigators.² Nevertheless the meaning of certain terms used in taxation and the nature of the taxes they designated are still very often unclear and have not been determined. This is explained by the insufficiency and in some cases the vagueness of the sources, and also by the fact that one and the same term had a different meaning at different times and in different regions. The latter circumstance is evidently to be explained by the fact that the different areas had dissimilar fiscal regulations and traditions, whilst the tendency of Moslem lawyers to consider the tax system as a unified whole inclined them to use a common terminology for taxes that differed at times in various districts.

The sources mention about 45 terms for taxes and obligations of the Il-Khān period that survived in part into the following period. Some of these terms are however synonyms. The majority of them were known before the Mongols, under the Saljuqs or even earlier. The tax system of the Mongols nonetheless weighed much more heavily upon the population of Iran than the fiscal systems of earlier epochs. This was because of the high, inexactly ascertained rates of tax and the arbitrary methods of collection practised by the authorities, and not because of the imposition of new taxes. (Rashid al-Din and Vassāf note the practice of exacting one and the same tax several times in one year or exacting it several years in advance.) A final reason for this was the fact that a

ruined country could not bear such a tax burden. The burden was made more heavy by tax-farming and by covering State expenditure with assignations (barāt, havāla), payment of which was imposed on the raʿīyyat. Whilst it is true that both practices existed under previous rulers, they greatly expanded under the Mongols, and Ghazan's fiscal policy was only a palliative. The whole weight of the tax burden fell of course on the peasant raʿīyyat, and the lower and middle ranks of the town dwellers; the upper classes—"the people of the sword" and the "people of the pen" were either free from taxes or passed them on to the quit-rent peasants of their estates.

The main tax before the Mongol conquest was, as is known, the kharaj—the land tax. A new tax came into existence alongside it in the Mongol period, and in some cases replaced the kharaj. This was the qubchur. As Quatremère has shown, the qubchur was at first only a tax on pasture land. Qubchur kept its original technical meaning of one out of every 100 head of cattle or 1 per cent amongst the Mongols under the Il-Khāns, from which it is evident that taxes paid by the nomads remained insignificant. But shortly after the Mongol conquest the Mongol authorities began to use the word qubchur, a term familiar to them, to designate the basic direct tax paid by town and country dwellers. Thus the qubchur meant two basically distinct taxes: the 1 per cent paid by the nomads; and the tax on the settled population, which, as can be seen from Juvaini and Rashid al-Dīn, was paid in money even after Ghazan's reforms, and must have been very difficult for the peasants to pay, since they had to sell their grain to raise the money. The nature of the qubchur remains far from clear. The opinion has been expressed that the qubchur paid by the settled population corresponds to the kharaj, but this has not been proved, as is shown by Minorsky. It has also been shown that in some areas only one of the taxes was collected—the qubchur in one, the kharaj in another. Indeed Rashid al-Dīn mentions "qubchur regions" (vilâyat-i qubchūrī); in other vilâyats, for example Khūzistān, only the kharaj was exacted. But there were regions like Fārs where both the qubchur and the kharaj were paid. It is not known what the basis of the distinction was.

1 See Quatremère, op. cit. p. 256 n. 83; compare B. Vladimirtsov, Obschestvennii stroi mongolov, p. 112.
2 Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, p. 761; Dastūr al-kātiḥ, ff. 201 b, 226 a.
3 A Seyyībīl dī Qazīm Aq-Lūqānī, p. 955 n. 2.
4 A. A. Alizade, op. cit. p. 204.  
6 Mukātibāt-i Rasīdī, pp. 122-3 (no. 22).  
7 Vassāf, p. 347.
From information given by Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī,1 we can see that the qubchur was a poll tax under Hūlgu (and evidently later) and that it was imposed on all subjects first of all by the Mongols contrary to Muslim law, which exempted the Mohammedans. The qubchur was graded according to the property of the tax-payer, and its rate changed often.2 Rashīd al-Dīn relates that the qubchur was usually farmed out, and that there were governors who took 10 times, and even 20 or 30 times the qubchur from the ra‘iyyat of their vilāyats (the latter being evidently an exaggeration).3 Qubchur returns under Ghazān are not known. One can deduce from the decree of Ghazān only that the overall sum from each district was ascertained on the basis of fixed estimated expenditure (ikhrājāt-i muqarrart) and was then divided amongst the ra‘iyyat on the basis of previous tax lists.4 The term qubchur disappears from documents under the Jalayīrids, but the tax itself—poll tax, paid by Muslims as well—was still in existence later under the name of sar-shumāra or sarāna.

As we have already said, the kharāj was mostly collected in kind as part of the crop (the ancient muqāsama) in the Il-Khānīd period, but it was paid in cash5 on a measured area (the ancient misāha) in the countryside near to such towns as Baghdad and Shīrāz. The rate of the tax was not the same in each vilāyāt. In one of Ghazān’s decrees the part of the crop given by the peasant to the Divān (kharāj) was fixed at 1/3 to 1/4.6 But in Khūzistān, as we have said, the kharāj from state-owned land was fixed during the reign of Ghazān at 6/10 of the crop. In one Jalayīrid document the rate of the kharāj is stipulated as 2/10 of the harvest in kind (bahra), “according to the custom of the vilāyāt”.7 Apart from the basic kharāj (ašl-i kharāj or simply ašl) there was also an additional sum—farʿ.8 The farʿ was supposed to be 1/10 of the basic kharāj, according to Vaṣṣāf, and from 1/10 to 2/10, according to Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī.9 The terms ašl-i kharāj and farʿ were known long before the Mongol conquest.10

1 Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī, p. 763.
4 Ibid. p. 402.
6 Ibid. p. 551.
7 Dastūr al-kātib, f. 199b.
8 Vaṣṣāf, pp. 438, 439.
9 Ibid. p. 435; Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī, p. 762.
alleviated rate of $\frac{1}{10}$ of the crop in kind, was exacted from privately owned lands (mulk, arbâbî) under the Il-Khâns. Apparently this was a special privilege of the landowners. It did not apply to peasants paying quit-rent, who had to pay rent to landlords (bahra-yi mâlikâna), as well as 'ushr to the divân.

The sources give conflicting information on the qalan, which is evidently explained by the fact that it signified different taxes and duties at different times and in different places. Grigor of Akner and Rashîd al-Dîn speak of the qalan as a kind of military service. But the table of taxes of Khûzistân show it to be the upkeep of the military aristocracy (amîrs) during their tours and military expedition, whilst the amount raised by the qalan was a meagre 1,200 dinârs from the whole of Khûzistân, compared with the total tax from the region of 325,000 dinârs. But the thirteenth-century Persian poet Pûr-i Bahâ, in a qaṣîda in honour of the historian and administrator ‘Alâ’ al-Dîn Juwaynî speaks of the qalan and the qubchûr as the two main taxes that bore heavily and with ruinous effect upon the population. We conclude from this that the term qalan was here used in place of khabârî.

Earlier we mentioned the tax that the Mongols introduced for the first time, the tamgha, which was paid on all forms of trade and urban crafts, even prostitution, and which replaced the Moslem zakât at the rate of 2½ per cent. (There is no mention of zakât in documents of the thirteenth century and after.) The rate of the tamgha is not known exactly. But from the letter of Rashîd al-Dîn to his spiritual counsellor Śadr al-Dîn Turkâ’î we can conclude that the rate was 10 per cent of the value of each commercial transaction originally, and that Ghazan cut it by half in some towns and in other towns abrogated it for a period (for example, in the towns of Khûzistân).

The term ‘avârîd meant a special tax to cover extraordinary expenses, but was in fact regularly imposed and was extremely ruinous. We can

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1 Concerning the origin and original character of the ‘ushr see A. N. Poliak, Classification of Lands . . ., pp. 49–62; F. Lokkegaard, Islamic Taxation, pp. 72–91.
2 At least from all private estates in Khûzistân and the Iṣfâhân vilâyât; see the Mukâṣibât-i Raṣhîdî, pp. 53–4 (no. 13), 121–3 (no. 22); cf. Rashîdî ‘ayn al-hayât, p. 227.
4 Ibid.
5 See V. Minorsky, Pûr-i Bahâ and his poems, pp. 194–7 (Persian text), 198–200 (English translation), especially verse two:

"The whole world has become scattered and homeless
Because of the immense qalan and endless gopèr."
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judge its character from a tale of Saifi. In 716/1317 the governor of Khurāsān, the Amir Yasa’ul, desiring to organize a celebration in honour of his daughter on the occasion of her marriage with the son of Prince Yasa’ur, imposed ‘avarid of 300,000 dinārs on the ra’iyyat of Khurāsān, 50,000 of which were to be paid by Herāt. Two na’ibs with fifty horsemen, arriving in Herāt on the day of the Festival of the Sacrifice (‘id-i qurbdn), drove the inhabitants out of the mosque with sticks, and laid 100 to 200 dinārs tax on all whom they caught and bound. They extorted it on the spot, beating and torturing, wounding and making invalids of about 200 citizens. By sunset they had collected 50,000 dinārs.1 ‘Avārid was already resorted to under Maḥmūd of Ghazna.2

The words ‘alafa and ‘ulufa (lit. fodder, forage) signified a collection in kind to provide food and fodder for the military caste and the army in a given district. According to the sources, this exaction consisted of grain, straw, oxen, sheep, poultry, wine, and sometimes money. In 707/1307 the general Muḥammad Sām demanded 500 kharvārs of grain, 500 rams, 50 horses, 30 slaves (barda) and 10,000 dinārs for his army from the vassals of the lord of Herāt.3 The ṭagḥār was the same tax, but in a narrower sense, being only paid in grain, at the rate of 100 mans (= 1 kharvār, or ass load).

The general poll-tax (sar-shumāra, sarāna = qubchur) introduced by the Mongols, which we have already mentioned, must not be confused with the ancient poll-tax based on Moslem law, exacted from the non-Moslems—the jizya. After the Mongol conquest the jizya ceased to exist. Ghazan restored the jizya paid by the heterodox (October 1295) after his conversion to Islam, but quickly abolished it (1296)4 because of the intercession of the Nestorian patriarch Mar Yabalaha III, an Uighur by birth (1281-1317). But in 1306 the jizya was restored again by Öljeytü, and this time for good.5 Under Sultan Uvais the jizya paid by Christians and Jews (men only) was 8 dinārs from the rich, 6 from those of middle condition, and 4 from the poorer people.6 It is not clear whether the jizya was paid by the heterodox instead of the sar-shumāra, or together with it. In some districts khāna-shumāra7 (i.e. tax paid by household or family) was exacted in place of sar-shumāra.

Tax on gardens was paid in fruit—bāgh-shumāra8—and was evidently

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1 Saifi, p. 649.
2 Saifi, p. 522.
3 Ibid., p. 149.
4 Ibid., f. 225a-225b.
7 Dastūr al-kātib, f. 220a.
8 Ibid.
identical with the *thamārāt* (fruit). This tax derives from the time of Khusrau I Anushirvān, who laid a tax on fruit trees.

Increases in the *kharāj* and other taxes were reflected in the terms *tafdvut* (difference), *taufīr* (increase), *zāvā'id* (excess), and *nemerī* (Mongol: addition). Details and rates of these taxes are not specified more exactly.

The term *ikhrājāt* (lit. expenditure), frequently encountered in the sources, evidently referred to the whole group of circumstantial and permanent taxes paid by the ra'iyyat to cover the cost of officials touring the latters' districts (*ikhrājāt-i šādir u vārid*). Expenditure covered by estimates (*muqarrari*) was distinguished from expenses beyond the estimates (*khārijīyat*). The following taxes evidently belonged to the group: *haqq al-taqrlr* (synonym—*rasm al-viẓāra*)—as we see from the correspondence of Rashid al-Dīn; a tax in kind (grain, sugar, etc.) for the support of the Grand Vazīr: *rasm al-sadāra* (*haqq al-tauliyja*)—a tax collected from the ra'iyyat of vaqf lands for the Grand Sadr at the rate of 10 per cent; *rusūm-i shahnagī* or *dārūghakī*—a tax for the governor of a province (*shahna, daruqha, basqaq*); *rusūm-i 'ammāl* (*rasm-i khazāna, Arabic-Persian*)—a tax for the upkeep of officials of the Exchequer (*khazna, bait al-māl*), fixed at 2 out of every 100 dinārs tax from the time of Ghazan; *haqq at-tahsīl* ("share of the tax")—for the tax collector (*muhassi/, *tahsīldār*); and *harz*—a tax at the preliminary estimate of a crop, and similar taxes.

The term *tarh* signified the compulsory sale of products by the ra'iyyat to the Exchequer or local ruler at prices much below market value, and the compulsory purchase by the ra'iyyat of goods lying in government stores at prices far beyond that value. The meaning of the term is explained by A. A. Alizade.

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1 Vaṣṣāf, p. 439; *Mukātibāt-i Rashidi, pp. 121 ff.*. The reading of Professor Muhammad Shafi', the manuscript had *smārāt*.
3 This term was already known in the eleventh century, see the *Siyāsat-Nāma* p. 209.
4 Vaṣṣāf, p. 326; also mentioned in the Ani inscription.
5 Juvainī, vol. 1, p. 23; Vaṣṣāf, p. 339; *Dastūr al-kātib, ff. 112a, 201a–201b, 221b, 225a–229a*. (All the documents granting immunity shown here speak of liberation from the *ikhrājāt* as well as other taxes.)
6 *Mukātibāt-i Rashidi, pp. 236–7 (no. 36), 243 (no. 37).
7 *Dastūr al-kātib, f. 213a.
9 A. A. Alizade, *Termin tarh, pp. 109–13*; there also references to sources; in particular there is the story from Vaṣṣāf (p. 363) about how, at a time of famine in Fārs, the ra'iyyat were ordered to provide the Exchequer with a *tarh* of corn at 6 dinārs per *kharvār*, when the market price was 30 dinārs per *kharvār*.
"Presents" from the ra'iyyat to the Il-Khân, to members of his family, to dignitaries, and to the local feudalists (Persian pīshkāsh, Mongol sa'uri, Turkish tureghu) were obligatory upon their arrival in a district, or upon the occasion of some festivity, and their proportions were established. Thus one of Ghazan's decrees states that a wine-skin of fruit-juice should contain 50 Tabrīz mans in payment of sa'uri to the residence of Il-Khân, whilst a wine-skin of fruit-juice given on the occasion of a festivity should hold 40 mans.¹

The gathering of ra'iyyat for forced labour has already been mentioned. It was one of their heaviest duties. No less heavy for them was the obligation to billet (Arabic nuzūl, Turkish gonalgha)—the duty of taking into their houses the innumerable messengers, amirs, military persons, and officials, together with their staffs, and then to feed and entertain them. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, every basqag who toured a region with his staff occupied at least a hundred houses at one time. "In every neighbourhood", he says, "where a messenger decided to stay, the inhabitants were immediately subjected to constraint, since his slaves and military servants lowered themselves into neighbouring courtyards from the flat roofs, and stole whatever their eyes fell on. They shot their arrows at pigeons and chickens, and often hit children. Whatever they found that was eatable or drinkable or could be fed to their cattle, no matter to whom it belonged, they stole for themselves."² Since the messengers were arriving all the time, when one left a house, another would be billeted in it the very same day. "Every year", relates Rashīd al-Dīn, "under various pretexts messengers took away several thousand cows, bedding, cauldrons, pots and utensils belonging to the inhabitants. They stabled saddle animals and beasts of burden in the gardens, and in one day would ruin a garden which was the product of ten years' work and a thousand difficulties overcome."³ Ghazan abolished the right to billet in the houses of the ra'iyyat and ordered the construction of special government hostelries. But already by the time of the Il-Khân Abū Sa'id the obligation to billet had appeared yet again. We can ascertain this from the fact that the reason for the uprising of the Sarbadārs in Khurāsān (737/1337) was the unbridled licence of a Mongol messenger who stopped for lodging at the village of Bāshṭin and demanded wine and a woman. Under Sūlṭān Uvais decrees were again issued to forbid billeting in the houses

² Ibid. p. 564.
³ Ibid. p. 460.
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of the ra‘îyyat. Of course the obligation to billet existed in Iran before the Mongol conquest, but never before did it assume such proportions of national disaster as it did under the Mongols, according to Rashid al-Din, when many of the ra‘îyyat deliberately kept their houses in a delapidated condition, which however did not always help.

The carriage duty (Turkish ulagh)—the obligation of the ra‘îyyat to provide animals for riding and carrying on the postal service (barîd, Turkish yam)—was already in existence at the time of the caliphate. But only in the Mongol period do the sources describe it as a national calamity.

"It is impossible to calculate", says Rashid al-Din, "how many asses the ulagh took each year from the ra‘îyyat, the merchants, and others, and how many thousands of ra‘îyyat had their heads, arms, and legs broken by the messengers. The ra‘îyyat were all the time wandering about in search of their animals, taken from them for government transport, and did not know what to do. Some of their animals had been driven away for good, and were not returned. Others were left by the roadside to die; and the ra‘îyyat neglected the farms and their work."

Such were in general the system of taxes and obligations and its terminology under the Îl-Khâns. We shall not dwell here upon a number of fiscal terms which are insufficiently clear. Taxes and obligations not based on Moslem law (that is, apart from the kharâj, ‘ushr, jizya, and zakât) were covered by the term takâlîf, taklıjât-i divânî. But beside these there were taxes arbitrarily fixed by local authorities, denoted in the sources by the terms shištâqat (Arabicized plural of the Mongol shîlaq, pretext (for extortion) and shanâqis (plural of Arabic shanqaša—synonym of istiqqa—"draining to the uttermost, exhausting utterly").

The system of taxes and services of the Îl-Khân state was without a doubt based on the merciless exploitation of the settled working population by both the state and the feudal leadership connected with it. The scale of feudal rent and taxation was completely out of proportion with the economic development of the country. Attempts to

1 Dastûr al-kâtib, ff. 50b, 166b-168b.
4 See Khwandamîr, Habîb al-siyar, vol. iii, pt. 4, p. 21, where there is an abridgement of the decree of Sulãn Ahmad Aq-Qoyunlu (902/1497) abolishing the taxes takalîf-i divânî and ikhrâjât-i shištâqat, by reason of their not being based on Moslem law.
5 See Râvandi, p. 507 (editor’s note on the word shangasa).
reform this system and make it less hard on the peasants and town dwellers—under Ghazan and the early Jalayirids—gave but temporary and relative periods of economic revival. In sum, this system, together with the general ruin of the period of the Mongol conquest, was the main factor in the inability of Iran to regain the level that it had reached by the beginning of the thirteenth century. High rates of feudal rent and tax were the chief causes of the popular uprisings in Iran.
CHAPTER 7

RELIGION UNDER THE MONGOLS

As we have already seen, at the time of the Mongol conquest most of Iran was Sunni; indeed, says Molé, this was “one of the most Islamized countries in the Middle and Near East”.1 Small Zoroastrian minorities existed in one or two centres, but played only a secondary role in the country’s religious life. There were also Jews and Christians, but the latter were far less numerous than in the Arabic-speaking countries of Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. A summary of the distribution of the various Muslim schools and sects in Iranian territory has been given above, pp. 283–302.

The Mongol invasion of Persia, which began in 1220, together with the subsequent fall of the Baghdad caliphate (1258) and the killing of the last ‘Abbāsid caliph, al-Musta‘ṣim bi’llah, brought the entire Muslim world and especially Persia face to face with unexpected and formidable problems. For the first time in the history of Islam a great part of the Muslim world found itself under the rule of a non-Muslim power—and not only non-Muslim, but one which, to begin with, was in general anti-Muslim. At the same time, however, when the Mongols destroyed the external and political power of the reformed Ismā‘īlism of Alamūt, they thus saved orthodox Islam from the continual menace which it represented. And their destruction of the Sunni caliphate in Baghdad meant that for the first time Sunnism was deprived of every semblance of political authority, and this could only be an advantage for Shi‘ism. The presence of a Shi‘t theologian, and one of the greatest of the time, among Hülegü’s advisers was, to say the least, significant.

There has been a tendency to exaggerate the unimportance of the decadent Sunni caliphate under the last ‘Abbāsids. In reality, it was precisely the decline of the caliphs’ political power that led them to accentuate certain more specifically “religious” aspects (in the Western sense) of this institution. For example, when they were trying to dissuade Hülegü from attacking the capital, the caliph’s ambassadors said to him: “If the caliph is killed, the whole world will be disorganized, the Sun will hide his face, the rain will cease to fall and the plants

will no longer grow.” This is the typical notion of the “sacred monarch” to be found in many Asiatic traditions, and it is significant that the Mongols themselves, who in some respects had similar ideas concerning the sanctity of sovereignty, seem to have believed the ambassadors up to a certain point. In fact, when Musta’sim was taken prisoner by Hulegu’s hordes, some of the Sunnis who were with the Mongols said that “if Hulegu spills the blood of the caliph on the ground, he and his infidel Mongols will be swallowed up by the earth. He must not be killed. ... The accursed Hulegu feared that if he let the caliph live, the Muslims would rise in revolt, and that if he slew him with a sword and his blood was spilled on the ground, there would be an earthquake.” He therefore had him killed by the well-known method, without any shedding of blood. Contemporary sources are full of interesting references to this sacred aspect of the caliph; even Hulegu’s court astrologer, Husam al-Din, had predicted six disasters if Baghdad were to be attacked. Fortunately for Hulegu his Shi’i adviser Nasir al-Din Tusi was able to show that Husam al-Din’s astrological deductions were wrong. That the Shi’is were not very grieved by the fall of the Abbasid caliphate is evident in practically all the sources, even if one disregards the “treachery” of the last Abbasid’s Shi’i minister, Ibn al-Alqami (d. 656/1258), and the presence in Hulegu’s retinue of Nasir al-Din Tusi. Certain hadiths had been circulating for some time, which might well have persuaded the Shi’is to collaborate with Hulegu: according to one, for example, the “Turks” would help the Mahdi or the Qa’im to achieve victory; and there were other similar stories. It is known that while Hulegu was preparing to lay siege to Baghdad, several Shi’i communities surrendered to him, and a rumour also spread that, under the influence of Nasir al-Din Tusi, he had become a Muslim.

On the other hand, the fall of the caliphate had a disastrous effect on the Sunnis, and all the Sunni historians speak of it as if it were a cosmic catastrophe, while poets wrote elegies on the death of al-Musta’sim, on that occasion Sa’di, the great Persian poet, composed two qaṣidas, one in Arabic and the other in Persian. But while the psychological effects on the Sunnis are evident, the theological consequences

3 See above, p. 346.
4 Qazvini, Kitab al-naqd, pp. 510-11.
are less clear. The true caliphate, which combined the spiritual with
the temporal power, had long since ceased to exist. Despite the fact
that princes even in distant lands like India had theoretically to be
invested by the Caliph of Baghdad, it is no exaggeration to say that his
effective authority during the decadence of the ‘Abbasid dynasty was
spiritual rather than temporal. The comparison between the pope and
the caliph is not a recent European invention, but can be found for the
first time in the diary of the Shafi’i qadi Jamal al-Din Muhammad b.
Sälim of Hämä, in Syria, who in 1260, that is shortly after the fall of
Baghdad, visited Italy and went to the court of King Manfred, son of
Frederick II, as envoy of the Mamlük Sultan Baibars. Here he speaks
of the pope, as “the Caliph of the Franks”. This is interesting, because
it was Baibars who in 1261 with great pomp installed an uncle of the
dead al-Musta’sim as “Caliph”, conferring upon him functions which
were somewhat “spiritual” and nominal. Ignoring the realities of the
situation, Sunni writers of treatises continued to repeat the old notion
of a caliphate pure and simple, even at a time when it had become a
fairy tale or had disappeared altogether. The more intelligent among
them, such as Ibn Khaldûn in the fourteenth century, admitted that
after the disappearance of Arab dominion nothing was left of the
caliphate but the name;¹ while al-Nasafi (d. 537/1142) and Ibrâhîm
Halabi (d. 1549) maintained that the real caliphate had lasted only thirty
years, until the death of ‘Ali. It is therefore not surprising that the
theological effects of the fall of the Baghdad caliphate were very slight.

The Mongol invasion, then, strengthened the non-Muslim communi-
ties in Persia. Chingiz-Khân and Ögedei were shamanists who had no
desire to be converted to any other religion, though Chingiz-Khân was
interested in other creeds and made inquiries, both directly and
indirectly, about the usages and customs of foreign religious com-
panies. Gûyükl had strong leanings towards Christianity, even if he
actually remained a shamanist. Möngke seems to have been somewhat
indifferent to religious matters, but as soon as Qubilai embraced the
Buddhist faith and his brother Hûlégü also showed leanings towards
that religion (in fact it is almost certain that the latter became a Bud-
dhist), shamanism lost all its official significance. This did not happen,
however, with the traditional religious customs of the Mongols.
Sorcerers were still numerous and respected, and Abaqa greeted with
joy a magician (sâhir) named Baraq, who visited him in 1278.² The

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figure of the shaman in the religious world of the Mongols in Iran disappeared more or less definitely during the reign of Arghun (1284–91), when Buddhism was being practised more thoroughly and conscientiously. But the real nature of Buddhism in Il-Khānid Iran and its influence on the Muslims of that country is an unsolved, and perhaps insoluble, problem, chiefly because of the lack of reliable sources. (In contrast, we know that the Mongols had a considerable influence on the Persian language.) Iran must have been full of Buddhist temples—we hear of them only when they were destroyed in 1295–6—and in these temples there must have been numerous priests. Buddhism was particularly strong under Arghun, who even caused Buddhist priests to be brought from India, and is said to have died as a result of treatment prescribed for him by an unidentified “Indian yogi”. (For contacts between Sūfis and Buddhist priests, see below, pp. 545–6.) Nestorian Christianity was also widespread, especially among the women of the Il-Khāns’ family; Möngke’s mother, several of his wives, and Hūlegū’s wife were all Christians, as were many other women (including, of course, Abaqa’s wife Maria, known as Despoina Khatun, who was an illegitimate daughter of the Byzantine Emperor Michael VIII). These women often had their children baptized, and at least two Il-Khāns, Aḥmad Tegāder and Öljëtū, were Christians in their childhood. As regards the Jews, their position was considerably strengthened by the success of individual Jews in obtaining court appointments, a notable case being the physician and minister of Arghun, Sa’d al-Daula, who was a mortal enemy of the Muslims and favoured his fellow-Jews in every possible way by using his influence over the sovereign. But even royal favour was not enough to save him from popular fury, and he was executed in 1291. According to Vaṣṣāf (d. first half of fourteenth century), Sa’d al-Daula tried to gain the favour of the Il-Khān by declaring that Chingiz-Khān was a prophet, that the gift of prophecy was hereditary, and that Arghun should follow in the footsteps of the prophet Muḥammad and found a new umma (religious nation), which would be universal and would turn the Ka’ba into a pagoda! Another important figure of the Il-Khānid period is also said to have been a Jew, at all events by origin. This was Raṣḥid al-Dīn, a physician and a famous historian of the Ghazan period; he too was killed, in 1318, but his death did not completely put an end to the influence of Jews at the Il-Khānid court.

The 16th of June 1295 (1 Sha’bān 694) was a very important day in the
history of religion in Il-Khanid Persia, for on that day, a few months before his accession to the throne, Prince Ghazan was converted to Islam and assumed the Muslim name of Mahmūd, at Firūzkūh in the presence of Shaikh Sadr al-Dīn Ibrāhīm al-Ḥamawi. It is true that the Il-Khan Tegüder (d. 1284) had previously been converted to Islam and had taken the name of Āḥmad, but this was purely a personal matter and had no sequel. Ghazan, on the other hand, made the whole of his court and large numbers of the Mongols in Iran become Muslims. Thus, after a lapse of some seventy years, Islam again became the official religion of Iran; moreover Ghazan started a veritable persecution of Buddhists and other believers. Of particular interest is the following passage from the Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh:

When the Lord of Islam, Ghazan, became a Muslim, he commanded that all the idols should be broken and all the pagodas (but-khāna) and (ātāsh-kāda) destroyed, together with all the other temples the presence of which in Muslim countries is forbidden by the sharīʿa, and that all the community (jamāʿat) of the idolatrous bakhshi [a Turkish word derived from the Chinese po-shih “teacher”] should be converted [forcibly] to Islam. But since the Most High God did not aid them, they had no true faith, but were Muslims only outwardly and by necessity, and in their district (nābiyya) there were signs of unbelief (kufr) and of aberration (dalālat). After a certain time the King of Islam perceived their hypocrisy and said to them: “Let those among you who wish it return to India, to Kashmir, to Tibet, and to the countries whence they came; and let those who remain here cease to be hypocrites, and let them believe in that which they have in their hearts and cease from defiling with their hypocrisy the true religion of Islam. And if it should come to my ears that they are building fire-temples or pagodas, I will without hesitation put them to the sword.” But some persevered in their hypocrisy, while others again returned to their wicked beliefs. And Ghazan said: “My father was an idolater and died an idolater and built for himself a temple which he made vagy for that community [of the bakhshi]. That temple I have destroyed; go ye there and live on alms [among those ruins].”

It would seem that this “temple of Arghun”, like other temples, contained portraits of the deceased sovereign, which the women of his family tried in vain to save from the iconoclastic zeal of the neophyte Ghazan.

Besides destroying the temples of the idolaters, Ghazan also embarked on an active cultural policy in support of Islam. According to the sources he was a frequent visitor of the mosques, arranged for public readings of the Qurʿān, had a particular reverence for the Shiʿi

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holy places in Mesopotamia, built mosques in every village, and founded numerous religious institutions for the poor in the larger towns and also in Mecca. He seems to have devoted particular care to the building of dār al-siyādas, which were kinds of hostels in which the descendants of the Prophet (ṣayyids) were accommodated free of charge. Among the holy foundations he created, Rashīd al-Dīn even mentions a kind of shed in which birds could find shelter and food during the winter months, and in this Ghazan may have been influenced by similar Hindu and Buddhist practices.

In his definite leaning towards Shi‘ism Ghazan visited the Shi‘i sanctuaries in Mesopotamia, and it would seem that he even had coins struck bearing inscriptions of the Shi‘i type. His brother and successor Oljeitu went still further. Originally a Christian, he subsequently became a Buddhist and eventually a Muslim. But even after embracing the Muslim religion he still seemed uncertain, since he was first a Ḥanāfī, then a Shāfī‘i, until, disgusted with the sectarian squabbles among the various Sunnī schools, and influenced by Tāj al-Dīn Avajī of Mashhad and by Jamāl al-Dīn Muṭahhir, Oljeitu finally went over to Shi‘ism, despite the efforts to win him back to Buddhism made by the bakhsis who had remained in Iran. His son and successor Abū Ša‘īd, however, was a Sunnī. This in itself is sufficient to show that these conversions must be ascribed mainly to the activities of preachers and propagandists of the various sects in court circles. For example, it is not clear whether Oljeitu’s Shi‘i tendencies brought about any spread of Shi‘ism among his Persian subjects, and some of the sources even tell us that before he died he was converted once again to Sunnism.

Most Persian Muslims, even during the Mongol and Il-Khānid eras, remained Sunnites. In addition to Baghdad, Iṣfahān and Shirāz were the citadels of Sunnism in Iran, and during the reign of Oljeitu, according to Ibn Baṭṭūta (fourteenth century), it was in these centres that the population and the scholars offered the most vigorous resistance to the unsuccessful attempts to convert them forcibly to Shi‘ism. Despite such sporadic attempts, however, it may be said that the traditional hostility between the two great branches of Islam became less acute after the end of the Sunnī caliphate in Baghdad and when the Il-Khānid government—unlike that of the Saljuqs—began to show more sympathy for Shi‘ism, i.e. Twelver Shi‘ism (we shall deal later with the

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1 [Ed.: Some at least of these bakhsis must have been Mongol shamans. See above, p. 402.]
extremist sects). An example of this rapprochement is the *Aurâd al-
akhbâb wa fîsâkîs al-âdâb*, a mystical book of devotions written in 723/
1323 by the Sûfî Sunnite Abû'l-Mafâkhîr Yaḥyâ Bâkharzî, which
contains prayers handed down by Shi'î imams whose names are each
followed by the formula *radîya ilâhu 'anhu*, "May God be pleased with
him". On the Shi'î side, too, a more conciliatory attitude became
perceptible. The great theologian and mystic Şadr al-Dîn İbrahim
(644/1246–722/1322), who influenced Ghazan to become a Muslim,
was, like his father, a Sunnî, but nevertheless he studied under Naṣîr
al-Dîn Tûsî and other learned Shi'îs, and there are many pro-Shi'î
features in his work, *Farâ'id al-sim'tâin fî mânaqib al-rasûl wa 'l-batîl
wa 'l-murtâdâ wa 'l-sîyâsâ*. A proof of the interest Ghazan himself took
in the "family of the Prophet" are the numerous hostels he founded,
these being rather like *vaqfs* endowed with funds in order to help the
*sayyîds* in the various districts. In some cases people sought refuge in
Shi'îsm because they were disgusted with the squabble among the
different Sunnî schools, and especially, as regards Iran, between
Shafî’ites and the Hanaﬁtes. Typical of these was the quarrel at Öljæitur's
court between some Hanaﬁ scholars and the Shâfi’i qâdi Nizâm al-Dîn
'Abd al-Malik of Marâqeh, which became so violent that "the Mongol
amîr Qutlugh-Shâh turned to the other amîr and said: 'Why have we
abandoned the *Yasa* of Chingiz-Khân and the religion of our fore-
fathers and accepted this religion of the Arabs, which is divided into
so many sects?'" It would seem that this episode was one of the
reasons why Öljæitur embraced Shi'îsm.

But it was during the Mongol and Il-Khânid period that Twelver
Shi'î theology became stabilized in forms which were to become
canonical, and, though subjected to modifications, were never sup-
planted. The two leading representatives of Shi'î thinking at this time
were Naṣîr al-Dîn Tûsî (d. 672/1274) and his disciple 'Allâma Hillî
(d. 726/1326). Of the former, who was an astronomer, philosopher,
jurist, and a theologian of encyclopaedic knowledge, it is difficult to
give a concise description, and here we will only add that he was one
of the founders of Imamite theology and that his innumerable works
have been the subject of many commentaries. The second man, like
his uncle Muḥaqqiq Hillî (d. 676/1277), was a theologian and jurist
rather than a philosopher, and his treatises form the basis of all subse-
quent Shi'î canonical law.

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1  Hâfîz-i Abrû, pp. 50–1 n.
The trend towards Shi'ism in many circles was due above all to mysticism, which at this time revealed many interesting Shi'i features.

At the time of the Mongol invasion two tariqas had a predominant influence in Iran: the Kubraviyya in the East and the Suhravardiyya in the West. A characteristic of the Şüfism of this period is its deeper study of the philosophical and theoretical aspect of doctrine, this being partly due to the influence of Ibn 'Arabi, whose disciples in the East included Sadr al-Din Muḥammad b. Ishāq Qonavi (d. 673/1274), author of Fūkūk, Miftāḥ al-ghaib, and Naṣḥāt-i Ilāhiyya, and Qonavi's disciple the well-known Persian poet Irāqī (d. 688/1289), who wrote the famous Lāmāʿāt annotated by Jāmī. Ecstatic Şüfism was gradually being transformed into 'Irfān ('gnosis) and penetrating more and more into Persian lyric poetry, nearly all of which at this time was strongly influenced by Şüfism. But parallel with this esoteric level ran the "practical" form of Şüfism, whose leading exponents were Farīd al-Dīn Āṭār (who is said to have been killed by the Mongols in 618/1221 at a very advanced age) and later Jalāl al-Dīn of Balkh (d. at Qonya in 672/1273), founder of the famous tariqa called the maulaviyya, in which particular importance was attached to mystic dancing. The Maṭnawi-i Ma'navī and the Diwān-i Shams-i Tabrīz by Mālānā Jalāl al-Dīn are two of the best works produced by Persian religious genius.

In the progressive penetration of Shi'ism into Persian Şüfism, the Kubraviyya school was particularly important. Kubrā himself was the great Şūfi master of the Khwārazm, and he was killed about 618/1221 at the time of the Mongol invasion. Although a Şafi'i Sunnite, he is said to have had leanings towards Shi'ism, but his eulogies of 'Alī and of the ahl al-bait are common to all Şūfis, and they do not prove that Kubrā favoured Shi'ism more than other writers. His first-generation disciples appear to have been all Sunnis, and uncommon trends are to be found only in the works of Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥamūya, who is said to have taught that the auliya' of the Muslim community are twelve in number, and that the twelfth is the šāhib al-ğamān, who will return to bring justice to all the world: an interesting adaptation of the Şūfi doctrine of the twelve imāms. Later, in the person of the Kubravi Shaikh 'Alī al-Daula Samnānī (d. 756/1355), we meet a writer of unusual originality. Of particular interest for our study are the relations with the religious leaders at the court of Arghun, in whose service he spent some time during the Mongol period. He had a great admiration for the ascetic achievements of the bakhshis, one of whom helped him to
solve certain problems in his spiritual life, but he distrusted the monistic tendencies in the Indian religions. Nevertheless, Indian influences may perhaps have inspired his theory of the "inner" or subtle "senses" (lātīfā). In the interesting "confessions", which form part of his Ṣafwat al-ʿurwa, Samnānī clearly showed his partiality for Sunnism, but he was scandalized by the quarrels among the various juridical schools and did not adhere to any single school. Finally his soul found rest in Sunnism, but in admitting that 'Ali alone of all the caliphs achieved perfection in all three aspects of the imamate—khilāfa, varāba, and valāya—he came in many respects closer to Shi'ism than to Sunnism. We may thus conclude with Molé that "his conception of Ṣūfism and its role enabled him to construct something resembling a Sunnite Shi'ism, which, although opposed to the ravid, exalts the role of the ahl al-bait, and especially that of 'Ali". The remaining links in this chain of Kubrāvī Ṣūfism tinged with Shi'ism would take us beyond the Mongol and Īl-Khānid era. After Kubrā's Sunnī Ṣūfism, in which he acknowledged 'Ali, and after the frank and tolerant Sunnism of Samnānī, we have in the works of 'Ali Hamdānī (d. 786/1384) a vigorous Sunnism in sharī'a side by side with extreme Shi'i ideas in tariqa, followed by the openly professed Shi'ism of Nurbakhsh (d. 869/1464). The imperceptible transition from Sunnism to Shi'ism, which first appears in the Kubraviyya tariqa, exercised a great influence on Islam in Iran, and is the explanation for the acceptance of confessional Shi'ism in the Safavid era.

The Shi'i tendencies in the kubraviyya, however, were not the only instances of the curious Shi'i Ṣūfism which began in Iran at this time. Another is the Shaikhiyya-Jūriyya silsila in Khurāsān, which had considerable political importance since it was linked with the Sarbadārid movement. The Shaikhiyya of Khurāsān were followers of Shaikh Khalīfa (killed in 736/1335), who was a Māzandarānī by origin and—an interesting point—a disciple of 'Alā' al-Daula Samnānī, with whom, however, he seems to have had certain disagreements. At Sabzavār in Khurāsān Khalīfa founded a school of mysticism, which many of the inhabitants of the city joined. Sabzavār had long been a centre of Shi'ism, but we know very little about the teachings of Shaikh Khalīfa. At all events they were considered heretical by the Sunnī faqīh of the city who in vain implored the Īl-Khān Abū Sa‘īd to get rid of Khalīfa. Eventually he was secretly murdered by local Sunnites and was succeeded by one of his disciples, Hasan Jūri, who gave the movement a character which was more markedly Shi'i and
at the same time more military than it had been. The names of all the adherents were recorded in writing and they were advised “to keep themselves hidden until the day of the rising”. The movement, unlike the other tariqas, which were far more peaceful in their attitude towards the ruling powers, had all the characteristics of a social revolt (it would appear that Hasan Jūri himself was of peasant origin). After the death of the founder, Hasan Jūri found a large number of new supporters in Nishāpur, in Tūs, Khabūshān, Abīvard, and so on, who joined forces with the Sarbadārids and helped to create the curious “Shī‘i republic” of Sabzavār. The military and political vicissitudes of the Sarbadārids, however, are outside the scope of our argument, since they continued into the post-Il-Khānid period. Hasan Jūri was arrested about the year 739/1338 and died shortly afterwards.

The mixture of militarism, social reform, and Shī‘ism characteristic of the Shaikhīyya-Jūriyya tariqa is also found in the movement of the followers of Mir Qivām al-Dīn Mar‘āshī, in Māzandarān, which the sources definitely describe as a branch of the Shaikhīyya-Jūriyya tariqa, and in fact it was Hasan Jūri who granted the title of Shaikh to Qivām al-Dīn’s father, ʿĪzz al-Dīn Sūgandi. The latter died while returning from Sabzavār to Māzandarān, and his son succeeded him as head of the Māzandarānī branch of the tariqa. At Āmul, about the middle of the century, Qivām al-Dīn became the head of a mass movement and founded a miniature Shī‘i state. His confraternity, like the Shaikhīyya-Jūriyya, was definitely Shī‘ī, and the Mar‘āshī were a family of sayyid descended from ‘Alī Zain al-ʿĀbidīn.

Another group of Sūfis who first sympathized with Shī‘ism and then embraced it completely were the Ṣafavīs, who were destined to be the founders of the Ṣafavīd dynasty two centuries later, under which the whole of Persia was converted to Shī‘ism. The founder of this confraternity, Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn Ishāq of Ardabil (d. 735/1335), was a disciple of Shaikh Zāhid Gīlānī (d. 700/1301), who in turn was a disciple of Jamāl al-Dīn Jīlī (d. 651/1253), himself a follower of Najm al-Dīn Kubrā. Nevertheless Shaikh Ṣafī was undoubtedly a Sunni, and the “military” and Shī‘i trends in his brotherhood did not make their appearance until after the Mongol period.

In any case, Sūfism with a Shī‘i tinge remains the most important religious feature in Iran at this time, especially in view of later developments.

1 Ḥāfiz-i ʿAbrū, p. 474.
No description of the religious movements in Iran during the Mongol and Il-Khanid eras would be complete without some mention of the extremist movements, some of which, rightly or wrongly, were accused of “Mazdakism”; in our discussion we shall exclude the Ismāʿīlis, who are dealt with elsewhere in this volume. One such movement began during the ninth year of the reign of Ogedei (1229–41), when a “maker of sieves” named Maḥmūd appeared in the village of Tārāb, near Bukhārā, who claimed to have remarkable magical powers, in particular that of curing the sick and receiving messages from spirits concerning occult matters. These powers were rumoured to have been taught to him by his sister, for, as Juvainī says, “in Transoxiana and in Turkestan many persons, especially women, claim to have magical powers, and when anyone has a pain or falls ill, they visit him, summon the exorcist, and perform dances and similar nonsense, and in this manner convince the ignorant and the vulgar”. Maḥmūd Tārābī even managed to occupy Bukhārā with the help of the peasants and artisans, who were living in dire poverty; but according to the hostile chronicler Juvainī, his adherents also included nobles and learned Muslims. The Mongols had to despatch what was practically an expeditionary force to quell this rebellion, which, apart from its economic and social significance, throws an interesting light on popular beliefs in Iran at this time, and especially on the presence of messianic and thaumaturgical elements among the oppressed lower orders.

Somewhat sketchy and incomplete are the references found in sources such as the Jāmiʿ al-tawārikh and the Nuzhat al-qulūb, to real or pretended “Mazdakite” movements in Il-Khanid Iran. These played an important role in the conspiracy of Prince Ala-Fireng, the elder son of Geikhatu (Jumādā I 703/December 1303), who was persuaded by a “Mazdakite” sect to take over the reins of government. According to Rashid al-Dīn, the promoters of this conspiracy “passed themselves off as šaiḥīhs [mystics]”, but in reality they had subversive social ideas. The heads of the sect were the pir Yaʿqūb Bāghbānī, a šaiḥīh named Ḥabīb, who had once been khalīfa (deputy) to Shaikh Raṣḥīd Bulḡārī, a sayyīd named Kamāl al-Dīn, and various others. Under a veil of mysticism, coupled with stories of miracles, and of the apparitions of angels, prophets, and saints, there lay concealed, says Raṣḥīd al Dīn, the ancient “way of thinking of Mazdak”. Ideas of this kind were

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2 Transl. Arends, p. 203.
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widespread among the populace, though many influential personages were also said to be members of the sect, some of them from the entourage of the notorious finance minister Ṣadr al-Dīn, who was responsible for the introduction of paper money into Persia. The minister himself was said to have been a disciple of Shaikh Raḥīd Bulghārī, mentioned above. In any case the conspiracy was discovered and its religious leaders were executed. But these followers of Yaʿqūb Bāghbānī were not the only "Mazdakites" in Iran during those days.

In his *Nuzhat al-qulūb*, a geographical treatise written in 1340, Mustaufī Qazvīnī gives a description of the province of Rūdbār in Māzandarān, not far from the Ismāʿīli fortress of Alamūt, and after telling us that the inhabitants were Bāṭūnīs (Ismāʿīlis), he adds that there also existed a group of people calling themselves *Marāghīyyān*, who were believed to be "Mazdakites". If Schwarz's unconvincing hypothesis is correct, the word *Marāghīyyān* means "men of Marāgheh", and thus they would be the last remnants of the descendants of the followers of Pāpak, who had fled from Āzarbāijān after the collapse of the Khurramīte movement. A more probable explanation is that, by calling them "Mazdakites", the sources wished to stress certain extremist social tendencies, real or imaginary, in the ideas professed by these interesting sects, about whose real religious theories we know very little.

In the history of religion in Iran, the Mongol period is important for a number of reasons. First, it saw a strengthening of Shiʿism as a consequence of the fall of the 'Abbāsid caliphate, and this was accompanied by a proportionate mitigation of the Shiʿi–Sunni dispute, the appearance within Šūfism of trends towards Shiʿism, and a leaning towards a certain *tashayyuʿ hasan* ("moderate" Shiʿism) in Sunni circles. In addition, certain Šāfī and Shiʿi movements of a military kind were formed, which were the forerunners of the Šāfavid movement, while pseudo-Mazdakite eschatological and social movements occurred sporadically. And finally, Šūfism made particularly noteworthy progress, especially in its doctrinal tendencies.
This chapter touches on the era of the “Great Saljuqs” only in its last phase, that is, towards the end of the reign of Sulṭān Sanjar (d. 552/1158), a monarch who was then decadent though he was later idealized. The Saljuqs are a remarkable phenomenon, and we should therefore cast at least a cursory glance back to the period of their real greatness; for this wholly Turkish dynasty, holding sway over an immense area, played a very considerable part in the expansion of the Persian literary language and of Persian culture in general. That the principal Saljuq rulers themselves showed a lack of culture was no obstacle to this, mainly because their internal policy was in the hands of Iranian counsellors and trusted advisers, without whose help these barbarian warriors could scarcely have held their own in such a highly cultivated milieu. Moreover the example set by the policy of Sulṭān Mahmūd of Ghazna had a lasting effect: the Saljuq court teemed with Iranian scholars and Iranian writers. The official language was Persian, and in it was conducted the official correspondence of the court, in contrast to the practice under Mahmūd. This is one side of the picture. On the other, the waves of Turkish expansion were hastening the influence of that language in certain areas, with Turkish idioms even beginning to approach the position of the literary language.

Whereas the expansion of the Saljuqs was to the west, embracing Syria, Asia Minor, and the Caucasus, the ousted Ghaznavids strove to establish a firm footing in Multān, the Punjab, and Sind, at the same time extending the sway of the Persian language and Persian literature in the upper social strata of their remaining Indian possessions. Similarly the courts of the Khwārazm-Shāhs (1077–1231) and the Ghūrids (1100–1206) were unable to dispense with Persian culture, though its vitality—measured by the number and importance of their poets and other writers at this time—was certainly not comparable to that in neighbouring territories to the west. The same is true of the Qara-Khitai.

Thus from the cultural point of view the Saljuq era does represent
one of the high-water marks of Iranian history and civilization. This
cultural expansion is reflected in the development of the towns, in the
founding of remarkable schools (*Nizāmiyya*), not only in Baghdad but
also in other important centres; in the transference of the admini-
strative machine from the hands of the old aristocratic families to those
of a new middle-class intelligentsia; and also, as Bausani suggests, in
the imponderable, if not always noticeable, influence of Ismā'īlism.
What novel and unprecedented developments might have taken place,
had not the disastrous Mongol cataclysm occurred!1

Poetry also flourished during the period of the decline and fall of
Saljuq rule, but the forms perfected by the old masters were already
dying out and poetry was developing in an entirely new direction.
Sanāʾī had pointed to such new ways during the first half of the sixth/
twelfth century. The panegyric ode (*qasida*) reached its greatest heights
in the works of Anvari and Khāqānī, because both these outstanding
poets realized that the old paths could no longer be trodden and that
the crisis would have to be resolved. Searching for fresh ideas and
imagery, they saw a way out in the combination of poetic experience
with erudition and refined rhetoric, in which—and this cannot be over-
emphasized—genuine poetry did not in any way suffer. This was the
case with the great poets at least; with the lesser, however, virtuosity
of technique tended to take the place of ideas. Their verses are more
suited to private reading, for in public recitation their deeper significance
and refinement would vanish without a trace, as would all likelihood of
any brilliant effect. The tradition of recitation was already dying out by the
end of the Saljuq period. All this, together with increasing Arabiciza-
tion, led in poetry to the "'Iraqi" style and in prose to artificiality.

From the social point of view the poets no longer stood on so high
a pedestal as they had done previously. They faced each new day with
fear, for the vast Saljuq empire was gradually disintegrating into states
of varying sizes. Jealous of one another and easily bought for money,
the poets were not treated with any great tenderness by the rulers, and
thus it is common to find them languishing in prison or wandering
from one court to another. They were compelled by the search for daily
bread and their own prodigality to hunt for material rewards, and this in
turn made begging, which even the most famous amongst them con-
donned, the most effective means of support for their poetic activity. Their
distress was heightened by the universal sense of insecurity and the con-

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1 *Persiani*, p. 139.

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stant threat of invasion. Lamentations and vindictive or scornful verses provide a good barometer for measuring prevalent social conditions.

This alone was enough to cause the qaṣida to lose its formerly privileged position. Additional factors were a growth in the power of the towns, guilds, and bazaars, and an increasing antagonism to feudal overlords on the part of their tenants. This development found its expression in the increasing popularity of both the ghazal and the quatrain from the second half of the sixth/twelfth century on, with the ghazal gradually taking pride of place. The chaste language of these and other similar forms, compared with the exaggerated bombast of the qaṣidas, was a natural outcome of this change. The origin of the ghazal is sometimes traced back to the old independent song, and sometimes to the detachment of the purely lyrical exordia in the qaṣidas and their division into smaller units, singing being an essential feature in both cases. The poets took refuge in these forms when eulogistic verse could no longer provide sure hope of success. Sūfism, particularly widespread in the non-feudal layers of society, adopted the ghazal and the quatrain for its own ends. The strength of this movement grew in proportion to the economic and social distress of the empire, but was not confined only to certain well-defined social strata. Although it embraced more or less all poetry, it would be mistaken to assume that only with Sūfism did poetry exist at all. Nevertheless Shibli Nu‘mānī is convinced that a ghazal untouched by Sūfism is a rose without a scent. It is interesting to note that a definite nom de plume in the last line of a ghazal occurs a hundred years earlier in Sūfī writings than in non-Sūfī ghazals (sixth/twelfth century). Bertel’s thinks that the earliest Sūfī poets imitated the artisans with whom they were closely connected, whose practice it was to mark their products with their names, while Bausani and with him Ateş see in the nom de plume the poet’s own emotional self-exhortation. The artisans and their circles formed a secret society, the Futuwwa or “young men’s association,” closely linked to Sūfism. A link between the Futuwwa and the Akhis, a secret brotherhood existing in Asia Minor and Transcaucasia, is very probable.

There is another poetic form that came strongly to the fore in the late Saljuq period. This was not the heroic epic, whose inappropriate subject matter and antiquated language did not permit it to continue into this period; it was the romantic epic. After ‘Unṣuri (and countless other

2 Cf. Dějiny perské a tětžeské literatury, p. 84.
3 Franz Taeschner in a letter: “As far as I can make out, the Futuwwa and the Akhī brotherhood are indistinguishable.”
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Mathnavī writers), this form was to reach such perfection in the hands of Niẓāmī (d. 605/1209) that he in turn became the model for all Iranian poets in subsequent centuries. The romantic tale, indeed even an early type of romantic epic, is known to have already existed in Middle Persian literature. It should not surprise us that something so profoundly characteristic of Persia reappeared quite naturally in Islamic-Iranian culture, a fact which is confirmed by the Vis u Rāmīn (an Iranian counterpart of the medieval European Tristan and Isolde epics), which existed in Pahlavi, probably in a Pāzand or Pārsī version, at least as a tale and, in the earliest New Persian period, as an epic. Rūdakī (d. 329/940) also helped to keep the romantic tradition alive. A closer examination of this development reveals moreover that very many lines in mathnāvis must have been taken from romantic epics.\(^1\) We know the titles of two such epics by ‘Unṣurī (d. 431/1039), and a considerable portion of a third (Vāmīq u ‘Adhra) has recently been discovered in India by Muḥammad Shaft. Three survive in their entirety: ‘Ayyūqi’s Varga u Gulsāh (early fifth/eleventh century), the Vis u Rāmīn of Fakhra al-Dīn Gurgānī (d. after 448/1039), and the Yūsuf u Zalīkhā of Amānī, written after 476/1083. The production of romantic epics cannot have ceased all of a sudden, although no titles, let alone actual texts, survive. The fact that so many echoes of Vis u Rāmīn are discernible in Niẓāmī suggests that he was indebted to the works of his predecessors, and these must therefore still have been extant. The preference for the didactic, ethical or Šūfī epic undoubtedly sprang from the immorality and depression of the period; Sanāʾī was to become one of its greatest exponents.

The weakening of Saljuq power led to the disintegration of the empire. Amongst the principalities which arose during the second half of the sixth/twelfth century, that of the Khwarazm-Shāhs became increasingly powerful, since, apart from the personal energy of these rulers, the territory possessed numerous geographical and political advantages. The Khwarazm-Shāhs were well on the way to restoring the Saljuq empire to the size it had enjoyed at its zenith, but there was to be a reversal whose effects on the whole Iranian world were truly tragic. The catastrophe came from the East.

The fact that a clash occurred between the Khwarazm-Shāh and

\(^1\) It is the merit of Mahjūb in his Mathnavī-Saʿā'i to have clarified our ideas about the early history of the mathnavī in New Persian down to the fifth/eleventh century. On a manuscript of the Humāi-Nāma prior to A.D. 1200 see A. J. Arberry, “An early Persian epic”, Mélanges Masse (Tehran. 1963), pp. 11-16.
Chingiz-Khān is insufficiently explained by the arrogant behaviour of the sultan: that would be too superficial a reason to account for events which were of the greatest historical importance. The clash became inevitable once Chingiz-Khān had unified Mongolia and consolidated its fighting power; indeed, since he depended on a feudalized nomadic aristocracy, he had to subordinate his policies to its requirements. The power of the Khwārazm-Shāhs, on the other hand, as the spies of Chingiz-Khān soon found out, was by no means as solid as its expansion implied. The outcome of the struggle was thus already decided in advance. The Mongol invasion took place in two waves, beginning in 1219 under Chingiz-Khān himself, and continuing under the leadership of the first Il-Khān Hūlegū, who in 1256 broke the power of the Assassins and in 1258 destroyed Baghdad and the caliphate.¹ Neither phase of the invasion touched the southern half of Iran; but the northern districts, including Khwārazm and Transoxiana, were struck with indescribable brutality. The invasion of course embraced a much vaster area, but here we are concerned only with the Mongol conquests in Iran and her neighbouring territories. The eastern Islamic areas in particular suffered greatly from this terror. The ruthless invaders massacred wholesale, destroying everything so as to instil fear and prevent counter-attack from behind. Indeed this catastrophe is one of the causes of Iran’s subsequent backwardness. Not only the political but also the cultural development of the country was brought almost to a halt for many years to come, even though it cannot be denied that the concentration of such immense areas in the hands of the conquerors brought with it certain economic advantages.

Under Hūlegū (654–63/1256–65), the bounds of the Il-Khānid empire had been more or less definitely established. It was to become “an essentially Iranian state which for the first time for many years incorporated the greater part of the Iranian people. The importance this had for the development of Persian civilization and for the continuation of Iranian culture is not to be under-estimated.”² Although the Il-Khāns (654–736/1256–1336) strove to make good the brutality of the conquerors, they were nevertheless foreigners in Iran. A shattered economic system—these nomadic shepherds finding themselves in countries where feudalism was flourishing—was to remain with them until the end of the seventh/thirteenth century, when Ghazan

¹ See Boyle, “The Death of the Last ‘Abbāsid Caliph”.
² Spuler, Die Mongolen, p. 59
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(694–703/1295–1304) attempted to carry out reforms: much too late, however, to preserve the power of the dynasty from its imminent dissolution. Nor could the conversion to Islam of the last rulers and the Mongol regiments help to avert this.

To the handfuls of survivors in the smouldering ruins, art could be of little consequence. Writers and scholars fled to take refuge in places less sorely smitten. That part of their cultural heritage which they could not take with them was doomed to destruction. Only the archives of the Assassins reached the hands of the historians after the destruction of the stronghold at Alamūt. The culture of the north-eastern provinces shifted to those of the south-west and elsewhere. This is why Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī was to appear in Saljuq Qonya, Sa’dı in Shīrāz, Amīr Khusrau and ‘Irāqi in India. When, under Hülegū, Tabrīz was raised to the position of capital city, political and intellectual life moved away to this particular region, and Āzarbāijān remained the heart of the empire for eighty years. The ‘Irāqi style becomes predominant at this time, and the first signs of the Indian style begin to appear. If the old qaṣīda lost its former eminence, this was for the reasons usually given, namely, that there were no great Iranians left, and that, to begin with, the Mongols could not understand Persian. At all events the ʿIl-Khāns themselves produced not a single poet or prose writer, and their courts displayed not the slightest interest in poetry. Moreover under the Mongols there was a new growth of towns, for which the panegyric ode had no appeal. The ghazal and the maṭḥnāvī were the forms in which their interests could be expressed.

The distress of the towns was by no means slight; disturbances and oppressions continued, encouraging the retreat into Sūfīsm. This suffering expressed itself in the mystical and didactic qaṣīda (as opposed to the purely panegyric odes), and even more in the short ghazal, which reached its greatest perfection in the hands first of Saʿdı and later of Ḥāfīz. The long mystical poem reached its culmination in these years (ʿAttār, Maulāvī); versified teachings of the Sūfī system now made their appearance; and the influence of Sūfism became altogether more evident. These phenomena clearly demonstrate an attempt to escape from a horrible reality. The ʿIl-Khāns showed interest in

1 [Ed. With the possible exception of Abū Saʿıd. See above, p. 413.]
2 Pūr-i Bahā’s “combination of encomium with blame” admirably fits the times. On the introduction of Turco-Mongol expressions into the qaṣīda, cf. Minorsky, “Pūr-i Bahā’s ‘Mongol’ Ode” and Kubičková, “La qasīda à l’honneur de Waḡihuddīn Zangī”.

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learning only in so far as they were able to appreciate it. Hülegü founded an observatory, entrusting it to his favourite and counsellor Našır al-Din Ṭusí (597-672/1200-74). Since the reason for its erection lay not in any interest in science but solely in astrological superstition, the fact that the Persian scholars used it for genuine astronomical research deserves all the more credit. Another subject which flourished during this period, reaching unprecedented heights, was historiography, for Chingiz-Khan and the Il-Khāns were intent on immortalizing their deeds and the fame of the Mongols. The Mongols slaughtered far too much of the population of Persia and destroyed too much of its economic structure and cultural heritage, for the catastrophe they had caused not to leave permanent scars. In this account the poets, the real essence of New Persian literature, take up the first and by far the largest portion of our interest, while the second, much smaller portion deals with the prose writers. The poets themselves will be examined in chronological order, less as individuals than as members of groups which emerge quite naturally. The importance of mysticism will make it necessary to devote a special section to its main representatives. Since panegyric poetry had been all-important until the Mongol period (its chief mode being the qaṣīda), it forms a magnificent gateway through which to enter upon a detailed study of New Persian literature. Nevertheless, special circumstances require that an exception be made at the start.

SANĀ‘Ī

Sanā‘ī is a poet on whom little research has been done.¹ Only the last phase of his life and work comes within the scope of this study, and both are unfortunately hidden in great obscurity. The dates variously given for his death are as much as seventy years apart (520-90/1126-94), and the discrepancy between the dates for his last poem is eleven years (524-35/1129-41). More important is the question: can he be regarded as an adherent of taṣawwuf or not? In their appreciation of him, West and East diverge greatly. Nonetheless the significance and lasting influence of Sanā‘ī as a poet were so great that it would be impossible to omit him from this survey.

Hakim (“the scholar”) Abu‘l-Majd Majdūd b. Ādam Sanā‘ī was born

¹ Y. E. Bertel’s, Istoriya, pp. 402-55, is the only authority to have based his account on a thorough examination of the poet’s work.
about 473/1080–81 in Ghazna, where he spent his youth. He had already begun to write poetry during the rule of the Ghaznavid Abū Sa‘īd Mas‘ūd (492–508/1099–1115), but was not to remain a writer of panegyrics for long. A profound psychological upheaval made him turn to the opposite extreme. Legend attributes this to a quarrel picked with him by a madman, who accused him of the rankest heresy for his praise of rulers. This horrible experience—which was probably what led him later to undertake a pilgrimage to the holy places of Islam—occurred around 1105 during his sojourn at Balkh, where he wrote the satirical poem, Kār-Nāma-i Balkh, “The Book of the Deeds of Balkh”. His life after his return to Balkh was interrupted by journeys to Khurāsān and Khwārazm, until he reappeared at his birthplace around 518/1124–25. But not even the entreaties of Bahram-Shāh (510–52/1117–57) could induce him to return to the court. Nevertheless it was to Bahram-Shāh that he dedicated his last and most celebrated work, the mathnāvi Ḥadīqat al-haqīqa (“The Garden of Truth”), and because of this he was accused of an heretical desire for innovation and had to beg for an edict of purification from Baghdad. He was then already seriously ill, and died immediately after the completion of the poem.

The complications do not end here, however. Whereas Persian scholars are at pains to present Shi‘ism as the poet’s creed, Sana‘ī’s qaṣida on Abū Ḥanīfa points instead to Sunnism, even though the tenor of his utterances regarding the family of the Prophet is clearly sympathetic. Tradition insists that he was a disciple of Shaikh Yusuf Hamadānī, and European orientalists, too, accept his taṣawwuf, and even see him as one of the most typical of the mystic poets. This is contrary to the most recent view, that of Y. E. Bertel’s, who concedes at most a small degree of mysticism, while emphasizing all the more Sana‘ī’s critical, didactic, and ascetic (though not Śūfī) tendencies.

Even when items of doubtful authorship are excluded, Sana‘ī’s works consist of a whole series of mathnāvis and an extensive divān. The shorter mathnāvis are generally grouped among the so-called “Six of Sana‘ī”, the best-known being the Sair al-‘ibād ila ‘l-ma‘ād (“The Pilgrimage of the Servants of God to the Place of the Return”), a poem the theme of which is in some ways reminiscent of Dante’s Divine Comedy, especially the Inferno. Moreover this theme had already occurred in the Middle Persian Artāk Virāz Nāmak (“The Book of Artak Viraz”), and in Avicenna’s, that is Ibn Tufail’s Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān.
"The Garden of Truth" (sometimes also called the Ilāḥī-Nāma, "The Divine Book") overshadows all Sanā‘ī’s mathnavis—both in length (according to its author it has 10,000 lines, but 12,000 would be more correct); and also in importance, not only for its own sake, but for the further development of this type of mathnavī, as it is the first to be so long and to contain parables. Sanā‘ī began his magnum opus in 524/1129-30 and finished it eleven years later at the age of 60, immediately before his death. The Ḥadiqa consists of ten chapters, each with a different title, arranged in different orders in different manuscripts; the content of the chapters is heterogeneous.

Most orientalists regard the Ḥadiqa as an “encyclopaedia of Ṣūfism”, whereas Bertel’s prefers the description “encyclopaedia of all Sanā‘ī’s accumulated knowledge”. He reminds us that the poet frequently speaks of asceticism but never of spiritual discipline (tarīqa), and that he never mentions the “way of the Ṣūfis” by name. Bertel’s concedes some mysticism only in the chapter on love. In so doing he comes into conflict with Western opinion, but this is less important than the fact that Oriental scholars are unanimous about the Ṣūfī character of Sanā‘ī’s poetry. Moreover, with the exception of Bertel’s, European orientalists do not recognize in Sanā‘ī such exceptional qualities as do the Persian scholars, who show marked enthusiasm for him. Nizāmī’s Makbzan al-asrār (“The Treasure-chamber of Secrets”) and Khaqānī’s Tuhfat al-Irāqain (“The Gift from the two Iraqs”) follow most closely in time on the great master’s example. The description of night in Nizāmī’s poem was obviously influenced by the Ḥadiqa. Yet Sanā‘ī’s language distinguishes itself from that of others, and, unlike the older, simpler language, his delights in learned allusions. Another difficulty for a reader lies in his use of brachylogy. Thus it is comprehensible that the Ṣūfis encountered difficulties when trying to gain instruction from the Ḥadiqa; at the request of his pupils, Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (“Maulavi”) is said to have decided to write his own mathnavī, whose revelation of truths was more accessible to them than the Ḥadiqa. Although the Ḥadiqa was one of Maulavi’s models, the techniques of the two authors differ: the Ḥadiqa does not delight in anecdotes, whereas they are interwoven everywhere in Maulavi’s work.

Sanā‘ī was also one of the first to make the ghazal a medium for mystical ruminations; and in doing so, he provided an example for succeeding generations. Many of his ghazals cannot fail to move the reader. The anacreontic manner is present, and there are outspoken attacks on
poetry written for mercenary motives, as well as severe judgments on contemporary life in all its aspects (and on the Turks too); the poet refrains neither from invective nor from obscenity. But his real significance lies in his effective, far-reaching introduction of an ascetic and mystic attitude as an ingredient of the didactic mathnavi of varying length (Nāsir-i Khusrav, d. 465-10/1072-77, had already introduced philosophic ideas into poetry). Sanā’i led poetry away from simple and mundane things to spheres more elevated and intellectually more ambitious; in doing so he became a great innovator. Particularly notable is his social message that all Moslems are equal.

THE PANEYRIC POETS

(i) In Transoxiana

Shihāb al-Din ‘Am’aq of Bukhārā served the Qarakhānids in Samarkand, and, being an outstanding poet, was honoured with the title “Prince of Poetry”. ‘Am’aq enjoyed the highest esteem and favour at court, acquired great wealth, and insisted that other poets should revere him. He was a man of culture and had a thorough command of all the devices of rhetoric; in one of his qaṣidas he worked the words mū’i u mūr “the hair and the ant” into every half-line, a unique feat indeed! But he was too good a poet to be guilty of the barrenness of mere artificiality. His similes are tender and heartfelt, whether founded on fancy, reason or reality. Only one line seems to have survived from his epic Yusuf and Zalikha, and this is no less intricate since it can be scanned in two metres—the reason, no doubt, for the loss of the epic. He died in 542-43/1147-49 at the age, it is said, of 100, and in the loneliness which elderly court poets, superseded by younger rivals, knew only too well.

‘Abd al-Vāsi‘ Jabalī of Gharchistān, born about 555/1160, sang the praises of various contemporary dynasties. He is noteworthy as the precursor of a stylistic change that was to dominate the sixth/twelfth century: this consisted of a more frequent use of the colloquial language by cultured people, together with an increased number of Arabic expressions. He had a predilection for rhetorical ornaments, in particular for the figure laff u nashīr (chiasmus). His divān of animal names is a real treasury of information.

More important as a prose writer than as a poet is Rashid al-Din

1 On this epic and its forerunners and imitations see Khayyām-Pūr (1338), p. 242.
Muḥammad ‘Umari (meaning “a descendant of Caliph U‘mar”), usually called Rashid-i Vatvāt (“the Bat”), because he was a small, unprepossessing man with a bald head. He was born at Balkh in 508-09/1114-16, and died either in 578/1182-83 or, more probably, five years earlier. After acquiring an excellent education in his home town and in Khwārazm, he became the most outstanding stylist in Persian and Arabic in the court of the Khwārazm-Shāh Atsiz and his successors. Although he was often out of favour, Rashid was constantly in the shah’s entourage. His poetic sphere was naturally that of Persian and Arabic court poetry. Rhetorical ornaments came easily to a man who wrote an excellent guide to poetry; in handling these ornaments he was a master. In his works there is therefore little place for feelings, although, as the impressive qaṣīda on the visit of his beloved old mother shows, he was capable of capturing the right tone when occasion demanded. Elsewhere all the fireworks of rhetorical figures and tropes, all the ingenuity of language and form, are unable to conceal the coldness of feeling in his poems. The poet had to devote much attention to the description of martial events which he witnessed, and many of these descriptions are certainly very good. Rashid’s rhetorical talent was greatly, if not unanimously, admired: a master such as Khāqānī placed it below that of Adīb Ṣābir.

Rashid cultivated lively relations with the literary world, and in this he was helped considerably by his high position as a court dignitary, since it made those more or less close to him seek his favour unless political antagonisms forced them to do otherwise. This was the case, for instance, in his relations with Adīb Ṣābir, a poet at the hostile court of Sanjar. Political hostility does not account for every such breach, however. Rashid was a self-satisfied and arrogant man, full of personal sympathies and antipathies, fond of criticizing others. Those poets who listened to his advice and gave way to his suggested alterations to their poems, enjoyed his favour even to the extent of being invited to live with him. In such cases Rashid could be generous in material ways also. His relationship to Khāqānī is interesting: it began with expressions of mutual praise, short-lived however, since Khāqānī suspected Rashid of obstructing his access to the court of the Khwārazm-Shāh. Rashid possessed a large library, collected manuscripts and compared variants. A strict Sunni, he condemned all philosophers.

1 The name means “sand martin” according to Saʿīd, Taʾrīkh, vol. ii, p. 628.
2 Vil’chevsky in a letter.
Rashid's prose is particularly valuable. Pride of place goes to his "Art of Rhetoric", the Ḥada‘iq al-sīhr fī daqa‘iq al-šī‘r, or "Magic Gardens of the Niceties of Poetry", written because Muḥammad b. ʿUmar Rādūyānī's Tarjuman al-Balāḡa, "Guide to Eloquence" (composed between 481/1088 and 507/1114) had become out of date. In Rashid's book almost thirty Persian poets are represented by examples, 'Unsuri in particular; amongst the Arab poets, Mutanabbi is most often cited. Saḥāṭ and Firdausi are, in Rashid's eyes, non-existent, and he never mentions his own contemporaries. Nevertheless this is a valuable book, though its artificiality was probably an unfortunate influence on the development of Persian poetry. It was followed by a host of imitations.

Apart from his Persian works, there is also a collection of Rashid’s Arabic writings. Outstanding examples of his prose are the collections of his Persian and Arabic letters, both official and private: it is in these and in his poetics that his real significance can be seen.

A particularly arresting and indeed welcome exception in the grey monotony of more or less well-known panegyric poets is the satirist Ḥākim ("The wise") Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿAli (or possibly Masʿūd), of Samarqand or its vicinity, who according to his own claim was a scion of the family of Salmān, the Persian companion of the Prophet. He was generally known as Sūzani, the “needlemaker”, a nom de plume said to have arisen because of his violent passion for a needlemaker's apprentice under whose influence he supposedly took up the twin crafts of needlemaking and poetry; this seems, however, a clumsy explanation when the relevance of “nomen omen” is so obvious. Details of his life (he died in 562/1166) are lacking, apart from what we can gather from his works. Obviously he was a very cultured writer: he took a knowledge of Arabic for granted. Countless allusions of his, and what seem to us now his extremely interesting quotations, lead to the conclusion that he was remarkably well read, and that his knowledge of Christianity and Manichaeism was exceptional, while his frequent use of Turkish words shows how widely known that language was. When he alludes to situations in everyday life, his level of meaning is often obscure—a problem which arises often enough with literary figures. In order, apparently, to make his livelihood, he addressed eulogistic verses to greater and lesser rulers, though he himself probably never left

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Samarqand. Despite all their rhetorical erudition, however, these panegyrics show a general poverty of language. His qaṣidas are hardly likely to have aroused much admiration for him, in contrast with the fontaines lumineuses of the court poets, even if those to whom they were addressed could scarcely understand them. But their delight in Sūzānī’s broad and non-literary humour must have been all the more spontaneous and unfeigned. He never hesitated to include lewd and insulting remarks, travesties and parodies, in his satire, for which he had many a down-to-earth metaphor and turn of phrase. He possessed unmistakable poetic talent, but too often lacked all sense of good taste. Nevertheless Sūzānī was a genuinely realistic poet, worthy of the most thorough study.

(ii) Ghażnavid

A somewhat later poet, hitherto less well known, is Sayyid Ašraf al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad Ḥasan b. Muḥammad Ḥusainī Ghażnavī, called Ašraf for short. His poetic career began towards the end of the fifth/eleventh century under the Ghażnavīs. He was active for a long time at the court of Bahram-Shāh, where he enjoyed the favour and esteem both of the ruler and the viziers. After 543/1148 his life became less peaceful; harassed, he made his way through Khūrāsān and ‘Irāq to Baghdad and Mecca, singing the praises of minor Saljuq princes and of the great Sultān Sanjar. He died suddenly in 556/1160-61 on the way from Hamadān to Khūrāsān, in Āzādvār, where his grave can still be seen. His divān, which contains inter alia eighty-three ghazals, is particularly significant for the development of this form. Occasionally signed with the pseudonym “Ḥasan”, and essentially lyric in manner, his ghazals frequently contain eulogies of Bahram-Shāh, often just in the final lines. In his qaṣidas the panegyric manner alternates with the didactic. Although not impervious to the influence of his predecessors and contemporaries, he possessed a voice original and strong enough to influence poets of the latter half of the sixth/twelfth century. Simplicity and lucidity are not the least of his merits.

(iii) Saljuq

It is well known that poets of the Saljuq period went from court to court in search of better conditions; there is nothing surprising in this. But at the same time they could also have other motives for so doing.

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A case in point is a man who was made to suffer for a mode of conduct that happened not to be spontaneous but was enjoined on him.

Shihâb al-Din Adib Šâbir b. Ismâ‘îl Tirmidhî, a panegyric poet at the court of Sultan Sanjar, was a fluent writer of conventional “love and wine” poetry; his sensitive verses are marked by the usual mannerisms, and by a predilection for certain rhetorical figures. But at heart he was a pessimist and probably for that reason a night-reveller. He imitated masters old and new and was in contact with the leading poets of his day; even Anvari regarded himself as insignificant in comparison with Tirmidhî. His exceptional knowledge of Arabic proves how highly educated he was; not only was he conversant with Arabic literature, he even translated Persian verse into Arabic. At the beginning of the hostilities between Sanjar and the Khwârazm-Shâh Atsîz, he was despatched to the latter, ostensibly as an ambassador—as proof of the high regard in which he was held—but in reality as a spy. When he discovered Atsîz’s plans to assassinate Sanjar, he was cruelly punished, being drowned in the Oxus (538/1143 or 542/1148).

The qaṣîda, flourishing generally throughout the twelfth century, reached its culmination in the works of two poets who were contemporaries of each other: Anvari of Khurasan and Khâqâni of Caucasus, masters of a poetic genre particularly neglected and underestimated by Western scholars. Both were poets who outshone their predecessors, and whom their own followers could not surpass. Both were men not only of intellectual and poetic genius, of profound thought and wisdom, but of genuine feeling too. Erudition is the hallmark of their poetry, as is virulent invective. They wrote both qaṣîdas and ghazals, and other slighter types of verse. But whereas Khâqâni’s works include an extensive mathnâvî, tradition ascribes some didactic prose writings to Anvari. Since they both enjoyed considerable fame in their own lifetimes, it is all the more surprising that details concerning them are so deficient and distorted, in the case of Anvari perhaps even more than with Khâqâni. Traditional biographies are full of attractive but unfortunately fictitious anecdotes which contain only grains of truth at most. Factual pictures of their lives could not be pieced together as long as reliable editions of their works were lacking. It is indeed fortunate that there has recently been an improvement in this respect. Anvari and Khâqâni are amongst the most difficult poets to understand; to do so requires the greatest philological, historical, and cultural penetration. (For further discussion on Khâqâni, see below, pp. 569 ff.)
Anvari’s name and genealogy can be established with relative ease and accuracy: they are Auhad al-Din ‘Ali b. Vahid al-Din Muhammad b. Ishāq Abīvardi. He was born in the village of Badana, not far from the small town of Abīvard (or Bāvard), between Nasā and Sarakhs. Badana was situated in Dasht-i Khāvarān, and therefore the poet is said to have signed his earliest poems with the name Khāvari before assuming his well-known nom de plume of Anvari.¹ As is often the case in the biographies of early poets, the precise year of his birth is not known, but there is good reason for supposing it was 510/1116–17, since his first known qaṣida dates from 530/1135–36. His father left him a modest fortune, which he soon squandered in riotous living. A tendency to drink, already apparent in his youth, was later to find expression in notorious passages in his qaṣidas where he begs for wine. He parried the reproaches of his friends in a probably unfinished mathnawi, the surviving torso of which shows that the author’s propensity for invective was present in him from the start. He studied the customary sciences, in particular philosophy, mathematics, medicine, and astrology, and his works are permeated with a deep knowledge of them. Yet it was not to science and learning that he was to devote his life. A delightful anecdote tells us why he gave his preference to poetry; no doubt it is apocryphal, yet it has a core of truth: the prodigality of the court poets must have appeared attractive to a man of such unbridled inclinations. He did in fact make his way to the court of Sultan Sanjar, to whom he was undoubtedly akin in temperament, and there he became one of the ruler’s intimates. He probably resided in the sultan’s palace at Marv until the catastrophic Ghuzz invasion (548/1153–54). He then lived in Nishāpūr and above all in Balkh. It was in Balkh that he underwent a disagreeable experience, when some verses lampooning the city appeared. The inhabitants, deeply offended, threatened Anvari, supposing him to be the author. Even a long qaṣida, full of praises of Balkh, might not have been enough to placate them had he not been protected by respected worthies of the town who were also his friends. It was finally discovered that the lampoon had been foisted on him by Athīr al-Dīn Futūḥī. Between 560 and 565 (1164–70) he visited Baghdad and Mosul. It cannot yet be established how long he spent there, but it is certain that after 568/1172–73 he was back in Balkh, where he presumably lived until his death.

¹ Nafisi, Divān-i Anvari, p. 37, assumes that Khāvari is a mistake due to the incorrect explanation of Anvari-yi Khāvari as “Anvari of Khāvar”.
One of the hardest problems in his biography is to establish the date of his death. If circulating rumours are sifted, we are left with a range of dates from 540 to 597 (1145–1201), a period of almost sixty years. The foremost Iranian scholars are working on the solution of this problem. One clue is offered by the conjunction of the seven planets, with Saturn in Libra, a celestial occurrence which was regarded by astrologers and especially by Anvari as the portent of a cataclysm of the first order. The terrified population of Balkh abandoned their homes and fled to the woods and mountains in the hope of finding some refuge there from the hurricane that was supposedly threatening, while on the critical day, 29 Jumādā II 582 (15 August 1186), the flame of the little lamp on the minaret did not even flicker. Events justified those who disagreed with Anvari, e.g. the poet Zahir Faryabi, and the resulting scorn must inevitably have injured Anvari’s reputation. Embittered, he retired to complete solitude, writing nothing more, and died either in 583/1187–88, or, more probably, in 585/1189–90.

Lyric poetry was completely reformed by this poet of genius. It might be added that he practised poetry in all its forms, though as a court poet he favoured the qaṣīda. Though appreciating the masters of this style, he was well aware that it was static and inflexible in both form and expression, and he set about taking it apart and reshaping it. He did not regard its traditional sequence as sacrosanct, and was fond of beginning with praise of the person to be eulogized and then passing on to another subject. The customary types of exordium vanish, their lyrical qualities being allowed to appear wherever they like. He does not attach any particular value to romantic feelings, not even in a dialogue between a lover and his beloved; amorousness is obviously not identical with passion, it conceals something else: it is directed at the person eulogized. To create lyrical episodes he had recourse either to descriptions of nature, in which he was most successful, or to philosophical reflexions. He was a master of description, be it of personal experiences (his crossing of the Oxus) or of public happenings (the catastrophe brought about by the Ghuzz, 548/1153).

His language, too, departed from tradition. He could not help making use of the ornaments provided by poetics, and his command of the whole range of rhetoric was perfect; but here too he was in search of something new. He was no lover of trifling play with words and letters; instead he delighted in tropes, metaphors, similes, and allusions. He seldom, however, sacrificed a thought to a rhetorical embellishment.
Extrem[e] elegance of fi[rst and last lines, of transitions, and of the invocation is characteristic of him. His use of hyperbole, in which his thoughts and their effect are expressed to maximum advantage, is striking. So sovereign was his command of language—indeed he could improvise at a moment’s notice—that he could express any idea with ease, though this does not mean that his ideas are immediately accessible to one and all. The stiff and antiquated language of his predecessors did not suit Anvari, and he used contemporary colloquial language, in particular the cultivated speech of the educated. This, together with his unusually comprehensive knowledge, drove him to replace the customary and hackneyed images with fresh ones drawn from the most varied fields of knowledge, as familiar to him as was poetry itself. This ushered in a wave of Arabicization such as had not hitherto occurred, though this does not mean that Anvari added an unnatural or inappropriate element to poetry.

An essential ingredient of Anvari’s divān is the ghazal, which in his unique way he brought to a high degree of perfection—the highest perhaps until Sa‘di. Nor could a man of his intellectual brilliance ignore thequatrain. But there was another genre which was particularly congenial to his easily excitable temperament, namely the “fragment” (qit‘a). This form gave poets the opportunity of treating their subject matter as freely as they wished; like other poetic forms, fragments allowed invocations and tokens of gratitude, but they also permitted attacks, and this was grist to Anvari’s mill. While his qasidas and ghazals gleam with immaculate purity, his fragments were the ideal vehicle through which to work off his vanity, his sarcasm, his sense of injustice, and his petty jealousy of other poets. In them he incorporated his satires, or rather lampoons, for which he did not hesitate to use the coarsest, most scandalous expressions, whether his irritation was justified or not; for his sharp tongue spared no one, and indeed he sometimes hoped to incur his masters’ favours by these means. He raised his voice against the stupidities prevalent at all levels of society, against sycophancy, against anomalies in administration; he satirized women, blind fate, and so on. Lampoons cannot fail to be personal, and paradoxically their very subjectivity sheds a most informative light on society. Anvari’s most likeable facet is his humour, found especially in his petitionary verse.

Anvari’s originality as a writer lies in his divān taken as a whole.

1 Occasional poems of the most diverse content with the rhyme scheme, ba, ca, da...
Yet he was not only a great poet but a great scholar too, as is proved by the multitude of allusions in the divān. It is also known that he was an admirer of Avicenna’s philosophy and that he knew Ghazālī’s *Destructio Philosophiae*. When in Mosul he wrote a learned petition in honour of Quṭb al-Dīn Maudūd and promised to write more. There are also reports of a commentary on astronomical tables and of an astrological work of his called *Mufīd*, “The Useful One”; but these writings have been lost, and only incomplete references to them survive.

Anvari himself seems to have been a man fond of good living, merry to the point of licentiousness, and a great drinker of wine (indeed he once fell off a roof when intoxicated). In his petitionary verse he could be quite shamelessly importunate, though elsewhere he condemned begging as unworthy of poetry and the poet. Poetry itself he called unnecessary and worthless, though here he was obviously thinking of panegyric poetry. His inconsiderate delight in abusing others shows that he was irascible and easily hurt; on the other hand the discrepancy between the volume of his praise and the worth of its object was obvious enough to so perspicacious a man. Nevertheless he remained loyal to Sanjar and to the Saljuqs in general, even though the uncertainty of the times forced him to bestow praise on all kinds of people. His fluctuating attitude to various problems must be seen as a result both of the upheavals and dangers of the period, and of his exuberant talent and explosive, violent temperament.

Eastern scholars are trying to discover which sect Anvari belonged to. Whereas in the past they would have liked to regard him as a Shi‘i, it is now openly admitted by Iranian scholars that he was a Sunni.

Anvari was not uninfluenced by his predecessors, in particular by Abu’l-Faraj Rūnī, who probably died after 492/1098–99. Anvari was acquainted with the poetry of Khāqānī, and in his turn exerted a considerable influence on contemporary and subsequent poets. Zahir Fārābī (d. 598/1201–02) adopted Anvari’s manner to such an extent that later generations could not decide which poet to prefer. But the initiated opted, and quite rightly, for Anvari. Now regarded as one of the greatest figures in Persian literature, he has been prevented from becoming universally known only because panegyric poetry is foreign to the West.
Transcaucasia and its neighbour Azarbâijân provide a good example of an area which produced a homogeneous group of poets, each of whom nevertheless had his own characteristics. There are of course other examples (see, e.g., pp. 584–6); but literary history has not yet studied this aspect of Persian literature in sufficient detail. Although the great Saljuq rulers strove to bring this territory under the strong and centralized administration of their empire, they were unable to subdue the local feudal organization for long and to prevent its disintegration into independent principalities. The feudal conditions of Transcaucasia were very much closer to those of Europe than to those elsewhere in Iran.

Its poetry is proof of its high degree of culture. Not only were there innumerable Caucasian and Azarbâijâni writers and scholars, but they were especially original. Their modes of expression, their vocabulary, and their syntax contain certain features found seldom or not at all in the poets of eastern Iran. This does not mean that there were no connexions between this school and the poets of the other parts of Iran. All these developments in poetry had sprung from the same roots, but had afterwards been subjected to local influences, in this case to the propinquity of non-Iranian and non-Muslim territories, whose languages were foreign or, at most, merely related to Persian. With the exception of Nizâmi’s works, the entire poetic output of the region was confined to lyric poetry, to the qâṣîda in particular. Moreover all these poets were employed by royal courts. Here, too, although there was no specifically Şûfî literature, the Şûfî mask allowed poets to express opinions which would have been unthinkable in normal circumstances. Under the influence of Şûfîsm, of the urban classes that is, the ghâzal became very popular; and under the growing influence of the towns, themes were occasionally chosen from outside the courtly sphere. One of the striking features of the Transcaucasian school is its complicated technique. In their language the poets desisted from archaism, but drew all the more extensively from Arabic vocabulary. There are even traces of local folklore.

The school, which began with Qâtrân (d. 465/1072), formed a well-defined group of teachers and pupils of whom two, Khâqânî and Nizâmi, were to exert a lasting influence on the entire development of their respective genres: Khâqânî being the greatest exponent of the
qasida and Nizāmī the most brilliant writer of romantic epics. Apart from the latter poet, all the others were attached to courts, even though Persian was not the language of the princes whose praises they sang. But these patrons should not be over-idealized; their moods, often arbitrary and hostile, and the possibility of their disfavour and of ensuing imprisonment were common perils for the poets. One result was that the court poets could not display a definite moral attitude. The first such poet was the courtier Nizām al-Dīn Abu'l-'Alā Gānjāvī (d. 554/1159), the first notable figure of the school of Shirvān, a critic and teacher highly regarded by the generations after him. Little of his writing has survived.

An attempted comparison has already been made above (p. 563), and now it can be taken further. Khāqānī and Anvari were undoubtedly great poets, and only their almost exclusive concentration on the panegyric seems to me to have prevented them from becoming known outside the bounds of Iranian culture. Khāqānī's biography abounds with problems, though Anvari more than rivals him in this respect. The infusion of learning into poetry, a characteristic they shared with their times, contributed towards their greatness. Anvari was well acquainted with philosophy and acknowledged its place in his writings; Khāqānī was no lover of it. They were well aware of the shady side of panegyric writing and often even expressed a disgust for poetry. Both, however, were excellent lyric poets, and the genuine feeling in their ghazals clearly points the way to Sa'dī and Ḥāfiz. Neither of them was pampered by life. The choleric Anvari inclined to laughter, while Khāqānī surveyed the world with a sombre gaze. Their sharp tongues gave them such a reputation that they almost came to grief, for each had certain invective poems falsely attributed to him; in spite of this, they each had to make atonement and beg for pardon. And in the end, both of them retired into solitude.

Of all the poets in this period, Afdal al-Dīn Badil (Ibrahim) b. 'Ali Khāqānī of Shirvān (b. 515/1121-22) was most closely bound to his native country, Āzarbāijān, and therefore his poetry cannot be understood without a thorough knowledge of the political and cultural life of eastern Transcaucasia, a central meeting-point of Muslim and Christian religious influences. Khāqānī remembers his father, the cabinet maker 'Alī, but his deepest affection was for his mother, who had once been a Nestorian slave, and who, although she had embraced Islam, must certainly have taught her son the elements of the Christian
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faith and its rites. Khâqâni, unlike the majority of Islamic Persian writers, was remarkably well informed on the subject of Christianity; he did not of course owe this knowledge solely to his mother, for the interest in religion prevailing amongst those around him had much to do with it. His divân abounds in images and symbols which are sometimes Christian, sometimes Muslim, both blended together; at times he also quotes from Christian prayers and sacred texts. A divân of this kind could not have been composed anywhere except in Transcaucasia.

His youth was spent in poverty and distress, and nothing would have come of him, the child of an ordinary artisan family, had not his talent and quite exceptional sagacity attracted the attention of his uncle, the doctor Mîrzâ Kâfi al-Dîn ʿUmar b. ʿUthmân, a cultured man who himself taught the boy the rudiments of Arabic (Khâqâni was also to write Arabic qaṣîdas). Then followed a thorough education in every branch of science, which left its mark on Khâqâni and his work. Ghazals and eulogies of the Prophet (naʿr), written under the mystical nom de plume of Häqâʾiqi, “the searcher after truth”, soon gave the young student the reputation amongst his companions of being a reasonably good poet; but the naʿts of his maturity were to earn him the name of Hassân al-ʾAjâm, “the Persian Ḥassân”. When the court poet Abuʾl-ʿAlâ Ganjavi (p. 569 above) took him as a disciple, he was so well pleased with him that he gave him his daughter’s hand in marriage, and even presented him to the Shîrvân-Šhâh, who at that time was Abuʾl-Muzaffar Khâqân-i Akbar Manûchihr b. Farîdûn. It seemed that Khâqâni (who had been led by these favourable auspices to request this pseudonym) had indeed succeeded. But his father-in-law soon became jealous, and this put an end to all the young poet’s hopes: there could be no question of a career for him when ʿAli the cabinet-maker had sold his possessions to support his son and the latter’s family.

This was the actual background to the impassioned quarrel which broke out between the two poets, and which continued until Khâqâni accused Abuʾl-ʿAlâ of sympathizing with the ideology of Ḥasan-i Ṣabbâh, the founder of the Assassins: an accusation of considerable gravity in the eyes of the Sunni prince. Khâqâni then tried to establish himself elsewhere, especially at the court of the famous Khwârazm-Shâh ʿAlâʾ al-Dîn Atsîz, but this the poet Rashîd Vaṭvâṭ (pp. 559 ff.) would not allow. To Rashîd’s friendly approach, Khâqâni replied with

an angry satire, and though he soon regretted his act, he did not im­
prove his relations with Rashid. When ‘Umar the doctor, his “uncle”
and teacher, died in 545/1150, Khāqānī was filled with anchoretic
yearnings, a mood that was to reappear later though he was able to
indulge it at the end of his life. His attempt to reach the court of Sulṭān
Sanjar failed; he had got only as far as Ray when the destruction of the
Saljuq empire reduced all his hopes to naught. In 551-52/1156-57 he
undertook his first pilgrimage to the holy places of Islam, a concession
accorded him probably at the request of the Georgian king Dmitri I.
One fruit of this pilgrimage was the Ṭuhfat al-‘Irāqain (“The Gift from
the Two Iraqs”), the first book of travels in mathnavī form to be written
in Persian. He met with a most unfriendly reception in Isfahān on his
return journey: the city rose in indignation against him on account of
an offensive and scandalous satire which had been foisted on him by
Mujir Bailaqānī. Khāqānī was driven to appease the city with a long
qasida meant to clear up the deceit. Shortly afterwards he was thrown
into prison (554/1159), his laments finding utterance in the so-called
“prison qasidas”. The cause of this must be sought in the upheavals
that followed the death of the Shīrvar-Shāh Manūchīhr (554-57/1159-
62), since Khāqānī probably refused to support the shah’s widow
Tamara in her conception of the succession.

In Vil’chevsky’s biography a definite clue to this event is furnished
by a qasida written in 564/1168 and addressed to the Byzantine Emperor
Manuel Comnenus (1143-80) rather than to the latter’s nephew and
rival Andronicus Comnenus.¹ This qasida proves that Khāqānī visited
the court of the Emperor at Constantinople: in it he speaks of the
religious controversy which was at that time engrossing Constantinople
and Orthodox Christianity, namely, the interpretation of the words: “I
go unto the Father: for the Father is greater than I” (John xiv.28).
Khāqānī’s interpretation concurred with the opinion of the Church
Council, which had been influenced by Manuel to oppose Andronicus.
Later, however, Khāqānī showed a different attitude to Andronicus,
when the latter, an exile, wandering from place to place with his consort
Theodora, eventually arrived in Transcaucasia at the court of the
Georgian king Giorgi III (1156-84). There Andronicus was greeted
with all due pomp and took part in the allied campaign of Georgia and
Shīrvar to ward off the Russian attack on Transcaucasia in 569/1173.
In one of his qasidas the poet offers Andronicus his services, describing

¹ Vil’chevsky, op. cit. p. 67; but cf. Minorsky, “Khāqānī”.

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him as the only man capable of defeating the Russian armies, and going
so far as to call him the worthiest claimant to the Imperial throne, which
in fact Andronicus never ceased to strive for. This complete reversal in
Khāqānī’s attitude was caused not so much by Andronicus’s hostility to
Russia, as by the poet’s own dissatisfaction with the court of Akhsitān
and with Shirvān in general; this unhappiness was the reason for his
never-ending attempts to break away. He was able to disguise his
service to Andronicus by another pilgrimage (which was probably
again brought about by the intercession of a member of the Byzantine
Imperial family). Thus in 570/1175, entrusted with a political mission
on behalf of Andronicus, he set out for Iraq; and he remained in
Baghdad for some time, where, despite invitations, he refused to enter
the service of the Caliph. Soon after his return to Shirvān he suffered
the cruel blow of the death of his son Rashid al-Dīn (571/1176), and
probably other misfortunes besides. His struggles to escape from his
surroundings at Shirvān became increasingly desperate; yet each time
his hopes were dashed. Although Akhsitān was by no means fond of
him, he was reluctant to lose him. Finally Khāqānī began to long for
Khurāsān, by then already under the dominion of the Khwārazm-Shāh;
he would willingly have established himself there, now that Rashid
Vatvāt was dead (573/1177–78). In 580/1184 he either went or fled to
Tabrīz, but never got any farther; from there he visited Baghdad and
various other places, but Tabrīz remained his principal place of resi-
dence. Many of the poems in his divān date from this period, but his
activities, apart from writing poetry, remain obscure. While he was at
Tabrīz his wife died, in Shirvān, and he poured out his grief in eight
elegies. After living in what seems to have been solitude, he died at
Tabrīz in 595/1199.

A comparison between Vičhevsky’s biography of the poet and of
the traditional native ones will reveal many discrepancies. In order to
establish the truth, it is wiser to follow the example of various Iranian
and Soviet scholars and rely on the evidence of Khāqānī’s divān itself,
since it contains a host of autobiographical details. Conversely, we can
appreciate the poetry fully only by continually bearing in mind the
history and culture of the Muslim and Christian Caucasus, and by
remembering Khāqānī’s ties with Constantinople. The poet provides
some help in this, with allusions and frequent, although well hidden,
chronograms. A speciality of Khāqānī’s (as of other poets of the
Āzarbāijān school, no doubt) is the double chronogram calculated
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according to both the Hijrī and the Julian calendars, though its presence is not immediately obvious. A good example occurs in the famous qaṣīda on the ruins of Madāʾin (Ctesiphon), a poem erroneously attributed to the poet’s second pilgrimage. That it was written instead in 561/1166 is clearly indicated by a double chronogram within it.¹ Thus Khāqānī did not write the qaṣīda while bewailing the actual ruins of the celebrated metropolis; he wrote it six years after his return from the pilgrimage and even used a similar qaṣīda by the Arabic poet Buḥṭūrī (d. 284/897) as his model. There can be no question of any patriotic feelings or of any echoes of Iranian national ideals in Khāqānī’s qaṣīda; rather, it is a beautiful variation of the usual lament on the transitoriness of worldly things.

Within his dīvān, every description of Khāqānī’s life shows the unrest in which he lived. The poet was continually complaining and lamenting. This was not the fault of his milieu only; its moral standards were by no means high, but he too was to blame for his sufferings. Nor can it be maintained that he never accepted any gifts or emoluments from the Shirvān-Shāhs. Nevertheless he was always convinced that he was being treated unjustly, and because of this he was continually fleeing from place to place in search of something better. He was a poet of genius, but a man of boundless conceit and always apt to take offence. This is the key to the correct understanding of his inconsistent behaviour.

Khāqānī was a panegyric poet, though not quite in the usual sense; he was not just a poetic craftsman, but a genuine poet of an exceptional and brilliant kind. Outwardly his writing is beset with innumerable difficulties, so that it yields its treasures to few, and then only with the help of the numerous commentaries which this peculiarity has rendered necessary. A man of outstanding learning, he made use of every detail that contemporary knowledge could offer, displaying them all with the fireworks of his rhetorical virtuosity. In both science and poetry he was in his element; but as he was first and foremost a poet, science had to be the servant of his poetry. The nature of the difficulties which encompass it is a result of this; they stem not from any desire to dazzle and impress nor from any superficial delight in artificiality, but from his intellectual richness: Khāqānī presupposes like-minded readers. These difficulties are present in his panegyric verse and in his more heartfelt passages—in his powerful and moving laments and elegies on the deaths of his

¹ Letters of O. L. Vil’chevsky dated 22 July and 26 September 1959.
son and wife, for instance, and on the murder of a scholar during the Ghuzz incursion; they are present when he meditates on the transience of the things of this world in the qaṣīda on the ruins of Ctesiphon, when he is suffering from jealousy, lack of friends, betrayal, and imprisonment. Particularly magnificent are his descriptions of landscapes and of nature, of morning and sunrise in particular; here, as in other passages, we sense the beauty of his Caucasian homeland. Nor is love entirely absent, though its presence is rare. The manifestation of Allah as the Beloved is a concept quite foreign to him. In his panegyric verse, which often rises to tones of the most exaggerated adulation, his purpose is not just empty praise, for he also imparts instruction and advice. At the same time, his ability to attack and to slander is equally remarkable. His enthusiasm is for religious and especially Šāfi‘i wisdom, rather than for anything philosophical. In his originality he reveals affinities with the poets of Āzarbāijān and ‘Irāq, but his qaṣīdas, as he himself admitted, reflect the direct influence of Sanā‘ī. He knew, admired, and imitated the great poets of Khūrāsān, such as Manūchīhrī, and he strove to surpass ‘Unsūrī in ornamentation. He used the ghazal both for the expression of its customary themes and for its laments.

A master of language, a poet of sense and sensibility, constantly inclining towards introspection, and a man of unique personality; with such qualities Khāqānī is assured of a place in the front ranks of Persian literature. (This being so, the praise he consciously and not infrequently bestows upon himself does not sound hollow.) He reveals the heights to which the qaṣīda can aspire in the hands of a genius. Unfortunately the art of the qaṣīda is in all respects esoteric. Khāqānī exerted an incalculable influence on the entire subsequent development of panegyric poetry. His qaṣīda on Ctesiphon even influenced the “Ode on the Kremlin” by the modern poet Lahūtī (d. 1957). It is also likely that Maulāvī adopted the form of Khāqānī’s exordia and ghazals for many of his own ghazals; on the other hand the picaresque tone of some of his poems is reminiscent of Ḥāfīz two hundred years later.

This picture of Khāqānī would not be complete without further mention of his Tuhfat al-‘Irāqain, “The Gift from the Two Iraqs” (i.e. from Persian and Arabian Iraq), the author’s poetic description of his first pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. The title was not his original one, since he himself calls the work Tuhfat al-khawāṣir va zubdāt al-ẓamā‘ir, “The Gift made up of Memories and a Selection of Thoughts”. The work is immediately remarkable because it has nothing in common
with any other existing mathnawī; nor can it be described as a continuous travel narrative, because the author constantly interrupts it with digressions. In fact, it is an Oriental counterpart to Byron's *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*. At the very beginning Khāqānī apostrophizes the sun, and during the course of the poem he repeatedly alludes to it on all manner of occasions and in its most diverse aspects. In six cantos of varying length, he treats of places and important people, of nature, events, traditions, and customs, and of his own life and family. His style varies from description to direct address and dialogues, of which one of the most striking is a long conversation with the prophet Khīḍr. The poet praises and laments, but he also inveighs against people (not sparing his own father-in-law).

Yet even this does not complete the picture of Khāqānī, for the man’s real thoughts and feelings are not to be found in his eulogies any more than in his invectives. Rather, it is in many lesser-known qaṣīdas—either messages to, or laments for, relatives and friends, for artisans, stallkeepers, poets, and other simple folk in Shīrvān: works written not for hope of reward but out of sincerity of heart, and thus permeated with deep feeling for their respective heroes—it is in these qaṣīdas, together with his intimate, essentially lyrical ghazals and quatrains, and finally in his “Fragments”, where he often expresses the purest and most lofty humanism, that Khāqānī translated into superlative poetry the thoughts and ideals of an oriental town in the Middle Ages, thus preserving them for posterity.

Khāqānī’s disciple and his rival in courtship was Abu’l-Nizām Muḥammad Falāḵī Shīrvānī, a native of Shamāḵī (b. 501/1107, d. 549-51/1154-57). Calligrapher, Arabic scholar, and mathematician, he was also well versed in astronomy and therefore surnamed Falāḵī, meaning both “heavenly” and “ill-starred”; indeed he is said to have written a book on astronomy. It is strange that Falāḵī does not seem to have thought any contemporary poet worthy of mention; instead he regarded himself as the equal of Abū Tammām (d. 230/846) and of Abū Nuwās (d. 198/810). He spent his whole life at the court of the famous Shīrvān-Shāh Manūchīhr II b. Farīdūn, and, unlike the other poets, praised only his master in his finely wrought qaṣīdas. Yet he too, like Khāqānī, Muḥir, and probably Abu’l-ʿAlā, was thrown into prison as a result of the calumny of rivals, an experience which had a deep effect on him. Of his poetic works some 1,512 scattered lines have survived, and
they are relatively simple, even when they touch on science. He generally includes essentially lyrical passages, on wine and the beloved, at the end of a qaṣida. He admires neither bigotry nor boastfulness. From prison he spoke as a true poet; but originality was never his most salient feature. Nevertheless 'Iṣmat Bukhārā’ī (d. 829/1425-26) imitated him, as did Salmān Sāvaji (see p. 613), though the latter did not acknowledge his model.

Another of Khāqānī’s pupils was Abu’l-Makārīm Mujir al-Dīn of Bailaqān (part of Shīrvān), an excellent though pugnacious poet: in fact after his apprenticeship he became an enemy who attacked the master in a lampoon. Virtually nothing is known of his life except that he came of a family in no way distinguished and that his mother was an Abyssinian. In his qaṣidas he extolled amongst others the atabegs of Āzarbāijān (Eldigūzids) and the Saljuq sultan Arslan b. Toghril. His relations with these, alternating between favour and disgrace, between fame in the eyes of the envious and public ignominy, indeed imprisonment, cannot be described here. Mujīr’s dīvān is impressive because of its good taste, the harmony of its language, and its lucidity, simplicity, and forceful impact (indeed Amir Khusrau Dihlāvī preferred it to Khāqānī’s); he is at his best when imitating old masters, rather than his own teacher. He was not inclined to display his knowledge, either literary or scientific, in his verse, and had no great understanding of philosophy; his mysticism was nothing more than superficial asceticism and pessimism. His lampoon on Isfahān (written because of allegedly inadequate hospitality) caused much suffering for Khāqānī, who was taken to be the author. It was in Isfahān that Mujir died in about 594/1197-98, though whether by natural causes is not known.

To the same group as Khāqānī and the Āzarbāijān poets connected with him belongs Athīr al-Dīn Abu’l-Fadl Muhammad b. Tāhir (d. 577/1181 or 579/1183-84), a native of the distant town of Akhsikat, in Farghāna; his pseudonym was Athīr or Athīr-i Akhsikat. His earliest works date from before the time he left his home for the west, following the brutal Ghuzz incursion. In Āzarbāijān he entered the service of the Eldigūzids and acquired a brilliant literary reputation. His panegyric qaṣidas are very much in the manner of Khāqānī, with whom, as with Mujir, he maintained relations. He could not, however, restrain himself from attacking them both. An egotist, he loved himself most, while regarding Khāqānī as his equal and honouring Mujir with the epithet “Robber of the caravans of poetry”. His ghazals and quatrains are
worthy of attention, and certainly his ingenuity of content and form cannot be denied; but this is counterbalanced by the frequent obscurity resulting from his erudite manner.

Born about 551/1156 in Fāryāb (to the south-west of Balkh), Zahir al-Dīn Tāhir b. Muḥammad, who wrote under the name Zahir, came of a learned family. That he was probably of Turkish origin, or brought up in Turkish surroundings, would account for the large proportion of Turkish words in his divān. When Anvari and his supporters made their prophecy, that a catastrophic hurricane would occur in 582/1186, Zahir was amongst those who disputed its accuracy, and in doing so he aroused the enmity of Toghan-Shāh b. Muʿayyad. He then betook himself to Ḩīṣān and from there to Māzandarān and ūzārbaījān, praising a whole series of patrons on the way. He dedicated the majority of his panegyric qasidas to Nuṣrat al-Dīn Abū Bakr Eldigüz, the atabeg of ūzārbaījān and 'Iraq (587–607/1191–1211), though at this court he was not immune from the animosities created by intrigues. He finally came to prefer seclusion in Tabrīz, where he died at the age of forty-seven.

Zahir was unashamedly a writer of panegyrics, a follower of Khāqānī and Anvari, both of whom he surpassed in exaggerated adulation, though he lacked their emotional depth, not to mention their genius. He was an obsequious man whose begging was in the worst taste; but cupidity was a feature of the period. He despatched poems of praise far and near, in Arabic as well as Persian. In his conceit he criticized Anvari, Niẓāmī, and others, because he regarded no one as his equal, though he himself did not write any satires. But he did undoubtedly possess certain poetic gifts, which must have enabled him to exert a considerable influence, since later generations were undecided whether to give preference to him or to Anvari, whom he in fact imitated. Their indecision was sadly misplaced, it is true, for Zahir was far from being a great poet; in the eyes of his contemporaries his chief merit lay in the relative comprehensibility of his verse. The reading of his divān presupposes a good knowledge of the troubled age in which he lived. The praise which Ḥāfiz bestows on him is for a line falsely attributed to him. However, Saʿdī himself imitated Zahir's lyrical preambles.

The romanticism of Niẓāmī may be identified with a conception of humanity of the most sublime kind. What a difference there is between this conception and the sober utilitarianism of Saʿdī! Niẓāmī comes
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first not only as a socially conscious philosopher but also as a psychologist, a story-teller, a verbal artist, and a rhetorical virtuoso.

As the scene of the greatest flowering of the panegyrical qaṣīda, southern Caucasia occupies a prominent place in New Persian literary history. But this region also gave to the world Persia’s finest creator of romantic epics. Ḥakīm Jamāl al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad Ilyās b. Yūsuf b. Zaki b. Mu‘ayyad Niẓāmī, a native of Ganja in Āzarbājān, is an unrivalled master of thoughts and words, a poet whose freshness and vigour all the succeeding centuries have been unable to dull. Little is known of his life, the only source being his own works, which in many cases provide no reliable information. We can only deduce that he was born between 535 and 540 (1140–46) and that his background was urban. Modern Āzarbājān is exceedingly proud of its world-famous son and insists that he was not just a native of the region, but that he came of its own Turkish stock. At all events his mother was of Iranian origin, the poet himself calling her Ra’īsa and describing her as Kurdish. The only fact known about his youth is that he was orphaned early. It can be assumed that his family was relatively wealthy, for otherwise he could scarcely have enjoyed that excellent education in all the known branches of science and learning which his works so incontestably reveal. His native Ganja seems to have cast a spell on him: he left its walls only once, in 581 or 582 (1185–87), and then against his will: when the ruler of Āzarbājān, Qizil-Arslan, who was on a progress some thirty farsakhs (117 miles) away, expressly requested to meet him. Did Niẓāmī make his living from poetry alone? Was poetry his only source of livelihood? An answer of a kind is to be found in Lailī u Majnūn, an epic of over 4,000 lines which Niẓāmī conjured up in less than four months; there he says that he might have been able to complete it in a fortnight had it not been for another occupation.1 If he visited royal courts in his early years, he soon abandoned the practice; he was no court sycophant, indeed his whole way of thinking was against it. He did dedicate his great epics as well as occasional ghazals to princes; but it was then customary to do so in the hope of some reward or, rather, fee. Bahrām-Shāh, in return for the dedication of the epic Makhzan al-asrār, sent him 5,000 dinārs and five nimble mules. Niẓāmī’s reward for Khusrau u Shīrin (he was given the village of Ḥamdūniyān) seems to have been less satisfactory, for it was made fun of by one of his rivals. It may therefore be justifiably deduced that he did not enjoy an excess of worldly goods. Tradition

1 Lailā u Majnūn, ed. Dastgirdī, p. 29, ll. 10–11.
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associates him with certain of the *Akhis*, a kind of masonic society of the period, which recruited its supporters not from high-ranking circles but rather from the artisan classes. He was not an adherent of Şûfism. 599/1203 has generally been taken to be the year of his death, but the chronology of the persons he praised points to a later date, the most credible being that inscribed on an old gravestone, namely 605/1209, though the inscription itself contains a mistake and is therefore not entirely trustworthy. People have for centuries made pilgrimages to Niżāmī’s mausoleum as though to the burial-place of a saint; it has now been lovingly restored.

Niżāmī’s epics consist of five independent poems, each with its own metre which were only later grouped together in a collection known as the *Khamsa* or “Quintet”. In the first poem, *Makhzan al-asrār*, “The Treasure-Chamber of Secrets”, the topical allusions are dated, but a difficult and still unsolved problem arises. The earliest manuscripts of the epic give three different dates for its completion. These are apparently approximate only, and unfortunately happen to be metrically interchangeable. However, on the basis of various other allusions, the year 570/1174–75, when Niżāmī was approximately thirty-five, appears the most likely one for its completion. Unlike all his other epics, this poem has an ethical and philosophical content, though Şûfī symbolism is apparent only in the introductory passage concerning the heart. He does not avoid criticism of the rulers and of their system, he defends the rights of the ordinary man, and holds up truth as a categorical imperative. As regards its content, Niżāmī’s work has a precursor in Sanā’ī’s *Hadīqa*, but both in metre and in the clear-cut organization of the poem, he went his own way: his desire was, as he proudly announced, to stand on his own feet. The introduction is made up of eulogies of God and of the Prophet; a description of the latter’s ascent into heaven in the space of a second; a eulogy of Bahrām-Shāh; a description of the poem’s genesis, and a passage in praise of words and poetry: in other words, a series of passages of the kind which later occur regularly in every conceivable epic. Each of the poem’s twenty chapters has a theoretical introduction and an illustration in the form of a parable, which often refers only to the last idea in the introduction, while at the same time forming a transition to the next chapter. The mastery with which the poet handles the theoretical reflexions and then devises appropriate parables must be particularly emphasized. The subject matter itself is not easily digestible; but the perfect way in which such intractable
material is adapted proves the greatness of Nizâmi. There is no trace of
the diffuseness characteristic of Sanâ‘î; the poetry is drawn from the
living language, yet this remains Nizâmi’s most difficult work.

The repercussions of the poem on Persian literature were extremely
far-reaching and made themselves felt on the literature of neighbouring
countries also. Indeed the fame which Nizâmi acquired with Makbzan
al-asrâr spread so far that the ruler of Darband, though the poem was
not dedicated to him, expressed his admiration with the gift of a
Qipchaq slave girl called Afaq (i.e. “Blanca”), whose beauty obviously
must have captivated the poet, since he married her in 569/1173–74.
Their happy union was blessed with a son to whom Nizâmi repeatedly
refers in his works, but unfortunately in 1180 her death put an end to
their happiness.¹ When the ‘Iraqi Saljuq Toghril II requested a love
epic from the poet without specifying the subject further, Nizâmi
picked on the story of the lovers Khusrau and Shirin, a theme set in his
own region and based at least partly on historical fact, though an aura
of legend already surrounded it. Nizâmi completed the work in feverish
activity after Afaq’s death (c. 576/1181), with Shirin and Afaq, two
figures of the utmost purity, blending into one in his imagination. The
poem is really a romance of the love and suffering of a princess as a girl
and then as a wife, and is unequalled for its pure beauty in the whole
of Persian literature. Some of the events narrated in it were obviously
suggested by the unworthiness of the ruling classes; the shâh’s vacil­
lation, for example, leads to an uprising of his vassals and the downfall
of all the main characters. Nizâmi’s motivation is psychological; his
portrayal of character is brilliant. We have the constant Shirin and the
vacillating Khusrau; her love shines with purity, his feelings spring
from egotism. The episode of Farhâd stands out as an example of love
sacrificing itself. The animal passion of the shâh’s son Şhirüye is of
the basest kind: in him the loose morality of a feudal lord is depicted
in even worse light than it is in Khusrau. How much more noble, by
comparison, is the labourer Farhâd!

The subject of the third epic, written in 584/1188, is not taken from
Persian history but is borrowed from the Arabian world: not that of
the Bedouins, but one closer to the Persian conception of Arabia.
Lailû u Majnûn was composed at the request of the Shîrvân-Shâh
Akhsitan, and Nizâmi undertook its composition unwillingly, fearing

¹ He lost his second wife after completing his Lailû u Majnûn; he married for the third
time whilst writing the Şharaf-Nâma. The third wife also died before him.
that the subject would prove too slight; for this reason he chose the shortest metre. The subject is in fact similar to that of Romeo and Juliet. It is an epic full of feeling and passion, and quite unlike the colourless Arabic sources on which Niżāmī drew. The drama of the story culminates in the casting off of the iron fetters, symbolic of a deliberate break with human society. Majnūn (“Fool”) lives only for the spiritual bond uniting him with Lailī; this is why the external appearances seem not to change after the death of the husband she had been compelled to marry. The whole conception is entirely psychological without any trace of Sūfism. Majnūn has to suffer as a poet too, but grief enhances the passion of his songs. Bertel’s has pointed out the didactic element concealed in the epic. On the one hand we have the exceptional mildness of Majnūn’s father, on the other the unnatural tyranny of Lailī’s; and a third concept of fatherhood is apparent in the relationship of Niżāmī to his son, which is expressed in the preamble to the poem. When in a special chapter the poet addresses the son of the ruler, it seems that he really has in mind the ruler himself, who, being a father, might be able to perceive the lesson of the tragic story which he had himself suggested for the epic.

It has been maintained that Lailī u Majnūn is inferior to the previous epic, but I do not share this opinion. In the development of plot and in emotional depth, not to mention language and rhetoric, it is certainly quite the other’s equal. Moreover the exceptional number of imitations of it attest to its popularity, and although this has naturally decreased with the decline of feudalism, the theme of the epic still recurs today in Turkish and Persian novels.

The fourth of Niżāmī’s epics in terms of chronology, but the first in merit, is the Haft Paikar, “Seven Pictures” (completed in 593/1197), whose elegant, graceful metre corresponds to the lighter nature of the poem. It is dedicated to the Aqsunqurid ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Körp-Arslan, the Prince of Marāqheh, who had commissioned it without specifying a theme. Its subject is the life of the Sassanian Emperor Bahrmān V Gūr (420–38), a monarch less celebrated in history than in legend; in other words, it is taken once again from Iranian history. Bahrmān is the central figure, but his story does not occupy the entire poem, more than half of it being made up of the seven delightful tales of the seven princesses whom Bahrmān married, and these, taken together, amount to a second plot.

1 Bausani. Istoria, p. 665.
In the *Haft Paikar* the shāh does not appear in the same light as the heroes of the *Shāh-Nāma* or those portrayed by the followers of Firdausī. Bahrām is made to correspond to the new conditions, as can be clearly seen if Firdausī's version is compared with Niẓāmī's. The attitude of the poet is obvious: he upholds the people against the misrule of the princes and potentates, and offers the latter a lesson cast in the most exquisite poetic form. In the tales of the seven princesses, Niẓāmī's narrative art reaches the highest degree of perfection he ever attained. The most varied aspects of love are brilliantly conveyed, always with a profound moral basis. In his description of passion, Niẓāmī commands the whole range from the utmost delicacy to the most extreme violence. He avoids the make-believe of the fairy tale, transposing it into illusion and thus into subjective reality. His language is not antiquated; rather, it corresponds exactly to the times and provides an admirable vehicle for describing events and emotions.

Niẓāmī's last epic is the *Iskandar-Nāma*, "The Lay of Alexander", or more properly *Sharaf-Nāma*, "Book of Honour" and *Iqbāl-Nāma*, "Book of Fortune", which, if taken together, form his most extensive work. Its dating, however approximate, provides insuperable difficulties, chiefly because the dates of Niẓāmī's death and of the accession of ʿIzz al-Dīn Masʿūd, the ruler of Mosul (1211-19) clash. The *Sharaf-Nāma* can with some hesitation be ascribed to the years between 1196 and 1200, and the *Iqbāl-Nāma* to the years between 1200 and the poet's death (600/1203-605/1209?). Dārāb solves the problem by regarding the dedication to ʿIzz al-Dīn Masʿūd as a later interpolation.¹ These dates, however, are all extremely doubtful. A peculiarity of the epic is the apostrophization of the "cup-bearer" in the first part and of the "singer" in the second, as a prelude to each.

Niẓāmī took the material for the entire poem from Arabic and Persian chronicles, but certainly not from monographic sources. Desire for war and conquest is quite foreign to his Iskandar; he fights and conquers only when obliged to do so or when helping others. He appears first as a warrior, in the *Sharaf-Nāma*, then as a philosopher, and finally as a prophet in the *Iqbāl-Nāma*. For this reason Niẓāmī attaches no importance to Iskandar's origin. In the later sections especially, the poet's indebtedness to Greek wisdom can frequently be detected, though anachronisms are numerous. However, the sublimity of his thoughts could allow him at times to dispense with historical accuracy.

¹ *The Treasury of Mysteries*, p. 64.
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All his life he was preoccupied with the problems of social order and the struggle against its disturbers and enemies—indeed from this point of view, his works can be seen as a gradual crescendo culminating in the *Iskandar-Nāma*. His last epic can be called a product of his old age only in the sense that here his humanism found its profoundest expression. The sumptuous style of his earlier poems would here have been out of place; the *Iskandar-Nāma* is less colourfully written than the others, its allegories and symbolism standing out all the more for this reason. While *Khusrau u Shirin* is rich in imagery, all the later epics become increasingly simple in form, reaching their artistic culmination in the *Haft Paikar*.

Nizâmi’s great virtues are his wealth of ideas, his powerful imagination and infinite religious depth, command of *le mot juste*, perfect poetic technique, ability to choose and order his material, philosophic profundity, and understanding of social questions; indeed he often voices the attitude of the towns. He did much to further the introduction of vernacular current language into epic poetry, giving it the same vocabulary which had already penetrated court poetry; in doing so, he dealt a decisive blow to the ancient epic tradition, since the latter, through its reluctance to accept the influence of Arabic, was becoming increasingly difficult to understand; indeed, Gurgâni in his romantic epic *Vis u Rāmin* (1040–54) had not been entirely able to avoid the influence of Arabic. The heroic epic was becoming less and less important, not only because of social changes and a diminishing interest in its old style, but because it had proved incapable of casting off the studied purity of language which was its characteristic. Moreover the influence of the language of lyric poetry tended to emphasize certain aspects of epic poetry that had hitherto been overlooked, namely, the lyrical approach and psychological motivation. As the ideals of chivalry died out, the personal element came to the fore and the tragedy of the individual acquired increasing scope, all of which coincided with the rise of an urban middle class which eclipsed the other social strata. In the metrical field, on the other hand, Nizâmi was in no way an innovator, since all the metres he uses can be found in earlier epics. Şafâ is undoubtedly right when he claims that in the disputes between Khusrau and Shirin, Nizâmi imitated the corresponding passages in Gurgâni’s *Vis u Rāmin*; he may elsewhere have borrowed from other mathnawi writers also. But even if he did, he impressed the unique stamp of his genius on all his borrowings.

1 *Hamâsa*, p. 321.

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His lyrical divan is said to have amounted to almost 20,000 couplets, but apart from a number of ghazals and a handful of qaṣidas, is entirely lost. It would appear that tradition has greatly exaggerated the original number of lines, though what little remains is enough to show that Niẓāmī was a great master of the ghazal. His lyric poetry is permeated with passionate emotion, and its unusual dichotomy between the poet and the person addressed generates a sense of perpetual tension. He must certainly have been writing lyric poetry throughout his life.

The number of imitators of Niẓāmī's Khamsa was exceptionally great both in Iran and in areas within the sphere of Persian culture, i.e. Turkey, Central Asia, and India. These writers mirrored its form and its subject-matter, and chose analogous and sometimes identical themes, often reproducing them in similar groups of five. The first and foremost imitator was Amir Khusrav (see below, pp. 606–9), who in turn influenced others after him. From the point of view of poetic quality, the magnificent epic Lailī u Majnūn (895/1489–90) by Maktabī of Shīrāz comes closest to Niẓāmī's own poem, though Maktabī achieves new effects by the inclusion of ghazals, a practice for which there is evidence already at the beginning of the eleventh century. Maktabī's poem was in due course to have a counterpart in Fudūlī's treatment of the same subject in the language of Āzarbāijān, in whose literature Fudūlī's poem occupies a high place. The intense admiration which was felt for Niẓāmī is also reflected in arts such as miniature-painting, many of whose subjects are taken from the Khamsa.

THE İSFĀHĀN SCHOOL

The poet Jamal al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Razzāq İsfahānī is less well known than Niẓāmī, but he merits attention because of his plebeian origins and especially because he represents the İsfahān School in the literature of Persian ‘Irāq. Born in İsfahān of a local family who appear to have been artisans, he worked as a goldsmith and miniature-painter. His education and knowledge were of the usual kind. From early youth he began writing poetry, and although he produced much panegyric verse, he was not attached to any court. He suffered from an impediment of speech, and was left by smallpox with faulty eyesight. He attempted

THE İSFAHAN SCHOOL

to establish himself both in Āzarbāijān (visiting Ganja, where he must certainly have met Niẓāmî) and in Māzandarān, no doubt in the hope of obtaining a better livelihood from the local rulers; but he appears to have met with no success since he eventually returned to his home town, where he spent the rest of his life. He was well aware of İsfahān’s shortcomings and censured them, but he was too patriotic to restrain his indignation when Mujir ridiculed the city.

He practised all the less ambitious forms of lyric verse, though chiefly the qaṣīda and ghazal. His qaṣīdas sing the praises of numerous distant and nearby princely personages—especially the İsfahānī families Saʿīd and Khujand (the former of the Shāfiʿite and the latter of the Hanafite persuasion)—as well as of members of learned circles. He was influenced by the great panegyric poets who were his contemporaries: Khāqānī, Anvari, and Raṣḥīd Vaṭvāṭ, actually quoting from them on occasion (though they never quote him); but in contrast to their displays of erudition, he never abandons his simplicity. He had dealings of a friendly or polemical nature with many writers. In his own writings he delighted in proffering advice to all and sundry, in admonishing and criticizing, and in imitating Sanaʿī, though unsuccessfully. His qaṣīdas dispense with the exordium and plunge at once in medias res with the eulogy itself; descriptions of nature are infrequent throughout. He occupies an important position in the development of the ghazal, which he did much to perfect; its possibilities must have been particularly congenial to him, since he comes near to striking the tender notes of the ghazal in his qaṣīdas also. Vaḥīd praises Jamal’s choice of metaphors.1 The subjects of his poems attracted attention, as is shown by the echoes found in later masters of the ghazal, including Saʿīd. The ideas expressed in his works are idiosyncratic: he is constantly longing for renunciation but never practises it. His reflexions are based on traditional and formal theology rather than on philosophy or mysticism.2 “The qaṣīda known as āḥūb-i rūğār [confusion of the times] sums up all the bitterness of human life.” He died in 588/1192.

His son Kamāl al-Dīn Ismāʿīl of İsfahān (b. 568/1172–73) was one of the great poets of İsfahān and one of the very last important panegyric poets. Although he was prevented from completing his education by the financial difficulties which beset his family after his father’s death, the technical expressions recurrent in his writings show that he was

1 Armaghān, vol. xviii, p. 86.
3 Abdullah, The Value, p. 5.
soundly versed in all the customary branches of knowledge. Besides Persian he wrote Arabic poetry; but this has perished along with his prose writings. Like his father he was a Sunnite of the Shāfi‘ite persuasion, though he was also a member of the Ṣūfī order. But asceticism was by no means the keynote of his life; he was an excellent backgammon player and a lover of wine, which he used to request from those whose praises he sang. He began to write verses when a boy, and at the age of twenty composed the famous elegy on the death of his father, a work of high perfection. The influence of a member of the Sa‘īd family secured him a public position, but he lost it as a result of envious calumny and even suffered a fine. Although he was pardoned, he gave up the idea of an official career and thenceforth devoted himself solely to poetry. The influential persons to whom he addressed his eulogies ensured him a quiet life, and a considerable income too, which enabled him to support others less fortunate than himself. Besides praising the two distinguished Iṣfahānī families (Sa‘īd and Khujand), he wrote eulogies of the Khwārazm-Shāhs, the atabegs of Fārs and the princes of Ṭabaristān. His love for his home town was even greater than his father’s. For all his Ṣūfism, he was fond of luxury, ostentation, and the society of the great; and he lacked neither presumption nor desire for fame. On the other hand, he never harmed others. At the approach of the Mongol invaders he fled into the outskirts of the city disguised as a dervish, but this did not save him; he died in 635/1237 at the hands of the Mongols, when it was discovered quite by chance that he had hidden people’s valuables in a well. His tomb has been preserved.

Kāmal was most at home in panegyric poetry. In contrast to his father’s, his verse contains less depth of feeling, though it is more polished and exceptionally rich in new and striking ideas. Because of this he was called Kullāq al-ma‘ānī, “Creator of subtle thoughts.” The lack of lyrical exordia in his qaṣīdas is compensated by the frequent interjection of didactic advice, mystical reflexions, laments on life, sickness, transitoriness, and the all-pervading decay of civilization. His descriptions have always attracted unanimous praise. Kāmal was the creator of the standard ‘Irāqi type of qaṣīda, which was later—like his father’s ghazal—brought to its fullest perfection by Sa‘īdī. He also practised the shorter forms of lyric poetry, but did not reach very great heights in the ghazal because he often chose inappropriate modes of expression. Ritter has recorded the existence of a mathnawi by Kāmal on the subject of mystic love.¹

¹ “Philologika VII”, p. 105, no. 20.

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There is probably no author in the whole of Persian literature whose biography and works present so many riddles as do those of 'Aṭṭār. Virtually nothing is known about him because the works themselves, in so far as they are reliable and authentic, betray virtually nothing. The story that Abu Ḥamid Muḥammad b. Abū Bakr Ibrāhīṁ, generally known as Farid al-Dīn 'Aṭṭār, lived the same number of years as there are suras in the Qur'ān (114) must be firmly rejected. Since the date of his death can be ascertained with relative accuracy, the date of his birth can best be placed in 537/1142–43 or three years later. He was born in Nishāpūr or in a neighbouring suburb or town. In his poems he calls himself 'Aṭṭār, which means both “apothecary”, which in fact he was, and also “doctor”. In the pharmacy in Nishāpūr, which he had inherited from his father, about five hundred people had their pulses taken daily; yet in spite of this he was soon able to complete the epics Musibat-Nāma and Ḥābi-Nāma, which he had begun in his shop. There were advantages as well as drawbacks to his noisy surroundings, as he met people from all walks of life and was able to learn much from them. Amongst them were adherents to Ṣūfīsm, who introduced him to the miraculous world of the saints, and he certainly had links with Ṣūfī circles. It is nowadays considered possible that he came into contact in 616/1219–21 with Maulavī, who was at that time a boy, for it was to Maulavī, when on his wanderings, that the aged 'Aṭṭār dedicated his epic Asrār-Nāma, while to Maulavī’s father he prophesied that Maulavī would scorch with fire those whom the world had scorched. 'Aṭṭār himself writes that he visited the doctor Majd al-Dīn Khwārazmī (drowned in 606/1209–10 or in 616/1219–20), who was a follower of Shaikh Najm al-Dīn Kubrā (d. 618/1221); but he himself was never Najm al-Dīn’s disciple. A venerable old man, he was killed during a massacre in 618/1221, when, according to 'Aṭā Malik Juvainī, his native town was taken by the Mongols. Thus he reached the age of eighty-one. His grave can still be seen in Shādīyākh, a suburb of Nishāpūr, not far from the mausoleum of the saint Muḥammad Maḥrūq and the tomb of 'Umar Khayyām.

'Aṭṭār regarded himself as a prolific writer, but it is extremely difficult to ascertain exactly what he wrote. Once again we are confronted with numbers that cannot be trusted: a total of sixty-six works is reached if genuine, dubious, and spurious works are all included. But even if we confine ourselves to extant and definitely genuine māḥnāvis (Khusrav-
Nāma, Asrār-Nāma, Manṭiq al-ṭair, Muṣḥbat-Nāma, Ilāḥi-Nāma), together with a divān of lyric poetry, a collection of quatrains entitled Mukhtār-Nāma, and the insignificant Pand-Nāma, we are still faced with an impressive total of approximately 45,000 lines.

‘Attār’s best-known epic, and crowning achievement in the art of the mathnawi, is the Manṭiq al-ṭair, “The Language of the Birds” (an expression taken from the Qur‘ān, S. xxvii, 16), which is often called Maqāmāt-i Tuṣyr, or “The Stations of the Birds”. He was not the first to pick such a theme: Abū ‘Alī Ṣina had already written the symbolical Risālat al-ṭair, “Treatise on Birds”, in Arabic, and a poem of the same title, also in Arabic, is ascribed to Muḥammad Ghazālī (d. 505/1111). ‘Attār’s immediate sources or models were Ghazālī’s work, the allegorical dialogues about birds in the famous Ismā‘īlī-slanted encyclopedia of the tenth-century Ikhwān al-Ṣafā (“Brothers of Purity”), and Sanā’ī’s Sair al-ibād (see above, p. 557). ‘Attār blended his models, changed the object of the quest from the mythological bird ‘Anqā and the mythological bird Simurgh, and made brilliant use of the double meaning of the name Simurgh. In his version all kinds of birds assemble and decide to go and search for a king to rule over them. Hudhud, the hoopoe, assumes the leadership of the expedition because he knows where the Simurgh, the rightful king of the birds, lives; but he cannot set out alone. The birds are deterred by the difficulties ahead of them, and talk each other into pursuing aims which, though not despicable, are earthly and of little value for their quest; but the hoopoe always dissuades them from these aims. The journey is long and arduous, since the pilgrims have to pass through seven perilous valleys. Many of the birds fall by the wayside, but the survivors journey on for many years; the majority perish, until only thirty birds remain (ṣī murgh). Finally they reach the court of the Simurgh. There the sun of his presence shines, and in their own reflexions they recognize themselves, the thirty birds, ṣī murgh, the Simurgh. When they gaze on the Simurgh they behold themselves, and when they gaze on themselves they behold the Simurgh: and if they look on both at once, they see only one Simurgh. After many ages have passed, the birds are restored to their own identity and enter the state of “continuing to exist after having ceased to be”.

The Ilāḥi-Nāma or “Book of God” also takes the form of a story within a story, its principal theme being ḥabd, i.e. renunciation of worldly desires and wishes, whose place should be taken by the higher
ideals of mystic ethics and piety. The king asks his six sons what it is that they most desire. The first asks for the daughter of the king of the Peris, the second for knowledge of the magic arts, the third for Jamshid’s magic goblet, the fourth for the elixir of life, the fifth for Solomon’s magic ring, and the sixth for the philosophers’ stone. The king convinces each in turn of the thoughtlessness of his wishes and guides them towards higher goals.

While dialogue and persuasive speeches are the structural basis of the Ilahi-Nama, dialogue plays a noticeably less important role in the epic Musibat-Nama.¹ The subject of the story within the narrative framework is the soul’s journey during the meditation of mystical seclusion. It is possible that the accounts of spiritual journeys by the famous mystic Bāyazid Bistāmi (d. 261/874), which ‘Atār himself recorded in the Tadhkurat al-Auliya, specifically suggested this poem to him, or at least influenced his writing of it. In the Musibat-Nama the thought of the soul in meditation wanders through the mythical and physical cosmos, personified as a traveller who is the disciple of a pir (master of a mystic order). The traveller passes through forty stations corresponding to the forty days of his meditative seclusion, and after each of his visionary dialogues with one of the mythical, cosmic, and physical beings, or personified virtues of the soul, he receives instruction from the pir concerning his interlocutor; thus here too the sequence of speech, reply, and concluding lesson is preserved. The attitude of the traveller is one of spiritual distress, perplexity, irresolution, and despair. From the beings he visits he is seeking help, guidance, and deliverance from his tormenting condition. Each time he begins his speech with a captatio benevolentiae, by enumerating the being’s claims to fame, but all his requests receive negative answers, which always derive from the difficulties of each being’s own position. The prophets direct him to Muḥammad, who at last shows him the right way, the way into his own soul.

Quite different in structure is the relatively less extensive Asrar-Nama, constructed in the manner of Sanā’i’s Hadiqa, the later Mathnavi of Maulavi. In this small work many of the themes whose variations dominate the great epics are briefly sounded, the passages of theoretical instruction and the exhortations taking up more space than in the other works. The Khusrau-Nama or Khusrau u Gul is the complete antithesis of all four works so far mentioned. Logical and compact in structure,²

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¹ Ritter, *Das Meer*, pp. 18–30. Ritter is my authority in all this section.
it is a romantic story about two lovers, a piece of fiction of the usual adventure type without any trace of mysticism; it was probably an early work composed shortly after the death of the poet's mother. The real heroine of the epic is a most enchanting woman whose great beauty involves her in sufferings of all kinds, but who at the end victoriously maintains her feminine purity.\footnote{En miniature: Ilāhi-Nāma, ed. Ritter, pp. 31 ff., transl. Rouhani, pp. 71 ff.}

It must be emphasized that all ‘Attār's epics except for the last-named contain a much greater amount of abstract thought than their basic plots would suggest, since these are mainly taken up with the individual stories illustrating the underlying theme.

‘Attār's divān contains about 10,000 lines of lyric poetry in the form of qaṣidas and ghazals. It is almost devoid of descriptions of nature, and is completely lacking in panegyric verse (which ‘Attār eschewed completely, being quite indifferent to all holders of power); but his poetry is marked by transports of ecstatic fervour (and often rindī).\footnote{When there is kindness of heart, the religious law is valid only within certain limits.} In this he exerted a certain influence on Sa’īdī and Ḥāfīzī. He constantly uses word-repetition and regular refrains, no doubt to bring about a heightening of emotion. In comparison with Sanā’ī's ghazals, those of ‘Attār are distinguished by a great emphasis on mystical symbolism and by infectious enthusiasm. The Mukhtār-Nāma, "Book of Selections", forms an independent collection of 2,010 quatrains which ‘Attār himself selected as the best in his entire works and arranged in fifty chapters according to their content.

Exceptionally important is the Tadhkirat al-auliya, which consists of ninety-seven biographies of early mystics and is an excellent example of old, straightforward Persian prose. Twenty-three of the items, however, must be ascribed to Aḥmad al-Ṭūsī (twelfth century) and four to a later author.

‘Attār deepens the pantheistic tasavvuf by making the quest for the absolute more thorough—a quest whose central idea is the deification of the self. To set free the divine substance in himself completely and become God, a human being must take the way of fana, or cessation of being. The only force which can make this possible is that love which is prepared to make the utmost sacrifices.\footnote{Cf. Ritter, "Das Proömium", p. 179.} Passionate tones accompany this mystical speculation. Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī expresses his admiration for
Sanâ’ī, but regards himself as nothing better than a slave in comparison to ‘Attâr.

As in other cases, modern research has shown how the biography of Maulânâ Jalâl al-Dîn Rûmî (whom the Persians generally call Maulavi) has in the course of time been distorted and endowed with legendary features, though it must be admitted that the romantic vicissitudes of his life provided good grounds for this. Born in 604/1207, he came of an old and learned family in Balkh, where his father, Bahâ’ al-Dîn Muḥammad Valad, was a well-known preacher by no means averse to mystical speculation. He compiled a collection of memorable fragments from his sermons under the title Ma‘arif, “Gnoses”, echoes of which can be heard even in Maulavi’s divân and mathnâvi. Fear of the Mongols, together with the pressures of various controversies, impelled Bahâ’ al-Dîn to leave Balkh in about 616/1219-20, first for the holy places and then via Damascus to Qonya (c. 618/1221-22). After Bahâ’s death (628/1230-31) Maulavi came under the influence of the mystic Burhân al-Dîn Muḥaqiq of Tîrmîdh, a disciple of his father. Following no doubt the suggestion of this spiritual guide, he set out for Aleppo and Damascus to further his education. It may have been in Damascus that he first met the wandering dervish Shams al-Dîn Muḥammad Tabrîzî, for whom he conceived a passionate attachment after the death of Burhân al-Dîn in 638/1240-41. When Shams al-Dîn appeared in Qonya in 642/1244, he was at that time allegedly sixty years old. Nevertheless his physical beauty and his novel mystical-narcissistic theories concerning the higher world of the beloved (ma’ṣhûq) completely captivated Maulavi. When this passionate affair had aroused the antipathy of his disciples, Shams departed for Damascus in high dudgeon, but he allowed his pupil’s fervent supplications to weaken his resolve, and finally consented to return to Qonya, only to arouse another immediate outbreak of hostility (645/1247), which once again compelled him to leave the place. After this he vanished into thin air, but not without leaving some traces, because his sayings were later collected under the title Maqâlât-i Shams-i Tabrîz. Although these are difficult to understand, the ideas they have in common with Maulavi’s writings indicate the influence of Shams al-Dîn on the latter.

In vain the pupil searched for his master. It is thought that the dance

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1 Gölpınarlı in his article “Mawlânâ” comes to the conclusion that Maulavi at the time of his meeting with Shams al-Dîn was already 62 years old. He bases his argument on a ghazal of the poet. This hypothesis strikes me as very doubtful.
which members of the Maulavi order still perform to the languid sound of a reed flute and the gentle beating of a miniature double-drum represents the vain and desperate search for this mysteriously lost friend. This whirling dance is the centre-piece of all the rites of the Maulavi dervishes and was instituted by Maulavi himself. His longing and his anxiety made him a truly great poet; he identified himself with the vanished ma'shaq, and in so doing found him again spiritually. His poems are not sung by himself, they are sung by his teacher reembodied in him. He even wrote under the name of Shams-i Tabriz, "Sun of Tabriz", though occasionally he uses the name Khamsib, i.e. "Silent One", which Gölpinarlı thinks he had adopted as a pseudonym before his meeting with Shams al-Din. The playing of music and the singing of passionate hymns and dances were well able to rouse his turbulent emotions; they were roused too by his new mystical and emotional attachment to an illiterate "goldsmith", Şalâh al-Din Faridûn Zarkûb, with whom he became so infatuated that the jealousy and animosity of his other disciples were once again aroused, leading to a grave crisis in the order. After Şalâh’s death (662/1263-64) the master turned his affections to Hûsâm al-Din Hasan, who was the actual inspiration of his principal work. Jalâl al-Din’s mortal pilgrimage came to an end on Sunday, 5 Jumâda II, 672/7 December 1273; his bier was accompanied to the grave by the entire population of Qonya, not only the Muslims but the Christians and Jews also, all of whom remembered the master’s boundless tolerance.

The lyrical Kulliyât-i Shams, "The Complete [lesser] Poems of Shams", amount to a total of 36,349 lines in the excellent critical edition by Professor Badi' al-Zamân Furuzânfar. From first to last these poems are permeated with the mystical idea of the identification of subject with object, which leads on the one hand to pantheism and on the other to self-deification, "in which the narcissistic theme of the identification of the self with the loved object, of its fusion with it, is very prominent". In the impassioned ecstasy with which ideas and visions well up in them, these lyrics far exceed all Persian poetry previously written; indeed they were dictated in what amounts to a trance and, by contrast with the works of other poets, are in fact relatively simple in style. Despite this, the grandiose scale of the underlying ideas has a tiring effect because it is expressed with a monotonous seriousness to which all the lyrical variations, however, colourful and fiery, are unable to impart sufficient variety and interest. Diversity, it
must be emphasized, has never been one of the virtues of Persian poetry; on the other hand, the remarkable subtlety with which spiritual processes are described—in Maulavi’s work too—must be counted to its credit.

Jalāl al-Dīn’s principal work, an encyclopaedia or rather bible of Ṣūfism and theosophy, is the Mathnavī-i Ma‘navī, “The Mathnavi concerned with the Inner Meaning of all Things”. It is in six books, amounting to a total of 27,000 lines, the sixth book being unfinished and the seventh spurious. It is less passionate than the ghazals, but possesses great poetical beauty and other artistic qualities, quite apart from its importance for Ṣūfī philosophy and ethics. The poem lacks the customary opening cantos and begins with the lament of the reed flute, which was suggested by (Pseudo-)‘Attār. The sustained feat of imagination is astonishing when one considers that the work was dictated, to the one who inspired it, over a period of more than ten years which included several intervals; but this is partially offset by a certain lack of harmony in its contents (in this respect Maulavi resembles Sanā’i) and by some slight formal aberrations. Reflections alternate with parables and stories of the most varied kinds, the one often interrupting the other; emotions alternate with thoughts, erudition and rhetoric with simplicity, yet the language is so flexible that it always suits the content exactly. There can be no doubt that the technique of the narrative episodes in his Mathnavi is carried to even greater perfection than in the works of ‘Attār. A difficulty of a special kind lies in “the sequence of ideas, which is loosely associative and reminiscent almost of a train of thought. Another peculiarity is the relation of each story to the teachings attached to it. Often the story is not an allegory or moralizing parable; its purpose is simply to arouse the listener’s interest in what is to follow, the latter being only loosely connected. One would expect the moral to be based on the actual point of the story. This is, however, by no means always the case.”

Here too the influence of ‘Attār can be detected. Thanks to Nicholson’s critical edition, which provides both a translation and a commentary by the same scholar, it has at last become possible to penetrate into

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1 It should not pass unnoticed that, according to Gölpmarš, the Maulavi dervishes did not regard themselves as Šāfs and stood aloof from the Šāfs orders. Cf. Ritter, Oriens, vols. xiii-xiv, p. 346. Was this perhaps only the case in the early days of the order?


Maulavi’s theological system and to trace its connexions with Sanā‘ī and particularly with ‘Aṭṭār. Ritter fears that the results of such an inquiry, though likely to be considerable, might be less rewarding than could be expected, and he therefore suggests that Maulavi’s philosophy should be studied above all with the help of other authentic sources. These, says Ritter, are his letters and sermons, the sayings contained in his *Fihū mā fihi*, i.e. “Miscellanea”, the works of his father, the surviving tradition of his teacher Shams-i Tabrizī, the memoirs of Ahmad Asfākī (d. 761/1360), and lastly the works of Maulavi’s son Sultān Valad (d. 712/1312), who was also a Ṣūfī poet and with whom the history of the Maulavi order really begins. The establishment and growth of the order and the initiation of its first rituals were all the work of Valad. He also applied the concept of theophany to saints and shaikhs and made three hitherto unknown favourites of his father famous. He wrote a *mathnāvi* in three parts, which provides authentic information about his father and his doctrines; the second part, usually known as the *Rabāb-Nāma*, “Book of the Rebec”, consists of two sections which are very important philologically, for one is in Saljuq Turkish and the other in Greek.

**Saʿdi**

We think of the most popular moralist in Persian literature, indeed one of the most famous of all Persian poets, not as a stern mentor but as a jovial, laughing person, with perhaps a glimmer of good-humoured roguishness. That is at any rate the kind of person who emerges from his works. The biographical facts that have been handed down contribute little towards his portrait. And even Saʿdi’s own words cannot altogether be trusted; they cannot be taken literally and this makes it extremely hazardous to base a reconstruction of his life on the many stories which he tells, presumably only to entertain and instruct.¹ There is no contemporary information about him; uncertainties abound at every point. As to the dating of his life prior to 655/1257 and after 680/1281-82, there is nothing definite to go on and we must be content with hypotheses.²

The oldest records give us these names: Musliḥ al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh b. Muḥarruf b. Musliḥ b. Muḥarruf, known

¹ No one will, for example, believe the story of the dervish who crossed a river on his cloak.

as Sa‘dī Shīrāzī, but there are numerous variants. Both his own works and tradition confirm that he was born in Shīrāz, a town to which he remained most movingly loyal throughout his life and for which, no doubt, he longed passionately when travelling abroad. The date of his birth is based entirely on hypothesis, the most plausible suggestion being that of ‘Abbās Iqbal: 610-15/1213-19. Even then Sa‘dī would have reached a great age, though not the legendary one of 120. Thanks largely to the considerable culture of his father, Sa‘dī received a careful education from an early age; he often recalls his father’s love and wise guidance. His mother continued the same routine after his father died, when Sa‘dī was only about twelve. Shīrāz was by no means short of schools, and Sa‘dī began his studies there; these were cut short by his move to Baghdad, made through fear of the “Turks” (or so at least he says in the Gulistān). Tradition maintains that he was sent to Baghdad where he was supported by the Salghurid atabeg of Shīrāz; but he certainly cannot have gone there as early as 592/1196, since it is said that he studied at the famous Shāfi‘ite university, the Nizāmiyya. Moreover it is scarcely credible that the atabeg would have accorded such a favour to a boy of humble albeit educated background. Attempts have been made to derive specific dates from the names, which he himself gives, of his teachers in Baghdad: yet here, too, difficulties arise. Nor can anything be learnt from the passages in which Sa‘dī apparently addresses himself as a man aged fifty or sixty. We only know that after completing his studies he set off on travels which took him to Iraq, Syria, and the Hijāz. On the other hand it is hard to believe that he travelled in eastern Iran, Transoxiana, and India. The many impossible ingredients in the story of how he destroyed the infamous idol in the temple of Somnat exclude the likelihood that he visited India. Equally untenable is the description of his meeting with a boy in Kāshghar, which, if true, would suggest that even before the completion of the Gulistān his fame as a poet had spread to such remote areas; this is quite unlikely even if the date of the peace treaty between the Khwārazm-Shāh and the Qara-Khitai (probably 1210) is arbitrarily moved forward. This objection is corroborated by the fact that the best Persian Ars Poetica, al-Mu‘jam (630/1232-3) by Shams-i-Qais, contains no quotations from Sa‘dī, though there are a great many from other poets of that period.

The Gulistān mentions a visit to Tabriz, where Sa‘dī is said to have

1 Nafisi, Ta‘rikh-i durust, p. 65.
met the Şahīb-Dīvān Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Juvainī, his brother ‘Alā’ al-Dīn ‘Aṭā’-Malik Juvainī (see below, pp. 622–3), and the İl-Khān Abaqa himself, to all of whom he gave advice at their request—advice, however, which is much too naïve for the episode to be credible. That Sa’dī was famous at that time can be accepted without difficulty (Abaqa ruled from 663 to 680/1265–82), but it is very doubtful that he would have set out alone from Shīraz to Tabrīz since he declined other journeys at that time, though he did sing the praises of Şahīb-Dīvān Juvainī. Other meetings with famous people provide the material for favourite anecdotes, not a word of which can be true. For example, in Shīraz he is supposed to have met Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn, the earliest ancestor of the Ṣafavīd dynasty, whom he represents as holding strong Shi’ī beliefs; the fact that both men were Sunnīs was readily overlooked for the purposes of the anecdote. Sa’dī’s return to Shīraz after many years of travel brings us to the first reliable dates. Soon afterwards he completed his didactic epic Bustān, “The Orchard” (655/1257), and a year later he finished his Gulistān, “Rose-Garden”, which is written in both prose and verse, the former poem being dedicated to the ruling atabeg Muẓaffar al-Dīn Abū Bakr b. Sa’d Zangi, the latter to his son Sa’d b. Abū Bakr b. Sa’d Zangi, from whom Sa’dī took his nom de plume. Its derivation from the name of a prince has no significance, for there are other instances, the best-known being Qā’ānī in the nineteenth century. Sa’dī had certainly begun writing before this time, but he had not yet acquired fame. He left Shīraz unknown, and returned there equally unknown. Fame—and it was quite phenomenal—came only with the Bustān and then especially with the Gulistān, two works from which he has been universally quoted ever since.

Sa’dī’s assertion that he composed the Bustān immediately after his return to Shīraz and the Gulistān only a year later must be understood in the sense that he completed sketches brought back from his travels, because such short periods of composition would scarcely be possible for works so replete with details and original perceptions, not to mention their formal elegance and indeed perfection. Sa’dī settled permanently in his beloved Shīraz, where in monk-like seclusion he devoted himself to meditation and poetry; from the abundant experience which he had gained in his own life he imparted advice to rulers and subjects, disciples and admirers, and in turn delighted in their benevolence, their gifts and the subsistence they provided. This period
probably saw the composition of most of his lyric poetry, comprising both the ghazals and didactic panegyrical qasidas, in which he admonishes the great and comments on current events.\footnote{We also have verses composed in the dialect of his native town.} It is curious that he nowhere alludes to the death of the two brothers Juvaini; did he fear to do so, or had he already ceased writing? Nafisi has established the correct date of Sa'di's death, from among many put forward, as 27 Dhu'l-Hijja 691/9 December 1292.\footnote{\textit{Ta'rikh-i durrust.}}

It cannot be disputed that Sa'di was an adherent of \textit{Sufism}. The ambiguity of his ghazals may be overlooked, because this was customary. The most convincing proof of his \textit{Sufi} outlook is the chapter on love in the \textit{Bustan}. His tendency, however, was not towards speculation but at most towards asceticism, and his motives were dictated more by utilitarianism than by philosophical ethics. This is why, as a moralist, he shows little regard for consistent adherence to ethical doctrines which he himself has propounded elsewhere, but prefers to countenance exceptions which are quite their reverse when he feels there is no alternative. Truth is holy, certainly, but there can be occasions when prudence ordains a lie. This Sa'di illustrates in the very first anecdote in the first chapter of the \textit{Gulistan}, where infringement of the principle of truth is dictated by common humanity, since otherwise the caprice or stupidity of the king and the ruthlessness of his advisers would undoubtedly have led to bloodshed. A whole series of similar antinomies could be cited. In his own life, too, Sa'di did not always act in accordance with strict ethical principles. If he belonged to those rare figures in Persian literature who valued freedom of literary expression, who disliked the obsequiousness of panegyrical verse and preferred to express admonition in their qasidas, thus virtually committing themselves to controversies with the rulers, why then did he sing the praises of Hüleğü, the very man who had removed the Salghurid Saljuq-Shah, destroyed Baghdad, and put the last 'Abbasid Caliph al-Musta'sim to a most ignominious death? Why again did he lament this very caliph in a heart-rending elegy—quite out of line with the policy of his lord and master in Shiraz, Abū Bakr b. Sa'd, who, while professing to accept the Sunna, led his army in support of the Mongol campaign to destroy the centre of Sunni Islam? Shibli supposes that Sa'di, although usually included amongst the greatest \textit{Sufis}, was really no \textit{Sufi} by nature, but had to make an intense effort to accept \textit{Sufism}, being
naturally more inclined to externals in the manner of the mullas; indeed, he tells how his father castigated him when a small boy for his egotism and his critical eye for the faults of others. Sa‘di also criticizes pederasty, though he is not immune to similar tendencies himself.

This literary output embraces every kind of lyric poetry, as well as the didactic epic and elegant prose. The heroic epic did not suit his pacific nature (the prelude to a battle scene in the Bāstān is a display of bravura written to prove he could do it if he wished). A brilliant story-teller, he lacked the patience to allow himself to be tied to a single theme, which is necessary in romantic epics often thousands of lines in length, but not in didactic epics with their varied contents. Though he brought the ghazal to the highest degree of perfection in the period, he won most esteem for the prose of his world-famous Gulistān. He was thus a master of both prose and verse.

Sa‘di’s principal didactic works are the Bāstān and the Gulistān. Moralizing verse had long been in existence, it is true, but the great poet of Shirāz was the first to raise it to the level of true poetry. The Bāstān, or perhaps more correctly Sa‘di-Nāma, is an epic in the mutaqārib metre (three bacchic and one iambic foot), which was erroneously regarded as a prerogative of the heroic epic. The poem is almost 4,500 lines long and, apart from the opening (Sunni) doxology, is divided into ten chapters which deal in turn with various virtues. The poet begins each chapter with the outline of a theoretical problem and then illustrates it either from his own experience or from legends, history, and so on, in the manner usual in all didactic mathnavis. These parables, which are almost always brief, occur more frequently than in other comparable works.

The Gulistān follows the same ideological pattern. Its form may not have been beneficial to the development of Persian prose, for the work was written in rhyming and rhythmic prose interspersed with verses (which take up about a third of the book) in the manner of the Munājāt (“Prayers”), by Anšārī (d. 481/1088), who seems to have been Sa‘di’s model. In contrast with the Bāstān, where the parables are linked to ethical problems, the anecdotes form the body of the Gulistān, one or two lines of pithy wisdom being deduced from each: in fact this is a kind of miniature maqāma (see below, p. 618). The book consists of an introduction and eight chapters in which the anecdotal material is arranged under particular headings. Sometimes the title does not fit

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1 Si‘r, vol. ii, p. 34.
the anecdote, at other times the deduction has no recognizable connexion with it. Sa'di's style is characterized by a sovereign command of language, refined simplicity (lacking only in the somewhat over-ornamental introduction), and by a terseness at that time rare. If the Būstān cannot be said to contain any deep philosophy (except perhaps in the Ṣūfī third chapter concerning love), this is even more true in the thoroughly practical and sociologically more down-to-earth Gulistān, where the deductions are usually no more than the most obvious commonplaces, clothed admittedly in matchless poetry. An attempted translation will, to one's surprise, produce shapeless banality, because nothing can replace the magic of Sa'di's own simplicity. He can strike a spark of poetry from the most insignificant everyday occurrence, and the occurrence does not necessarily have to contain a lesson. The tone of the work is kaleidoscopic, the serious alternating with the comic, the sublime with the frivolous. There are also certain difficult passages; a good example is Sa'di's dispute with a dervish about rich people, who are criticized for their indifference to the poor and to those in distress. At first sight it appears that Sa'di is trying to defend the rich; but a deeper insight into his polished but bitter irony shows on whose side he was really.

Sa'di's two main works have produced a host of imitations (the Gulistān understandably even more than the Būstān). The best-known are Jāmī's Babāristān ("Spring Garden") written in 892/1487, and Qā'ānī's Kitāb-i Parīshān ("Pell-Mell"), written in 1152/1836.

Although popular at courts, Sa’di was certainly no court poet; despite this he could not entirely resist the attraction of panegyric verse, for all his condemnation of it. In the traditional order the catalogue of his lyric poetry contains four collections of qaṣīdas and one extensive strophic poem. But there is one great difference between him and his precursors. He came into contact with a great many courts, but he never renounced his belief in freedom of thought and freedom of the pen; nor did he ever beg. His eulogies are restrained; he rightly accuses Zahir Fāryābī of exaggeration, and all the more eager to fill his own qaṣīdas with good advice and wise remarks addressed to the shāhāns, in which he urges generosity and goodness, appeals to their better selves, and emphasizes the transitoriness of the world. To do this he had to choose his mode of expression judiciously, otherwise his audacity might have brought risks; he was, however, protected by his personal authority. In these lyric poems the didactic element is most prominent,
the lyric least. Not all the qasidas can be said to be valuable, for many are marred by diffuseness and monotony.

As regards content and scope, the main part of Sa’di’s output lies in the books of ghazals, together with a collection of aphorisms and maxims called Šābibiyya, and finally his “Fragments”, i.e. quatrains and single lines. The century-long development of the ghazal before Hāfiz culminates in Sa’di. What is his particular merit? Above all, he does not merely play with words in his praises of the beloved, but allows himself to be moved by feelings of genuinely experienced love, whether we regard it as realistic or transcendental. According to Bahār, many of the poems come near to declaring their political themes under the guise of wine and the beloved. Certainly Sa’di the moralist is true to himself when he opposes hypocrisy in all its forms. He also creates many subjects which are new and gives new colours to old ones. Not the least of his characteristics are the simplicity of the language, the appropriateness of his metres, the lightness of his refrains, and the direct way in which each story makes its single point.

Critical studies of Sa’di’s literary remains have recently been undertaken by Furuğhi and Aliyev. Six treatises written in ornate prose (that is, prose alternating with verse, as in the Gulistān) have survived under Sa’di’s name, though at least one of them cannot be deemed authentic. To these can be added a seventh, which is a shallow parody of the mystical and religious homily in the second treatise, and is also probably spurious. Sa’di himself, however, is undoubtedly the author of some short tales in the fifth chapter of the Gulistān which are far removed from the fragrance of the rose-garden. Indeed their existence helps to prove the authenticity of the extremely scabrous (Mutāyabāt “Jokes”, also known as Khābīthāt or Hazīyyāt, “Facetiae”), a collection of somewhat monotonous poems quite lacking in artistic taste, which Sa’di claims, in an apology in his preface, that he was ordered to write. In this aspect of the work of Sa’di, and of all similar writers, Bausani sees the only example of realism in traditional Persian literature: an extremely barren one at that. The authorship of the Pand-Nāma “Book of Maxims” is disputed; it was at one time a favourite text for study in the West, and contains many sound principles without ever aspiring to great artistic heights.

Sa’di is one of the most lively and colourful figures in Persian and indeed world literature. Yet it is quite impossible to co-ordinate his ideas into an integral system. Too impulsive and too much of a poet...
to be without inconsistencies, he is nevertheless always convincing, and his great attraction possibly lies in the very contrariety of his paradoxical ideas. These are for the most part truisms, but they are so superbly expressed that they are comprehensible even to the simplest person. Many have become proverbs, if they were not proverbs originally. Echoes of Firdausi, Asjadi, Sanai, Anvari, Zahir Faryabi, and even the Arabic poet Mutanabbi (d. 354/965) show Sa’di’s wide reading and good taste, while an inimitable lightness of touch pervades all his work. One of his most sublime ideals was the brotherhood of man, and his Sufism served the common people by encouraging activity and a balanced life; and in like manner he attacked intolerance, injustice, exploitation, and hypocritical or extravagant piety. But Sa’di’s unique and lasting success lies above all in his universally accessible and accommodating moral philosophy. The Persian, as indeed any human being, can see himself in Sa’di.

\textbf{SA’DI’S CONTEMPORARIES}

\textit{(a) Panegyric writers}

The Mongol invasion wrought such havoc in Khurasan, Azarbajin, and finally in central Iran, that poetry took a long time to recover in those areas. The great poets of the seventh/thirteenth century lived in unscathed peripheral lands, i.e. the south-west (Sa’di), Asia Minor (Maulavi), and India (Amir Khusrau). In Iran proper, literary life was concentrated at Shiraz, which had been left more or less untouched by the Mongols. The central figure here was undoubtedly Sa’di; the rest were merely imitators of earlier writers or of Sa’di himself. One writer deserving mention is Radi al-Din Abü ‘Abdallah Muhammad b. Abü Bakr Imami of Herat (d. 676/1277-79), who wrote panegyrics of the amirs and viziers of Kirmān. His qaṣidas and ghazals are simple in style and reflect the spirit of taṣāvvuf. Imami’s work has received obviously exaggerated praise from his better-known contemporary Majd al-Din Hamgar (b. 607/1210-11, d. 686/1287), who was at first a functionary and a panegyric writer at the court of the Salghurid atabegs of Shiraz. After their downfall, he was active at Isfahān and Baghdad, travelled through Khurasan, and finally returned to his native city. As a poet he shows a command of delicate ideas, and his quatrains, varied in theme and expression and personal rather than speculative in tone, are extremely beautiful.
Fakhr al-Din Ibrāhīm b. Shahryār ʿIrāqī was a contemporary of Saʿdī and, like him, had been a pilgrim in the eastern half of Islam; but in contrast to Saʿdī, he was a profound theosophist. A serene thirst for knowledge and a capacity for love were the dominant traits in his character, and they shaped his whole life. Born at Hamadān in 610/1213, he astonished those around him by his unusual talent and erudition. At the age of seventeen, he joined a band of wandering dervishes, amongst whom was a beautiful youth for whom he conceived a passionate admiration (an occurrence which was to repeat itself later). He abandoned everything, and wandered with them about Persia and India, where for twenty-five years he lived with Bahāʾ al-Din Zakariyyā of Multān, a disciple of Shihāb al-Dīn Suhravardi. But at last the jealousy of his colleagues in the order forced him to leave secretly for Mecca. After completing the pilgrimage he visited Qonya, where he was enthralled by the lectures of Shaikh Ṣadr al-Dīn Qonāvī on the speculations of the famous mystic philosopher Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240). Under the impact of these lectures ʿIrāqī wrote his Lāmaʿāt (“Lightning Flashes”), which are ecstatic meditations on Ibn ʿArabī’s Fusūs al-Ḥikam (“Ring-Stones of Wisdom”). Circumstances led him to travel to Cairo and thence to Damascus, a place sanctified by the presence of Ibn ʿArabī’s and other tombs. In both cities he was received with unprecedented pomp. He ended his days in Damascus in 688/1289 and was buried next to the grave of the man who in his eyes represented the most sublime theosophy.

The Lāmaʿāt, ʿIrāqī’s principal work, is not large in size but is profound and truly poetic. It is written in prose interspersed with Persian and Arabic verse. With this work a new influence began to affect the theory of love, namely that of Ibn ʿArabī’s theosophy, whose monotonous outpourings were soon to inundate the last remaining islands of independent mystic thought within Islam.1 Of the various commentaries on the book, that of Jāmi, entitled Ashīʿa-yi Lāmaʿāt (“Flashes of Lightning”, 886/1481), became the most famous. ʿIrāqī’s divān and his delightful Ushsh dq-Ndma “Book of Lovers”, also known as Dab Fasl, “Ten Chapters”), a short mathnāvi incorporating ghazals, move along the same erotic-mystic lines, reaching their peak of

ecstasy in the ghazals of the divān.\textsuperscript{1} Compared with Maulavi’s poems, ‘Irāqi’s are more polished in form. ‘Irāqi’s theoretical statements on mystical love are all the more important because, thanks to an extant detailed biography of him, much is known about his personal experiences of mystical love, which is rarely the case with Persian poets.

Afḍal al-Din Muḥammad Kāshi, generally called Bābā Afḍal, was born around 582/1186-87 or 592/1195-96 in Maraq near Kāshān, and died after 654/1256 or 664/1265-66; according to Minovi, however, he lived considerably earlier, at the beginning of the seventh/thirteenth century; he is buried in Maraq. There is scant information about his life, and it has little importance. His thought was influenced by the Bāṭiniyya and by Avicenna, whom he also resembles in his attempts to substitute Persian technical terms for Arabic ones. His writings are chiefly in Persian, but sometimes also in Arabic. His prose works are concerned with philosophy, theosophy, metaphysics, ethics, and logic; they are partly original, partly editions or translations of the writings of others, are distinguished by a simple, intelligible, and lucid style. Bahār regards Afḍal’s translation of Aristotle’s Kitāb al-nafs (De Anima) as exemplary. Bābā Afḍal’s quatrains are extremely attractive, and their occasional notes of revolt were remarked on long ago by Whinfield.\textsuperscript{2} It is no wonder that several of them have gained currency as purported works of Khayyām. Bābā Afḍal must also be included amongst the principal theorists of Sufism.

A figure of much more questionable importance is Shaikh Maḥmūd Shabistārī (d. c. 720/1320-21), whose Gulshan-i Rāz (“Rose-Garden of Secrets”) written in 710/1311 has received some notice in the East and undue admiration in the West. It is a relatively brief compendium of symbolic “Ṣūfī” terminology, and was in fact a series of versified replies to versified questions by Mir Husaini Sādāt (d. 718/1318). The fact that the then Aga Khan interested himself in a Bombay (1280/1863) edition of this work suggests that the author (if indeed he was Shabistārī) may have had Ismā‘īlī leanings.\textsuperscript{3} Whoever he was, he was no outstanding poet.

Rukn al-Din Auḥādi Isfahānī (b. in Marāğheh about 670/1271-72, d. 738/1338) has been much admired and imitated in the West for

\textsuperscript{1} ‘Ubaid-i Zākānī’s mathnavī of the same name written in 75/1350 was probably inspired by this work but is concerned with worldly love.


\textsuperscript{3} See Arberry, \textit{Classical Persian Literature}, p. 304.
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his artistic expression of Şûfi ideas. This is particularly true of his principal work, the mathnawi Jâm-i Jâm (“The Cup of Jamshid”, i.e. the mirror of the whole universe), written in 733/1332-33 in the manner of Sanâ’î’s Ḥadiqa, though not in blind imitation, since Auḥad adapted his work to the requirements of his own age. For us today his importance lies not so much in his mysticism as in his social and pedagogic interests, such as social intercourse, the rebuilding of cities, the education of children, criticism of magistrates, and so on, to which he gives greater attention than do most Persian poets. His poem “is thus in some sort an amalgam of the Qâbûs-nâma with the Ḥadiqat al-haqïqa”.

Some of Auḥad’s ghazals were even incorporated in the divân of Ḥâfîz. A poet and critic as sensitive as Muhammad Bahâr has observed that a ghazal by Auḥad can be fully the equal of one by Ḥâfîz himself. Auḥad seems to have owed his nom de plume to the head of his order, Shaikh Abû Ḥamid Auḥad al-Dîn of Kîrmân (d. 697/1298), who was the author of a mathnawi entitled Mîshâb al-awwâb (“Light of Souls”). This is an allegorical pilgrimage through imaginary cities, displaying basic ideas which are strikingly similar to those of Dante’s Divine Comedy. Auḥad of Kîrmân was suspected of heresy, which is not surprising since he was a disciple of Muḥyî al-Dîn ibn ‘Arâbî: he advanced the doctrine of man deified and “belongs together with Ahmad Ghazâlî and ‘Iraqî to that group of Şûfis who revered heavenly in earthly beauty”.

NIZÂRÎ

Ḥâkim Sa’d al-Dîn b. Shams al-Dîn b. Muḥammad Nizârî Kuhistânî (b. 645/1247-48 at Birjand, d. there in 720/1320-21) stands out among Persian poets for his individuality. He came of an old but impoverished family of the landed aristocracy, and lost what little wealth he had inherited during the Mongol invasion, so that he was reduced to a life of hardship. He acquainted himself with Persian and Arabic literature, and ‘Umar Khâyyâm had a particularly strong and lasting influence on him. Although some of his teachers were Sunnî, he held fast to the religious beliefs of his father. Nizârî was ostensibly a Shi’î of the traditional kind, but he undoubtedly had leanings towards Ismâ‘îlism,

1 Arberry, Classical Persian Literature, p. 307.
2 Bahâr, p. 184.
3 According to Eghbal, MDAT, vol. 11, pt. 3, p. 8, it is the work of Muḥammad b. El-Toghan Bardâshî and is only ascribed to Auḥad al-Dîn Kîrmânî.
4 Ritter, “Philologika IX”, p. 60.

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particularly in his interpretation of the Qur'ān and of external observances (for instance with regard to wine-drinking), and also in his refusal to believe in the existence of Hell. From his youth on he served at the court and in the chancellery of the Kart rulers of Herāt, and he had perforce to sing their praises in qaṣīdas. As if in loyalty to the Ismāʿīli tradition, he longed for detailed knowledge of other lands and peoples, and of their opinions; and both in his official capacity and on his own initiative he undertook many journeys. The fruit of his two years of pilgrimage (678-79/1280-81) was the Safar-Nāma (“Travel Book” about 1,200 lines long), in which, far from recording trivialities, he describes the life of the cities and regions he saw, his meetings with people, and other experiences. After returning to Herāt he re-entered the service of the court, but was so slandered that he lost his position. A self-defence written in verse, the Mumāzārā-i Shāb u Rūz (“Dispute between Night and Day”) resulted in his pardon, though only for a time. He then withdrew into solitude, and poetry itself is said to have become repugnant to him; eventually he set himself up as a farmer, a way of life which he, like Ibn Yamīn, valued highly.

His divān contains about fifteen sections, amongst them the long mathnāvī (about 10,000 lines) called Aṣhar u Maghar, concerning the fidelity of two lovers; it was written in 700/1300. Nizārī’s ghazals go beyond the traditional literary models, and in so doing mirror all the more clearly the social discontent which resulted from the Mongol oppression and exploitation. Another work that bears the stamp of originality is the Dastūr-Nāma (in 576 lines), a kind of parody of the popular “books of maxims”, which in its language and poetic form is extremely polished; it was written for the poet’s sons, but in fact “gives to those who lead a dissipated life and are partial to a goblet of wine rules of conduct which are in direct opposition to those laid down in the Qur’ān”. Daulatshāh says that the work was much appreciated by connoisseurs and men of the world, but he does not conceal the attitude of the clergy towards the poet—to them he was a heretic indeed.¹

Nizārī is little known and certainly underrated. The reasons for this lie in his convictions, his opinions, and the attitude of his poetry. Bertel’s regards him as an outspoken free-thinker and blasphemous underminer of the very foundations of orthodoxy.²

¹ “Destūr-nāme Nizārī”, p. 42.
² Leiden ed., p. 231, l. 24; p. 233, l. 7; Bertel’s, op. cit. p. 44.
The earlier phase of Islamic contact with India goes back to the eighth century; but it was little more than a prelude. In fact Islam began to take root only with Maḥmūd of Ghazna (early eleventh century), whose Indian policy was continued by his successors and, later, by members of other dynasties; though all were Turkish, they brought the Persian language and customs of India with their courts, because they themselves had come under the sway of Persia's highly developed culture. The influence of the courts, and the presence of Indians at them, caused Persian to spread throughout the conquered territories, where anyone wishing to enter the civil service had to master that language. The upper classes were naturally the ones affected, and it was from their ranks that the Indo-Persian poets were drawn, in so far as these were not Iranian immigrants. As foreigners, they showed many peculiarities in their writings—writings which Persians proper regard as un-Persian. Nevertheless there were several Indo-Persian men of letters—a surprisingly large number in all—who exerted an influence in Iran itself and in Central Asia. The greatest of them was Yāmīn al-Dīn Abū’l-Ḥasan Āmir Khūsrau Dihlāvī, who was born in 651/1253 at Patyālī and died at Delhi seventy-five years later.

Āmir Khūsrau was an Indian only on his mother's side; his father, an illiterate Turk from Central Asia, was a man of some importance, who had moved to India with his tribe, the Ḥazārā-yi Lāchīn, during the Mongol invasions, either from Transoxiana or from Bālkh. Although he belonged to the Chishtī order of Śūfīs and was completely devoted to its shaikh, the saint and scholar Nizām al-Dīn Auliya (d. 725/1324), Āmir Khūsrau worked as a court poet in the service of various rulers and dynasties in Delhi and Multān. This did not in the least disturb the mystical bent of his lyric poetry. The poetic works of this Ṭūṭī-yī Hindī ("The Indian Parrot") were formerly estimated to run to 400,000 lines, but this total is quite fanciful and cannot stand up to critical examination, even though Khūsrau was undeniably an extremely prolific poet and also a prose writer. He collected his best lyrics in five divāns which contain eulogistic qāsidas and also examples of all the other lyric genres, especially the ghazal. In qāsidas Āmir Khūsrau followed the example of Khāqānī, though without the latter's incomprehensibility, while also imitating Sānāʾī and later his own contemporary Kamāl al-Dīn Isfahānī; in the ghazal, however, Sa’dī
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was his model. Muḥammad Waḥīd Mīrzā, while not wishing to under­
rate the poet’s other works, regards the ghazals as the most important
part of his output and emphasizes their simplicity, internal coherence,
wealth of feeling, and joie de vivre, their melodious sound (whence their
popularity amongst Sūfis), and finally their intellectual sublety, a
quality which he claims is lacking in the Persian poets of Iran, apart
from Jāmī (d. 898/1492) and Naṣirī (d. 1021/1612-13).¹

Amīr Khusrau’s work culminates in his epic poetry, which is an
essential link in the development of the Persian mathnāvī. It consists
of historical poems and of parallels to Nizāmī’s Khamsa, each group,
like the Khamsa, being divided into five parts, as is Khusrau’s lyric
poetry too. The themes for the first group of epics are taken entirely
from contemporary local history; thus Khusrau inaugurated a new
development by rejecting the romanticism of the fairy tale and the
myth in a daring attempt at historical and local realism. This branch
of his epic poetry, which occupied him from 688/1289 until his death,
includes: Qirān al-sa’dain (“The Conjunction of the Two Lucky Stars”),
written in 688/1289, which describes the struggle for the throne and
reconciliation between Kai-Qubād, the son, with Bughra-Khān, the
father; Miftāḥ al-futūh (“The Key to Victories”), written in 690/1291,
which describes the four victories won by Jalāl al-Dīn Firūz-Shāh
Khalji in the single year 689/1290; and the Tughlaq-Nāma, which deals
with the events during the short life of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tughlaq-Shāh,
and was composed towards the end of Khusrau’s life.

The first of these poems was written at the behest of Kai-Qubād
himself. Though the theme was not exactly attractive, the command
did enable Amīr Khusrau to realize his long-held ambition of trying
his hand at an epic of some length, possibly in emulation of the masterly
Nizāmī. He succeeded in avoiding the obvious pitfall of monotony
and produced a work of outstanding merit, which is recognized by critics
as his finest mathnāvī, but to do so he had to call upon all his powers of
narrative and lyric invention, interspersing a whole series of ghazals
and poetic descriptions among the sections of narrative, a feature which
recurs in the other poems in this group. Each chapter has a title in the
form of abyāt-i silsila, i.e. uniformly versified titles for each canto, and
this practice is repeated in several of his other epics and divāns. In the
Miftāḥ al-futūh historical accuracy is emphasized; and as in the previous
work, the panegyrical origin of the poem is transparent. The Tughlaq-

¹ The Life and Works of Amīr Khusrau, pp. 205 ff.
Nāma was likewise written at a royal behest. “The mathnavi does not offer many attractions to a student of literature. It is on the whole a plain narrative but with a few of those lively and imaginative passages that characterize Khusrau’s other poetical works.”

Unique features are discernible in Nuh Sipihr (“Nine Heavens”), written in 718/1318, an epic of heterogeneous content. Epic descriptions alternate with passages praising India and more or less directly extolling Mubarak-Shāh Khaljī (716-20/1316-20). “The poem, in fact, is replete with things of immense historical and sociological interest and may safely be claimed to be a composition unique, in style and spirit, in the whole range of mathnavi literature—a poem which would amply repay a careful study and would be appreciated much better after a thorough perusal.”

In contrast with Khusrau’s other versified narratives, ‘Ashiqa or ‘Ishqiyya (715/1316) is built around “the central theme of the romantic love and the tragic fate of Khizr Khan and the beautiful princess Devaldi”. This epic undoubtedly influenced Salmān Sāvaji, who was one of the first to follow the lead of the great Indian poet.

Amir Khusrau was the first poet who wrote on the model of Nizāmi’s “Quintet”, and he did so in a way that was to have a decisive effect on later imitations. The Indian poet took the same subjects as in the Khamsa, altering the various episodes, the motivation, and the language to a greater or lesser extent, and displaying an erudition which, though considerable, by no means equals Nizāmi’s. The clear-cut outlines of Nizāmi’s poetry here give way to a certain nebulous quality, and its philosophical profundity and social preoccupation vanish. But it was precisely this undisputed lowering of levels and euphuization of style which accorded with the taste of the times. There have been occasions, though only in periods of literary decadence, when critics have given preference to Khusrau’s Khamsa. The great Nizāmī, despite his verve and creative ebullience, spent half a lifetime on the composition of his Khamsa, whereas Amir Khusrau completed his task in just under three years (698-701/1298-1301). His Khamsa does not amount to much more than half Nizāmi’s in length. Notwithstanding all his talent and wealth of imagination, the speed of composition alone would prevent his being the equal of the master of Ganja. Vahid Dastgirdi does not attribute any very great poetic value to Khusrau’s Khamsa.

1 Wahid Mirzâ, op. cit. p. 252. 2 Ibid. p. 189. 3 Ibid. p. 178. 4 Ibid. p. 192, for various views on the subject.
Some of Khusrau’s quatrains are reminiscent of Khayyám, and there are several others in praise of apprentices, the latter reputedly drawn from a collection of amorous epigrams entitled Shahr-Āshūb, “Disturbers of the City”. (Humorous poems of this kind appeared both before and after Khusrau.) The question of Khusrau’s Hindi poetry remains unsolved. Though the poet must certainly have known his own vernacular (after all, his mother was of Indian origin), the authenticity of the poems ascribed to him in this idiom is extremely doubtful. He did, however, make use of Hindi words in his Persian poetry.

What is of interest is his prose, even if the titles of the numerous works traditionally ascribed to him must be reduced to no more than three. The principal one of these is his Ijāz-i Khusravi (“Khusrau’s Inimitability”) or Rasa’il al-Ijaz (“Treatises on Inimitability”), an extensive work dating from between the years 682/1283-84 and 719/1319-20, which consists of six treatises on various stylistic and rhetorical questions together with examples of letters, etc. “It introduces a healthy change by his innovations inasmuch as he attached more importance to ideas and intellectual figures of speech than to senseless alliterations, quips and puns.” His Ta’rikh-i ‘Ala’i (“History of ‘Alá’”), or Khaż’in al-futuh (“Treasure-Chambers of Victories”), written in 711/1311-12, describes events during the years 695-711/1296-1312, when ‘Alá’ al-Din was reigning. The style is extremely bombastic and precious, though the work remains an important historical source. Khusrau’s Afdal al-fawa’id (“The Most Excellent Moral Precepts”) is a compendium of the sayings of Niẓām al-Dīn Auliya, his Şūf guide.

Information has survived of the poet’s musical abilities and it is probable that he did much to bring about the fusion of Persian and Indian music in India though unfortunately there are no works on music by him.

Amir Khusrau is the greatest representative of Indo-Persian classicism. His style, which Bertel’s calls “powdered”, may be seen as a prelude to the “Indian style” proper, which was to arise almost three hundred years later. Although he liked to follow precedents, there is no denying that he made considerable efforts to be independent; his epics, in so far as they are based on his own experience and observations, are certainly original. Emotional depth and a sense of humour are outstanding qualities of his writing.

1 Ibid. p. 220.  
2 Ockerk, p. 41; idem, “Navoi i Nizami”, p. 81.
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One of Amir Khusrau’s close friends was Amir Najm al-Din Ḥasan Sijzī, surnamed Ḥasan Dihlavi (b. 651/1253, d. 729/1328), a court poet, though perhaps reluctantly, since it is likely that under the influence of his spiritual mentor Niẓām al-Dīn Auliya he regarded panegyrics as unworthy of a poet. His eight hundred or so ghazals, which are much admired both in and outside India, are distinguished by simplicity of language and poetic technique and by an emotional force even greater than in Khusrau’s, though Ḥasan knew how to be mordant as well as delicate. Marek also refers to romantic and didactic epics and prose works by Ḥasan. Although his poetry seems at first sight simple, it is in fact written with great skill. It is not surprising that he influenced even Persian and Central Asian poets such as Kamāl Khūjandi (d. 803/1400-01) and ดาmr ʾIṣfahānī (d. after 985/1578); Kamāl was even called “Ḥasan’s Plagiarist”. Like Khusrau, Ḥasan took Saʿdi as a model. Compared with those of many other poets, his ghazals have a remarkable internal coherence.

PANEKYRIC POETS AT MINOR COURTS

A poet whose fame was great even in his own lifetime is Kamāl al-Dīn Abūʾl-ʾĀṯār Maḥmūd b. Ālī, whose poetic pseudonym Khwājū (“The Little Lord”) was probably a childhood nickname. Born in 689/1290 or 679/1281 at Kirmān, he was very much a court poet, as his qaṣidas, dedications, and epics prove. His patron was the last Il-Khān Abū Saʿīd; he then served the Muzaffarids and the Jalayirids, finally settling at the court of Abū ʾIṣḥāq ʾInjū in Shīrāz, where he died in 753/1352 or 762/1361. Much of his life was spent wandering from place to place, and in so doing he became acquainted with many people and joined a Ṣūfī order, which was to make its mark on his writing. He was twenty-seven when one of his qaṣidas was immortalized in plaster on the walls of the bath-house at Yazd. Even if later generations have somewhat modified the hasty judgments of their merit, his writings are numerous and remarkable, especially his diwan entitled Sanāʾīʾ al-kamāl, “Arts of Perfection” (alluding to his name Kamāl al-Dīn). Because he was a court poet, the panegyric element is very much to the fore, though he praised not only temporal rulers but also the imāms, especially ʿAlī. Much of his poetry springs from religious—mostly Ṣūfī—and ethical considerations. His qaṣidas were obviously

1 Dějiny perské a tadjické literatury, p. 524.
written under the influence of the 'Iraqi school, while Sa'di influenced his ghazals, even though he himself maintained that he wrote in the manner of Ḥāfīz. While it is not true that Ḥāfīz actually praises him in so many words, the number of identical subjects in the divāns of both poets suggests that they shared sympathies; a likelihood confirmed by the fact that their ghazals have been confused by later generations. Their common sphere of activity, together with the fact that they probably knew each other personally, makes it easy to believe that they influenced each other, and Khwājū is more likely to have influenced the young Ḥāfīz than vice versa. Köprülû sees in Khwājū’s ghazals a connecting link between Sa’di and Ḥāfīz,1 Shibli Nu’mānī perceives a lack of mysticism in his poetry and in consequence regards him as nothing more than a colourful flower without a scent.2 Khwājū even wrote riddles and logogriphs, both decadent literary genres but widely popular for this very reason; on the other hand he was adept at choosing the mot juste, and was versed in intricacies of poetic technique and stylistic art to the point of artificiality.

In writing a “Quintet” Khwājū modelled his work on Nizāmī’s, but also introduced alterations which were to be perfected one and a half generations later by Jāmī. Khwājū’s mathnavīs belong to his maturity, perhaps even to his old age. Two of them are love stories, the other three being devoted to religious themes, either ethical, Ṣūfī, or inspired by the poet’s membership of his order. The love stories concern the adventures of two couples, Humdi u Humayun (732/1331-32) and Gul u Naurūz (“Rose and New Year”, 742/1341-42), the latter being the better mathnavī, though its subject matter is not original. Both are almost like fairy tales from the Arabian Nights, with a tendency to veer into mysticism.3 The next phase in Khwājū’s epic-writing is represented by his Raudat al-Anwar (“Garden of Lights”, 743/1342), an imitation of Nizāmī’s Makbzan al-asrār (see above, pp. 579-80); then follow two Ṣūfī ethical mathnavīs, the Kamāl-Nāma (“Book of Perfection”, 744/1343-44) and the Gauhar-Nāma (“Book of the Pearl”, ? 746/1345-46).

As to the Sām-Nāma—an epic, more in the form of a courtly novel, about the ancient Iranian hero Sām—Safa favours Khwājū’s authorship for a variety of reasons, although the old sources make no mention

1 IA, vol. v, p. 40a.
2 Shīr, vol. v, p. 30, where he makes the same reservation with regard to Salmān Sāvaji.
3 Bausani, Istoria, p. 752.
of the work;\textsuperscript{1} Köprülü, on the other hand, doubts its authenticity and regards it as a feeble effort. Several prose treatises are also ascribed to Khwâjû; they are all written in an artificial prose style in the manner of the \textit{Maqâmas}.

In spite of his reputation, Khwâjû is a poet without personality; it is truer to say that he was a successful imitator of greater poets both in his lyric poetry and in the romantic and reflective \textit{matnavigi}. Indeed he was so skilful at imitation that his contemporary Hâdîr of \textit{Shirâz} accused him of plagiarism in a versified lampoon, doubtless prompted by nothing more than spiteful envy of the reputation that Khwâjû was already enjoying.

A remarkable exception to the general monotony of Persian poetry in this period is presented by \textit{Amîr Maḩmûd b. Amîr Yâmîn al-Dîn Ţughra’î} of \textit{Faryûmad} (this was not his actual birthplace), named Ibn Yâmîn for short, born in 685/1286 or 687/1288. After the death of his father, who was also a poet, he succeeded to the latter’s office as a director of finance to the vizier of \textit{Khurâsân} in 722/1322, but this gave him no satisfaction as he was denounced by his colleagues and finally dismissed. In the unusually uncertain circumstances prevailing after the death in 736/1336 of the last ruling \textit{Il-Khân}, namely \textit{Abû Sa’îd}, Ibn Yâmîn shuttled between the courts of various rival petty princes. At the Battle of \textit{Zâveh}, fought between the poet’s patrons, the Sarbadârs of \textit{Sabzavâr}, and the Kârs of \textit{Herât} (743/1342), he lost the only manuscript of the \textit{divân} he had composed during the first half of his life, and probably all his wealth as well. He was taken prisoner by the victorious Kârs and remained in captivity for several years. He was not badly treated, but he had to sing his captors’ praises until he managed to return from \textit{Herât} to the Sarbadârs at Sabzavâr. He died in 769/1368 at \textit{Faryûmad}, where he was living a withdrawn life as a farmer.

The loss of the \textit{divân} was a bitter blow; but it was not lost entirely beyond recall, because Ibn Yâmîn pieced it together again as far as possible from his own memory and that of his friends. In Leningrad an old manuscript is preserved in which there are also poems dating from the first half of his poetic career. Since this manuscript certainly does not contain all his poetry, it can be assumed that Ibn Yâmîn’s total output was more than has actually survived; nevertheless 16,000 lines are a substantial amount, double the 8,000 lines in the printed

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Hamâsa}, p. 335.
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dition. He eulogized approximately sixty-five rulers, some of whom were mutual enemies, but his qaṣidas are all thoroughly average, often repeating themselves and full of plagiarisms. His ghazals are equally mediocre; it is in vers d’occasion (gif’a) that he excels, rivalling Anvari as an exponent of this form. These short poems are the products of the inspiration of the moment, and as a result contain inconsistencies and even contradictions. In them Ṣūfism alternates with rationalism, encouragement to activity with a desire for isolation from the world; they are, in other words, true products of their times. Ibn Yamin was in many ways a forward-looking poet, not without a touch of materialism. In these poems he attacks the feudal overlords whom he praises in his qaṣidas, confesses reverence for women, shows pity for the suffering, and extols the virtues of husbandry—but without ceasing to be the loyal servant of the sultans. He accepted the Shi‘ī convictions of the Sarbadārs as his creed and was amongst the earliest poets to praise the imāms and Karbala. All this, together with his knowledge of rural life, renders his “fragments” important for the understanding of social and peasant life in the period, while the document itself is almost unique amongst the Persian classics. Ibn Yamin captivates the reader not with the excellence of his style but with his down-to-earth ideas and his realism.

A country nobleman, Khwāja, Jamāl al-Dīn Salmān Sāvaji, i.e. of Ṣāveh (b. c. 709/1309, d. 778/1376), was the last notable pre-Safavid panegyric writer. He eulogized the Jalayirids, though he did not hesitate to praise their temporary conquerors. Because he was a “prince of poets” and in the ruler’s confidence, his favour was courted by many, and he soon acquired fame and esteem through the preciosity of his “over-artificial qaṣidas” written in the manner of the panegyric poet Sayyid Dhu‘l-Fiqār Shirvānī (d. 689/1290). This type of poetry had been in vogue before and was often to be cultivated with greater perfection afterwards, particularly by poets in the ninth/fifteenth century who put Salmān in the shade. As a compensation for their lack of ideas, the writers of panegyrics pursued a line of “art for art’s sake” all the more vigorously. Salmān was especially skilful in his use of the double entendre. But writing of this type was chiefly a way of attracting notice at the outset of his career. He wrote works of greater literary merit when he began to think up new subjects and new metaphors. Despite this, his qaṣidas still contain echoes of Kamāl al-Dīn Ismā‘īl, of Ṣahīr Faryābī, and Anvari, and even of the early panegyrist
Manūchihri (died c. 432/1040-41), while the great mystic poets can be recognized as the models of his ghazals. Salman wrote hymns glorifying God, the Prophet, and the imāms, in particular ‘Ali, who until then had not been praised very much in Iran; on the other hand, it cannot be maintained that Salmān was an out-and-out Shi‘i. Apart from these poems and other traditional forms of lyric verse, he wrote a Sāqi-Nāma (“Book of the Cup-Bearer”), which probably antedates Ḥāfīz and was therefore one of the earliest lyric poems; a romantic epic called Jamshīd u Khurshīd (763/1361-62), an adaptation of Khusrau u Shīrīn under another name; and a romantic tale Fīrāq-Nāma (“The Book of Separation”), written to console Sulṭān Uvais on the loss of his favourite; the separation was temporary at first, but after the reconciliation it was to become permanent, since his beloved died. Since the poem was based on an actual occurrence—and here Salmān was following the example of Amīr Khusrau—his Fīrāq-Nāma was to become a model for many later poets. In general Salmān’s works display accomplishment rather than genuine poetic fire. The praise he was given in the divān of Ḥāfīz was based on spurious poems, though Ḥāfīz certainly knew his works, as Salmān knew those of Ḥāfīz; and in fact their styles are so similar that some of Salmān’s ghazals have passed into the other’s divān. His frivolous verses (“Jokes”) recall those of Sa‘di. ‘Ubaid-i Zākānī reproached him for writing in the language of women, saying he must have written his poems for his wife; nevertheless the two men became friends.

Judaean-Persian literature lies somewhat outside the scope of this study. Towards the end of the Mongol period, Maulānā Shāhīn of Shirāz, taking as his subjects biblical material and Judaean-Persian traditions, became a kind of Firdausī or Niẓāmī of the Iranian Jews. Before his time translations of the Pentateuch had already been made. The Judaean-Persian writers all used the Hebrew script exclusively.

At this point the Mongol period comes more or less to an end, and poetry moves into the age of Timūr with the outstanding figure of Ḥāfīz.

**PROSE**

This section does not touch on strictly scientific prose, but is confined in the first place to belles-lettres; then to prose lying on the border between literature and science: didactic prose with literary pretensions; and finally, historiography.

Though New Persian prose has not acquired the fame of New
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Persian poetry, and with a few exceptions has not received the same notice or critical scrutiny as the poetry, it must on no account be underrated, as regards either quantity or quality. Immeasurable riches still lie hidden in manuscripts. A peculiarity of Persian literary prose, and often of scientific prose too, during this period is a tendency—to an even greater extent than in earlier periods—to approximate to poetry as the true voice of Persia. To this end literary prose favoured a florid style and the inclusion of verse, accompanied by an increasing use of Arabic. In didactic and scientific prose the same means were used, especially in prefaces and historical works, and sometimes even to the point of including verse in the text itself. Furthermore, in literary prose rhythm and rhyme were brought into the structure of the sentence, particularly in the short story in dialogue form known as magâma; indeed the whole gamut of rhetorical ornamentation and excessive Arabic borrowing were the essential features of this curious genre, and became much more important than the story itself. Tendencies of this kind had already been discernible during the Saljuq era, and Mongol rule only sharpened the taste for this ornamentation and preciosity in both literary and didactic prose. This trend, however, was not wholly uniform. Although it is indisputable that artificiality increased and that prose became highly elaborate and tended towards poetry, still there were always certain writers who cultivated simple or at least relatively chaste modes of expression. Two currents were thus at work in the same period. While historians delighted in styles of every kind, including the most pretentious, Sufi writers in general preferred a simpler tone. History apart, bombast tended to occur most frequently in biography and literary history, essays, and epistolary writings. In these genres may be found a style which is flowery, high-flown, often excessively verbose, and lacking in content sometimes to the point of utter vacuity; a style, moreover, which swelled the proportion of Arabic vocabulary in Persian to such extreme limits that only professional aesthetes were capable of understanding it. The requirements of reality were simply lost from sight.

I. Literary prose

The oldest Persian novel, Samak-i 'Ayyâr ("Samak the Magnanimous") was written down, according to the oral tradition of Ṣadaqa b. Abu'l-Qâsim Shirâzi, by Farâmurz Khudâdâd b. 'Abdallâh Kâtib al-Arra-
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jānī in 583/1189. It records the fabulous adventures of the various knights who courted the Emperor of China’s daughter. Another novelist, Abū Tāhir Muḥammad Ṭarsūsī, whose dates are quite uncertain, imitated Firdausī in the sphere of historical romance, and became famous for various prose novels based on Persian legends; his Dārāb-Nāma has been published.1 There is also a novel by Ḥamīd al-Dīn Jauhari Zargar dating from the sixth/twelfth century and telling about the poetess Mahsiti; only a small number of the quatrains quoted in it, however, can be accepted as genuinely hers.

Collections of anecdotes, arranged under various unifying titles, have also come down. The most important is Jawāmī‘ al-bīkāyāt va jawāmī‘ al-rīwāyāt (“Necklaces of Anecdotes and Lightning-Flashes of Tales”), comprising 2,113 stories gathered by Sadid al-Dīn Muḥammad ‘Auṭī. A descendant of ‘Abd al-Rahmān ‘Auṭ, one of the Prophet’s companions, ‘Auṭī came of a cultured Transoxianian family who engaged in literary pursuits; he was born between 567 and 572 (1171–77). He travelled widely, and worked at royal courts in Transoxiana, Sind, and finally Delhi; he seems to have had no moral scruples about changing masters. There is no further record of him after 630/1232–33. The collection of stories dates from the author’s later years and is distinguished by its simplicity, which contrasts with the pomposity of the Lubāb al-albāb (“Quintessence of Hearts”), written in 618/1221–22. The latter, besides being more characteristic of his style, is the oldest work of its kind in Persian literature. It is a sort of history of literature or rather a collection of biographies of poets, written in a flowery style, in place of which one would prefer more facts. ‘Auṭī was not an outstanding master of style and the importance of both works lies in their usefulness. The Jawāmī‘ al-bīkāyāt, a veritable fountain of anecdotes drawn from a great many sources, was in turn a source for the parables of the didactic writers and is important for this reason alone, quite apart from its occasionally valuable historical comments. In 620/1223 ‘Auṭī made a Persian translation of Al-Faraj ba‘d al-shidda (“Joy after Sorrow”), from the Arabic of the Qāḍī Abū ‘Alī al-Muḥsin al-Tanukhī (d. 384/994); but it has not survived. The original was again translated between 651/1253–54 and 656–73/1258–75 by Ḥusain Dihistānī Vazīrī, but it is not certain whether this was in fact a new translation or simply

1 See the Bibliography s.v. Bīghāmī. To judge from the manuscript, Bīghāmī must have written the text in the eighth/fourteenth or ninth/fifteenth century. The narrator, however, must have died a little earlier.
an adaptation of the older one; even now all the uncertainties about this so-called second translation and its author are far from having been removed.

Among the collections of moralizing fables or tales incorporated in a framework, first and foremost stands Kalila u Dimna, for countless ages one of the most treasured books of the peoples of East and West; it is also known by the name "Bidpai's Fables". For present purposes, its origin lies in the excellent Arabic translation by the Persian 'Abd-Allâh b. al-Muqaffâ' (executed c. 142/759), whose text was taken from the Middle Persian adaptation by Burzoe of various Indian models. Several Persian versions were based on the translation by Ibn al-Muqaffâ', but they were all superseded by that of Abu'l-Ma'âli Naṣr Allâh, probably a native of Shîrâz, who at the command of the Ghaznavid Bâhrâm-Shâh (511-52/1118-52) undertook a new adaptation. Khusrau Malik (555-82/1160-86) rewarded his ministerial services by having his executed. The versified version by Rûdaki has been lost. And even Naṣr Allâh's work (written between 515 and 537/1131-53), which, in spite of much rhetorical ornamentation adapted to the exigencies of contemporary taste, is still a masterpiece of Persian prose by virtue of its elegance and comparative simplicity, was not to remain unscathed. The ornamentation which he gave it seemed insufficient to later writers, who outdid each other in their customary stylistic contortions and bombast, though it is not surprising that so popular and highly valued a work should have been subject to such influences. The elegance of Naṣr Allâh's style became obscured and his text underwent such brutal distortion that it is virtually impossible to form any clear idea of its original state without the aid of a critical reconstruction. In or about 658/1260 Baha' al-Din Aḥmad Qâni'i of Ṭûs cast Naṣr Allâh's version into the form of a mathnawi in the mutaqârib metre for 'Izz al-Din Kai-Kâ'ûs, the Saljuq ruler of Rûm. The version by Ḥusain Va'iz Kâshîfî entitled Anvâr-i Subâlî ("The Lights of the Canopus") is far more blatantly rhetorical than that of Naṣr Allâh; but this belongs to the end of the ninth/fifteenth century.

The Marzubân-Nâmâ, written in the Tabari dialect by Ispahbud ("Prince") Marzban b. Rustam b. Shahryâr b. Sharvin around the turn of the tenth to eleventh century, provides a valuable parallel to Kalila u Dimna. Only two mutually independent New Persian versions have survived, both written in an over-elaborate style. These are the Marzubân-Nâmâ by Sa'd-i Varâvînî of Āzarbâijân, written between
607/1210 and 622/1225 and the ṫaʿṣṣat al-aṣrāfīl ("The Garden of Sensible Minds"), written at the end of the twelfth century, by a vizier of the Saljuqs of Rūm, Muḥammad b. Ghāzi of Malatiya. Three works resembling the Arabian Nights, viz. the Sindbād-Nāma ("The Book of the Seven Viziers"), the related Bakhtiyār-Nāma ("The Book of the Ten Viziers"), and the Tuti-Nāma ("The Parrot-Book"), date from this period and were at one time extremely popular. They are collections of tales arranged within the framework of a definite "moralizing" idea (mainly that same objectionable disparagement of and disrespect for women which underlies the Arabian Nights). One collection without any underlying idea is the Qiṣṣa-yi Chāhār Darvīsh ("The Tale of the Four Dervishes"), a fantastic work strongly impregnated with the romantic spirit. The origins of these collections lie for the most part in India and Sassanian Iran, though their texts have of course undergone the most varied and colourful developments. Sooner or later they were all clothed in a more elevated prose style. The original version of Sindbād-Nāma, written in a primitive style by Khwāja Amir al-Dīn Abu'l-Fawāris Qanārizī in 339/950–51, has disappeared, together with a poetic replica by Azraqī (d. before 465/1072); the latter was recast in a more elevated style by Muḥammad al-Zahirī al-Kātib of Samarqand in 556–57/1160–61. The oldest version of the Bakhtiyār-Nāma, dating from the beginning of the seventh/thirteenth century, is by a certain Muḥammad Daqāʾiqī of Marv, to whom a version of the Sindbād-Nāma is also attributed; it exists in several different versions, and was versified by an otherwise unknown poetaster named Panāḥī at the Qara-Qoyunlu court in 851/1447. The Tuti-Nāma, the anonymous original version of which has disappeared, is preserved in an "extremely tasteful new version" (Ethē) of 730/1330 by Ḥiyā al-Dīn Nakhshabī, as well as in shortened versions by Muḥammad Khudāyand Qadīrī (ninth/tenth century) and Abu'l-Faḍl b. Mubārak (d. 1011/1602–03), and in a metrical version by Ḥamīd of Lahore.

A nobler type of rhetorical art is represented by the maqāma, a true expression of art for art's sake, in the form of tales in prose interspersed with verse about the adventures of witty vagrants, an attenuated offshoot of the classical mime. The principal examples are in Arabic, although the creator of the genre, which was later to be brought to perfection by Ḥarīrī (d. 516/1122), is generally considered the Persian Badiʿ al-Zamān of Hamadān (d. 598/1007), unless chronological precedence is given to his rival Abū Bakr al-Khwārizmī (d. 383/993

618
or 393/1002). The Arabic works of two principal exponents of the *magāma* were then imitated in Persian by the qādī Ḥamīd al-Dīn (d. 559/1163–64), who employed fewer unfamiliar and recherche expressions than Ḥarīrī, and whose style was closer to that of his fellow-countryman Bādī’ al-Zamān. After an interval came Sa‘dī’s *Galīstān*, which had its first imitation in the *Nīgarīstān* (“Picture Gallery”) by Mu‘īn al-Dīn Juvānī (735/1335).

II. Literary prose bordering on the scientific or didactic

A work of Ṣūfī character, *Aṣrār al-tauḥīd fī Maqāmāt al-Šaikh Abū Sa‘īd* (“The Secrets of God’s Oneness on the Spiritual Stations of Shaikh Abū Sa‘īd”), provides valuable information about the life of the celebrated mystic who died c. 570–80/1174–85. According to this biography, written by his great-great-grandson Muhammad b. al-Munavvar, Shaikh Abū Sa‘īd did not himself write poetry; the poems generally attributed to him must therefore be by others. The work also possesses great literary merit, and except in its introduction avoids the artificialities fashionable in the sixth/twelfth century.

Ṣḥḥāb al-Dīn Šuhrāvārdī blended taṣāvvuf with Zoroastrian and Neo-Platonist ideas in his Arabic and Persian works, and put forward the heretical philosophy of Monism; for so doing he was executed in Aleppo in 587/1191, and he is therefore called al-*Maqṭūl*, “the executed one”, to distinguish him from other writers of the same name. His treatises in Persian are consciously artistic in style (H. Corbin calls them visionary) and are amongst the earliest allegories ever written in that language. Written in relatively simple language, these tales are remarkably effective. Other prose of this kind includes ‘Aṭṭār’s hagiographic *Ṭadḥkirat al-auliya*, and the *Mīrṣād al-‘ibād* (“Observatory of God’s Servants”) of Najm al-Dīn of Ray. In the latter work, besides important and varied themes drawn from Ṣūfism, there are valuable quotations from the poets, including the earliest reference to ‘Umar Khayyām’s quatrains.1 It was written at the request of the author’s disciples in 618–20/1221–23 in Qaṣāriyya and Sivās, where he had taken refuge from the Mongol hordes. For ‘Irāqī’s *Lama‘āt* (“Lightning Flashes”) see above p. 602; three minor prose works are ascribed to Shabistarī (p. 603 above); and the Arabic and Persian writings of Bābā Afdal should also be mentioned (p. 603 above).

1 Arberry, *op. cit.* p. 252, stresses “the detailed account of the mystical commemoration (*dbikr*), and the curious discussion of the kinds of ‘light’ seen in ecstasy”.

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POETS AND PROSE WRITERS

To the category of didactic prose belongs the *Akhlaq-i Naṣirī* ("Ethics of Naṣir"), so called in honour of the Ismā'īli Naṣir al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm of Kūhīstān, which was written in 633/1235–36 and is the first of three famous treatises on ethics. The author, Khwāja Naṣir al-Dīn Ṭūsī (597–672/1200–73), was one of Hūlegū’s most influential advisers, an outstanding polymath who composed innumerable scientific works in Arabic and Persian. He was at the same time a moralist of a very strange kind—"Professor Levy remarks that the verdict of history is a most unfavourable one"—who was able to be of service both to the Assassins and to their Mongol enemies, and to contribute to the downfall of the last ʿAbbāsid, an action allegedly prompted by his Shiʿi convictions. It is known that the *Akhlaq-i Naṣirī*, and in particular its introduction, was originally composed in the spirit of his then masters, the rulers of Alamūt, but was later submitted to a thorough revision under Hūlegū, who had put an end to the rule of the Assassins. Naṣir al-Dīn exonerated himself by claiming that he had written the earlier version under duress as a captive of the Assassins; in the changed circumstances, he was quite naturally at pains to conceal his past as far as possible. His writings deal with mathematics, astronomy (a short introduction to the subject in verse is ascribed to him), cosmology, mineralogy, geography, history, the science of calendars, law, medicine, education and morals, geomancy, logic, theology, poetry, and letter-writing. When the seven hundredth anniversary of the death of Khwāja Ṭūsī was celebrated at Tehran in 1956, the city justly honoured one of Iran’s greatest geniuses. He converted his ruthless utilitarianism into an active policy and ended by making a great contribution to the relief of Persia after the Mongol catastrophe, just as Shams al-Dīn Juvainī did somewhat later, though the latter’s motives were undoubtedly more idealistic.

A second non-fictional prose includes works concerned with literary history. The *Chahār Maqāla* ("Four Treatises"), written in 550–51/1155–57 by Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. ʿAli of Samarqand, generally known by the name Niẓāmī-yi ʿArūḏī, is a work of fundamental importance for the study of contemporary and earlier movements in literature. The reader must bear in mind, however, that it was written in the atmosphere of the Ghūrid dynasty, and consequently supports their attitudes and opposes those of their enemies, especially the Ghaznavids. On Rashīd Vaṭvār’s *Ḥadāʾiq al-sīb*r ("Magic Gardens"), see above, p. 561;


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and on ‘Auffi’s *Lubab al-albāb* (“Quintessence of Hearts”), see p. 616. A work on the subject of Persian prosody, versification and poetics, attributed to Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, is said to be no great masterpiece. This subject received its finest treatment in *al-Mu‘jam fī ma‘āyir ash‘ār al-‘Ajam* (“An Explanation of the Criteria of the Poems of the Persians”), written between 614/1217 and 630/1232-33 by Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Qais of Ray, first in Arabic and subsequently in Persian at the request of the scholars of Shīrāz. Its value lies in the exactitude of the rules which it sets down and to an equal degree in many reliable quotations which it contains, often from poets whose divāns have since been lost.

III. HISTORIOGRAPHY

Amongst the historical works dating from the close of the Saljuq period, the following are important for their content and style. The *Tarikh-i Baihaq* (“The History of Baihaq”) by Abu‘l-Ḥasan ‘Ali b. Zaid al-Baihaqī, called Ibn Funduq (d. 565/1169-70), must be clearly distinguished from the much earlier *Ta‘rīkh-i Baihaqī* (“The History of Baihaqī”) or *Ta‘rīkh-i Mas‘ūdī*, a history of Sūltān Mas‘ūd of Ghazna by Abu‘l-Faṣl Muḥammad Baihaqī (d. 470/1077-79). Of historical importance is the *Kitāb al-tawassul ila al-tarassul* (“An Exploration of the Approaches to Letter-Writing”), an epistolary collection by Bahā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad Mu‘ayyad al-Baghdādī (d. not before 588/1192), which was completed in 578-79/1182-84. The *Ta‘rīkh-i Ţabaristān* (“History of Ţabaristān”), was written in 613/1216 by Muḥammad b. Isfandiyār. Finally the *Rāḥat al-sudūr wa ʿayāt al-surūr* (“Repose of Hearts and Signs of Joy”, 599/1203), a history of the Saljuqs by Najm al-Dīn Abū Bakr Muḥammad Rāvandi, is “certainement un plagiat de *Saljuq-nama-i Zahiri* [Nishapuri] puisqu’il n’y a pas un mot de plus et s’arrête absolument à la même date. Ravendi a tout simplement changé le style de Zahiri sans rien y ajouter”.

Although the Mongol invasion inevitably had a most catastrophic effect on the development of Persian culture (except in those marginal areas which remained unscathed or were in any case not Iranian), Persian historiography reached its apogee precisely during this unfortunate period; indeed the principal historical works of the Mongol period are amongst the finest ever produced by any of the Islamic

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peoples. The Il-Khāns were eager to have their conquests and actions immortalized and they soon found subjects who were willing to undertake this task. As these writers had access to the relevant documents, especially those concerning the history of the Mongols and Turks, and as they had witnessed at first hand the events they described, they were able to provide penetrating and accurate accounts; even though they were court officials, they did not necessarily indulge in eulogies. The consolidation of the Mongol empire was the main factor in the remarkable development of Persian historiography during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; other factors were the Crusades and the increase of caravan and sea trade in Asia and the Mediterranean, both of which served to tighten the political, economic, and cultural fabric of Iran and to broaden the horizon of Persian historians.

The complex sentence structure and wealth of vocabulary which characterize the styles of these historians can best be seen as a legacy of the Saljuq period in its decline. Two works in which this kind of writing is particularly evident are Nūr al-Dīn Muḥammad Nasawi’s Naṣīḥat al-maṣdīr (“Expectorations of the Consumptive”) 632-37/1234-40, and Ḥasan Niẓāmī Nišāpūrī’s Tāj al-maʿāshīr (“Crown of Glorious Deeds”), which is a bombastic and superficial history of India covering the years 587-614 (1191-1217). To this group also belongs the Tarjama-yi Yamīnī (“Translation of Yamīnī’s Book”) of Abu’l-Sharaf Naṣīḥ Jarbadhaqānī (early seventh/thirteenth century), which owes its rhetorical style to its Arabic original of 1021. These works are the historical counterparts of the purely literary belles lettres of the period, both reflecting a stylistic development that continued throughout the Mongol period and eventually reached the most distasteful extremes, destined in their turn to have a harmful influence on later Persian historical prose. Because of their ornamentation—a feature which undoubtedly had an aesthetic appeal to contemporary taste—factual works of this kind enter the sphere of literature.

‘Alā’ al-Dīn ‘Aṭā Malik Juvainī (623-81/1226-83) is a typical representative of this style, although he had already begun writing during the early part of the Il-Khānid period. He came of a family which had transferred its services from the Khwārazm-Shāhs to the Mongols. While his brother Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad occupied the position of a šāhib-divān or finance minister to the Mongol khans, ‘Aṭā Malik was

the governor of Baghdad and indeed a very benevolent one. The Juvainis were the leaders of a group who furthered the Mongol regime, but none of the family earned any thanks for their services; they were removed at the instigation of the Mongol nobility, who were hostile to them, and their immense wealth was confiscated. 'Atä Malik has been immortalized by his Ta'rikh-i Jabän-Guhab (“History of the World-Conqueror”), completed in 658/1260, which in three volumes deals in turn with: (a) the history of Chingiz-Khän, his ancestors and descendants, from the first campaign to the death of the Great Khan Gûyük Khân (647/1248); (b) the history of the Khwärazm-Shâhs and of the Mongol viceroys in Iran until 656/1258; and (c) the entry of Hûlegû into Iran in 1256–58 and the history of the Ismâ’îls or Assassins (1090–1258). The author visited Mongolia and was present at the destruction of the Assassin stronghold at Alamût, from whose valuable library he tried to save what he could. On the basis of the (no longer extant) Sar-Gulbarsht-i Sayidnä (“Incidents in the Life of our Lord”, i.e. Hasan-i Şabbâh, the founder of Ismâ’îli rule in Alamût), he wrote a description of the fortunes of this curious sect. Juvaini was a supporter of his masters, he neither concealed nor tried to exonerate them from their misdeeds. In his inquiry into the reasons for the fall of Iran he anticipated Ibn Khaldûn. Juvaini’s style alternates between a greater and lesser degree of ornamental rhetoric.

Rashîd al-Dîn Fadî Allah of Hamadân (645–817/1247–1318) is regarded as Persia’s greatest historian. An exceptionally cultivated man, he was originally a physician and later became vizier, a position he continued to hold until the reign of Abû Sa’îd, when he was accused of poisoning the latter’s father, Öljëtû, and executed. Not even the insults heaped upon his corpse could satisfy the hatred felt for him; in 1399 his remains were exhumed and reburied in a Jewish cemetery. His enormous fortune was confiscated and his library of 60,000 volumes dispersed. His letters provide a useful historical source, but his principal work is the Jämî‘ al-tawârikh (“Compendium of Histories”), written at the behest of Ghazan. The first part, called Ta’rikh-i Ghâzânî in honour of its sponsor, was devoted to the history of the Mongol empire and the Il-Khâns up to the death of Ghazan in 703/1304; the second part was dedicated to Öljëtitû (703–16/1304–16) and is devoted

1 He also composed qasidas in the Mongol, Arabic, Persian and Turkish languages, cf. Spuler, Die Mongolen, p. 457, n. 2. [Ed.: It is in fact highly doubtful whether Rashîd al-Dîn had more than a smattering of Mongol. See Doerfer, Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neu persischen, vol. 1, pp. 44–8.]
to general world history; and the third, a geography of the "seven climes", probably either was never written or was lost at the dissolution of the author's library. The entire work, written in a comparatively simple style, is noteworthy for several reasons. The first part, which contains more detailed and comprehensive information than any comparable works, including those in Chinese and Mongolian, is particularly valuable. The general history is not confined to the Islamic countries but looks farther east and west. In his task Rashid al-Din had the collaboration of specialists on the language or nation in question; indeed for Mongolia his authority was Ghazan himself. Their contributions may well have been considerable, and it has even been doubted whether Rashid al-Din can really be called the author of Ḥāmi’ al-tavārikh; however, these doubts have been convincingly dispelled by Murtadavi. Rashid al-Din always takes social and economic factors into consideration. Himself a bureaucrat from the middle class and a supporter of the centralizing policies of the Il-Khāns, he opposed the particularist tendencies of feudalism, and therefore the Mongolian nomadic aristocracy.

A work in which bizarre and distorted writing reaches its climax, but which is nevertheless a mine of information, is the Ṭajzīyat al-ansār wa ṭaṣārijat al-a’sār ("The Partition of Territories and the Lapse of Ages") by Shāraf al-Dīn ‘Abdallāh of Shīrāz, generally called Vassaf-i Ḥaḍrat, i.e. "Court Panegyrist" (663-735/1264-1334). It continues the work of Juvainī, embracing the years 656-723 (1258-1323). Being a court official, Vassaf had access to the archives and therefore provides a great deal of factual detail, though unfortunately in a most intimidating manner. He himself admits that he was concerned primarily with literary effect, historical events serving merely as a basis. The work is thus an exercise in style on a lavish scale. To judge by their lasting effect, Vassaf’s extreme fondness for Arabic words and his excessively bombastic, florid, and precious style were amongst the most harmful influences on Persian prose. On social and economic matters, however, Vassaf must be regarded as an excellent authority. In his political opinions he followed Rashid al-Dīn, eulogizing the Mongols but never hesitating to reveal their inhumane and unjust acts.

Alongside the supporters of the Il-Khāns there were other historians who were outspokenly opposed to them. Apart from the Arab Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630/1234), particular mention should be made of Muḥam-

1 Loc. cit.
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mad Nasawi (see above, p. 622) and Minhāj al-Din ‘Uthmān Jūzjānī (b. c. 589/1193, d. after 664/1265); and there were others of lesser significance.

Views similar to Rashid al-Din’s were held by another historian, Hāmid Allāh Mustaufi Qazvīnī, an advocate of centralization. His Ta’rīkh-i Guzīda (“Selected History”) begins with the creation of the world and runs to 730/1329. In about 735/1335 he completed his immense Zafar-Nāma¹ (“Book of Victories”), an imitation of Firdausi’s Shāh-Nāma containing about 75,000 lines of verse. His third work was a cosmography and geography entitled Nūzbāt al-qulūb (“Restoration of Hearts”) written in 740/1340-41, which is outstanding for the accuracy of its dates and other facts.

Works on the history of India include Dīyā’ al-Din Bārānī’s Ta’rīkh-i Firūz-Shāhī, dealing with events during the years 1265 to 1357; the Ta’rīkh-i ʿAlā’i of ʿAmīr Khusrau (see above, p. 609), a Ta’rīkh-i Vāsīf in miniature; and Jūzjānī’s general history entitled Ṭabagāt-i Nāṣīrī (657–58/1259–60).

In conclusion, it must be stressed that this survey covers only a very small proportion of the vast quantity of prose writing produced during the period. In selecting works to be discussed, I have given thought to their stylistic and other aesthetic aspects. Works confined to science, mathematics and so on, have been omitted entirely.²

¹ Two further historical epics of the Mongol period are listed by Murtadāvī, Tahqīq, p. 149 (they are completely worthless); he also, ibid. p. 323, quotes a doublet of Rashīd al-Dīn by Shams al-Dīn Kāshānī.

² For a general survey of such works see Felix Tauer, “Persian Learned Literature from its Beginnings up to the end of the 18th Century” in Rypka, History of Iranian Literature (Dordrecht, 1968). [Ed.: Professor Rypka’s chapter was completed on 9 November 1963.]
CHAPTER 9

THE VISUAL ARTS,
1050–1350

The period of Iranian history covered in this discussion began with the rise of the Turkish dynasties of the Ghaznavids and of the Great Saljuqs and ended with the small Iranian or Mongol dynasties which followed and contributed to the fall of the Il-Khanid empire. The specific dates quoted above are only approximations since stylistic and thematic changes do not necessarily coincide with major historical events, but the period as a whole is one in which all provinces of Islamic Iran and all media of artistic creation underwent considerable changes and in fact established architectural, formal, iconographic, and aesthetic standards which were to remain for many centuries thereafter those of Islamic Iranian art in general. This statement is valid in the sense that the arts of the following centuries can almost always be shown to be in a definable kind of relationship to forms, ideas, and techniques created or developed between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries. Yet, if these filiations with later centuries can indeed be established, it is far more difficult to define the relationship of this art to that of previous centuries. In fact our documentation on and conceptual framework for the arts of the first four centuries of Islamic Iranian art are so limited and so much tied to the interpretation of a few texts or to purely accidental finds, that, with a few exceptions to be mentioned in due course, we will consider the art of Iran during the centuries under consideration as a new creation. If it is perhaps too adventurous to call it a renaissance in the sense that it does not seem to be in continuous but in revolutionary relationship to what preceded, it is not too far-fetched to talk of an artistic explosion, for, regardless of its complexity in details, the period which produced the mosque of Isfahān, the minaret of Jām, the mausoleum of Sanjar in Marv, that of Öljaitü in Sulṭāniyeh, Kāshān and Ray ceramics, the “Bobrinski” kettle, the Wade cup, the “Demotte” Shab-Nāma, and the manuscripts of the Rashidiyya can by any account be considered as one of the most productive and most brilliant periods of Iranian art.
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The period is not an easy one to define properly. First, the disastrous lack of proper monographic studies—except in the case of a very few objects and buildings—makes any generalization somewhat hazardous. Secondly, the periodization of the different artistic entities which can be defined is impossible in anything but the most general terms. To give but a few examples, one may point out that the period of the Great Saljuqs (roughly from 1050 to 1150) is almost totally terra incognita in all but architecture, while the century which followed the death of Sanjar is tremendously rich in properly dated objects but exhibits an original architecture only in a few small monuments from areas peripheral to the Iranian world, primarily Āzarbāijān, and a few cities of Central Asia. Other instances are ceramics, in which some of the most remarkable objects of the so-called “Saljuq” style were demonstrably manufactured after the Mongol conquest; and manuscripts, among which the greatest masterpiece of the fourteenth century, the “Demotte” Shāh-Nāma, has never found the artistic and intellectual or social milieu in which it was made. Thus it is, at this stage of our research, still almost impossible to coordinate properly the monuments with the events of the time; and often in trying to explain the monuments one misses the human and spiritual context in which they were made and used. Hence, even though one must be cognizant of the classical divisions of styles into a Saljuq period (roughly until the third or fourth decade of the thirteenth century) and the Il-Khānid one (roughly after the last decade of the same century), we shall in this chapter avoid these distinctions on the ground that neither the monuments nor the social and cultural history of Iran have as yet been sufficiently explained to make the time distinctions more than convenient labels for museum identification.

Yet this lamentable historical vacuum is not the only methodological deficiency with which we have to cope. An equally frustrating problem is posed by what may be called the geographical coordinate of the arts. It is clear for instance that the third, fourth, and fifth decades of the twelfth century witnessed a remarkable building activity known primarily through large congregational mosques in the area of Isfahān, that the last decades of the twelfth century and the thirteenth

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century saw major constructions of mausoleums in Āzarbājījān, that inlaid metalwork was developed to a particularly remarkable degree in Khurāsān in the second half of the twelfth century, and that Rashid al-Din sponsored a major school of painting in Tabriz in the first two decades of the fourteenth century. In all four of these instances there is no evidence that any other part of Iran enjoyed the same developments. Should any of them then be considered as regional growths to be explained by some local needs or purposes? Or are they purely accidentally preserved and should a style or an idea formed in Khurāsān in the middle of the twelfth century be construed as valid for the rest of Iran? It is of course clear that each such definable group of monuments will provide different answers to these questions. The Rashidiyya school of painting did have a greater importance in the development of Iranian art after the death of its founder in 1318 than the architectural style of Āzarbājījān in the thirteenth century. Yet almost no attempt has yet been made by archaeologists or historians to separate pan-Iranian trends from local ones or to assess the exact character of any one provincial development, and to the questions raised almost thirty years ago by Professor Minorsky, scholarship has still not provided answers.

These methodological and intellectual difficulties in any attempt to discover the structure—the word is used here in the sense given to it by linguists or ethnographers—around which one can explain the monuments of Iranian art and their development makes our task of discussing them in a few pages particularly arduous. To attempt a chronological description would take us too long and is somewhat meaningless without at least partial solutions to the questions raised in the preceding paragraphs. A discussion of techniques separately from each other would correspond to traditional methods of treating Islamic art, but its underlying assumption of separate developments for each major medium would have to be demonstrated for this particular period and in any event it would not provide a clear summary of the visually perceived world created during these centuries. Our choice, therefore, has been to avoid any attempt at total coverage but rather to select a more limited number of precise topics through which, it is hoped, one may be able to define the major characteristics of the arts of the eleventh to fourteenth centuries and also point to the problems which still need

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to be solved. Three such topics were chosen: the architecture of the mosque, the objects of the twelfth–thirteenth centuries, the painting of the fourteenth century. Each of these, as we will try to show, serves as a focal point around which most of the major monuments and problems can be discussed. Much in the interpretations which will be proposed is still hypothetical, but it is our belief that only through working hypotheses can the actual significance of an insufficiently studied art properly emerge.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE MOSQUE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

The central phenomenon of the architecture of Iran during these centuries is the formation of what may be called the classical Iranian mosque. Almost its most perfect example is found in the now ruined masjid-i jum'a of Varamin (fig. 1; pls. 1, 2), near Tehran. It is a rectangle, 66 by 43 metres, with a remarkably clear plan. A courtyard in the centre was lined with an internal façade; on either side lies an axial ivan (definable as a rectangular vaulted hall of which one side opens directly to the outside) framed by two or four smaller arched openings. The ivâns are not of equal size and the centrally planned balance of the court is overshadowed by the strong longitudinal axis of the wider ivân on the qibla side (pl. 2) which is followed by a superbly majestic dome rising high above the rest of the building. The area between ivâns is at the same time quite open for circulation and yet definable through a series of long vaults carried on square or rectangular supports. A curious sort of ambiguity remains as to whether these supports are actually piers imagined as separate entities or walls opened up by wide arches. There are three entrances to the building, each of which is a shallow ivân leading into the axial ivâns of the court. The main entrance, on the longitudinal axis, is architectonically articulated through a series of niches and prefigures the composition of the ivân qibla.

The medium of construction is brick throughout. Its fabric varies from place to place and thus serves at the same time as a mode of construction and as decoration. The vaults are usually pointed barrel vaults. The ivâns and the zone of transition to the dome are provided with a characteristic architectonic composition known as the muqarnas. It consists of a combination—variable in structure and extent—of complete units of construction, such as half-domes and vaults, or segments thereof, used, at least in appearance, either to give variety to
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a wall surface or to organize the passage from one form to the other, as from square to octagon or from walls to vault. Throughout the building decoration is at the same time omnipresent and subordinated to architectural lines. Several different techniques are used: imaginative variations in the fabric of construction, stucco, terra-cotta, colour faience. Although vegetal motives do exist, the main designs are either epigraphical or geometric. The former, with their religious or historical subject-matter, serve also to identify the purpose, quality, and time of execution of the building. The latter are used to strengthen the main

Fig. 1. Plan of mosque at Varâmin.
lines of the building and have been used in a particularly effective
fashion.

Such are briefly the major characteristics of the mosque of Varāmin.1 Their significance is that almost all of them were created or developed
during the two and a half centuries which preceded the building of the
mosque. The time of invention, history, or purpose of most of these
features are still not well understood and each one deserves a separate
monographic treatment. We shall limit ourselves here to a rapid
discussion of some of the problems posed by the most striking identi­
fying characteristics of the building.

The first one is the plan of a mosque with four ʿivāns around a court
(pl. 3) and with a large dome on the axis in front of the ʿmihrāb. The
establishment of this plan, which remained characteristic of Iranian archi­
tecture for many centuries, has been the subject of much controversy
and the question of the origins of this plan demands some elaboration.
It seems clear that, toward the end of the first half of the twelfth century,
a whole group of cities in the western Iranian province of Jibāl either
acquired totally new congregational mosques or replaced older, presum­
ably hypostyle buildings with new ones. The reasons for these trans­
formations are not certain. There may have been local reasons in each
instance, like the 1121–22 fire which destroyed most, if not all, of the
older mosque of Isfahān. Or else these mosques simply reflected the
growth in wealth and population of the province under the rule of the
Great Saljuqs. Whatever the reasons, in Isfahān, Ardistan, Gulpāğān,
Barsian and Zavāre,2 new mosques were erected, all of which exhibit
sufficiently related characteristics of style and plan that they form a
clearly identifiable architectural school.

The masterpiece of this school is undoubtedly the mosque at
Isfahān, but it also has a number of internal peculiarities due to the
presence of older remains (to some of which we shall return) and to a
particularly complicated later history.3 As a result it is perhaps less
immediately useful to define typical features than it is to illustrate the
higher technical and aesthetic values of the style. More typical is the

1 Latest description with bibliography in Wilber, pp. 158–9.
2 In addition to the studies by M. B. Smith quoted previously (especially in Ars Islamica,
vol. iv), the most convenient introduction to this group of monuments is by A. Godard,
"Les Anciennes mosquées de l'Iran", ʿAshūr-e Irān, vol. i (1936), and "Ardistan et Zavare", ibid.
mosque at Zavāreh (fig. 2), built in 1136. It is a simple rectangle with an unobtrusive side entrance, an appended minaret, a courtyard with four ivāns prominently contrasted in plan and elevation from the rest of the building where clearly identified piers support barrel vaults: a large dome appears behind the ivān qiblā. This basic kind of plan was imposed elsewhere on more or less complex older remains and in a more refined way appears at Varāmin.

But there is a further complicating factor. Whereas in Zavāreh the whole building was conceived as a unit, in a number of other examples,
by little, argued Godard, that such open areas became entirely built up, and it is a peculiarity of the early decades of the twelfth century that the architects of western Iran introduced a court with four ivāns to surround the dome. The origin of the four ivāns is found in eastern Iran, where it is assumed to be the characteristic plan for the private house. And the reason of this impact of eastern Iran would have been the impact of the one new kind of building known to have been created in the eleventh century, the madrasa, an institution created in part for the re-education of the masses in orthodoxy and presumed to have originated in activities carried out first in the private houses of eastern Iran.¹

Such is, in a slightly simplified form, the presently accepted theory; but there is much in it which is hypothetical and uncertain. First the degree of archaeological and historical precision which is required in such hypotheses does not exist for the monuments of eastern Iran² and the little that is known of eleventh- and twelfth-century architecture in Transoxiana and Khurāsān offers no example known to me of mosques with four ivāns.³ There is much danger in relating relatively well-known monuments, like those of Jībāl, with far less well studied ones and, as was mentioned before, our understanding of the character of the provinces of Iran is far too uneven to allow for generalizations. Secondly, even if it is quite likely that there were instances of fire-temples transformed into Muslim oratories and that single domical sanctuaries were indeed built, it is nonetheless true that the small space thus provided is not very well suited to Muslim cultic practices, especially in larger cities. Furthermore, there is a tradition of a dome in front of the mīhrāb going back to the Umayyad mosque in Medina; in this instance the domed areas also served as a maqsūra (reserved area) for the caliph or his representative. It so happens that, in the case of the mosque of Iṣfahān, the domed room in front of the mīhrāb is provided with a


² This is particularly true of the presumably critical madrasa at Khargird; cf. the objections raised by K. A. C. Creswell, The Muslim Architecture of Egypt, vol. ii (Oxford, 1959), pp. 132–3.

³ There is no easily accessible and complete description of Central Asian monuments taken all together; the most convenient introduction is G. A. Pugachenkova, Puti vagittia arkhitekturi Yuzychnogo Turkmenistana (Moscow, 1958); now also Istoriya iskusstv Uzbekistana (Moscow, 1968).
formal inscription giving the name of Nizām al-Mulk and thus dating it between 1070 and 1092. This together with other bits of evidence analysed by Sauvaget\(^1\) suggests that some, if not all, of these large domes had a ceremonially princely significance. Or, alternatively, all of them could have had a primarily religious and symbolic significance in emphasizing the orientation of the building and the direction of prayer.

This latter point may be strengthened by the third difficulty involved in the classical scheme explaining the formation of this type of mosque. It is that the plan of the court with four ʿivāns itself is not particularly adapted to the ceremony of prayer. It is a centrally arranged plan revolving around a court and it does not in its simple form provide the automatic orientation which is essential in a mosque; hence the widening of one ʿivān and the large size of the dome could be interpreted as necessary adaptations of a given type of plan to new purposes. Moreover, there is considerable evidence that the plan was a ubiquitous one, i.e. that it was a sort of standard arrangement which could be—and was—used for many purposes. This is shown partly by its impact on regions west of Iran, but also by its occurrence in secular structures, such as the magnificent twelfth-century caravanserai of Ribāṭ Sharāf\(^2\) or the Ghaznavid palace of Lashkari Bāzār.\(^3\)

Pending further studies and especially excavations of pertinent buildings, it would seem, therefore, preferable to argue that, while the fact of the creation of a new type of mosque in the early twelfth century in western Iran is undeniable, the reasons for its creation in this particular form are not yet elucidated. Yet, even though the peculiar combinations and uses of ʿivāns and domes which were thus created appear as new, their immediate adaptation and their continued utilization over several centuries indicate that in some way these elements of plan and elevation struck a particularly meaningful chord in the Iranian vision of its monuments. Was it a revival with modifications of the forms of Sassanian architecture with its domes and ʿivāns? Then one may indeed suggest that it was a renaissance. Or did these forms continue over the preceding centuries in ways of which we are not aware? Then it would be more appropriate to talk of a blossoming of seeds planted earlier. Or was this new architecture the result of the impact of the new Turkish masters of political power who would have served as catalysts to the

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\(^1\) Cf. above note 1, p. 633.
formalization of indigenous traditions or brought new ones from the East? Then indeed these monuments may appropriately be called \textit{Saljuq}.

Yet, until new research has brought answers to these questions, it may be preferable to talk more modestly of a western Iranian type of mosque plan created in a clearly defined period and with considerable impact on later centuries. Through its form in Varamin in the early fourteenth century, one can imagine the changes brought into it: strengthening of a longitudinal axis through an elaborate gateway (the \textit{pish-taq}), simplification and standardization of systems of support, partial decrease in relative size of the court, more elaborate proportions between parts. The ways in which these changes were brought in and their chronology are still matters which have to await investigation.

Although the plan with four ivāns became the standard plan for mosques, it should be noted that it does not define all types of mosque buildings erected during these centuries. Especially in the early fourteenth century there were many instances of repairs and reconstructions in older buildings\(^1\) and a particularly noteworthy feature was that a large building like the mosque of Isfahān was subdivided into smaller units, thereby suggesting a change in the religious practices of the time and the apparent uselessness of the large early congregational mosque. More extraordinary is the one significant remaining mosque which clearly identifies the Il-Khānīd imperial style. Built in Tabrīz between 1310 and 1320 by ‘Alī-Shāh, a vizier of Öljeitū, it is known today as the “Fortress”, the \textit{Arg}. Originally there was a large court with a pool in the centre of the building, but its main unit was an ivān, 48 metres deep, 25 metres high, and 30 metres wide. Its walls were between 8 and 10 metres thick and its vault, which was meant to be larger than that of Ctesiphon, fell shortly after its completion.\(^2\) This astounding construction was clearly megalomaniac and illustrates an odd variant within the traditional plan of the mosque.

Next to the plan, the most significant feature of the Iranian mosque as it appears in Varāmin is its construction. And here again the main threads lead back to the architecture of the twelfth century in western Iran. Although stone was used consistently in many parts of Āzarbāijān and unbaked brick or rubble in more prosaic buildings,\(^1\)

\(^1\) There is no list available of these reconstructions but many instances can be found throughout Wilber’s book and in several studies by M. Siroux, esp. in “Le masdjid-e djum’a de Yezd”, \textit{Bull. Inst. Fr. Arch. Or.} vol. xlv (1949).

the standard medium of construction of most of Iran became baked brick. The significance of this point is twofold. On the one hand, it appeared in the late eleventh century with the domes of Isfahan as a comparatively new medium of construction in western Iran, while its sophisticated use can be demonstrated as early as in the ninth and especially tenth centuries in north-eastern Iran. Thus the possibility does indeed exist that the development of brick architecture was part of a possible impact of one region of Iran over the other. On the other hand, as early as the first major datable constructions of the late eleventh century, the masons of Iran used their brickwork ambiguously, in that they transformed it into a medium of decoration. As a result wall surfaces can vary from the superb nakedness of the mosque of 'Ali-Shâh in Tabriz to the involved complexity of the dome in Varâmin.

But the most noteworthy constructional characteristic of these centuries occurred in the development of a new and more magnificent type of dome than had been known in Iran until then. It is not only the large mihrâb domes which made this development possible. In a mosque like Isfahan there were several hundred smaller domes covering the areas between ivâns; few of these have been preserved and the identification of those which are of the twelfth century is another unfinished task of archaeological scholarship. Also in Isfahan there remains the probable masterpiece of early Iranian domes, the so-called north dome of the mosque (pls. 4, 5), originally probably a ceremonial room for the prince’s entrance into the sanctuary. But in addition the eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries witnessed a remarkable spread of monumental mausoleums, some of which continued to be tower-tombs as before, while others were squares or polygones covered with cupolas. The greatest concentrations of the mausoleums remaining from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries are in Transoxiana and Âzarbâijân, while the fourteenth-century ones are more evenly spread all over Iran. Many of these mausoleums had a primarily religious character and this was the time of the formation of the large sanctuaries

1 The recent discovery by D. Stronach and T. C. Young, Jr., of two eleventh-century mausoleums with extensive brick designs in western Iran will lead to new hypotheses on this subject, “Three Seljuq Tomb Towers”, Iran, vol. iv (1966).


3 In addition to the works quoted previously see M. Useinov, L. Bretanitskij, A. Aalamzade, Istoriya arkhitekturi Azerbaidzhana (Moscow, 1963), pp. 44 ff.
In spite of several pioneering studies, the exact characteristics and development of these Iranian domes are still insufficiently documented and I should like to limit myself to three features which seem to me to be of particular importance. The first one concerns the general appearance of these domes. During these centuries two separate changes were introduced in the construction of cupolas. One is the creation of a double shell, i.e. in effect two domes more or less parallel to each other. The phenomenon is peculiar to northern and north-eastern Iran and its first appearance occurs in monuments which have been variously dated in the eleventh or twelfth centuries. But, while it is obvious that this

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1 Survey, pp. 1080 ff.
2 For the mausoleum of Sanjar see now Pugachenkova, pp. 315 ff.; for the Sultaniyeh one of the best studies is by Godard in Survey, pp. 1103 ff.
3 A. Godard, “Voûtes iraniennes”, Athar-e Iran, vol. iv (1949), and remarks by M. B. Smith in Ars Islamica, vol. iv.
4 In addition to Pugachenkova, pp. 275 ff., see A. M. Prubytkova, Pamyatniki arkhitektur XI veka v Turkmenii (Moscow, 1955). It seems still uncertain whether an eleventh-
development will have considerable importance for the changes brought into domes in the fifteenth century, the exact assessment of the reasons for the invention of the double dome is more difficult to make. It should probably be connected with a general interest on the part of north-eastern Iranian architects for the lightening of the mass of the dome, both in the literal sense of making cupolas less heavy and in the aesthetic sense of giving to the upper part of the building an airier look. In this latter sense the development must be related to an equally great interest in galleries around the zone of transition which were brought to a most perfect pitch in the mausoleum of Öljeitü. While such appeared to be the primary concern of north-eastern architects, those of western Iran had to tackle the huge domes in the back of their mosques. Their major contribution was a technical one; by an imaginative use of brick ribs around which the mass of the dome was built up, they solved the problem of making large cupolas without centring, but these ribs eventually became a single mass with the rest of the dome and should not be interpreted in the same fashion as ribs of Gothic architecture. It is perhaps in the Varamin dome that these two traditions—one concerned with alleviation of weight, the other with sureness of construction—meet most effectively in that the general shape and massiveness of the cupola relates it to western Iranian practices of the preceding centuries, while the striking use of windows is more typical of north-eastern tendencies.

The second noteworthy feature of these Iranian domes is their zone of transition effecting the passage from the square to the circular base of the cupola. The technique used throughout was based on the squinch creating an octagon. In a number of instances of larger domes, an additional sixteen-sided area was provided above the octagon. However, the most striking feature of the zone of transition during these centuries was the remarkably architectonic use made of the muqarnas by western Iranian architects. The origin and the exact purpose of this combination of architectural units is not known, but it seems likely, within our present evidence, that it developed in eastern Iran in the tenth century as a primarily decorative form.\(^1\) In the eleventh century in western Iran the muqarnas acquired a more meaningful

\(^1\) The crucial building for this problem is the Tim mausoleum, whose latest discussion is by G. A. Pugachenkova, *Istoriya Zodchikh Uzbekistana*, vol. 11 (Tashkent, 1963).
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function as a working element in the upward movement of the dome. Logically constructed around a few basic axes of symmetry the muqarnas became the visible means by which masonry was articulated, at least as far as the viewer is concerned, for whether or not the actual thrusts from above were carried down the lines of the muqarnas is still a moot question. That an interest in the logical articulation of walls and masonries existed in Iranian architecture of the eleventh and twelfth centuries is clear from other instances as well, such as the unique structure of the piers in the north-eastern dome in Isfahān or the fascinating system of interlocking ribs in the mausoleum of Sanjar.

Yet it would be wrong to consider these interests, some of which were short-lived, or the muqarnas exclusively as actual or imitative constructional devices. They were also decorative ones and, even though during the period with which we are concerned the decorative function did not always overshadow other purposes in the domes as such, it did so in façades, cornices, and other parts of buildings. Thus the fascination with transforming constructional units into decorative ones, or in the better monuments, the creation of an ambiguous balance between decorative and architectonic values clearly appears in the uses of the muqarnas as early as in the eleventh century and is continued over the next two centuries.¹

On the last significant aspect of Iranian architecture at this time, we may be briefer, because this aspect has been treated with greater thoroughness than the others.² A look at the mosques and mausoleums shows the considerable part played by various decorative techniques in the final state of the buildings. Some involved the medium of construction, others were specifically ornamental techniques, such as stucco, terra-cotta, and coloured bricks or tiles. The former two techniques are not new, but the latter appears indeed to have been a creation of these centuries, still used sparingly when compared to what will happen in later times, but portentous of a new and highly original relationship between colour and architecture. On the whole, however, the major characteristic of decoration in the large congregational

mosques is their subordination to architectural values. Rich though it may be in Varāmīn or the two large domes of Isfahān, its effectiveness lies in the way in which it emphasizes, strengthens, and accentuates lines and ideas of a preponderantly architectural vision of buildings. Nowhere is this more striking than in the superb masses of the domical exteriors. Yet, while this is generally true of the congregational mosques, it is less so of mausoleums, smaller sanctuaries, or the few known secular buildings. Pir-i Baqrān, near Isfahān, a small sanctuary for a local holy man dated between 1299 and 1312, is a true museum of stucco designs.1 The mausoleums of Āzarbāijān carry an extensive surface decoration which all but obliterates their actual walls.2 Ribāt Sharaf, a twelfth-century caravanserai, or the eleventh-century palace at Tirmidh had most of their walls covered with decorative designs and, in the former case, included even stucco imitations of brick walls.3 And the Jām minaret (pl. 6), like several other such structures perhaps more secular than religious in purpose, also has an almost total covering of decorative designs.4 It is as though the closer one comes to the little-known secular art of the time or to the more popular cults of saints the more brilliant and overbearing becomes the decoration, whereas the mosques maintain something of an ascetic dignity, more in keeping perhaps with the severity of official Islam.

It is difficult to sum up the characteristics of the architecture of Iran during some three centuries of numerous and varied building activities. Two major points seem to stand out. The first one is the apparent polarization in the twelfth century of major inventions in two areas: the north-east and the west, with a more minor but highly original centre developing late in the century in north-western Iran. While the contacts and influences between those centres are matters for debate, recent evidence seems to suggest that it is western Iran which created, at this time, the most unified architectural school, perhaps because it had been less developed and less creative than Khurāsān in the preceding centuries. The forms and ideas of plans and construction developed then were picked up by the Il-Khānids in the early decades of the fourteenth

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1 Wilber, pp. 121 ff.
2 In addition to relevant passages in Usćinov and others, Survey, and Wilber, see various remarks by Godard in Athdr-e Irān, esp. vol. 1 (1926).
3 Cf. note 2, p. 639 above and for Tirmidh Denike’s general study; on this whole point see also D. Hill and O. Grabar, Islamic Architecture and its Decoration (London, 1965).
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century and, in conjunction with their own monumental ambitions and renewed eastern Iranian traditions, created the monuments of Tabriz, Sultâniyeh (pl. 7a), and Varâmin. But the permanent coagulation of a series of definitive types and techniques seems, for the most part, to have been effected around 1100 in the West.

The second point concerns the character of this architectural typology, for it established the basis of almost all later developments in Iranian art. The building with an internal façade opening a court, the rhythms of fulls and voids based on ivâns, the mighty dome, the varieties of decorative techniques modifying the surface of the wall, and, among features which were not discussed, the tall, cylindrical minarets, and, at this time less developed, the high screen-like portal, these were all to become permanent features of medieval Iranian architecture. Whatever technical or decorative novelties were introduced in subsequent centuries, they were, for the most part, variations—sometimes far superior in actual quality and aesthetic merit—on the vocabulary of forms created in the twelfth century. That this happened altogether is more difficult to explain and, to a degree, the explanation lies in features of Iranian culture other than those of the visual arts alone. One possibility is that these immensely active centuries established the formal and aesthetic system of Iranian architecture in monuments—mosques, mausoleums, caravanserais—which by their very function remained in use for many centuries and thus forced themselves by their presence as permanent models. But whatever the explanation, there is little doubt that the monumental infrastructure created in the twelfth century may truly be called the classical period of Iranian Islamic art, for it consisted of monuments magnificent in their own right and at the same time sufficiently abstract in their formal and technical components to be used for centuries to come.

THE PORTABLE OBJECTS OF THE TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES

Whereas the architecture created in the twelfth and subsequent centuries was the beginning of a fairly coherent development in which the innovating position of the twelfth century is clearly apparent, things are far less tangible when we turn to the other arts. As far as painting, mural or manuscript, is concerned, it is at the end of the thirteenth century that there begins a definite movement whose steps can be partly traced
and explained. To these we shall return later. For the earlier centuries we have a few texts, some more or less understandable fragments, and a few manuscripts which still await proper analysis.\(^1\) A curious revival of monumental sculpture seems to have occurred at this time,\(^2\) but its instances are few, its genuineness not always secure, and in any case its future development limited. There is, however, one area of artistic activity where the reverse is true, i.e. a tremendous development in the twelfth–thirteenth centuries and a partial decadence in the fourteenth. It is the area of the objet d'art. Furthermore, whereas both painting and architecture are hardly known in Iran before the latter part of the eleventh century, this is not so with respect to objects. Be it in ceramics or in metalwork, glass, and textiles, as early as in the ninth century major objects were made and definable schools are identified. Thus, at least on the level of the existence of a semi-industrial manufacturing tradition, a certain continuity seems to exist and in Iran, as elsewhere in the Islamic world, there appeared a fascination, unknown since Antiquity, with the transformation of the everyday useful object into a work of aesthetic quality.

Difficulties of interpretation arise, however, primarily from the enormous mass of objects which have been attributed to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Almost no museum in the world seems to lack a “Saljuq” ceramic or tile or a bronze stand in the shape of a bird. Furthermore, a rather indiscriminate scholarship abetted by the activities of clandestine commercial diggers in Iran itself, has created a terminology of styles and types based on cities or provinces—such as Ray, Gurgān, Kāshān, Sāveh—which only too often do not correspond to more than the alleged place of origin of the first-known objects of the given type. Finally, the lack of properly dated objects, and especially considerable uncertainty about the actual archaeological index of those objects which are dated have added to the confusion prevailing in the field, although no one can deny the aesthetic qualities and the sheer variety of the things made during these centuries nor the fact that their existence is one of the main features of the arts of this time.

In view of the unsettled state of our knowledge of these objects, our remarks will be limited to three points which seem to be somewhat more

\(^{1}\) The most significant works involved are the mural paintings found at Lashārī Bāzār, above, note 3, p. 634, and the Istanbul manuscript of Warqah and Gulshāh, A. Ates, “Un vieux poème romanesque persan”, *Ars Orientalis*, vol. IV (1961).

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clearly definable than any attempt at the explanation of styles or at the periodization and localization of types.

The first of these points involves techniques. In ceramics the most astounding variety of techniques were used in Iran: simple sgraffiato wares, moulded wares, translucent wares, underglaze painted, overglaze painted, lustre painted, and especially the so-called mīnāʾi technique which permitted the clear fixation of many different colours on the surface of the object. Combinations of several techniques are not unknown.¹ A further significant development of ceramics was the tile. Sometimes used as a section in a larger frieze of consistent designs, the tile of the thirteenth century in particular was also often conceived as a single object, decoratively and iconographically self-sufficient, and it is with these that we will mostly be concerned. In metalwork, in addition to numerous gold objects, usually jewels, whose study has never been made, and a few silver ones, we encounter mostly bronze which was cast, chased, repoussé, or, most characteristically for the time, inlaid with silver.² None of these techniques, except mīnāʾi, were new in themselves, but there is little doubt that techniques such as mīnāʾi and inlaid metal were particularly developed because they allowed a greater refinement of designs on the surfaces of the objects.

The time of these changes in technical emphasis can probably be set in the middle of the twelfth century. For bronze the first-known object to illustrate the change is an 1148 penbox in the Hermitage Museum, ³ although the most celebrated early example is the 1163 bucket (also in the Hermitage), well known by the name of its former owner as the “Bobrinski kettle”.⁴ For ceramics the earliest dated faience, a fragment in the British Museum, is from 1179 and we may probably assume that the main development of new ceramic techniques was probably contemporary with that of bronze.⁵ For other media our information is fragmentary, but the crucial ones of bronze and ceramics seem to indicate the middle of the twelfth century as the beginning of the main explosion of new types of objects. We are very badly informed on the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. There are very few securely dated pieces and their position in the history of Iranian art is quite

¹ Best introduction in A. Lane, Early Islamic Pottery (New York, 1948).
⁵ Survey, pp. 1672 ff.
unclear. Tentatively and barring major archaeological discoveries, we may assume then that it is after the fall of the Great Saljuqs that the manufacture of objects developed in particularly striking new ways and that until then older techniques were preserved, but the explanation of these dates is a still unsolved problem of historical scholarship. A fairly clear ending to the series of ceramics developed in the middle of the twelfth century is provided by a study of the dated examples. The bulk of the objects are thirteenth century, without apparent effect from the Mongol invasion, but only lustre-painted tiles continue through the first third of the fourteenth century. After about 1340 there is a sudden lack of dated objects until around 1400. Metalwork, on the other hand, seems to have suffered from the invasion from the East. Practically no dated Iranian pieces are known after about 1225 until the latter part of the century when new objects were made for the new masters of the Near East and eventually a distinguishable school was established in southern Iran. Even though it may be assumed that new Iranian metalwork gave, in the twelfth century, a major impetus to Islamic metalwork in general, it is in the Fertile Crescent and Egypt that its greatest thirteenth-century masterpieces will be made.

There is one last remark to be made about the techniques. They also, like the monuments of architecture, have regional associations. For metalwork it is quite certain that Khurāsān, or, more generally, northeastern Iran, was the main centre from which new techniques derived and in which they were pursued until the Mongol invasion. A separate school has been suggested for north-western Iran, but its existence above the artisanal level is not secure. Ceramics are more difficult to localize properly, but there it would seem clear that the major impetus was in western Iran. Kāshān, of course, is the best-known centre and there is no doubt that its potters had acquired a particularly high reputation. The exact significance of the prominence of Kāshān for the evaluation of styles and techniques and for the attribution of pieces to specific centres is less easy to determine, for potters from Kāshān may indeed have worked elsewhere. But, in any event and regardless of the fact that ceramics of similar types were produced all over Iran, it seems that the new techniques and the new subjects originated primarily in western Iranian cities.

1 This is particularly true of the so-called Alp-Arslan dish (Survey, pp. 2500 ff.).
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It is thus primarily with the new ceramics of the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries and the new metalwork which can be dated between c. 1150 and c. 1220 that I should like to deal in introducing the second general point to be made about these objects. Their most striking feature is their use of human and animal figures. Such representational themes existed before, but clearly in a more limited way; they were either more or less sophisticated reflexions of folk art (especially in ceramics) or a limited princely vocabulary with many Sassanian reminiscences. The peculiarity of the iconography apparent in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is at the same time its variety and the suggestion of a meaningful visual system of images, even though we are not yet able to translate the language in its entirety. But that we are dealing at this time with a conscious fascination with the animation of the object through figures is made evident by one of the most unusual phenomena of this time, the concomitant animation of inscriptions which occurs on the objects themselves and even on a few monumental inscriptions.¹

What were these scenes? At one extreme stand very precise iconographic subjects: an episode from the Shāh-Nāma redone in comic-strip fashion (pl. 7 b),² the story of Bahrām Gūr and Āzāda in many forms,³ the story of Farīdūn (pl. 8),⁴ illustration of a specific (but unidentified) battle with the names of the personages involved in it,⁵ and, especially in tiles, a wide variety of subjects which can be described (an animal, a man reading a scroll, the façade of a building) but whose contemporary meaning usually escapes us. At the other extreme is found what may be called a generalized, abstract iconography, i.e. an imagery whose individual elements are easy enough to identify but whose significance on the object or for the viewer is less immediately clear. Three main cycles can be defined. One is the traditional princely cycle, with enthroned personages, male and female attendants, hunting, polo-playing, music and dancing. The cycle is usually shown in an expanded and full form on metal objects (pls. 10, 11), while one or the other of its elements occurs on ceramics, often in a very decorative fashion as frames for other subjects. Oddities and confusions do occur within the cycle, such as the backgammon players on the Hermitage kettle, but on the whole the cycle can easily be recognized and is consistent. The same is true of the second definable cycle, the astronomical one. It includes primarily the

³ Survey, pl. 604.
⁴ Ibid. pl. 692 c.
⁵ Ibid. pl. 674-5.
signs of the zodiac and symbols of the planets, but a particularly interesting group probably made in Šahršūr included also labours of the month. These themes are less common on ceramics but they do occur, usually on objects whose style and composition reflect metalwork. The third cycle is more difficult to describe and it is possible that it may not be more than a variant of the princely cycle. It occurs primarily on ceramics and shows, at its simplest, one or two personages, of either sex, motionlessly sitting next to each other, or playing a musical instrument, at times near a body of water or beside a tree. The facial types are usually distinguishable by their heavy lower jaws, very simplified facial features, and narrow slit eyes. In a few instances, such as celebrated plates in the Freer Gallery and in the Metropolitan Museum (pl. 9), more personages are added and the possibility is suggested that these images belong to our first group of precise stories or events. Yet these objects differ in style from those which do show precisely defined iconographic subjects and all of them are pervaded by a curious sense of immaterial reality. For reasons to be explained below, we may call this a cycle of love or of meditation.

The peculiarity of these themes is that, except for the princely ones, they all seem to belong exclusively to the period between 1150 and around 1300. They almost totally disappear from later pottery, which tends to a far more limited representational vocabulary, and the themes of metalwork in later decades are either consciously imitative of early models or traditional in their use of princely themes. It must be added that any eventual complete survey of iconographic cycles on Iranian objects of this period should also include decorative designs which appear to be purely ornamental but may at times also have more precise meanings and a whole category of objects in the shape of animals, human beings, and even houses whose importance is as considerable as their number and as the paucity of attempts to explain them. But, even though often quite original and aesthetically spectacular, as a type these latter categories of objects are not as original in Iranian art as the ones we have described and the hypothesis we shall formulate presently to explain the latter may apply to them as well.

Our third general point about this whole category of works of art

3 Ibid., pl. 686, 687, 693, 710, etc.
6 *Survey*, pl. 739 ff.
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concerns the meaning which should be attributed to them. Regardless of
their quality of execution, they were all useful objects, i.e. symbolically
or actually they were meant to fulfil some function, whether it be
pouring water or wine or holding flowers or sweets. It is therefore
possible that in some fashion the imagery on them reflects either the
precise function to which they were destined or some relationship
between owner and object, or maker and owner, or giver and owner.
In order to suggest the kind of relationship that was involved, a clue
is provided by the inscriptions. The most common ones consist of a
series of good wishes to an anonymous owner; at other times the
owner is known and the object acquires a "personalized" meaning.
Then there are inscriptions referring to the function of the object and
wishing successful performance of the function. On ceramics are also
encountered excerpts from celebrated literary texts or, more often,
shorter poems dwelling in more or less successful fashion on various
themes of love, separation, happiness, well-being, but especially love.¹
It is very rarely that one can find a direct and immediate correspondence
between images on objects and inscriptions. However, it could be
argued that the correspondence between them did not necessarily exist
on a narrative and illustrative level but on some other level, just as the
text and the image of a Christmas card do not necessarily relate to each
other, although both reflect a series of more or less concrete sentiments
accepted as being appropriate to the occasion. Since the inscriptions
so consistently bring out themes of love and well-being, it may be
suggested that the images should be interpreted in like fashion. No
problem is raised around interpreting in this fashion the astrological
images or the zoomorphic shapes of objects, since both of these themes
have had a long history of apotropaic meanings.² Nor is the princely
cycle particularly anomalous, since a semi-magical significance of power
and success is traditional with any princely cycle since ancient Egyptian
art. Illustrations of romances or references to well-known legendary or
actual events can easily also be so interpreted. As to the theme of love or
meditation, one could interpret it as a new iconography peculiar to these
times and specifically related to the new development during the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries of an esoteric poetry which was mystical and

¹ These texts have never been published systematically. For examples see M. Bahrami,
Recherches sur les carreaux de faïence (Paris, 1937), and Gurgan Faïences (Cairo, 1949), and
articles by L. T. Giuzalian in Epigraphika Vostoka, vols. ii, iv, v, vii (1947-53); cf. summary
² See article quoted in note 1, p. 646.
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religious but ambiguously used an erotic vocabulary for its deeper purposes. Such was the hypothesis suggested by R. Ettinghausen in a brilliant study devoted to a plate in the Freer Gallery. Its ultimate significance was that there is a series of levels of meaning at which these Iranian objects can be understood and that, in all probability, a certain ambiguity was consciously maintained in the images, in part because the visual and poetic system of the literature itself was ambiguous but also because these objects were ambiguous in themselves, partly works of art and partly implements for daily living.

There is one last remark of significance to be made about the meaning of these objects. The Hermitage bucket was made for a merchant, as were a number of other known bronze objects from Iran. The excerpts from the Shāh-Nāma on the ceramics followed a popular, spoken version of the text, not the learned manuscript one. The poems are almost always in Persian. Various Sufi groups had already by that time permeated the social organizations of the cities and provided them with an esoteric vocabulary which may or may not have always been understood at all levels of possible meaning. As a result one may draw the conclusion that it is the urban bourgeoisie of Iran which was the primary sponsor and inspirer of the astonishing development given to the beautiful object in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Parts of its themes were shared with the aristocratic milieu of princes but it is the city merchant and artisan who may be identified as the prime mover in the explosion of the art of the object. The development in Iran finds parallels in the Arab world with the illustrations of the Maqāmāt and its short-lived character can be explained by the decadence of urban life after the Mongols. As to why it was precisely in the second half of the twelfth century that this unique development took place, the question is still difficult to answer. Could it be a primary document for a shift in the power and prestige of the bourgeoisie at the moment when the strong arm of the Great Saljuqs was weakening?

PAINTING IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

It is generally recognized that, whatever its past, Iranian miniature painting began its known development with the Mongol conquest. One manuscript from the end of the thirteenth century, the Manāfī al-

Hayawdn in the Morgan Library in New York dated 1291, is usually considered to be the first document identifying a major stylistic change. Then the school established by Rashid al-Din (pl. 12) in the quarter of his creation near Tabriz is assumed, by the very character of its universal aspirations and the cosmopolitan position of the Il-Khânid capital, to have been a major catalyst in gathering new styles and ideas from many different sources. Out of it, with two extraordinary masterpieces, the "Demotte" Shâb-Nâma divided between many collections all over the world and the Kalila and Dimna in the University Library in Istanbul, a fully Iranian artistic tradition was established, although the exact dates of these two manuscripts is not known and the proposed dates vary from 1330 to the 1370's. These two unique masterpieces are usually felt to be related to a number of manuscripts dated in the 1350's, a Kalila and Dimna in Cairo and a Garshâsp-Nâma in Istanbul. Parallel to this "high" development, there is assumed a "lower" or more provincial development, whose roots may go back to pre-Mongol times. It consists mostly of a group of Shâb-Nâma manuscripts, usually attributed in part to Shirâz thanks to one manuscript dated in 1331, but it is agreed that other schools probably existed. In all of these manuscripts except perhaps the Istanbul Kalila and Dimna there always appears something experimental, as though Iranian painters were trying to discover new modes of expression and, fascinating though many of them are, these miniatures give more rarely the sense of self-assured perfection which begins later in the fourteenth century under new and different sponsors and influences. Although no absolutely definite date can be provided for the change, 1370 seems to be as good a date as any, since several fragments of that time in Istanbul clearly show a very different style. That, however, it is under the Il-Khânids that a new Iranian art of painting began has been fully recognized by the Iranian view of their own painting, since sixteenth-century writers clearly acknowledged that the reign of Abû Sâïd (1317-36) saw the birth of painting and recognized the names of two artists of the time, Aḥmad Mūsâ and Shams al-Din.

In its general lines this schematic outline probably corresponds to the reality of historical development of painting in the first two-thirds of the fourteenth century. While there are certainly many obscure moments

in this development especially as long as there are many documents which remain both unpublished and unclearly fitted within it,\(^1\) the outline may serve as a sort of backbone which has the merit of identifying two precise strands, an imperial Il-Khānīd one with cosmopolitan overtones, and several local schools, around which various miniatures or manuscripts can be arranged in a sequentially meaningful fashion. It is somewhat more difficult to relate the stylistic scheme to the political and cultural history of the time but these problems should be resolved whenever a clear picture emerges of Iranian history between the decline of the Il-Khānīds around 1330 and the new Timūrid order in the last decades of the century.

If, then, we leave for the time being the historical problems as being as adequately stated as evidence permits,\(^2\) what remains is to try to explain what was meant by Dūst Muḥammad in the sixteenth century when he wrote: “It was then (the rule of Abū Saʿīd) that Ustādh ʿĀḥmad Māsā...withdrew the covering from the face of painting and invented the kind of painting which is current at the present time.”\(^3\) Since we are inadequately informed on the intellectual framework within which Dūst Muḥammad made his remark, it is from the manuscripts themselves that we must try to discover in what ways the painting of the fourteenth century appeared revolutionary. Without attempting to be exclusive, it seems that there are two broad areas in which this painting is both new and the first step toward the art of the following period. These are first, subject-matter and the interpretation given to it, and secondly, the more precise problems of the representation of man and of landscape.

The subject-matter of Il-Khānīd painting has a number of very traditional elements. The book on the usefulness of animals known in several manuscripts of the late thirteenth and of the fourteenth centuries is not by itself a new genre and instances of the same sort of illustrated books exist in earlier Islamic art. The book of Kalīla and Dimnā was illustrated as early as the tenth century, although we do not have any remaining manuscripts before the thirteenth. A more original case is

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\(^1\) The unpublished documents include in particular the Istanbul albums and the Berlin one, about which we only know individual pictures which have been discussed. For fourteenth-century examples see R. Ettinghausen, “Persian Ascension Miniatures”, Accademia di Lincei, Rendiconti (1956).

\(^2\) In addition to B. Gray’s recent book, one should consult I. Stockhoukine, La Peinture iranienne (Bruges, 1936) and E. Kühlner’s chapter in Survey, pp. 1829 ff.

provided by the *Shāh-Nāma* and in general the epic tradition. Many of the illustrated texts had been written a long time before the Mongols; yet, until the Mongols, there is very little evidence of epic images on manuscripts (the main exception being probably the Freer beaker mentioned before,\(^1\) but even there it may be questioned whether a consecutive narrative of its type is really characteristic of manuscripts) and the little we know is that there were mural paintings with epic scenes,\(^2\) perhaps in the manner of the pre-Islamic Soghdian paintings from Panjikent. If we add to this that there are practically no known manuscript texts of the *Shāh-Nāma* clearly dated before the fourteenth century, it would follow that interest in and development of an epic art illustrating books on the legendary past of Iran appears to be an Il-Khānid creation, or at the very least, underwent a tremendous increase in the fourteenth century.

Several reasons may be given to explain this phenomenon. One is the importance of aristocratic taste and patronage which would naturally be concerned with legendary heroes. Another may have been the rediscovery through the Mongols of the old Soghdian epic traditions.\(^3\) But the most compelling reason was probably the activities sponsored by the Mongol princes themselves, especially Ghazan Khān, which led to the foundation of Rashidiyya. For, as Ghazan and Ōljeitū wanted to have the past deeds and mores of the Mongols recorded for posterity, they or their Persian executors had this specific aim fitted within a general world history, the *Jāmi' al-tawārikh*. Manuscripts of this work were copied and illustrated and several examples are preserved of the presumably original group, especially those in the Edinburgh University Library and the Royal Asiatic Society, dated respectively 1306 and 1314, and in Istanbul (pl. 12). A fascination for history and the past was not limited to official sponsors and it has been recognized that the writing of history was a major characteristic of Il-Khānid times.\(^4\) The *Āthār al-bāqiya*, also in the Edinburgh Library, dated in 1307–08 preserved illustrations of another compendium. It is only natural, under these circumstances, that the *Shāh-Nāma*, the most complete of the historical epics, be brought back into favour and

\(^1\) Above, note 2, p. 645.
popularity and thus it is that aside from the uniquely superb “Demotte” manuscript\(^1\) we have preserved several small \textit{Shāh-Nāmas} (pl. 13) of varying quality whose detailed study still remains to be made.\(^2\) All of them can be understood as the product of an awareness of more ancient times which was in fact an Īl-Khānid phenomenon.

There were variations in the ways in which the past, legendary or not, was treated. The \textit{Jāmi' al-tawārikh} and the \textit{Āthār al-bāqiya} were primarily narrative books in which precise events were depicted and, especially in the former, long lists of rulers were given. As a result we meet with a re-discovery of portraits, neither likenesses nor fictitious authors’ portraits, but set types identifying certain series of kings and emperors. Then we see specific scenes illustrated, and among these a number of images are clearly derived from models from the cultures whose histories or geography were described. Thus the representation of Tibet in the Royal Asiatic Society manuscript shows personages and building of Far Eastern character, while an Annunciation in the Edinburgh \textit{Āthār al-bāqiya} has Christian models. But for the most part new iconographic cycles had to be created, such as a cycle for the life of Muḥammad, the first such cycle in Islamic art. This was made possible by the introduction into Iranian art of new compositional principles and of a small number of units of composition which were sufficiently flexible to be used meaningfully in different contexts and thus illustrate different subjects with a comparatively small number of elements. Among them one may distinguish a clear tripartite composition of each image, the groupings of personages in two’s or three’s to make a crowd and several variations within these arrangements, a landscape which is at the same time very simple and conscious of spatial values, a superb utilization of gestures of the head and especially of fingers, and a limited use of colour. The small number of these features lends a certain monotony to the scenes from the \textit{Jāmi' al-tawārikh}, a monotony which is not always alleviated by the astounding quality of the drawing. But this monotony pertains also to the literary genre that was so illustrated. What seems far more significant is that these manuscripts and the school which produced them created and popularized


\(^2\) The most convenient list will be found in K. Holter, “Die islamischen Miniaturhandschriften vor 1350”, \textit{Zentralblatt f. Bibliothekswesen}, vol. liv (1937), to be supplemented by H. Buchthal, O. Kurz and R. Ettinghausen, “Supplementary Notes”, \textit{Ars Islamica}, vol. vii (1940).
a new vocabulary of forms without which later Iranian painting is not quite understandable. As we shall see below, much of this new vocabulary was of Chinese origin, and this is easy enough to understand if we consider the world-wide character of the Mongol empire. What seems far more important is that a court-appointed school of painting succeeded in imposing its new patterns. That it happened must be attributed to the new interest in history and to the systematic distribution all over Iran of Rashid al-Din’s historical volumes.

If we turn to the more specifically Iranian Shāb-Nāmas, a clear distinction can be established between the small and more provincial manuscripts and the “Demotte” codex. The former are primarily narrative and show only to a limited degree, if at all, influences from the Rashidiyya. Their origins may well go back to pre-Mongol times and perhaps even to media other than book illustrations. Their quality varies, but in some of the more successful ones a rather effective result has been achieved by the puppet-like, richly coloured personages on a gold background with only limited landscape or architectural props. Only in the aesthetically less rewarding 1341 manuscript do we encounter a somewhat more developed landscape.

The “Demotte” Shāb-Nāma (pls. 13-15), on the other hand, is undoubtedly one of the most complex masterpieces of Iranian art. Its fifty-six known miniatures have been the subject of many discussions and controversies about both their dates and technical problems of retouching or altogether later additions to the manuscript. That almost all the miniatures have been tampered with is clearly true and the original style of some of them is irretrievably lost. Yet it may be argued that on two counts essential for our discussion here practically all the miniatures can be used as evidence: the choice of illustrated subject-matter and the basic compositional pattern. In the first instance the miniatures have tended to emphasize certain subjects at the expense of others: legitimacy in large throne scenes and in specific stories dealing with the ways in which Iranian kings were discovered; the miraculous and the fantastic especially in the story of Alexander the Great (pl. 13); battles given monumental proportions either in single combats or in the dusty clash of competing armies; and especially death and mourning which inspired some of the most stunning compositions of the manuscript and which have led to the definition of one of the probable artists as a maître du

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2 The basic bibliography will be found in B. Gray’s book, p. 173.
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pathétique. As far as compositional patterns are concerned, the striking feature of the “Demotte” Shāh-Nāma, when seen in relation to the Jāmi‘ al-tawārikh, is that, while it clearly relied on the latter for many details especially in the grouping of personages, it expanded the image both iconographically by adding more personages and a far more developed landscape and spatially by devising more complex oblique and circular compositions, by multiplying planes of action, and by diffusing excellent draftsmanship with a far more expanded palette. In short, the artist or artists of the “Demotte” manuscript transformed the purely illustrative tradition of the small manuscripts and the technically perfect narrative of the Rashīdiyya ones into an intellectually and emotionally sophisticated interpretation of the Persian epic. In this sense it inaugurates what may be called a heroic tradition in Iranian art, just as the Jāmi‘ al-tawārikh inaugurated a historical one.

It is, thus, particularly unfortunate that we are still unable to define the milieu in which the manuscript was produced. Whether it should, in part, be interpreted as reviving a very ancient heroic tradition of painting almost unknown since the eighth century in Iran, whether it should be attributed to Tabriz because of its quality, of its relations to Chinese, Rashīdiyya, and even western arts and also because of its interest in Iranian legitimacy, a very Mongol concern, or whether it should be related to some Iranian milieu which saw in the tragically represented fate of Alexander the Great a parallel to the Il-Khānīds, these questions we simply cannot answer for the time being and yet they clearly are preliminaries to any proper understanding of the period and of its masterpiece.

In discussing the subject-matter illustrated by the Jāmi‘ al-tawārikh and by the Shāh-Nāma, we have repeatedly mentioned an evolution in the representation and use of landscape, the importance of human groups and expressions, and the existence of a strong Chinese impact on some aspects of miniatures. These three features are actually closely related to each other and had a considerable impact on later Iranian painting. Therefore, they deserve some comment.

The most striking feature of the 1291 manuscript of the Manāfi‘ al-ḥayawān in the Morgan Library is that, next to a group of images which are relatable to thirteenth-century Arab painting with their single plane

2 This point has come out in a completed dissertation at the University of Michigan on the Istanbul Rashīd al-Dīn manuscript by Dr G. Inal.
indicated by a grassy band and their strong colouristic effects, there occurs a very different style in which ink drawing predominates, several planes are distinguished by a series of parallel or oblique lines, trees are no longer shown in their entirety, their trunks have strongly emphasized knots, some of the animals are even shown in monochrome against a bare sky. All these changes with their linear qualities and spatial concerns are clearly of Chinese origin. An even stronger Far Eastern influence occurs in the Rashid al-Din landscapes with the introduction of Chinese-type mountains and a greater sophistication in the use of planes and of drawing techniques. The groupings of personages also bear the earmark of Far Eastern painting, as do certain types of clothes, certain facial features, and the ubiquitous cloud form. These themes all remain in the "Demotte" Shāh-Nāma and the Istanbul Kalila and Dimna in the sense that clouds, mountains, trees, certain flowers, groupings and personages, and certain spatial arrangements based on series of lines continue to be derived from Far Eastern art. And one can agree that Chinese painting—through its accidental impact by the nature of the Mongol empire and through the deliberate recourse to Chinese painters and works of art—created, or, at the very least, considerably enlarged the formal vocabulary available from then on to Iranian painters. It can further be agreed that the Rashidiyaa was one of the primary centres for the assimilation and dissemination of this vocabulary.

The new vocabulary which was thus created was rapidly transformed or, more precisely, it was used for purposes and in ways which have no relation to the place of its origins. Three principal areas can be identified in which Iranian artists so elaborated on their models as to make them not more than characteristic details. First, a great deal of the effectiveness of Chinese spatial and figural representations was lost when themes created in large scroll paintings were translated into the language of the more restricted illustrative miniatures. The frame of the Jami' al-tawarikh miniatures often seems more like a straight-jacket and the tendency to explode the limits of the traditional miniature frame will remain a constant characteristic of fourteenth-century Iranian painting culminating in the highly original use of the margin and relations between text and image found, for instance, in the Istanbul Kalila and Dimna. A result of this concern with the frame of the

1 For an analysis of a miniature from the manuscript, see J. Travis, "The battle of Ardavan and Ardashir," The Art Quarterly, vol. xxxi (1968).  
2 B. Gray, pp. 34 ff.
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individual image, tied with the consistent importance of precise subject-matter, led to a growing tendency to crowd the interior of the miniature with many natural, architectural, or human and animal elements. Each one of these has probably its own story before it became a *type* or a *cliche*¹ but, in many of the “Demotte” miniatures, they filled almost all spaces and replaced the excitement of Chinese empty spaces (still evident in some of the earlier Persian miniatures) with the very Iranian fascination with colour.

The second area of Iranian elaboration concerns more specifically landscape. As one moves from the *Jāmi‘ al-tawārikh* miniatures to those of the “Demotte” *Shāb-Nāma* or to the Istanbul *Kalila and Dimna*, the individual elements of the landscape—the ground with its flowers or tufts of grass, the grey mountains in which fabulous monsters live, the trees which talk—become adapted to the needs of the story; they become real actors and not merely supports for action or brilliant symbols of space. As Alexander the Great reaches the end of the world, the ground suddenly changes into a striking deformed conception of the non-world. And nothing illustrates better the tragedy of the battle between Rustam and Isfandiyār than the blossoming setting with its little genre scene in one corner and the almost chiastic arrangement of a blooming and of a dying tree in the centre of the composition (pi. 15). As these elements of the landscape increase in colourfulness and significance, they become more involved and more complex and, in an image like that of the king of the monkeys and the tortoise in the Istanbul *Kalila and Dimna*,² the landscape almost overshadows the incidents of the story and becomes an end in itself, but perhaps its sombre symphony of colours reflects the gruesome and cynical moral of the story. Thus, pending necessary detailed analysis, one might suggest that, as it became involved in the complexities of illustrated events, the Far Eastern vocabulary of landscape forms acquired a very Iranian nationality and also became at the extreme limit almost an end in itself.

The final characteristic feature of this painting is its transformation of man into a hero. As early as in the *Jāmi‘ al-tawārikh* the tall personages in their long robes and with their slightly bent heads become the principal subjects of the illustrations. The whole conception of the “Demotte” *Shāb-Nāma* further emphasized the point of the importance of man in the story and the human element is quite striking in the Istanbul *Kalila and Dimna*, although perhaps more conventional in the provincial

¹ R. Ettinghausen, in *Kunst des Orients*, vol. iii, for one such type. ² B. Gray, p. 35.
small *Shāh-Nāma*. But, even if one may agree on the preponderance of man in the fourteenth-century painting, the ways in which it is achieved were not consistently the same. Two main systems of representation may be identified. One may tentatively be called *aristocratic*. Its elongated personages are usually quiet and almost motionless, with perhaps a long finger or a slight movement of the head indicating emotional involvement. Facial features are usually carefully drawn and outlined. At the other extreme occurs a sort of *caricatural* or *pathetic* tradition. Bodies are grotesquely overdrawn, often shown in violent movements. But it is in faces, especially in some of the mourning faces of the "Demotte" *Shāh-Nāmas* or in the figures of executioners that a deformed expression serves both as a masterful vehicle for the representation of pain and horror and at times also for the ridiculous. In origin these two modes of representation may be related in part to certain Far Eastern ways; and the strangely unexplained drawings in an Istanbul album may be a later example of the caricatural style. At the same time both modes hark back to obscure Iranian traditions as early as the eighth-century Soghdian ones continued in part in Central Asian painting.

These remarks cannot be construed as providing a complete account of fourteenth-century Iranian painting. This task is impossible without many more detailed investigations than have been accomplished so far. Our attempt has been rather to focus attention on a few themes which seem to identify the first steps of a new Iranian art of painting: its relation to books and stories, its historical interest, the impact of Chinese painting as a creator of visual forms, the pre-eminence of human elements, the development of the landscape, the key position of the Rashidiyya school. There is a constant feeling in surveying these paintings of an art in "becoming", i.e. of an art in search of the themes and forms which will best express the needs and aspirations of the culture which sponsored it. But we are still too ill-informed on the character of the culture and especially on what it expected of its painting to give an adequate account of the latter's meaning. That in the process an extraordinary masterpiece like the "Demotte" *Shāh-Nāma* could have been produced is a testimony to the vitality of the aspirations at work and to the fermentation of ideas out of which will emerge the more classically perfect painting of the Timūrids.

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1 See the preliminary studies by O. Aslanapa, R. Ettinghausen and M. Loehr in *Ars Orientalis*, vol. 1 (1954).
2 For a general summary and a bibliography see M. Bassagli, *Central Asian Painting* (Geneva, 1964).
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CONCLUSIONS

In attempting to summarize the character of the visually perceived world of Iran between 1050 and 1350, two points may be brought out as being of particular significance. First, this is the time during which Iran acquired its permanent monumental Islamic infrastructure, in the same sense that the contemporary Gothic world accomplished it for the Ile-de-France or for England. Whatever earlier religious architecture of Iran had been, it is after the growth of the monuments of the area of Isfahān in the early twelfth century and of monumental tombs everywhere that the more or less permanent forms of most Iranian architecture were established: court with īvāns, domes, and decorative techniques. However spectacular, and even at first glance revolutionary, most later developments will almost always appear as variations on themes of the twelfth century.

In painting and the decorative arts, if we except the unique but comparatively short-lived art of objects on a broad social base which developed in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the principal novelty of the period consists in the first moments of the known history of Iranian painting. In this realm one cannot argue as well that the miniatures of the fourteenth century formed the permanent taste of Iranian painting. Yet later painting cannot entirely be explained without the experiments of the early fourteenth century and especially without the body of influences at work at that time and the visual vocabulary which slowly emerged out of them. Mutatis mutandis and without in any way suggesting a relation of cause and effect between the two traditions, it may be suggested that Iranian painting of the fourteenth century stands toward later painting in the same relationship as Giotto and the International Style stand to the Italian Quattrocentro.
CHAPTER 10

THE EXACT SCIENCES IN IRAN
UNDER THE SALJUQS AND MONGOLS

PRE-SALJUQ SCIENCES

In commencing a description of the mathematical sciences as practised and developed in Iran during the three and a half centuries beginning with, say, 430/1038, it is useful to review accomplishments in the field up to that time. Having assessed the accumulated scientific capital available, as it were, to the mathematicians and astronomers of the period, consideration can then be given to the manner in which they maintained, enhanced, or neglected the fund of knowledge they inherited.

One essential tool for any serious work, a place-value number system, had been at hand for three millennia. The calculus of sexagesimals, which had been developed in Mesopotamia, came to the Islamic world via the Greeks. It continued to be fully exploited for numerical operations throughout medieval times. The decimal system (but without fractions) was introduced into the Middle East from India during the 'Abbasid period. It did not become a serious competitor to sexagesimals until much later, nor was there any reason why it should.

Following the Pythagorean discovery of irrational ratios, the Greeks constructed a rigorous theory of the continuum, the process entailing a clear formulation of the notion of a limit. This body of doctrine likewise was taken over by the Muslims and subjected to repeated critical examination by numerous scholars. The same goes for geometric algebra, including a systematic treatment of the quadratic equation and a few cubics, euclidean plane and solid geometry, Apollonius’ work on conic sections, “analemma” methods (i.e. descriptive geometry), various categories of analogue computers, e.g. the astrolabe based on stereographic mapping, planetary equatoria, and so on.

As for trigonometry, in order to obtain numerical solutions to problems on the celestial sphere, Hellenistic astronomers had worked out a cumbersome discipline involving a single tabulated function,
that of chord lengths in terms of the corresponding arcs. The basic configuration was not the triangle, but the complete quadrilateral, relations between the sides being given by Menelaos’ theorem. The spherical angle as such played no role. Some time later, we do not know just when, the Indians substituted for the chord, tables of half-chords, thus introducing the sine function, the fundamental periodic function in science and technology. Long before, as a by-product of time-reckoning from the height of the sun, shadow tables had appeared in various places. They were the immediate ancestors of the tangent and cotangent functions.

These disparate elements were assimilated by the astronomers of the ‘Abbāsid empire and developed into a proper trigonometry. The now standard periodic functions of the discipline were defined, and the relationships between them explored. Extensive and precise tables of all were computed by the use of facile and powerful numerical techniques which were then new to mathematics and which were characteristic of Islamic work throughout. Shortly before the advent of the Saljuq dynasty several investigators stated and proved the plane and spherical cases of the sine theorem for oblique triangles. This made possible the abandoning of the Menelaos configuration in favour of relations involving the triangle alone, including functions of its angles as well as its sides.¹

The above leads naturally to a consideration of astronomy, the only branch of natural science susceptible of both extensive and exact development in ancient and medieval times. For many centuries the most challenging astronomical problem was that of predicting, for any given time, the positions of the planets, celestial objects which in the course of years trace out curiously looped paths in the night sky against the backdrop of the fixed stars. Two solutions to the problem of planetary motion were developed almost simultaneously in the last centuries B.C. One, the Babylonian, based upon sequences of numbers making up periodic relations now known as linear zigzag or step functions, had disappeared completely long before the rise of Islam. The other, of Hellenistic provenience, regarded the planetary paths as resulting from combinations of circular motions. Numerical results were then inferred by trigonometric calculations based on the geometric models. In the second century A.D. this type of approach culminated in

Ptolemy’s *Almagest*, easily the finest and most original astronomical work of antiquity. Meanwhile, some knowledge of pre-Ptolemaic Greek (and Babylonian) planetary theory had reached the Indian subcontinent. There the basic geometric model was subjected to modifications of considerable originality by individuals whose work gives the impression that they felt far more at home manipulating numerical rather than geometric concepts.¹ Sassanian Iran, thus enveloped on two sides and influenced by techniques emanating both from the eastern Mediterranean and from India, produced astronomical work of its own, of what degree of originality it is as yet difficult to say.²

In any event, three distinct and competing sets of astronomical doctrine were cultivated in the flourishing scientific centres of the ‘Abbāsid hegemony. There were active partisans respectively of the (Sassanian) Zīj-i Shāh, the Sindhind (from Sanskrit *siddhānta*) and the Almagest. But in the course of time the clear superiority of Ptolemaic theory over the other two was amply demonstrated, and by the beginning of our period they had effectively disappeared from the field.

The quickening of interest in astronomical theory from the ninth century A.D. on, was more than matched by activity in observational astronomy carried on predominantly at Baghdad, but also at Būyid, Ghaznavid, Sämānīd, and many other dynastic capitals³ stretching from Spain to Central Asia. An incomplete count yields a hundred and four dated observations between 800 and 1050 attested in the manuscript literature. These are mostly of equinoxes and solstices, but they include also planetary conjunctions, positions of individual planets, eclipses, and fixed star observations. For continuity this cannot touch the three-hundred year span of the single Babylonian archive now being studied.⁴ But it demonstrates that the active cultivation of astronomy was far more widespread and intensive in the ninth and tenth centuries than at any previous time in history.

The fruits of observation and theory combined were sets of numerical tables (*zījes*) appearing in great profusion during the same period. Their contents run the gamut of requirements for the practising astronomer-astrologer from purely mathematical tables of trigonometric functions

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and tables for calculating planetary positions through co-ordinate tables of fixed stars and famous cities.1

Thus, the scientists of Saljuq Iran found their subject in a vigorous and flourishing state. What they did with it is the next consideration.

**THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS**

Throughout the Middle Ages a succession of Muslim scholars worked along two lines, one of which led them to generalize the concept of a number. The second can be thought of as an examination of the nature of euclidean geometry which, in modern times, culminated in the appearance of the various non-euclidean geometries. Of the latter, only the first faint foreshadowing occurred in Saljuq and Mongol Iran. Both are sketched herewith.

Nowadays the domain of the real numbers is regarded as including various other categories of numbers: the integers, or whole numbers; the rationals, or common fractions—ratios between pairs of integers, expressible as terminating or repeating decimals; and the irrationals, expressible as non-terminating, non-repeating decimals. For the Greeks, however, the term "number" meant only a member of the infinite set 2, 3, 4, ..., i.e. a positive integer greater than unity. Frequently this definition sufficed, as in the comparison of geometric entities, say the lengths of a pair of "commensurable" lines. Commensurable magnitudes are those for which a common unit can be found. For a finite set of such magnitudes the use of fractions can be avoided by choice of a unit sufficiently small.

However, it had been discovered as early as the fifth century B.C. that for some pairs of easily constructed magnitudes, the diagonal and side of a square (√2:1), for instance, no such common unit can be found. In order to deal with the "irrational" ratios between such magnitudes Eudoxus worked out a definition of proportion (found in Book v of Euclid's *Elements*) which is equivalent to the celebrated definition of real numbers given in the nineteenth century by R. Dedekind. This involves dividing the set of all rational numbers by a "cut". Each cut constitutes a real number, and the set of all such cuts makes up the system of real numbers.2

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Eudoxus' version of the doctrine was completely rigorous, but it excluded common fractions and incommensurable ratios from the domain of numbers, and it presented no ready means for the carrying out of operations, say multiplication, between pairs of irrationals.

The early Muslim geometers resurrected and used a second definition of proportion which seems to have been known to the Greeks, but which appears explicitly nowhere in the Greek literature. In effect, it makes use of the procedure for expressing a ratio as a continued fraction. Examples are

\[ \frac{43}{19} = 2 + \cfrac{1}{3 + \cfrac{1}{1 + \cfrac{1}{4}}} \quad \text{and} \quad \sqrt{2} : 1 = 1 + \cfrac{1}{2 + \cfrac{1}{2 + \cfrac{1}{2 + \ldots}}} \]

If the fraction terminates the ratio is rational; otherwise it is irrational.\(^1\) The continued fraction approach has the advantage that, in the case of an irrational, cutting off the development at any stage yields a finite continued fraction which is a rational approximation to the ratio sought. In the computation of trigonometric tables the Islamic mathematicians were continually confronted with irrational ratios for which they used rational approximations, and already in pre-Saljuq times a tendency was evidenced to think of these ratios as numbers.\(^2\)

The matter was carried much farther by 'Umar Khayyam (fl. 1100) in his treatise on the difficulties of Euclid's Elements.\(^3\) Like his predecessors, he defined two irrational ratios as equal if and only if their continued fraction developments are equal. Still employing continued fractions he went on to give conditions for determining which of two unequal ratios, rational or irrational, is the greater. By showing the equivalence of his and the Eudoxian definition he was enabled to take over all the properties of proportions in the Elements. In this connexion he hypothesizes a magnitude whose ratio to a unit is to be regarded as completely abstract "connected to numbers, (but) not an absolute, genuine number" (\textit{tā'allaqabīl-'adad, lā 'adadan mutlaqan haqiyyatī}.

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2. E.g. in al-Birūnī's \textit{Al-Qanun al-Mas'ūdi} (Hyderabad-Dn. 1954), vol. 1, p. 303 l. 7. See also A. P. Juschkewitsch and B. A. Rosenfeld, \textit{Die Mathematik der Länder des Ostens im Mittelalter} (Berlin, 1960), p. 132.
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in the same passage he says “regarding it (ta’tabar fīhi) as a number, as we have mentioned”. Thus the irrational has very nearly, but not quite, been admitted to the status of a number.

Later Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (fl. 1250) in his trigonometrical work on the complete quadrilateral\(^1\) demonstrated the commutative property of multiplication between pairs of ratios (i.e. real numbers). He also asserts that every ratio can be regarded as a number.

The topic involving the foundations of geometry has the same two protagonists just mentioned and can be dealt with more briefly. It concerns the fifth postulate of Euclid, which states that if a transversal cuts two other lines in such manner that the sum of the interior angles on the same side of the transversal is less than a straight angle, the two lines will meet on that side if produced. It had been thought since classical times that this postulate was in fact provable in terms of the assumptions of the Euclidean system, and many geometers essayed such a proof. In the same tract referred to above\(^2\) Khayyām criticizes an attempt by Ibn al-Haitham (fl. 1000) and has a go at the problem himself. He considers a quadrilateral \(ABCD\), say, with equal sides \(AB\) and \(DC\), both perpendicular to \(BC\). This is the “birectangular quadrilateral” to which much later the name of Saccheri\(^3\) was attached. Khayyām easily shows, without using the fifth postulate, that angles \(A\) and \(D\) must be equal. Hence they both must be either (1) acute, or (2) obtuse, or (3) right angles. He then launches into the proof of a series of theorems designed to demonstrate the absurdity of hypotheses (1) and (2). If they can be demolished then (3) is valid, and (3) is equivalent to the fifth postulate. Naṣīr al-Dīn follows a somewhat different course, striving toward the same end.\(^4\) Their attempts were foredoomed to failure, for the fifth postulate is in fact independent of the others. If it is denied, and a different assertion substituted for it, a variety of geometries result which are different from that of Euclid, but no more and no less valid than it. It may turn out, for instance, that from a point outside a given line, two distinct parallels may be drawn to it. If either hypothesis (1) or (3) is substituted for the fifth postulate, one of the two now classical non-Euclidean geometries results. This lay far in the future.

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1 *Traité du quadrilatère, attrib. a Najsirud-din el-Toussy* (Istanbul, 1891), ed. and transl. by A. Caratheodory.
2 Rozenfel’d and Yushkevich, *op. cit.* transl. p. 120, text p. 42.
4 Juschkewitsch and Rosenfeld, *op. cit.* p. 130.
and unsuspected by Khayyám and Naṣir al-Din. Meanwhile they demonstrated properties characteristic of these unborn disciplines. For instance, both realized that acceptance of hypothesis (1) implies that the angle sum of any triangle is less than two right angles. This is a property enjoyed by triangles in the geometry of Lobachevskii.

**ALGEBRA—KHAYYÁM AND THE CUBIC EQUATION**

The expression

\[ x^3 + 200x = 20x^2 + 2000 \]

is an example of a cubic equation. To find a solution for it, a root, is somehow to obtain a particular number such that when \( x \) is replaced by it the resulting number on the left (the root cubed plus two hundred times the root) equals the resulting number on the right. This equation appears in a recently discovered treatise⁴ written by Khayyám. He shows that it is equivalent to the following geometric problem: Find a right triangle having the property that the hypotenuse equals the sum of one leg plus the altitude on the hypotenuse. He demonstrates in turn the equivalence of this with a second question in geometry; he finds a geometric solution of the equation at the intersection between a circle and a hyperbola, and a numerical solution by interpolation in trigonometric tables. This particular equation stimulates Khayyám to review the work done by others with similar problems, to make a classification of types of such equations, and to undertake the systematic solution of all.

His treatise is useful as giving an indication of the methods, motivation, content, and background of the algebra of his time, as well as its interrelations with other branches of mathematics.

In the example cited, the highest power of the unknown quantity is three. Had this highest power been a two the equation would have been a quadratic, if four a quartic, five a quintic, and so on. General procedures for the solution of quadratics had appeared early in the second millennium B.C. Isolated examples of cubics also had turned up centuries before Khayyám’s time. Thus Archimedes, in seeking so to place a plane that it splits the volume of a sphere in a given ratio, formulated the problem in terms of a cubic equation. He, like Khayyám after him, solved it by means of intersecting conic sections.

A conic section is any one of the curves (circle, ellipse, hyperbola, or parabola) formed when a circular cone is cut by a plane. The theory of

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conics as developed in classical times included manifold metric properties. For instance, if a point moves so that its distances, \( x \) and \( y \), from a fixed pair of perpendicular lines always satisfies the relation \( xy = 4 \), it will trace out an hyperbola. If the relation is \( y = x^2 \) the point will move along a parabola. At any intersection of the two curves both relations will be satisfied simultaneously. Hence at such a point the \( x \)-distance will satisfy the relation \( xy = x(x^2) = x^3 = 4 \), a cubic equation. And the distance from the point to the line is a root of the equation.

In his major work in algebra Khayyâm exploits this variety of technique to work out solutions for all possible types of cubic equations. In his classification, not only the equation

\[
x^3 = 20x^2 + 2000,
\]

but also

\[
x^3 + 20x^2 = 200x + 2000
\]
demands an approach different from the example given at the beginning of the section. This is because not only the number of terms but also the inadmissibility of negative terms affects the category of a given equation.

Khayyâm’s solutions appear as line segments, not numbers; he is usually satisfied with a single root per equation; no negative roots are admitted. All his expressions are written out in words—the symbolism we associate with algebra still lay centuries in the future. Nevertheless Khayyâm left the subject of polynomial equations in a state much farther along than that in which he found it.¹

TRIGONOMETRY AND COMPUTATIONAL MATHEMATICS

Saljuq and Mongol times are to be regarded as a period of consolidation in trigonometry rather than one of innovation. This was natural, since they followed hard after the significant forward steps taken by Abu’l-Wafā’ al-Buzjānī, Abū Naṣr Mašūr, and others.² The work of these people is assembled and integrated into much earlier material in the book of Naṣīr al-Dīn referred to above,³ the Kitāb shīkl al-qītā, com-

¹ There are several translations of Khayyâm’s algebra into European languages, the first being F. Woepke’s L’Algebre d’Omar Alkhayyami (Paris, 1851) which includes the Arabic text. An English version is by D. S. Kasir, The Algebra of Omar Khayyam (New York, 1931). The most recent is in the Traktati cited above, which also contains the Arabic text. See also Juschkewitsch and Rosenfeld, op. cit. pp. 113–24, and Rozenfel’d and Yushkevich, op. cit. pp. 250–9.
² Cf. Luckey, op. cit.
³ Caratheodory, op. cit.
TRIGONOMETRY

pleted in 1260. As its name indicates, it has mainly to do with the complete quadrilateral, the basic configuration of Menelaos' spherics. However, the last of the five treatises is written with the avowed purpose of eliminating the quadrilateral from the subject in favour of the simpler triangle. The author lists the six combinations of known sides or angles of a spherical triangle under which the triangle is determine. He then systematically indicates the solution of each case without recourse to the Menelaos Theorem. In this sense the book is the first treatment of trigonometry (the measurement of the triangle) as such.

It is a landmark also in a second sense. The subject evolved in response to a need on the part of astronomers to transform and apply in various ways the information yielded by observations of celestial bodies. Until the work of Naṣīr al-Din, trigonometric techniques were closely associated with problems in spherical astronomy. This did not cease in his time or later, but his book makes no reference to astronomy, and marks the emergence of trigonometry as a branch of pure mathematics.¹

Numerical analysis also received its impetus from astronomy because of the need for tables of the trigonometric and other functions encountered in solving problems on the celestial sphere. The apogee of Islamic work in computational mathematics did not occur until the Timūrid period, but steady progress in the field was maintained during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. As an illustration we cite the table of the tangent function which appears in the Zij-i Ilkhāni turned out at Naṣīr al-Din’s Marāgheh observatory. Up to forty-five degrees it proceeds at intervals of one minute of arc. Hence there are

\[ 45 \times 60 = 270 \] entries,

each to three sexagesimal places, which implies precision to the order of one in ten million, say. The function increases ever more rapidly as it approaches ninety degrees, so the interval between values of the argument is increased to ten minutes, up to eighty-nine degrees, and fifty minutes. The last entry in the table has five sexagesimal places. The design and carrying through of a project such as this involves much more than hiring a sufficient number of adept calculators.

The earth and its sister planets of the solar system rotate in nearly circular orbits about the sun, all lying pretty much in a single plane, the ecliptic. Think of each orbit as the rim of a spinning wheel, the poet’s *charkh-i gardun*, of which the line between sun and planet is a spoke. If, which is natural, we regard the earth as fixed, then the turning of the earth–sun spoke constrains the sun itself to move in an orbit about the earth, whilst it remains the hub of the independently rotating sun–planet spoke. Now the planet, riding upon the rim of its own wheel, alternately approaches the earth and recedes from it as the wheel spins. At the same time it alternately moves forward, ahead of the earth–sun spoke, thence receding behind it, and so on.

This figure of wheels upon wheels provides a valid if simplified explanation for the looped paths of the planets as seen from the earth. Moreover, if the larger orbit is called the *deferent* (*al-hāmil*), the smaller, rotating upon its periphery, the *epicycle* (*al-tadwr*), and if for the wheel–spoke the modern technical term *vector* is substituted, the configuration becomes the standard one of ancient and medieval planetary theory. For the superior planets, those whose orbits are larger than the earth’s, the deferent cannot be thought of as the orbit of the sun; nevertheless, for these planets also a deferent-epicycle combination is valid.

This general approach antedates Ptolemy, as does the realization that to obtain a closer correspondence to observation it is necessary for each planet that the earth’s position be slightly displaced from the deferent centre. Also pre-Ptolemaic is the notion, strongly held until the sixteenth century, that any celestial motion must be uniform and circular, or a combination of such motions. Stated in modern form, this requires that the motion of any celestial body be expressible as that of the end-point of a linkage of constant length vectors, each vector rotating at constant angular velocity, and the initial point of the first vector being at the earth.

Ptolemy’s observations led him to the realization that the centre of equal motion for the epicycle centre is neither the earth nor the deferent centre, but a point distinct from both, the *equant* (*mu’addal al-masir*). The presence of the equant in the Ptolemaic model makes possible a high degree of precision in predicting planetary positions, but it violates the principle of uniform circularity as stated above.

This alleged flaw in the planetary theory was the object of criticism.
by many astronomers, but until Il-Khānid times no one seems to have produced a model capable of competing with Ptolemy's in terms of accuracy, and which would at the same time involve only uniform circular motions. Such a development was, however, inaugurated by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and carried through by associates of his at the Marāḡeh observatory. He seems to have been the first to notice that if one circle rolls around inside the circumference of another, the second circle having twice the radius of the first, then any point on the periphery of the first circle describes a diameter of the second. This rolling device can also be regarded as a linkage of two equal and constant length vectors rotating at constant speed (one twice as fast as the other), and hence has been called a Ṭūsī-couple. Naṣīr al-Dīn, by properly placing such a couple on the end of a vector emanating from the Ptolemaic equant centre, caused the vector periodically to expand and contract. The period of its expansion being equal to that of the epicycle's rotation about the earth, the end-point of the couple carries the epicycle centre with it and traces out a deferent which fulfils all the conditions imposed upon it by Ptolemy's observations. At the same time, the whole assemblage is a combination of uniform circular motions, hence unobjectionable, and it preserves the equant property, also demanded by the phenomenon itself.

Other astronomers of the Marāḡeh group continued work along these lines, although their results have not as yet been fully recovered. In all cases their efforts, usually successful, seem to have been to construct combinations of uniform circular motions satisfying Ptolemaic boundary conditions and preserving the equant.

Among the five planets visible to the naked eye, Mercury is by far the most irregular. Hence the construction of a satisfactory model for predicting its positions offers more difficulty than does that for any other planet. After repeated efforts, made long after he had left Marāḡeh, Qūṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī, a younger associate of Naṣīr al-Dīn, produced the equivalent of the configuration illustrated in fig. 4. It satisfies all the conditions demanded by Ptolemy for the orbit of Mercury, and as such probably marks the apex of the techniques developed by the Marāḡeh school. Without going into details we note that, exclusive of the epicycle radius (not shown in the figure), it involves some six rotating vectors, of which two pairs \((r_2r_3\) and \(r_4r_5\)) are Ṭūsī-couples with different periods.

In sketching these developments, it has been necessary to omit many
aspects of the general problem of planetary motion which were considered by the scientists named. For instance, the planes of all the planetary orbits diverge slightly from the ecliptic, thus giving rise to motions in latitude for which machinery must be provided. Some appreciation of the inevitable complexity of a complete model may be gained by contemplating pl. 16, reproduced from a copy of one of Qurṭb al-Dîn's books.

Developments along the lines indicated did not cease with the disappearance of the Marâgheh group. The work of the Damascene astronomer known as Ibn al-Shâtir (fl. 1350) falls outside our domain geographically, though not in time. It is relevant to say, however, that he succeeded where Qurṭb al-Dîn failed, producing a lunar model free of the very serious defects in the Ptolemaic one, and in fact identical with the lunar model of Copernicus (fl. 1520). Indeed, it has been shown that most of the Copernican planetary models are duplicates of those exhibited either by the Marâgheh scientists or by Ibn al-Shâtir. All that is left to Copernicus is the philosophically important reintroduction of a heliostatic universe.¹

OBSERVATIONAL ASTRONOMY

It is safe to say that in Saljuq Iran many astronomers were engaged in making observations, but it is impossible to give a precise description of this activity because the available sources yield incomplete and conflicting information. That Sultan Malik-Shâh had a new solar calendar inaugurated is indubitable, its epoch coinciding with the day of the vernal equinox of A.D. 1079, each Nau-Rûz day thereafter to fall on the succeeding vernal equinox. However, one report states that a group of astronomers including Khayyâm was commissioned to work out the calendar, and that to do so large sums were spent on an observatory which was in operation about twenty years. A second source claims that the king proposed a programme of observations, at which the astronomers demurred and suggested the calendar as a counter-proposal, the implication being that no observatory was involved. The Naurûz-

¹ The subject of planetary motion cannot be discussed adequately without the introduction of technical material. The reader will find an exposition of the Ptolemaic system in O. Neugebauer's The Exact Sciences in Antiquity (2nd ed., Providence, R.I., 1957; there is a paperback edition by Harpers), appendix I. Descriptions of the Marâgheh and Ibn al-Shâtir models are given in the following papers in Isis: vol. xlvi (1957), pp. 428-32; vol. l (1959), pp. 227-33; vol. lv (1962), pp. 492-9; vol. lvii (1966), pp. 208-19, 365-78.
Fig. 4. Quṭb al-Dīn’s model for Mercury.
Nāma, spurious attributed to Khayyām himself, says that Malik-Shāh brought learned people from Khurasan, and had instruments constructed, such as the mural (quadrant?) and the armillary astrolabe, but the author gives no indication that he himself took part. The place of the observatory is moot, conjectures locating it at various cities ranging from Marv to Baghdad. A certain Abū Ja'far Muḥammad, in describing his own operations to determine the solar parameters carried out at Āmul states that Malik-Shāh ordered observations in Iṣfahān in 1083. Al-Khāzini, in the introduction to his al-Zīj al-Sanjārī (completed in 1115 and named after the son and successor of Malik-Shāh), has a description of several astronomical instruments and observational technique. He mentions no observations under Malik-Shāh, however. It is reported that in 1130 observations were under way at the Saljuq palace in Baghdad by Abu'l-Qāsim al-Aṣṭurlābī, but they were never completed.

In contrast to the above, information on the same subject for the Mongol period is ample and accurate. The installation at Marāgheh set up by Naṣīr al-Dīn under the patronage of Hūlegū can be called the first astronomical observatory in the full sense of the term. Founded in 1259 and endowed with ample funds, it continued in operation for some years after the death of its first director. The professional staff included about twenty well-known scientists drawn from many parts of the Islamic world, and at least one Chinese mathematician. They were housed in imposing buildings and had the use of a very large library. The instruments were constructed under the direction of a Damascene, Mu'ayyid al-Dīn al-'Urdī. They included a mural quadrant, an armillary astrolabe, solstitial and equinoctial armillaries, and a device having two quadrants for simultaneous measurement of the horizon co-ordinates of two stars.

Upon juxtaposing the descriptions by al-'Urdī and Tycho Brahe of the instruments constructed by each, one is inevitably struck by the strong similarities between the work of the two men. In terms of the results obtained, however, the contrast is very marked. Brahe's un-

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2 The main reference for this section is Aydin Sayili, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 661 above.
5 Tycho Brahe’s *Description of His Instruments* (Copenhagen, 1940), ed. and transl. by H. Raeder, E. Stromgren and B. Stromgren.
OBSERVATIONAL ASTRONOMY

precedently precise observations enabled Kepler to make fundamental advances in theory, whereas we have seen above that observation played no role in the Marāḡeh work in planetary theory. Furthermore, it can be shown (as charged by al-Wābkanwī)¹ that the planetary mean motion parameters in Naṣīr al-Dīn's *Zīj-i ʿIlkhānī* have been taken over from the earlier work of Ibn al-Aʿlam, hence they were not based on work at Marāḡeh. And these determinations require no elaborate instruments at all.

After the death of Hūlegū, later rulers of the same dynasty also sponsored astronomical work. Ghāzān is said to have built a minor observatory at Tabrīz.² It was probably from this centre that a Byzantine text³ relays a lunar eclipse report from Tabrīz in 1295, and a solar eclipse the next year. Working successively under ʿOljeitū and Abū Saʿīd, al-Wābkanwī reports planetary conjunctions observed in 1286, 1305, and 1306.

MATHEMATICAL GEOGRAPHY

In order to predict the positions of celestial objects as observed from his own station, the astronomer must know the position of his locality with respect to the base co-ordinates and epoch of the tables he is using. In response to this need, most medieval zijes give lists of cities, together with their latitudes and longitudes. A partial collection involving thirty such tables runs to about 2,500 localities in Asia, Africa, and Europe.⁴ Only one of these tables dates from the Saljuq period, but about a third of the total seem to have been put together in ʿIl-Khānīd Iran. Localities appearing most frequently in all the sources are concentrated in Iran and Central Asia. On the basis of this it can be inferred that this time was the peak of activity in this particular field, perhaps as a result of the excellent communications maintained by the Mongol bureaucracy. On the other hand, a count was made of localities listed in five or more tables including the *Zīj-i ʿIlkhānī* but not before. This yielded only twenty-nine place-names, of which only Qara-Qorum, Besh-Baliq, and Farghāna are easily identifiable Central Asiatic centres.

¹ See Aya Sofya MS. 2694, f. 3r.
² See above, p. 389.
Archimedes had discovered that whenever a heavy object is immersed in a liquid its apparent weight is decreased by the weight of whatever amount of the liquid it displaces. This fact was used by him in his celebrated investigation of the purity of Hieron’s gold crown.

The same principle is easily applicable to the calculation of the specific gravity of substances heavier than water, the ratio between the weight of any quantity of the substance and the weight of an equal volume of water. A succession of Muslim physicists, from the time of the caliph al-Ma’mūn on, developed varieties of balances for such determinations. The work was continued in Saljuq times by Khayyām, a certain Abū Hātim al-Muẓaffar al-Isfahānī, and ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Khāzīnī, the author of al-Zīj al-Sanjārī. Al-Khāzīnī has left an account of these researches in a work called Kitāb mīzān al-ḥikma.¹

The title of the book is the name of the main instrument it describes, a balance equipped with five pans, two of which were suspended from the same point on one side of the balance arm, the lower pan being immersed in water. Moreover, the other side of the balance arm bore a set of marks, one for each of the varieties of substance to be tested. Two of the remaining pans could be slid along this balance arm so as to be suspended at will from any one of the marks. The fifth pan was suspended at a fixed point on the arm, its distance from the knife-edge fulcrum being equal to that of the double pan on the other side.

Suppose now that a piece of metal were presented, alleged to be of, say, pure gold. One of the movable pans is suspended, empty, at the mark for gold; the sample is placed in the upper (air) pan of the double pan arrangement, and the sample is weighed in the usual manner. The sample is then transferred to the submerged pan, i.e. it is now weighed under water, and the weight which counter-balanced it in the fifth pan is transferred to the pan suspended at the mark for gold. If the instrument still balances, the sample indeed has the specific gravity of gold.

¹ The text was published by the Oriental Publications Bureau, Osmania University, Hyderabad-Dn., 1359 A.H. Large portions of the text had previously been published, translated, and commented upon by N. Khanikoff, as “Book of the Balance of Wisdom”, J.A.O.S. (1860), pp. 1-128. The subject has been extensively studied by Eilhard Wiedemann and his associates. See, e.g. Sitzungsberichte der physikalisch-medicinischen Gesellschaft zu Erlangen, vol. xi. (1908), pp. 153-59, which lists other papers. A short treatise on the balance by Khayyām is published in the Traktat, op. cit. note 10.
SPECIFIC GRAVITY DETERMINATIONS

If a mixture of two substances is presented, say an alloy of gold and silver, its composition is determined as follows. Set one of the two movable pans at the gold mark and the other at the silver mark. Now place the sample in the air balance and weigh it in the usual manner. Then transfer the sample to the water pan, and remove from the fifth pan the weight which counterbalanced the sample in air. Place part of this weight in the pan at the gold mark and the rest in the silver mark pan, in such manner that the instrument balances. The division of this weight is the proportion of gold to silver in the sample.

Implicit in the above is a reasonably precise knowledge of the specific gravity of any material to be assayed, and tables of such specific gravities are given in the texts, most of the constants stemming from al-Biruni. Also implicit is the realization that densities are affected by temperatures. The whole is an elegant application of theory to practise, typical of the Muslim medieval penchant for scientific instruments of many varieties.

RAINBOW THEORY

In antiquity a few individuals, notably Aristotle and Seneca, had attempted explanations of rainbow formation, but with little success. However, considerable progress was made in the study of more general optical problems, notably the phenomena of reflexion and refraction.

In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries this knowledge was applied independently in Western Europe and in Iran by investigators who made strikingly similar advances in rainbow theory. This involved a realization that (1) the effect is produced by the behaviour of rays of sunlight falling upon spherical droplets of water, and (2) that this behaviour is a combination of refractions and reflexions after the ray has entered the drop.

Kamāl al-Dīn al-Fārīsī (d. c. 1320) studied at Marāgheh under Qūtb al-Dīn Shīrāzī, the latter previously mentioned in connexion with planetary theory. Qūtb al-Dīn himself does not seem to have written extensively on optics, but his leading ideas were seized upon by Kamāl al-Dīn and developed in detail in a very extensive reworking of the optics (Kitāb al-manāẓir) of Ibn al-Haitham (fl. 1000). In so doing, Kamāl al-Dīn simulated experimentally the behaviour of sunlight falling upon raindrops by the use of a spherical glass container filled with water. This he suspended in a dark room, and he then proceeded to study the directions taken by an isolated ray of sunlight admitted through
a hole in such manner as to impinge upon the sphere. Thus he showed
that the primary rainbow is the result of two refractions and one
reflexion within the drop, while the secondary bow arises from two
refractions and two reflexions.

The same conclusions were reached at almost the same time by
Theodoric of Freiberg, whose work also was based on that of Ibn al-
Haitham. Because of a lack of a measure of refraction equivalent to
Snell’s law, the results obtained both in Europe and in the Orient were
qualitative rather than quantitative. Both Kamāl al-Dīn and Theodoric
sought to explain the colours of the rainbow, both unsatisfactorily.¹

THE STATE OF THE SUBJECT—THE SOURCES

Any broad survey such as this is ultimately dependent upon scientific
writings produced during the period under review. Many such works,
known to have been written, are no longer extant. Their absence would
be felt more, however, if those sources which have survived had been
completely exploited. On the contrary, most of the available Arabic
and Persian scientific manuscripts have not been read in modern times,
much less studied, and those texts which have been published are to a
great extent the results of chance encounters. The current general
picture may be altered significantly with the study of any additional
text. For instance, the existence of the non-Ptolemaic planetary models
discussed above was uncovered in the course of a few hours casual
browsing in the Bodleian in order to kill time after a particular group of
other manuscripts had been examined.

A number of topics are known to have been cultivated during the
eleventh and twelfth centuries, but it is not presently possible to say
whether they originated at this time or whether they had been passed on
from earlier times or other regions. An example is furnished by the
Dastūr al-munajjinīn,² an astronomical and chronological anthology put
together by some member of the Ismā‘īlī sect, and perhaps part of the

¹ See Carl B. Boyer’s The Rainbow from Myth to Mathematics (New York and London, 1959),
chap. v. This in turn is based upon the work of Eilhard Wiedemann, e.g. “Über die
Brechung des Lichtes in Kugeln . . .”, Sitzungsberichte der physikalisch-medizinische Sozietät zu
work has been published as Kitāb tanqih al-Manāẓir . . ., 2 vols. (Hyderabad-Dn., 1547–8
A.H.). In the preparation of this and other sections the counsel of Professor Seyyed
Hossein Nasr is gratefully acknowledged.
² Paris B.N. MS. Ar. 5968, ff. 75–8.
library found by Hülegü at the taking of Alamüit. This describes several interpolation schemes employing second-order difference sequences to fill in values for an arbitrary function between given tabular values. Another such method\(^1\) is described in the *Zij-i Asbrafi*, written in Shirāz early in the fourteenth century.

An anonymous manuscript, probably written after the time of Khayyām, gives a solution for a particular quartic equation,\(^2\) and the presumption is that additional work was done in this field.

An anonymous and undated manuscript probably composed in Iran or Central Asia during the latter part of the eleventh century employs a certain period relation between days and anomalistic months to give auxiliary tables for determining solar and lunar true positions. The period relation used is also found in Seleucid cuneiform tablets, Greek papyri, and Indian texts dating from the fourth century A.D. Hence its appearance in an Arabic text gives one of the few instances where the ancient “arithmetic methods” (as contrasted with the employment of functions of continuous variables) were taken over by Muslim scientists. At the same time, the unknown author combined with his application of the period relation a highly intelligent exploitation of the Ptolemaic lunar model and the facile computational technique characteristic of his time.\(^3\)

Because the Muslim calendar is a strictly lunar one, the methods for predicting the evening of first new moon visibility were of interest to Islamic astronomers. Some twenty-two different solutions to this problem have thus far been encountered in the literature, ranging from simple applications of a linear zigzag function to others (like that of al-Khāzinī in the *al-Zij al-Sanjari*) employing a high degree of mathematical sophistication. Many of these are of unknown provenience, but many stem from Saljuq and Mongol times.


If a frequency plot is made against time of the output of medieval astronomical tables arranged by geographical place of origin it will be seen that, beginning already with the tenth century, the path of the centroid commences veering east from the region of Baghdad. By A.D. 1100 the distribution is clustered on the Iranian plateau, where it remains for the next four centuries. The tables plotted represent only one genre of scientific writing. Nevertheless, in them are embodied the results of observation and theory, of astronomy and mathematics. The plot conveys about as true an impression of scientific activity during our period as can presently be expected.

From its position of strength Iran exported science to the regions adjoining it. A certain Orthodox bishop, resident in Tabriz in 1295 translated al-Zij al-Sanjari and al-Zij al-‘Ala‘i into Greek upon his return to Constantinople. His work was basic in the revival of astronomy then taking place in the Byzantine Empire. It is known that Chinese astronomers assisted Naṣir al-Dīn at the Marāgheh observatory, and that their presence facilitated intensive study of the Chinese and Uighur calendars on the part of Islamic scholars. But it is also known from Chinese records, that, at the request of the Great Khan Qubilai, a Muslim astronomer, a certain Jamāl al-Dīn, was sent to Pekin with drawings or models of instruments of the Marāgheh type to be used at the imperial observatory there. The Zīj-i Ilkhānī of Naṣir al-Dīn was translated from its original Persian into Arabic for use in the Arab world. The process going on in Byzantium, China, and the Arab regions was also taking place in India. In the fourteenth century the Tughluq sultan of Delhi maintained a translation service. Among the works he had put into Sanskrit was a Muslim treatise on the astrolabe, and doubtless other scientific books were translated. In Western Europe, particularly Spain, the twelfth century was the time of translations from Arabic into Latin, although many of the translations (such as the zīj of al-Khuwārizmī) were based on theories by then long obsolete in the Middle East. Even in the

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1 See, e.g. Kennedy, “Survey”, p. 168.
following century, only one European, Leonardo of Pisa, is known to have done original work in mathematics, and he travelled and studied in the Orient.

In contrast, we have noted significant advances in the foundations of mathematics, algebra, optics, and planetary theory. That these achievements were of a lesser order than those of Archimedes, and that their consequences were incomparably less significant than the scientific breakthrough which followed the work of Newton and Leibniz is perhaps irrelevant. The scientists of Saljuq and Mongol Iran were the best of their age.
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Volume Editor's Note

The bibliographies printed below are selective and incomplete. Their purpose is not to list all publications that bear directly or indirectly on the subject, but to enable readers to carry further the study of selected topics. A later volume in this series (vol. 8) will present at much greater length a systematic bibliography. As a rule, books and articles superseded by later publications have not been included, and references to general treatises not directly relevant to the subject-matter of individual chapters have been reduced to a minimum.

Within the limits set by these principles, contributors were free to compile bibliographies as they thought best. The “layout” of the lists, therefore, varies from chapter to chapter. The editor did not even find it desirable to produce a uniform method of abbreviating references to learned periodicals. Form of presentation is, therefore, the decision of the individual author.
CHAPTER I

1. Primary sources


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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Work Title</th>
<th>Edition Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibn al-Qalânisi</td>
<td><em>Dhâl ta'rikh Dimashq</em></td>
<td>Ed. H. F. Amedroz. Leiden, 1908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Imâd al-Dîn</td>
<td><em>See under Bundârî.</em></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kâshghârî</td>
<td><em>Diwan Lughat al-Turk</em></td>
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<td>Nâşir-i Khusrâw</td>
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For original sources in Arabic and Persian see footnotes to the text.

CHAPTER 3

In the preparation of this chapter I have drawn amply from various sections of the valuable work by Dhabihu’llâh Şafa, Ta’rîkh-i Adabiyyat dar Irân, vol. ii. Tehrân, 1336/1957.

Important sources for the religious history of Saljuq Iran are:
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Further references are given in the body of this chapter. There is an important bibliography, though devoted chiefly to the period immediately preceding the Saljuqs, in: B. Spuler. Iran in früβ-islamischer Zeit. Wiesbaden, 1952. (See especially pp. 133–224 and the map of religions at the end of the volume.)

CHAPTER 4

ABBREVIATIONS

J. A. Journal Asiatique.

Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division. Persia. 1945.
Alizade, A. A. See Rashīd al-Dīn.
Arends, A. K. See Rashīd al-Dīn.
Atalay, B. See Kāshghārī.
— Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion. London, 1928.
Blake, R. P. See Grigor of Akner.
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Budge, E. A. W. See Barhebraeus.


Frye, R. N. See Grigor of Akner.


Haenisch, E. See Secret History of the Mongols.


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— See also Waley, A.
Smirnova, O. I. See Rashid al-Din.
Togan, A. Z. V. See Ibn Faḍlân.
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CHAPTER 5

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CHAPTER 6

ABBREVIATIONS

B.G.A. Bibliotheca geographorum Arabicorum.
G.M.S. Gibb Memorial Series.
E.I. Encyclopaedia of Islam.
H.S. Works issued by the Hakluyt Society.
S.S.I.A. Sbornik statei po istorii Azerbaidzhan, Baku.
L. Leningrad.
M. Moscow.
SPb St Petersburg.

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CHAPTER 7

A bibliography of the sources used here and of much other material may be found in the following three works:


On “Shī‘ite” Sufism, see especially:

On Shi‘ism, see also:

CHAPTER 8

ABBREVIATIONS

J.A. Journal Asiaticque.
N.D.A.T. Nashriyya-yi Dānishkada-yi Adabiyyāt-i Tabrīz (Journal of the Tabriz Faculty of Arts).
N.D.A.Te. Nashriyya-yi Dānishkada-yi Adabiyyāt-i Tibrān (Journal of the Tehran Faculty of Arts).
ZDMG Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.

Further details in J. Rypka, History of Iranian Literature.

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CHAPTER 9

General

Beside general, and usually unsatisfactory, works on Islamic art, the only truly usable introduction to the art of Iran is to be found in A. U. Pope, ed., A Survey of Persian Art, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1939), partly out of date. Familiarity
with the contents of three periodicals is also essential: *Ars Islamica*, 16 vols. (1934–51); *Ars Orientalis*, 6 vols. to date (1953–66); *Athâr-é Iran*, 4 vols. (1936–49). For recent literature it is possible to keep up to date through the *Abstracta Islamica* published every year by the *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*.

**Architecture**

Photographs and brief introductions can be found in A. U. Pope, *Persian Architecture* (New York, 1965) and D. Hill and O. Grabar, *Islamic Architecture and its Decoration*, 2nd ed. (London, 1967). Most important articles or special studies will be found quoted there or in the notes to the pertinent chapter in this volume. Special mention should be made of recent efforts in Iran to provide systematic surveys, city by city, of the major monuments of the country. An excellent example is that of Lutfallah Hunarfar, *Ganjina-yi athâr-i ta’fîkh-i Isfahân* (Isfahan, 1964).

**Painting**

The most convenient introduction to the subject is provided by B. Gray, *Persian Painting* (Geneva, 1961), with an excellent bibliography. Among more recent publications two merit special attention: E. J. Grube, *Muslim Miniature Paintings* (Venice, 1962) and B. W. Robinson, *Persian Miniature Painting* (London, 1967). Both are exhibition catalogues which do not claim completeness but which are provided with important commentaries on exhibited paintings.

**Decorative Arts**

There is at present no convenient introduction to the ceramics, metalwork, glass, or textiles of the centuries under consideration in this volume and one would have to begin with the specific studies quoted in our notes. Some important preliminary remarks may be found in Charles K. Wilkinson, *Iranian Ceramics* (New York, 1963) and D. Barrett, *Islamic Metalwork in the British Museum* (London, 1949).

**Chapter 10**


Haddad, Fuad I. and E. S. Kennedy. “Geographical tables of Medieval Islam.”

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VARÂMÎN, MOSQUE, ENTRANCE.
2 Varāmin, mosque: (a) ḣabā on the qibla side; (b) dome from inside.
3 Isfahan, mosque: (a) court and iwans; (b) south dome, zone of transition.
4 Isfahān, north dome, elevation.
5  Iṣfahān, north dome, from inside.
6 Jām, minaret.
7  (a) Sulṭāniyeh, upper part of mausoleum.
(b) Goblet with Şhāh-Name scenes.
(a) Bowl with the story of Faridun.
(b) Bowl signed by 'Ali b. Yusuf.
9  (a) Dish signed by Shams al-Dīn al Ḥasanī.
    (b) Dish.
10  

(a) Kettle, inlaid bronze.
(b) Cup, inlaid bronze.
Incense burner.
(a) A scene from the story of Jacob.
(b) The tree of the Buddha.
(a) Shāh-Nāma, 1341: Rustam lifts the stone over Bīghan’s pit.
(b) Shāh-Nāma, fourteenth century: Alexander and the talking tree.
14 Šah-Nāma, fourteenth century: the bier of Alexander.
15 Rustam slays Isfandiyar.
Illustration of a planetary model from a copy of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shirāzī’s *al-Tuhfat al-thabīya*.